CHAPTER 44 —NATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER II—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SUBCHAPTER III—ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SUBCHAPTER IV—PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
SUBCHAPTER V—PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES
SUBCHAPTER VI—ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
SUBCHAPTER VII—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SUBCHAPTER VIII—EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Part A—Science and Technology
Part B—Foreign Languages Program
Part C—Additional Education Provisions
Part D—National Intelligence University
SUBCHAPTER IX—ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Editorial Notes
Codification
Chapter is comprised of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
§3001. Short title
This chapter may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, §1,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified as a note under
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions
"SEC. 1091. TRANSFER OF COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STAFF.
"(a)
"(b)
"SEC. 1092. TRANSFER OF TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER.
"(a)
"(b)
"SEC. 1093. TERMINATION OF POSITIONS OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection.
"(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production.
"(3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration.
"SEC. 1094. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.
"The President shall transmit to Congress a plan for the implementation of this title [see Tables for classification] and the amendments made by this title. The plan shall address, at a minimum, the following:
"(1) The transfer of personnel, assets, and obligations to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to this title.
"(2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of activities transferred to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to this title.
"(3) The establishment of offices within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to implement the duties and responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence as described in this title.
"(4) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, facilities, contracts, records, and other assets and obligations to be transferred to the Director of National Intelligence.
"(5) Recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the President considers appropriate.
"SEC. 1095. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFORM.
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"SEC. 1096. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
"(a)
"(2) The records of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be dispositioned pursuant to paragraph (1) without the authorization of the Director of National Intelligence.
"(b)
"(1) is authorized within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence the total of 500 new personnel positions; and
"(2) with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may detail not more than 150 personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a period of not more than 2 years.
"SEC. 1097. EFFECTIVE DATES.
"(a)
"(b)
"(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
"(2) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this Act [probably means the effective date of title I of
"(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 17, 2004], the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe regulations, policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines required under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 [
[Functions of President under section 1094 of
Short Title of 2018 Amendment
Short Title of 2012 Amendment
Short Title of 2004 Amendment
Short Title of 1996 Amendment
Short Title of 1994 Amendment
Short Title of 1992 Amendment
Short Title of 1984 Amendment
Short Title of 1982 Amendment
Short Title of 1949 Amendment
Act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §1,
Sections of National Security Act of 1947, which were classified to former Title 5, were repealed and restated in Title 10, Armed Forces, except as noted, as follows:
Section of former Title 5 | Section of Title 10 |
---|---|
171 | 131, 133. |
171a(a), (b) | 133. |
171a(c) | 125, 136, 141, 3010, 3012, 5011, 5031, 8010, 8012. |
171a(d) | 133. |
171a(e) | 132. |
171a(f) | 133. |
171a(g)–(i) | [Omitted]. |
171a(j) | 124. |
171c | 134, 135, 136, 718, 2358. |
171c–1, 171c–2 | [Repealed]. |
171d | 1580. |
171e | 171. |
171f | 141, 142. |
171g | 143. |
171h | 2201. |
171i | 2351. |
171j | 173. |
172 | 136. |
172a | 3014, 5061, 8014. |
172b | 2203. |
172c | 2204. |
172d | 2208. |
172e | 2209. |
172f | 126. |
172g | 2205. |
172h | 2206. |
172i | 2701. |
181–1 | 101, 3011, 3012, 3062, T. 50 §409. |
181–2 | 3012. |
411a(a) | 101; T. 50 §409. |
411a(b) | 5012. |
411a(c) | 5013, 5402. |
626(a) | 8012. |
626(b) | [Repealed]. |
626(c) | 101; T. 50 §409. |
626(d) | 8013. |
626(e) | 8012. |
626(f) | 8033. |
626(g) | 8011. |
626a | 8012. |
626b | 8013. |
626c | 743, 8062. |
Savings Provisions
"(a)
"(2) During the period referred to in paragraph (1) any reference in this Act or the amendments made by this Act to the Director of National Intelligence shall be considered to be a reference to the Director of Central Intelligence, as the head of the intelligence community.
"(3) Upon the appointment of an individual as Director of National Intelligence under section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as so amended, any reference in this Act, or in the classified annex to accompany this Act, to the Director of Central Intelligence as head of the intelligence community shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence.
"(b)
"(2) Upon the appointment of an individual as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947, as so amended, any reference in this Act, or in the classified annex to accompany this Act, to the Director of Central Intelligence as head of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."
Act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §12(g),
Separability
Construction of References to Director of Central Intelligence
Anomalous Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) coordinate the response of the United States Government to such incidents;
"(B) coordinate among relevant Federal agencies to ensure equitable and timely access to assessment and care for affected United States Government personnel, dependents of such personnel, and other appropriate individuals;
"(C) ensure adequate training and education relating to such incidents for United States Government personnel;
"(D) ensure that information regarding such incidents is efficiently shared across relevant Federal agencies in a manner that provides appropriate protections for classified, sensitive, and personal information;
"(E) coordinate, in consultation with the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the technological and research efforts of the United States Government to address suspected attacks presenting as such incidents; and
"(F) develop policy options to prevent, mitigate, and deter suspected attacks presenting as such incidents.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) serve as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordination Lead (in this section referred to as the 'Agency Coordination Lead') for the relevant agency concerned;
"(B) report directly to the head of such relevant agency regarding activities carried out under this section;
"(C) perform functions specific to such relevant agency and related to anomalous health incidents, consistent with the directives of the Interagency Coordinator and the interagency national security process;
"(D) represent such relevant agency in meetings convened by the Interagency Coordinator; and
"(E) participate in interagency briefings to Congress regarding the response of the United States Government to anomalous health incidents, including briefings required under subsection (c).
"(2)
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) an update on the investigation into anomalous health incidents affecting United States Government personnel and dependents of such personnel, including technical causation and suspected perpetrators;
"(B) an update on new or persistent anomalous health incidents;
"(C) a description of threat prevention and mitigation efforts with respect to anomalous health incidents, to include personnel training;
"(D) an identification of any changes to operational posture as a result of anomalous health threats;
"(E) an update on diagnosis and treatment efforts for individuals affected by anomalous health incidents, including patient numbers and wait times to access care;
"(F) a description of efforts to improve and encourage reporting of anomalous health incidents;
"(G) a detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of the Agency Coordination Leads;
"(H) information regarding additional authorities or resources needed to support the interagency response to anomalous health incidents; and
"(I) such other matters as the Interagency Coordinator or the Agency Coordination Leads may consider appropriate.
"(3)
"(A)
"(B)
"(d)
"(1) develops a process to provide a secure mechanism for personnel of the relevant agency concerned, the dependents of such personnel, and other appropriate individuals, to self-report any suspected exposure that could be an anomalous health incident;
"(2) shares all relevant data reported through such mechanism in a timely manner with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant agencies, through existing processes coordinated by the Interagency Coordinator; and
"(3) in developing the mechanism pursuant to paragraph (1), prioritizes secure information collection and handling processes to protect classified, sensitive, and personal information.
"(e)
"(1)
"(A) the threat posed by anomalous health incidents;
"(B) known defensive techniques with respect to anomalous health incidents; and
"(C) processes to self-report any suspected exposure that could be an anomalous health incident.
"(2)
"(f)
"(g)
"(1) increase capacity and staffing for the Health Incident Response Task Force of the Department of State;
"(2) support the development and implementation of efforts by the Department of State to prevent and mitigate anomalous health incidents affecting the workforce of the Department;
"(3) investigate and characterize the cause of anomalous health incidents, including investigations of causation and attribution;
"(4) collect and analyze data related to anomalous health incidents;
"(5) coordinate with other relevant agencies and the National Security Council regarding anomalous health incidents; and
"(6) support other activities to understand, prevent, deter, and respond to suspected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents, at the discretion of the Secretary of State.
"(h)
"(1) The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—
"(A) the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, of the Senate; and
"(B) the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Homeland Security, the Judiciary, and Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, of the House of Representatives.
"(2) The term 'relevant Federal agencies' means—
"(A) the Department of Defense;
"(B) the Department of State;
"(C) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
"(D) the Central Intelligence Agency;
"(E) the Department of Justice;
"(F) the Department of Homeland Security; and
"(G) such other Federal departments or agencies as may be designated by the Interagency Coordinator."
Consideration of Adversarial Telecommunications and Cybersecurity Infrastructure When Sharing Intelligence With Foreign Governments and Entities
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6307 of
Committee to Counter Active Measures by the Russian Federation To Exert Covert Influence Over Peoples and Governments
Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office
"(1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO.
"(2) The role of the NRO in the development and generation of requirements and acquisition.
"(3) The scope of the capabilities of the NRO.
"(4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the relationship of the NRO to other organizations and agencies in the intelligence and defense communities."
Incorporation of Reporting Requirements
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives."
Similar provisions were contained in
National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community
National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office
Commission on Roles and Capabilities of United States Intelligence Community
National Commission on Defense and National Security
"SECTION 1. This section establishes the National Commission on Defense and National Security.
"SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
"The Congress makes the following findings:
"(1) Recent revolutionary world events require a fundamental reassessment of the defense and national security policies of the United States.
"(2) Emerging democracies around the world will require political, technical, and economic assistance, as well as military assistance, from the developed free nations in order to thrive and to become productive members of the world community.
"(3) Real and potential military threats to the United States and its allies will continue to exist for the foreseeable future from not just the Soviet Union but also from terrorism and from Third World nations.
"(4) Proliferation of both sophisticated conventional weapons and of nuclear weapons could produce a world more dangerous than we have faced in the past.
"(5) Ethnic rivalries as well as economic inequalities may produce instabilities that could spark serious conflict.
"(6) In order to formulate coherent national policies to meet these challenges of a new world environment, it is essential for the United States to achieve a bipartisan consensus such as that which emerged following World War II.
"(7) Such a consensus can be fostered by the development of policy recommendations from a highly respected group of individuals who do not bear a partisan label and who possess critical expertise and experience.
"SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT.
"There is established a commission to be known as [the] National Commission on Defense and National Security (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the 'Commission'). The Commission is established until 30 days following submission of the final report required by section 6 of this section.
"SEC. 4. DUTIES OF COMMISSION.
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) The world-wide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
"(2) The political, economic, and military developments around the world and the implications of those developments for United States national security interests, including—
"(A) the developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
"(B) the question of German unification;
"(C) the future of NATO and European economic integration;
"(D) the future of the Pacific Basin; and
"(E) potential instability resulting from regional conflicts or economic problems in the developing world.
"(3) The foreign policy, world-wide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and implement the national security strategy of the United States, including the contribution that can be made by bilateral and multilateral political and economic associations in promoting interests that the United States shares with other members of the world community.
"(4) The proposed short-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of national power for the United States to protect or promote the interests and to achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
"(5) Long-term options that should be considered further for a number of potential courses of world events over the remainder of the century and into the next century.
"SEC. 5. MEMBERSHIP.
"(a)
"(1) Three appointed by the President.
"(2) Three appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
"(3) One appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
"(4) Two appointed by the majority leader of the Senate.
"(5) One appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"(f)
"(g)
"(h)
"SEC. 6. REPORTS.
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"SEC. 7. DIRECTOR AND STAFF OF COMMISSION; EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS.
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"SEC. 8. POWERS OF COMMISSION
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"(f)
"SEC. 9. INITIAL FUNDING OF COMMISSION.
"If funds are not otherwise available for the necessary expenses of the Commission for fiscal year 1991, the Secretary of Defense shall make available to the Commission, from funds available to the Secretary for the fiscal year concerned, such funds as the Commission requires. When funds are specifically appropriated for the expenses of the Commission, the Commission shall reimburse the Secretary from such funds for any funds provided to it under the preceding sentence."
[References in laws to the rates of pay for GS–16, 17, or 18, or to maximum rates of pay under the General Schedule, to be considered references to rates payable under specified sections of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, see section 529 [title I, §101(c)(1)] of
Intelligence Priorities and Reorganization
Change of Titles of Secretary of Defense, et al.; Reappointment
Act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §12(f),
Executive Documents
Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1949
Act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §12(i),
Ex. Ord. No. 10431. National Security Medal
Ex. Ord. No. 10431, Jan. 19, 1953, 18 F.R. 437, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13709, §1, Oct. 2, 2015, 80 F.R. 60793, provided:
1. There is hereby established a medal to be known as the National Security Medal with accompanying ribbons and appurtenances. The medal and its appurtenances shall be of appropriate design, approved by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
2. The National Security Medal may be awarded to any person, without regard to nationality, including members of the Armed Forces of the United States, for distinguished achievement or outstanding contribution made on or after July 26, 1947, in the field of national security through either exceptionally meritorious service performed in a position of high responsibility or through an act of heroism requiring personal courage of a high degree and complete disregard of personal safety.
3. The decoration established by this order shall be awarded by the President of the United States or, under regulations approved by him, by such person or persons as he may designate.
4. No more than one National Security Medal shall be awarded to any one person, but for subsequent services justifying an award, a suitable device may be awarded to be worn with the Medal.
5. Members of the armed forces of the United States who are awarded the decoration established by this order are authorized to wear the medal and the ribbon symbolic of the award, as may be authorized by uniform regulations approved by the Secretary of Defense.
6. The decoration established by this order may be awarded posthumously.
7. Any individual having personal knowledge of the facts of a potential recipient's exceptionally meritorious service or act of heroism, either as an eyewitness or from the testimony of others who have personal knowledge or were eyewitnesses, may recommend the potential recipient as a candidate for the award to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. Any recommendations shall be made with the concurrence of the department or agency employing the proposed recipient, if appropriate, and be accompanied by complete documentation, including, where necessary, certificates, affidavits, or sworn transcripts of testimony. Each recommendation for an award shall show the exact status, at the time of the rendition of the service on which the recommendation is based, with respect to citizenship, employment, and all other material factors of the person who is being recommended for the National Security Medal. Each recommendation shall contain a draft of an appropriate citation to accompany the award of the National Security Medal.
8. Upon a determination by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council that the National Security Medal is warranted, and following approval by the President, the Executive Secretary shall notify the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which will then process the award recommendation, prepare the National Security Medal, with any appropriate devices, and deliver the National Security Medal to the National Security Council for presentation to the recipient.
Regulations Governing the Award of the National Security Medal
Ex. Ord. No. 13709, §2, Oct. 2, 2015, 80 F.R. 60793, provided that the regulations governing the award of the National Security Medal that were issued pursuant to par. 2 of Ex. Ord. No. 10431 (prior to amendment by Ex. Ord. No. 13709) and published with that order were superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 13709.
Executive Order No. 11905
Ex. Ord. No. 11905, Feb. 18, 1976, 41 F.R. 7703, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 11985, May 13, 1977, 42 F.R. 25487; Ex. Ord. No. 11994, June 1, 1977, 42 F.R. 28869, which related to United States foreign intelligence activities, was superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 12036, Jan. 24, 1978, 43 F.R. 3674, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 12036
Ex. Ord. No. 12036, Jan. 24, 1978, 43 F.R. 3674, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12139, May 23, 1979, 44 F.R. 30311, which related to United States foreign intelligence activities, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12333, §3.6, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59954, prior to Ex. Ord. No. 12333 being amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13470, §4(j), July 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 45341.
Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance
For provisions relating to the exercise of certain authority respecting foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, see Ex. Ord. No. 12139, May 23, 1979, 44 F.R. 30311, set out under
Ex. Ord. No. 12333. United States Intelligence Activities
Ex. Ord. No. 12333, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59941, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13284, §18, Jan. 23, 2003, 68 F.R. 4077; Ex. Ord. No. 13355, §§2, 3, 6, Aug. 27, 2004, 69 F.R. 53593; Ex. Ord. No. 13470, §§1–4, July 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 45325, provided:
TABLE OF CONTENTS [Omitted.]
Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Act) [
PART 1—GOALS, DIRECTIONS, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS
1.1 Goals
The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.
(a) All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its interests.
(b) The United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.
(c) Intelligence collection under this order should be guided by the need for information to respond to intelligence priorities set by the President.
(d) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering:
(1) Espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests;
(2) Threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; and
(3) Threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
(e) Special emphasis shall be given to the production of timely, accurate, and insightful reports, responsive to decisionmakers in the executive branch, that draw on all appropriate sources of information, including open source information, meet rigorous analytic standards, consider diverse analytic viewpoints, and accurately represent appropriate alternative views.
(f) State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United States.
(g) All departments and agencies have a responsibility to prepare and to provide intelligence in a manner that allows the full and free exchange of information, consistent with applicable law and presidential guidance.
1.2 The National Security Council
(a) Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) shall act as the highest ranking executive branch entity that provides support to the President for review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of all foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action, and attendant policies and programs.
(b) Covert Action and Other Sensitive Intelligence Operations. The NSC shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each proposed covert action and conduct a periodic review of ongoing covert action activities, including an evaluation of the effectiveness and consistency with current national policy of such activities and consistency with applicable legal requirements. The NSC shall perform such other functions related to covert action as the President may direct, but shall not undertake the conduct of covert actions. The NSC shall also review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.
1.3 Director of National Intelligence
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director of National Intelligence (Director) shall serve as the head of the Intelligence Community, act as the principal adviser to the President, to the NSC, and to the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security, and shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget. The Director will lead a unified, coordinated, and effective intelligence effort. In addition, the Director shall, in carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this section, take into account the views of the heads of departments containing an element of the Intelligence Community and of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(a) Except as otherwise directed by the President or prohibited by law, the Director shall have access to all information and intelligence described in section 1.5(a) of this order. For the purpose of access to and sharing of information and intelligence, the Director:
(1) Is hereby assigned the function under section 3(5) of the Act, to determine that intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, pertains to more than one United States Government agency; and
(2) Shall develop guidelines for how information or intelligence is provided to or accessed by the Intelligence Community in accordance with section 1.5(a) of this order, and for how the information or intelligence may be used and shared by the Intelligence Community. All guidelines developed in accordance with this section shall be approved by the Attorney General and, where applicable, shall be consistent with guidelines issued pursuant to section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (
(b) In addition to fulfilling the obligations and responsibilities prescribed by the Act, the Director:
(1) Shall establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the Intelligence Community to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, of whatever nature and from whatever source derived;
(2) May designate, in consultation with affected heads of departments or Intelligence Community elements, one or more Intelligence Community elements to develop and to maintain services of common concern on behalf of the Intelligence Community if the Director determines such services can be more efficiently or effectively accomplished in a consolidated manner;
(3) Shall oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs;
(4) In regard to the establishment and conduct of intelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign governments and international organizations:
(A) May enter into intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign governments and international organizations;
(B) Shall formulate policies concerning intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign governments and international organizations; and
(C) Shall align and synchronize intelligence and counterintelligence foreign relationships among the elements of the Intelligence Community to further United States national security, policy, and intelligence objectives;
(5) Shall participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal drug intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
(6) Shall establish common security and access standards for managing and handling intelligence systems, information, and products, with special emphasis on facilitating:
(A) The fullest and most prompt access to and dissemination of information and intelligence practicable, assigning the highest priority to detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting terrorist threats and activities against the United States, its interests, and allies; and
(B) The establishment of standards for an interoperable information sharing enterprise that facilitates the sharing of intelligence information among elements of the Intelligence Community;
(7) Shall ensure that appropriate departments and agencies have access to intelligence and receive the support needed to perform independent analysis;
(8) Shall protect, and ensure that programs are developed to protect, intelligence sources, methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure;
(9) Shall, after consultation with the heads of affected departments and agencies, establish guidelines for Intelligence Community elements for:
(A) Classification and declassification of all intelligence and intelligence-related information classified under the authority of the Director or the authority of the head of a department or Intelligence Community element; and
(B) Access to and dissemination of all intelligence and intelligence-related information, both in its final form and in the form when initially gathered, to include intelligence originally classified by the head of a department or Intelligence Community element, except that access to and dissemination of information concerning United States persons shall be governed by procedures developed in accordance with Part 2 of this order;
(10) May, only with respect to Intelligence Community elements, and after consultation with thehead [sic] of the originating Intelligence Community element or the head of the originating department, declassify, or direct the declassification of, information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources, methods, and activities. The Director may only delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence;
(11) May establish, operate, and direct one or more national intelligence centers to address intelligence priorities;
(12) May establish Functional Managers and Mission Managers, and designate officers or employees of the United States to serve in these positions.
(A) Functional Managers shall report to the Director concerning the execution of their duties as Functional Managers, and may be charged with developing and implementing strategic guidance, policies, and procedures for activities related to a specific intelligence discipline or set of intelligence activities; set training and tradecraft standards; and ensure coordination within and across intelligence disciplines and Intelligence Community elements and with related non-intelligence activities. Functional Managers may also advise the Director on: the management of resources; policies and procedures; collection capabilities and gaps; processing and dissemination of intelligence; technical architectures; and other issues or activities determined by the Director.
(i) The Director of the National Security Agency is designated the Functional Manager for signals intelligence;
(ii) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for human intelligence; and
(iii) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for geospatial intelligence.
(B) Mission Managers shall serve as principal substantive advisors on all or specified aspects of intelligence related to designated countries, regions, topics, or functional issues;
(13) Shall establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such communications;
(14) Shall have ultimate responsibility for production and dissemination of intelligence produced by the Intelligence Community and authority to levy analytic tasks on intelligence production organizations within the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the heads of the Intelligence Community elements concerned;
(15) May establish advisory groups for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community to carry out the Director's responsibilities, to include Intelligence Community executive management committees composed of senior Intelligence Community leaders. Advisory groups shall consist of representatives from elements of the Intelligence Community, as designated by the Director, or other executive branch departments, agencies, and offices, as appropriate;
(16) Shall ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government elements, including military commands;
(17) Shall determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of, national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community, including approving requirements for collection and analysis and resolving conflicts in collection requirements and in the tasking of national collection assets of Intelligence Community elements (except when otherwise directed by the President or when the Secretary of Defense exercises collection tasking authority under plans and arrangements approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Director);
(18) May provide advisory tasking concerning collection and analysis of information or intelligence relevant to national intelligence or national security to departments, agencies, and establishments of the United States Government that are not elements of the Intelligence Community; and shall establish procedures, in consultation with affected heads of departments or agencies and subject to approval by the Attorney General, to implement this authority and to monitor or evaluate the responsiveness of United States Government departments, agencies, and other establishments;
(19) Shall fulfill the responsibilities in section 1.3(b)(17) and (18) of this order, consistent with applicable law and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, whether information is to be collected inside or outside the United States;
(20) Shall ensure, through appropriate policies and procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and integration of all intelligence activities conducted by an Intelligence Community element or funded by the National Intelligence Program. In accordance with these policies and procedures:
(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the United States;
(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the United States;
(C) All policies and procedures for the coordination of counterintelligence activities and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence inside the United States shall be subject to the approval of the Attorney General; and
(D) All policies and procedures developed under this section shall be coordinated with the heads of affected departments and Intelligence Community elements;
(21) Shall, with the concurrence of the heads of affected departments and agencies, establish joint procedures to deconflict, coordinate, and synchronize intelligence activities conducted by an Intelligence Community element or funded by the National Intelligence Program, with intelligence activities, activities that involve foreign intelligence and security services, or activities that involve the use of clandestine methods, conducted by other United States Government departments, agencies, and establishments;
(22) Shall, in coordination with the heads of departments containing elements of the Intelligence Community, develop procedures to govern major system acquisitions funded in whole or in majority part by the National Intelligence Program;
(23) Shall seek advice from the Secretary of State to ensure that the foreign policy implications of proposed intelligence activities are considered, and shall ensure, through appropriate policies and procedures, that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the responsibilities pursuant to law and presidential direction of Chiefs of United States Missions; and
(24) Shall facilitate the use of Intelligence Community products by the Congress in a secure manner.
(c) The Director's exercise of authorities in the Act and this order shall not abrogate the statutory or other responsibilities of the heads of departments of the United States Government or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Directives issued and actions taken by the Director in the exercise of the Director's authorities and responsibilities to integrate, coordinate, and make the Intelligence Community more effective in providing intelligence related to national security shall be implemented by the elements of the Intelligence Community, provided that any department head whose department contains an element of the Intelligence Community and who believes that a directive or action of the Director violates the requirements of section 1018 of the IRTPA or this subsection shall bring the issue to the attention of the Director, the NSC, or the President for resolution in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments.
(d) Appointments to certain positions.
(1) The relevant department or bureau head shall provide recommendations and obtain the concurrence of the Director for the selection of: the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury, and the Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the department head may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President, as the case may be. If the department head and the Director do not reach an agreement on the selection or recommendation, the Director and the department head concerned may advise the President directly of the Director's intention to withhold concurrence.
(2) The relevant department head shall consult with the Director before appointing an individual to fill a vacancy or recommending to the President an individual be nominated to fill a vacancy in any of the following positions: the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [now Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security]; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps above the rank of Major General or Rear Admiral; the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence; and the Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
(e) Removal from certain positions.
(1) Except for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose removal the Director may recommend to the President, the Director and the relevant department head shall consult on the removal, or recommendation to the President for removal, as the case may be, of: the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. If the Director and the department head do not agree on removal, or recommendation for removal, either may make a recommendation to the President for the removal of the individual.
(2) The Director and the relevant department or bureau head shall consult on the removal of: the Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [now Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security]. With respect to an individual appointed by a department head, the department head may remove the individual upon the request of the Director; if the department head chooses not to remove the individual, either the Director or the department head may advise the President of the department head's intention to retain the individual. In the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense may recommend to the President either the removal or the retention of the individual. For uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the Director may make a recommendation for removal to the Secretary of Defense.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the authority of the President to nominate, appoint, assign, or terminate the appointment or assignment of any individual, with or without a consultation, recommendation, or concurrence.
1.4 The Intelligence Community
Consistent with applicable Federal law and with the other provisions of this order, and under the leadership of the Director, as specified in such law and this order, the Intelligence Community shall:
(a) Collect and provide information needed by the President and, in the performance of executive functions, the Vice President, the NSC, the Homeland Security Council, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military commanders, and other executive branch officials and, as appropriate, the Congress of the United States;
(b) In accordance with priorities set by the President, collect information concerning, and conduct activities to protect against, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international criminal drug activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;
(c) Analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence;
(d) Conduct administrative, technical, and other support activities within the United States and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities, to include providing services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as designated by the Director in accordance with this order;
(e) Conduct research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions and missions or the provision of services of common concern for the Intelligence Community;
(f) Protect the security of intelligence related activities, information, installations, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Intelligence Community elements as are necessary;
(g) Take into account State, local, and tribal governments' and, as appropriate, private sector entities' information needs relating to national and homeland security;
(h) Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all intelligence activities and other information gathering in accordance with section 1.3(b)(20) of this order; and
(i) Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence activities as the President may direct.
1.5 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies
The heads of all departments and agencies shall:
(a) Provide the Director access to all information and intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise is required for the performance of the Director's duties, to include administrative and other appropriate management information, except such information excluded by law, by the President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order at the direction of the President;
(b) Provide all programmatic and budgetary information necessary to support the Director in developing the National Intelligence Program;
(c) Coordinate development and implementation of intelligence systems and architectures and, as appropriate, operational systems and architectures of their departments, agencies, and other elements with the Director to respond to national intelligence requirements and all applicable information sharing and security guidelines, information privacy, and other legal requirements;
(d) Provide, to the maximum extent permitted by law, subject to the availability of appropriations and not inconsistent with the mission of the department or agency, such further support to the Director as the Director may request, after consultation with the head of the department or agency, for the performance of the Director's functions;
(e) Respond to advisory tasking from the Director under section 1.3(b)(18) of this order to the greatest extent possible, in accordance with applicable policies established by the head of the responding department or agency;
(f) Ensure that all elements within the department or agency comply with the provisions of Part 2 of this order, regardless of Intelligence Community affiliation, when performing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence functions;
(g) Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all intelligence activities in accordance with section 1.3(b)(20), and intelligence and other activities in accordance with section 1.3(b)(21) of this order;
(h) Inform the Attorney General, either directly or through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities inside the United States not coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(i) Pursuant to arrangements developed by the head of the department or agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and approved by the Director, inform the Director and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, either directly or through his designee serving outside the United States, as appropriate, of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means outside the United States that has not been coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency; and
(j) Inform the Secretary of Defense, either directly or through his designee, as appropriate, of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence outside the United States in a region of combat or contingency military operations designated by the Secretary of Defense, for purposes of this paragraph, after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
1.6 Heads of Elements of the Intelligence Community
The heads of elements of the Intelligence Community shall:
(a) Provide the Director access to all information and intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise is required for the performance of the Director's duties, to include administrative and other appropriate management information, except such information excluded by law, by the President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order at the direction of the President;
(b) Report to the Attorney General possible violations of Federal criminal laws by employees and of specified Federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department, agency, or establishment concerned, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those procedures;
(c) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, consistent with Executive Order 13462 of February 29, 2008, and provide copies of all such reports to the Director, concerning any intelligence activities of their elements that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive;
(d) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources, methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with guidance from the Director;
(e) Facilitate, as appropriate, the sharing of information or intelligence, as directed by law or the President, to State, local, tribal, and private sector entities;
(f) Disseminate information or intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations under intelligence or counterintelligence arrangements or agreements established in accordance with section 1.3(b)(4) of this order;
(g) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination of information or intelligence resulting from criminal drug intelligence activities abroad if they have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic criminal drug production and trafficking; and
(h) Ensure that the inspectors general, general counsels, and agency officials responsible for privacy or civil liberties protection for their respective organizations have access to any information or intelligence necessary to perform their official duties.
1.7 Intelligence Community Elements
Each element of the Intelligence Community shall have the duties and responsibilities specified below, in addition to those specified by law or elsewhere in this order. Intelligence Community elements within executive departments shall serve the information and intelligence needs of their respective heads of departments and also shall operate as part of an integrated Intelligence Community, as provided in law or this order.
(a) THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence;
(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities without assuming or performing any internal security functions within the United States;
(3) Conduct administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as necessary for cover and proprietary arrangements;
(4) Conduct covert action activities approved by the President. No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution,
(5) Conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships with intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations consistent with section 1.3(b)(4) of this order;
(6) Under the direction and guidance of the Director, and in accordance with section 1.3(b)(4) of this order, coordinate the implementation of intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations; and
(7) Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the Director may direct.
(b) THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to support national and departmental missions;
(2) Collect, analyze, produce, or, through tasking and coordination, provide defense and defense-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, other Defense components, and non-Defense agencies;
(3) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
(4) Conduct administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as necessary for cover and proprietary arrangements;
(5) Conduct foreign defense intelligence liaison relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs with foreign defense establishments, intelligence or security services of foreign governments, and international organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this order;
(6) Manage and coordinate all matters related to the Defense Attaché system; and
(7) Provide foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
(c) THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. The Director of the National Security Agency shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions;
(2) Establish and operate an effective unified organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense, after coordination with the Director;
(3) Control signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
(4) Conduct administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as necessary for cover arrangements;
(5) Provide signals intelligence support for national and departmental requirements and for the conduct of military operations;
(6) Act as the National Manager for National Security Systems as established in law and policy, and in this capacity be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director;
(7) Prescribe, consistent with section 102A(g) of the Act, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the National Security Agency, and exercise the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations; and
(8) Conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relationships in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
(d) THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall:
(1) Be responsible for research and development, acquisition, launch, deployment, and operation of overhead systems and related data processing facilities to collect intelligence and information to support national and departmental missions and other United States Government needs; and
(2) Conduct foreign liaison relationships relating to the above missions, in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
(e) THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall:
(1) Collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate geospatial intelligence information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions;
(2) Provide geospatial intelligence support for national and departmental requirements and for the conduct of military operations;
(3) Conduct administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as necessary for cover arrangements; and
(4) Conduct foreign geospatial intelligence liaison relationships, in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
(f) THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS. The Commanders and heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), produce, analyze, and disseminate defense and defense-related intelligence and counterintelligence to support departmental requirements, and, as appropriate, national requirements;
(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
(3) Monitor the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation activities; and
(4) Conduct military intelligence liaison relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
(g) INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to support national and departmental missions, in accordance with procedural guidelines approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director;
(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities; and
(3) Conduct foreign intelligence and counterintelligence liaison relationships with intelligence, security, and law enforcement services of foreign governments or international organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4) and 1.7(a)(6) of this order.
(h) THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE COAST GUARD. The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall:
(1) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence including defense and defense-related information and intelligence to support national and departmental missions;
(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
(3) Monitor the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation activities; and
(4) Conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign intelligence services, security services or international organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and, when operating as part of the Department of Defense, 1.10(i) of this order.
(i) THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. The heads of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury; the Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security; and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy shall:
(1) Collect (overtly or through publicly available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information, intelligence, and counterintelligence to support national and departmental missions; and
(2) Conduct and participate in analytic or information exchanges with foreign partners and international organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4) and 1.7(a)(6) of this order.
(j) THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. The Director shall collect (overtly or through publicly available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information, intelligence, and counterintelligence to support the missions of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, including the National Counterterrorism Center, and to support other national missions.
1.8 The Department of State
In addition to the authorities exercised by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of this order, the Secretary of State shall:
(a) Collect (overtly or through publicly available sources) information relevant to United States foreign policy and national security concerns;
(b) Disseminate, to the maximum extent possible, reports received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
(c) Transmit reporting requirements and advisory taskings of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
(d) Support Chiefs of United States Missions in discharging their responsibilities pursuant to law and presidential direction.
1.9 The Department of the Treasury
In addition to the authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of this order the Secretary of the Treasury shall collect (overtly or through publicly available sources) foreign financial information and, in consultation with the Department of State, foreign economic information.
1.10 The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense shall:
(a) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate information and intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking and advisory tasking by the Director;
(b) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate defense and defense-related intelligence and counterintelligence, as required for execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental, and tactical intelligence requirements;
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components and coordinate counterintelligence activities in accordance with section 1.3(b)(20) and (21) of this order;
(e) Act, in coordination with the Director, as the executive agent of the United States Government for signals intelligence activities;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director, within the United States Government;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
(h) Protect the security of Department of Defense installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary;
(i) Establish and maintain defense intelligence relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments, intelligence or security services of foreign governments, and international organizations, and ensure that such relationships and programs are in accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.3(b)(21) and 1.7(a)(6) of this order;
(j) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to provide for cover and proprietary arrangements, to perform the functions described in [sub]sections (a) though [sic] (i) above, and to support the Intelligence Community elements of the Department of Defense; and
(k) Use the Intelligence Community elements within the Department of Defense identified in section 1.7(b) through (f) and, when the Coast Guard is operating as part of the Department of Defense, (h) above to carry out the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities assigned in this section or other departments, agencies, or offices within the Department of Defense, as appropriate, to conduct the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense.
1.11 The Department of Homeland Security
In addition to the authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used against the President or the Vice President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, and, as authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the President, other Secret Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally through such activities except to protect against use of such surveillance equipment, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General.
1.12 The Department of Energy
In addition to the authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of this order, the Secretary of Energy shall:
(a) Provide expert scientific, technical, analytic, and research capabilities to other agencies within the Intelligence Community, as appropriate;
(b) Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the Department can contribute; and
(c) Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters.
1.13 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
In addition to the authorities exercised by the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice under sections 1.4 and 1.7(g) of this order and under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide technical assistance, within or outside the United States, to foreign intelligence and law enforcement services, consistent with section 1.3(b)(20) and (21) of this order, as may be necessary to support national or departmental missions.
PART 2—CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
2.1 Need
Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national security, national defense, and foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative, and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded.
2.2 Purpose
This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.
2.3 Collection of Information
Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or by the head of a department containing such element and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order, after consultation with the Director. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention, and dissemination of the following types of information:
(a) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned;
(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized elements of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such elements may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons;
(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international drug, or international terrorism investigation;
(d) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims, or hostages of international terrorist organizations;
(e) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources, methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other elements of the Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present or former employees, present or former intelligence element contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting;
(f) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability or credibility;
(g) Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical, or communications security investigation;
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons;
(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate Federal, state, local, or foreign laws; and
(j) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
In addition, elements of the Intelligence Community may disseminate information to each appropriate element within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient element to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it, except that information derived from signals intelligence may only be disseminated or made available to Intelligence Community elements in accordance with procedures established by the Director in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Attorney General.
2.4 Collection Techniques
Elements of the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Elements of the Intelligence Community are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or the head of a department containing such element concerned and approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:
(a) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance;
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by elements of the Intelligence Community other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and
(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession;
(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by elements of the Intelligence Community other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence element contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and
(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service; and
(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.
2.5 Attorney General Approval
The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. The authority delegated pursuant to this paragraph, including the authority to approve the use of electronic surveillance as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, shall be exercised in accordance with that Act.
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement and other Civil Authorities
Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property, and facilities of any element within the Intelligence Community;
(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the general counsel of the providing element or department; and
(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement or other civil authorities not precluded by applicable law.
2.7 Contracting
Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the institution.
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws
Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States
No one acting on behalf of elements of the Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of any element of the Intelligence Community without disclosing such person's intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or the head of a department containing such element and approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director. Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the Intelligence Community element head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation; or
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
2.10 Human Experimentation
No element of the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for, or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.
2.12 Indirect Participation
No element of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.
2.13 Limitation on Covert Action
No covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
PART 3—GENERAL PROVISIONS
3.1 Congressional Oversight
The duties and responsibilities of the Director and the heads of other departments, agencies, elements, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall be implemented in accordance with applicable law, including title V of the Act [
3.2 Implementation
The President, supported by the NSC, and the Director shall issue such appropriate directives, procedures, and guidance as are necessary to implement this order. Heads of elements within the Intelligence Community shall issue appropriate procedures and supplementary directives consistent with this order. No procedures to implement Part 2 of this order shall be issued without the Attorney General's approval, after consultation with the Director. The Attorney General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving any procedures established by the head of an element in the Intelligence Community (or the head of the department containing such element) other than the FBI. In instances where the element head or department head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreements on other than constitutional or other legal grounds, the Attorney General, the head of department concerned, or the Director shall refer the matter to the NSC.
3.3 Procedures
The activities herein authorized that require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with existing procedures or requirements established under Executive Order 12333. New procedures, as required by Executive Order 12333, as further amended, shall be established as expeditiously as possible. All new procedures promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as amended, shall be made available to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
3.4 References and Transition
References to "Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community" or "SOICs" in executive orders or other Presidential guidance, shall be deemed references to the heads of elements in the Intelligence Community, unless the President otherwise directs; references in Intelligence Community or Intelligence Community element policies or guidance, shall be deemed to be references to the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, unless the President or the Director otherwise directs.
3.5 Definitions
For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have these meanings:
(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.
(b) Covert action means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include:
(1) Activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) Traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) Traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
(4) Activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.
(c) Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
(d) Employee means a person employed by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for an element within the Intelligence Community.
(e) Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists.
(f) Intelligence includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
(g) Intelligence activities means all activities that elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this order.
(h) Intelligence Community and elements of the Intelligence Community refers to:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency;
(3) The National Security Agency;
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency;
(5) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
(6) The National Reconnaissance Office;
(7) The other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
(8) The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps;
(9) The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(10) The Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration;
(11) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
(12) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
(13) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury;
(14) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security;
(15) The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard; and
(16) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the Intelligence Community.
(i) National Intelligence and Intelligence Related to National Security means all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, that pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, or that is determined for the purpose of access to information by the Director in accordance with section 1.3(a)(1) of this order, to pertain to more than one United States Government agency; and that involves threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.
(j) The National Intelligence Program means all programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.
(k) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
3.6 Revocation
Executive Orders 13354 and 13355 of August 27, 2004, are revoked; and paragraphs 1.3(b)(9) and (10) of Part 1 supersede provisions within Executive Order 12958, as amended, to the extent such provisions in Executive Order 12958, as amended, are inconsistent with this Order.
3.7 General Provisions
(a) Consistent with section 1.3(c) of this order, nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(1) Authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(2) Functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
[For provisions relating to consideration of Commandant and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence of the Coast Guard as a "Senior Official of the Intelligence Community" for purposes of Ex. Ord. No. 12333, set out above, and all other relevant authorities, see Ex. Ord. No. 13286, §87, Feb. 28, 2003, 68 F.R. 10632, set out as a note under
Executive Order No. 12334
Ex. Ord. No. 12334, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59955, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12701, Feb. 14, 1990, 55 F.R. 5953, which established the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12863, §3.3, Sept. 13, 1993, 58 F.R. 48441, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 12863
Ex. Ord. No. 12863, Sept. 13, 1993, 58 F.R. 48441, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13070, Dec. 15, 1997, 62 F.R. 66493; Ex. Ord. No. 13301, May 14, 2003, 68 F.R. 26981; Ex. Ord. No. 13376, Apr. 13, 2005, 70 F.R. 20261, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13462, §10, Feb. 29, 2008, 73 F.R. 11808, set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 13434. National Security Professional Development
Ex. Ord. No. 13434, May 17, 2007, 72 F.R. 28583, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(b) The Steering Committee shall consist exclusively of the following members (or their designees who shall be full-time officers or employees of the members' respective agencies):
(i) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, who shall serve as Chair;
(ii) the Secretary of State;
(iii) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(iv) the Secretary of Defense;
(v) the Attorney General;
(vi) the Secretary of Agriculture;
(vii) the Secretary of Labor;
(viii) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(ix) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
(x) the Secretary of Transportation;
(xi) the Secretary of Energy;
(xii) the Secretary of Education;
(xiii) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(xiv) the Director of National Intelligence;
(xv) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and
(xvi) such other officers of the United States as the Chair of the Steering Committee may designate from time to time.
(c) The Steering Committee shall coordinate, to the maximum extent practicable, national security professional development programs and guidance issued by the heads of agencies in order to ensure an integrated approach to such programs.
(d) The Chair of the Steering Committee shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Steering Committee, set its agenda, coordinate its work, and, as appropriate to deal with particular subject matters, establish subcommittees of the Steering Committee that shall consist exclusively of members of the Steering Committee (or their designees under subsection (b) of this section), and such other full-time or permanent part-time officers or employees of the Federal Government as the Chair may designate.
(a) identify and enhance existing national security professional development programs and infrastructure, and establish new programs as necessary, in order to fulfill their respective missions to educate, train, and employ security professionals consistent with the National Strategy and, to the maximum extent practicable, the plan and related guidance from the Steering Committee; and
(b) cooperate with the Steering Committee and provide such information, support, and assistance as the Chair of the Steering Committee may request from time to time.
(i) consistent with applicable merit-based hiring and advancement principles, lead the establishment of a national security professional development program in accordance with the National Strategy and the plan that provides for interagency and intergovernmental assignments and fellowship opportunities and provides for professional development guidelines for career advancement; and
(ii) issue to agencies rules and guidance or apply existing rules and guidance relating to the establishment of national security professional development programs to implement the National Strategy and the plan;
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall issue rules or guidance on professional development programs for Department of Defense military personnel, including interagency and intergovernmental assignments and fellowship opportunities, to implement the National Strategy and the plan, as appropriate, and shall coordinate such programs, to the maximum extent practicable, with the Steering Committee;
(c) The Secretary of State shall issue rules or guidance on national security professional development programs for the Foreign Service, including interagency and intergovernmental exchanges and fellowship opportunities, to implement the National Strategy and the plan, as appropriate, and shall coordinate such programs, to the maximum extent practicable, with the Steering Committee;
(d) The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of agencies of which elements of the intelligence community are a part, shall issue rules or guidance on national security professional development programs for the intelligence community, including interagency and intergovernmental assignments and fellowship opportunities, to implement the National Strategy and the plan, as appropriate, and shall coordinate such programs, to the maximum extent practicable, with the Steering Committee; and
(e) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a program to provide to Federal, State, local, and tribal government officials education in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery plans and authorities, and training in crisis decision-making skills, consistent with applicable presidential guidance.
(a) shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations;
(b) shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any agency, instrumentality, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law, including the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals, or the functions assigned by the President to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and
(c) is not intended to, and does not, create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
George W. Bush.
Ex. Ord. No. 13462. President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board
Ex. Ord. No. 13462, Feb. 29, 2008, 73 F.R. 11805, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13516, §1, Oct. 28, 2009, 74 F.R. 56521, 57241, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) "department concerned" means an executive department listed in
(b) "intelligence activities" has the meaning specified in section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended; and
(c) "intelligence community" means the organizations listed in or designated pursuant to section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
(b) The PIAB shall consist of not more than 16 members appointed by the President from among individuals who are not full-time employees of the Federal Government.
(c) The President shall designate a Chair or Co-Chairs from among the members of the PIAB, who shall convene and preside at meetings of the PIAB, determine its agenda, and direct its work.
(d) Members of the PIAB and the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) established in section 5 of this order:
(i) shall serve without any compensation for their work on the PIAB or the IOB; and
(ii) while engaged in the work of the PIAB or the IOB, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government (
(e) The PIAB shall utilize such full-time professional and administrative staff as authorized by the Chair and approved by the President or the President's designee. Such staff shall be supervised by an Executive Director of the PIAB, appointed by the President, whom the President may designate to serve also as the Executive Director of the IOB.
(a) assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, and of counterintelligence and other intelligence activities, assess the adequacy of management, personnel and organization in the intelligence community, and review the performance of all agencies of the Federal Government that are engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or the execution of intelligence policy and report the results of such assessments or reviews:
(i) to the President, as necessary but not less than twice each year; and
(ii) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the heads of departments concerned when the PIAB determines appropriate; and
(b) consider and make appropriate recommendations to the President, the DNI, or the head of the department concerned with respect to matters identified to the PIAB by the DNI or the head of a department concerned.
(a) There is hereby established a committee of the PIAB to be known as the Intelligence Oversight Board.
(b) The IOB shall consist of not more than five members of the PIAB who are designated by the President from among members of the PIAB to serve on the IOB. The IOB shall utilize such full-time professional and administrative staff as authorized by the Chair and approved by the President or the President's designee. Such staff shall be supervised by an Executive Director of the IOB, appointed by the President, whom the President may designate to serve also as the Executive Director of the PIAB.
(c) The President shall designate a Chair from among the members of the IOB, who shall convene and preside at meetings of the IOB, determine its agenda, and direct its work.
(a) issue criteria on the thresholds for reporting matters to the IOB, to the extent consistent with section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended[,] or the corresponding provision of any successor order;
(b) inform the President of intelligence activities that the IOB believes:
(i)(A) may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or presidential directive; and
(B) are not being adequately addressed by the Attorney General, the DNI, or the head of the department concerned; or
(ii) should be immediately reported to the President.[;]
(c) forward to the Attorney General information concerning intelligence activities that involve possible violations of Federal criminal laws or otherwise implicate the authority of the Attorney General;
(d) review and assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and sufficiency of the processes by which the DNI and the heads of departments concerned perform their respective functions under this order and report thereon as necessary, together with any recommendations, to the President and, as appropriate, the DNI and the head of the department concerned;
(e) receive and review information submitted by the DNI under subsection 7(c) of this order and make recommendations thereon, including for any needed corrective action, with respect to such information, and the intelligence activities to which the information relates, as necessary, but not less than twice each year, to the President, the DNI, and the head of the department concerned; and
(f) conduct, or request that the DNI or the head of the department concerned, as appropriate, carry out and report to the IOB the results of, investigations of intelligence activities that the IOB determines are necessary to enable the IOB to carry out its functions under this order.
(a) with respect to guidelines applicable to organizations within the intelligence community that concern reporting of intelligence activities described in subsection 6(b)(i)(A) of this order:
(i) review and ensure that such guidelines are consistent with section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a corresponding provision of any successor order, and this order; and
(ii) issue for incorporation in such guidelines instructions relating to the format and schedule of such reporting as necessary to implement this order;
(b) with respect to intelligence activities described in subsection 6(b)(i)(A) of this order:
(i) receive reports submitted to the IOB pursuant to section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a corresponding provision of any successor order;
(ii) forward to the Attorney General information in such reports relating to such intelligence activities to the extent that such activities involve possible violations of Federal criminal laws or implicate the authority of the Attorney General unless the DNI or the head of the department concerned has previously provided such information to the Attorney General; and
(iii) monitor the intelligence community to ensure that the head of the department concerned has directed needed corrective actions and that such actions have been taken and report to the IOB and the head of the department concerned, and as appropriate the President, when such actions have not been timely taken; and
(c) submit to the IOB as necessary and no less than twice each year:
(i) an analysis of the reports received under subsection (b)(i) of this section, including an assessment of the gravity, frequency, trends, and patterns of occurrences of intelligence activities described in subsection 6(b)(i)(A) of this order;
(ii) a summary of direction under subsection (b)(iii) of this section and any related recommendations; and
(iii) an assessment of the effectiveness of corrective action taken by the DNI or the head of the department concerned with respect to intelligence activities described in subsection 6(b)(i)(A) of this order.
(a) To the extent permitted by law, the DNI and the heads of departments concerned shall provide such information and assistance as the PIAB and the IOB determine is needed to perform their functions under this order.
(b) The heads of departments concerned shall:
(i) ensure that the DNI receives:
(A) copies of reports submitted to the IOB pursuant to section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a corresponding provision of any successor order; and
(B) such information and assistance as the DNI may need to perform functions under this order; and
(ii) designate the offices within their respective organizations that shall submit reports to the IOB required by Executive Order and inform the DNI and the IOB of such designations; and
(iii) ensure that departments concerned comply with instructions issued by the DNI under subsection 7(a)(ii) of this order.
(c) The head of a department concerned who does not implement a recommendation to that head of department from the PIAB under subsection 4(b) of this order or from the IOB under subsections 6(c) or 6(d) of this order shall promptly report through the DNI to the Board that made the recommendation, or to the President, the reasons for not implementing the recommendation.
(d) The DNI shall ensure that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency performs the functions with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency under this order that a head of a department concerned performs with respect to organizations within the intelligence community that are part of that department.
(b) Individuals who are members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Executive Order 12863 of September 13, 1993, as amended, immediately prior to the signing of this order shall be members of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board immediately upon the signing of this order, to serve as such consistent with this order until the date that is 15 months following the date of this order.
(c) Individuals who are members of the Intelligence Oversight Board under Executive Order 12863 immediately prior to the signing of this order shall be members of the Intelligence Oversight Board under this order, to serve as such consistent with this order until the date that is 15 months following the date of this order.
(d) The individual serving as Executive Director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board immediately prior to the signing of this order shall serve as the Executive Director of the PIAB until such person resigns, dies, or is removed, or upon appointment of a successor under this order and shall serve as the Executive Director of the IOB until an Executive Director of the IOB is appointed or designated under this order.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) Any person who is a member of the PIAB or the IOB, or who is granted access to classified national security information in relation to the activities of the PIAB or the IOB, as a condition of access to such information, shall sign and comply with appropriate agreements to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, and Executive Order 12968 of August 2, 1995, as amended.
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
George W. Bush.
Ex. Ord. No. 13732. United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force
Ex. Ord. No. 13732, July 1, 2016, 81 F.R. 44485, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13862, §2, Mar. 6, 2019, 84 F.R. 8789, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct as follows:
The protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and decisive use of force in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Minimizing civilian casualties can further mission objectives; help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations, especially in the conduct of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; and enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations critical to our national security. As a matter of policy, the United States therefore routinely imposes certain heightened policy standards that are more protective than the requirements of the law of armed conflict that relate to the protection of civilians.
Civilian casualties are a tragic and at times unavoidable consequence of the use of force in situations of armed conflict or in the exercise of a state's inherent right of self-defense. The U.S. Government shall maintain and promote best practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, take appropriate steps when such casualties occur, and draw lessons from our operations to further enhance the protection of civilians.
(a) In particular, relevant agencies shall, consistent with mission objectives and applicable law, including the law of armed conflict:
(i) train personnel, commensurate with their responsibilities, on compliance with legal obligations and policy guidance that address the protection of civilians and on implementation of best practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, including through exercises, pre-deployment training, and simulations of complex operational environments that include civilians;
(ii) develop, acquire, and field intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that, by enabling more accurate battlespace awareness, contribute to the protection of civilians;
(iii) develop, acquire, and field weapon systems and other technological capabilities that further enable the discriminate use of force in different operational contexts;
(iv) take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, such as providing warnings to the civilian population (unless the circumstances do not permit), adjusting the timing of attacks, taking steps to ensure military objectives and civilians are clearly distinguished, and taking other measures appropriate to the circumstances; and
(v) conduct assessments that assist in the reduction of civilian casualties by identifying risks to civilians and evaluating efforts to reduce risks to civilians.
(b) In addition to the responsibilities above, relevant agencies shall also, as appropriate and consistent with mission objectives and applicable law, including the law of armed conflict:
(i) review or investigate incidents involving civilian casualties, including by considering relevant and credible information from all available sources, such as other agencies, partner governments, and nongovernmental organizations, and take measures to mitigate the likelihood of future incidents of civilian casualties;
(ii) acknowledge U.S. Government responsibility for civilian casualties and offer condolences, including ex gratia payments, to civilians who are injured or to the families of civilians who are killed;
(iii) engage with foreign partners to share and learn best practices for reducing the likelihood of and responding to civilian casualties, including through appropriate training and assistance; and
(iv) maintain channels for engagement with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations that operate in conflict zones and encourage such organizations to assist in efforts to distinguish between military objectives and civilians, including by appropriately marking protected facilities, vehicles, and personnel, and by providing updated information on the locations of such facilities and personnel.
(b) No part of this order modifies priorities in the collection of intelligence or the development, acquisition, or fielding of weapon systems and other technological capabilities.
(c) No part of this order shall prejudice or supplant established procedures pertaining to administrative or criminal investigative or judicial processes in the context of the military justice system or other applicable law and regulation.
(d) The policies set forth in this order are consistent with existing U.S. obligations under international law and are not intended to create new international legal obligations; nor shall anything in this order be construed to derogate from obligations under applicable law, including the law of armed conflict.
(e) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Ex. Ord. No. 14086. Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities
Ex. Ord. No. 14086, Oct. 7, 2022, 87 F.R. 62283, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) Principles. Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized and conducted consistent with the following principles:
(i) Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized by statute or by Executive Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive and undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and with applicable statutes and Executive Orders, proclamations, and other Presidential directives.
(ii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, which shall ensure that privacy and civil liberties are integral considerations in the planning and implementation of such activities so that:
(A) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only following a determination, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, that the activities are necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; and
(B) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only to the extent and in a manner that is proportionate to the validated intelligence priority for which they have been authorized, with the aim of achieving a proper balance between the importance of the validated intelligence priority being advanced and the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(iii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subjected to rigorous oversight in order to ensure that they comport with the principles identified above.
(b) Objectives. Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted in pursuit of legitimate objectives.
(i) Legitimate objectives.
(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted only in pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:
(1) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities of a foreign government, a foreign military, a faction of a foreign nation, a foreign-based political organization, or an entity acting on behalf of or controlled by any such foreign government, military, faction, or political organization, in order to protect the national security of the United States and of its allies and partners;
(2) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign organizations, including international terrorist organizations, that pose a current or potential threat to the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners;
(3) understanding or assessing transnational threats that impact global security, including climate and other ecological change, public health risks, humanitarian threats, political instability, and geographic rivalry;
(4) protecting against foreign military capabilities and activities;
(5) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(6) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(7) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(8) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(9) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners;
(10) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section;
(11) protecting the integrity of elections and political processes, government property, and United States infrastructure (both physical and electronic) from activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person; and
(12) advancing collection or operational capabilities or activities in order to further a legitimate objective identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section.
(B) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President determines that signals intelligence collection activities may be used. The Director of National Intelligence (Director) shall publicly release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President, unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.
(ii) Prohibited objectives.
(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for the purpose of:
(1) suppressing or burdening criticism, dissent, or the free expression of ideas or political opinions by individuals or the press;
(2) suppressing or restricting legitimate privacy interests;
(3) suppressing or restricting a right to legal counsel; or
(4) disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or religion.
(B) It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners.
(iii) Validation of signals intelligence collection priorities.
(A) Under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (
(1) advances one or more of the legitimate objectives set forth in subsection (b)(i) of this section;
(2) neither was designed nor is anticipated to result in signals intelligence collection in contravention of the prohibited objectives set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and
(3) was established after appropriate consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(B) If the Director disagrees with any aspect of the CLPO's assessment with respect to any of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF or successor framework, the Director shall include the CLPO's assessment and the Director's views when presenting the NIPF to the President.
(c) Privacy and civil liberties safeguards. The following safeguards shall fulfill the principles contained in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of this section.
(i) Collection of signals intelligence.
(A) The United States shall conduct signals intelligence collection activities only following a determination that a specific signals intelligence collection activity, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; it could be used, for example, to ensure alternative pathways for validation or for maintaining reliable access to the same information. In determining whether to collect signals intelligence consistent with this principle, the United States—through an element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements, or their designees—shall consider the availability, feasibility, and appropriateness of other less intrusive sources and methods for collecting the information necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, including from diplomatic and public sources, and shall prioritize such available, feasible, and appropriate alternatives to signals intelligence.
(B) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be as tailored as feasible to advance a validated intelligence priority and, taking due account of relevant factors, not disproportionately impact privacy and civil liberties. Such factors may include, depending on the circumstances, the nature of the pursued objective; the feasible steps taken to limit the scope of the collection to the authorized purpose; the intrusiveness of the collection activity, including its duration; the probable contribution of the collection to the objective pursued; the reasonably foreseeable consequences to individuals, including unintended third parties; the nature and sensitivity of the data to be collected; and the safeguards afforded to the information collected.
(C) For purposes of subsection (c)(i) of this section, the scope of a specific signals intelligence collection activity may include, for example, a specific line of effort or target, as appropriate.
(ii) Bulk collection of signals intelligence.
(A) Targeted collection shall be prioritized. The bulk collection of signals intelligence shall be authorized only based on a determination—by an element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements, or their designees—that the information necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority cannot reasonably be obtained by targeted collection. When it is determined to be necessary to engage in bulk collection in order to advance a validated intelligence priority, the element of the Intelligence Community shall apply reasonable methods and technical measures in order to limit the data collected to only what is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, while minimizing the collection of non-pertinent information.
(B) Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals intelligence through bulk collection shall use such information only in pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:
(1) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(2) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(3) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(4) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;
(5) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners; and
(6) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives identified in subsection (c)(ii) of this section.
(C) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President determines that bulk collection may be used. The Director shall publicly release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President, unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.
(D) In order to minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties, a targeted signals intelligence collection activity that temporarily uses data acquired without discriminants (for example, without specific identifiers or selection terms) shall be subject to the safeguards described in this subsection, unless such data is:
(1) used only to support the initial technical phase of the targeted signals intelligence collection activity;
(2) retained for only the short period of time required to complete this phase; and
(3) thereafter deleted.
(iii) Handling of personal information collected through signals intelligence.
(A) Minimization. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence shall establish and apply policies and procedures designed to minimize the dissemination and retention of personal information collected through signals intelligence.
(1) Dissemination. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:
(a) shall disseminate non-United States persons' personal information collected through signals intelligence only if it involves one or more of the comparable types of information that section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981 (United States Intelligence Activities), as amended [
(b) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals intelligence solely because of a person's nationality or country of residence;
(c) shall disseminate within the United States Government personal information collected through signals intelligence only if an authorized and appropriately trained individual has a reasonable belief that the personal information will be appropriately protected and that the recipient has a need to know the information;
(d) shall take due account of the purpose of the dissemination, the nature and extent of the personal information being disseminated, and the potential for harmful impact on the person or persons concerned before disseminating personal information collected through signals intelligence to recipients outside the United States Government, including to a foreign government or international organization; and
(e) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals intelligence for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this order.
(2) Retention. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:
(a) shall retain non-United States persons' personal information collected through signals intelligence only if the retention of comparable information concerning United States persons would be permitted under applicable law and shall subject such information to the same retention periods that would apply to comparable information concerning United States persons;
(b) shall subject non-United States persons' personal information collected through signals intelligence for which no final retention determination has been made to the same temporary retention periods that would apply to comparable information concerning United States persons; and
(c) shall delete non-United States persons' personal information collected through signals intelligence that may no longer be retained in the same manner that comparable information concerning United States persons would be deleted.
(B) Data security and access. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:
(1) shall process and store personal information collected through signals intelligence under conditions that provide appropriate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons, consistent with the applicable safeguards for sensitive information contained in relevant Executive Orders, proclamations, other Presidential directives, Intelligence Community directives, and associated policies;
(2) shall limit access to such personal information to authorized personnel who have a need to know the information to perform their mission and have received appropriate training on the requirements of applicable United States law, as described in policies and procedures issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and
(3) shall ensure that personal information collected through signals intelligence for which no final retention determination has been made is accessed only in order to make or support such a determination or to conduct authorized administrative, testing, development, security, or oversight functions.
(C) Data quality. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence shall include such personal information in intelligence products only as consistent with applicable Intelligence Community standards for accuracy and objectivity, with a focus on applying standards relating to the quality and reliability of the information, consideration of alternative sources of information and interpretations of data, and objectivity in performing analysis.
(D) Queries of bulk collection. Each element of the Intelligence Community that conducts queries of unminimized signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection shall do so consistent with the permissible uses of signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection identified in subsection (c)(ii)(B) of this section and according to policies and procedures issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section, which shall appropriately take into account the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.
(E) Documentation. In order to facilitate the oversight processes set forth in subsection (d) of this section and the redress mechanism set forth in section 3 of this order, each element of the Intelligence Community that engages in signals intelligence collection activities shall maintain documentation to the extent reasonable in light of the nature and type of collection at issue and the context in which it is collected. The content of any such documentation may vary based on the circumstances but shall, to the extent reasonable, provide the factual basis pursuant to which the element of the Intelligence Community, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors, assesses that the signals intelligence collection activity is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority.
(iv) Update and publication of policies and procedures. The head of each element of the Intelligence Community:
(A) shall continue to use the policies and procedures issued pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 28 of January 17, 2014 (Signals Intelligence Activities) (PPD–28), until they are updated pursuant to subsection (c)(iv)(B) of this section;
(B) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order [Oct. 7, 2022], in consultation with the Attorney General, the CLPO, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), update those policies and procedures as necessary to implement the privacy and civil liberties safeguards in this order; and
(C) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, release these policies and procedures publicly to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, in order to enhance the public's understanding of, and to promote public trust in, the safeguards pursuant to which the United States conducts signals intelligence activities.
(v) Review by the PCLOB.
(A) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is encouraged to conduct a review of the updated policies and procedures described in subsection (c)(iv)(B) of this section once they have been issued to ensure that they are consistent with the enhanced safeguards contained in this order.
(B) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of completion of any review by the PCLOB described in subsection (c)(v)(A) of this section, the head of each element of the Intelligence Community shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations contained in such review, consistent with applicable law.
(d) Subjecting signals intelligence activities to rigorous oversight. The actions directed in this subsection are designed to build on the oversight mechanisms that elements of the Intelligence Community already have in place, in order to further ensure that signals intelligence activities are subjected to rigorous oversight.
(i) Legal, oversight, and compliance officials. Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals intelligence:
(A) shall have in place senior-level legal, oversight, and compliance officials who conduct periodic oversight of signals intelligence activities, including an Inspector General, a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, and an officer or officers in a designated compliance role with the authority to conduct oversight of and ensure compliance with applicable United States law;
(B) shall provide such legal, oversight, and compliance officials access to all information pertinent to carrying out their oversight responsibilities under this subsection, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources or methods, including their oversight responsibilities to ensure that any appropriate actions are taken to remediate an incident of non-compliance with applicable United States law; and
(C) shall not take any actions designed to impede or improperly influence such legal, oversight, and compliance officials in carrying out their oversight responsibilities under this subsection.
(ii) Training. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall maintain appropriate training requirements to ensure that all employees with access to signals intelligence know and understand the requirements of this order and the policies and procedures for reporting and remediating incidents of non-compliance with applicable United States law.
(iii) Significant incidents of non-compliance.
(A) Each element of the Intelligence Community shall ensure that, if a legal, oversight, or compliance official, as described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, or any other employee, identifies a significant incident of non-compliance with applicable United States law, the incident is reported promptly to the head of the element of the Intelligence Community, the head of the executive department or agency (agency) containing the element of the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the Director.
(B) Upon receipt of such report, the head of the element of the Intelligence Community, the head of the agency containing the element of the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the Director shall ensure that any necessary actions are taken to remediate and prevent the recurrence of the significant incident of non-compliance.
(e) Savings clause. Provided the signals intelligence collection is conducted consistent with and in the manner prescribed by this section of this order, this order does not limit any signals intelligence collection technique authorized under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (
(a) Purpose. This section establishes a redress mechanism to review qualifying complaints transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state concerning United States signals intelligence activities for any covered violation of United States law and, if necessary, appropriate remediation.
(b) Process for submission of qualifying complaints. Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Director, in consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community that collect or handle personal information collected through signals intelligence, shall establish a process for the submission of qualifying complaints transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state.
(c) Initial investigation of qualifying complaints by the CLPO.
(i) Establishment. The Director, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish a process that authorizes the CLPO to investigate, review, and, as necessary, order appropriate remediation for qualifying complaints. This process shall govern how the CLPO will review qualifying complaints in a manner that protects classified or otherwise privileged or protected information and shall ensure, at a minimum, that for each qualifying complaint the CLPO shall:
(A) review information necessary to investigate the qualifying complaint;
(B) exercise its statutory and delegated authority to determine whether there was a covered violation by:
(i) [sic] taking into account both relevant national security interests and applicable privacy protections;
(ii) giving appropriate deference to any relevant determinations made by national security officials; and
(iii) applying the law impartially;
(C) determine the appropriate remediation for any covered violation;
(D) provide a classified report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to the oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its rules of procedure;
(E) after the review is completed, inform the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals intelligence activities, that:
(1) "the review either did not identify any covered violations or the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation";
(2) the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community may, as prescribed in the regulations issued by the Attorney General pursuant to section 3(d)(i) of this order, apply for review of the CLPO's determinations by the Data Protection Review Court described in subsection (d) of this section; and
(3) if either the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community applies for review by the Data Protection Review Court, a special advocate will be selected by the Data Protection Review Court to advocate regarding the complainant's interest in the matter;
(F) maintain appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint and produce a classified decision explaining the basis for its factual findings, determination with respect to whether a covered violation occurred, and determination of the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation, consistent with its statutory and delegated authority;
(G) prepare a classified ex parte record of review, which shall consist of the appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint and the classified decision described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section; and
(H) provide any necessary support to the Data Protection Review Court.
(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply with any determination by the CLPO to undertake appropriate remediation pursuant to subsection (c)(i)(C) of this section, subject to any contrary determination by the Data Protection Review Court.
(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the reviews described in subsection (c)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and shall not take any actions designed to impede or improperly influence the CLPO's reviews. Privacy and civil liberties officials within elements of the Intelligence Community shall also support the CLPO as it performs the reviews described in subsection (c)(i) of this section.
(iv) Independence. The Director shall not interfere with a review by the CLPO of a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor shall the Director remove the CLPO for any actions taken pursuant to this order, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity.
(d) Data Protection Review Court.
(i) Establishment. The Attorney General is authorized to and shall establish a process to review determinations made by the CLPO under subsection (c)(i) of this section. In exercising that authority, the Attorney General shall, within 60 days of the date of this order, promulgate regulations establishing a Data Protection Review Court to exercise the Attorney General's authority to review such determinations. These regulations shall, at a minimum, provide that:
(A) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, and the PCLOB, shall appoint individuals to serve as judges on the Data Protection Review Court, who shall be legal practitioners with appropriate experience in the fields of data privacy and national security law, giving weight to individuals with prior judicial experience, and who shall not be, at the time of their initial appointment, employees of the United States Government. During their term of appointment on the Data Protection Review Court, such judges shall not have any official duties or employment within the United States Government other than their official duties and employment as judges on the Data Protection Review Court.
(B) Upon receipt of an application for review filed by the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community of a determination made by the CLPO under subsection (c) of this section, a three-judge panel of the Data Protection Review Court shall be convened to review the application. Service on the Data Protection Review Court panel shall require that the judge hold the requisite security clearances to access classified national security information.
(C) Upon being convened, the Data Protection Review Court panel shall select a special advocate through procedures prescribed in the Attorney General's regulations. The special advocate shall assist the panel in its consideration of the application for review, including by advocating regarding the complainant's interest in the matter and ensuring that the Data Protection Review Court panel is well informed of the issues and the law with respect to the matter. Service as a special advocate shall require that the special advocate hold the requisite security clearances to access classified national security information and to adhere to restrictions prescribed in the Attorney General's regulations on communications with the complainant to ensure the protection of classified or otherwise privileged or protected information.
(D) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall impartially review the determinations made by the CLPO with respect to whether a covered violation occurred and the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation. The review shall be based at a minimum on the classified ex parte record of review described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section and information or submissions provided by the complainant, the special advocate, or an element of the Intelligence Community. In reviewing determinations made by the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court panel shall be guided by relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the same way as are courts established under Article III of the United States Constitution, including those decisions regarding appropriate deference to relevant determinations of national security officials.
(E) In the event that the Data Protection Review Court panel disagrees with any of the CLPO's determinations with respect to whether a covered violation occurred or the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a violation, the panel shall issue its own determinations.
(F) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall provide a classified report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to the oversight of the FISC to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its rules of procedure.
(G) After the review is completed, the CLPO shall be informed of the Data Protection Review Court panel's determinations through procedures prescribed by the Attorney General's regulations.
(H) After a review is completed in response to a complainant's application for review, the Data Protection Review Court, through procedures prescribed by the Attorney General's regulations, shall inform the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals intelligence activities, that "the review either did not identify any covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation."
(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply with any determination by a Data Protection Review Court panel to undertake appropriate remediation.
(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, that a Data Protection Review Court panel requests from the CLPO and shall not take any actions for the purpose of impeding or improperly influencing a panel's review.
(iv) Independence. The Attorney General shall not interfere with a review by a Data Protection Review Court panel of a determination the CLPO made regarding a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor shall the Attorney General remove any judges appointed as provided in subsection (d)(i)(A) of this section, or remove any judge from service on a Data Protection Review Court panel, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity, after taking due account of the standards in the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act [probably means the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002] (
(v) Record of determinations. For each qualifying complaint transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, the Secretary of Commerce shall:
(A) maintain a record of the complainant who submitted such complaint;
(B) not later than 5 years after the date of this order and no less than every 5 years thereafter, contact the relevant element or elements of the Intelligence Community regarding whether information pertaining to the review of such complaint by the CLPO has been declassified and whether information pertaining to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data Protection Review Court has been declassified, including whether an element of the Intelligence Community filed an application for review with the Data Protection Review Court; and
(C) if informed that such information has been declassified, notify the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, that information pertaining to the review of their complaint by the CLPO or to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data Protection Review Court may be available under applicable law.
(e) Annual review by PCLOB of redress process.
(i) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is encouraged to conduct an annual review of the processing of qualifying complaints by the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order, including whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court processed qualifying complaints in a timely manner; whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court are obtaining full access to necessary information; whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court are operating consistent with this order; whether the safeguards established by section 2 of this order are properly considered in the processes of the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court; and whether the elements of the Intelligence Community have fully complied with determinations made by the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court.
(ii) Assistance. The Attorney General, the CLPO, and the elements of the Intelligence Community shall provide the PCLOB with access to information necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(iii) Report and certification. Within 30 days of completing any review described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, the PCLOB is encouraged to:
(A) provide the President, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the CLPO, and the congressional intelligence committees with a classified report detailing the results of its review;
(B) release to the public an unclassified version of the report; and
(C) make an annual public certification as to whether the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order is processing complaints consistent with this order.
(iv) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of receipt of any report by the PCLOB described in subsection (e)(iii)(A) of this section, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, and the CLPO shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations contained in such report, consistent with applicable law.
(f) Designation of qualifying state.
(i) To implement the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order, the Attorney General is authorized to designate a country or regional economic integration organization as a qualifying state for purposes of the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order, effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:
(A) the laws of the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization's member countries require appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities for United States persons' personal information that is transferred from the United States to the territory of the country or a member country of the regional economic integration organization;
(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization's member countries of the regional economic integration organization permit, or are anticipated to permit, the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of the United States; and
(C) such designation would advance the national interests of the United States.
(ii) The Attorney General may revoke or amend such a designation, effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:
(A) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization's member countries do not provide appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities for United States persons' personal information that is transferred from the United States to the territory of the country or to a member country of the regional economic integration organization;
(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the regional economic integration organization's member countries do not permit the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of the United States; or
(C) such designation is not in the national interests of the United States.
(a) "Appropriate remediation" means lawful measures designed to fully redress an identified covered violation regarding a specific complainant and limited to measures designed to address that specific complainant's complaint, taking into account the ways that a violation of the kind identified have customarily been addressed. Such measures may include, depending on the specific covered violation at issue, curing through administrative measures violations found to have been procedural or technical errors relating to otherwise lawful access to or handling of data, terminating acquisition of data where collection is not lawfully authorized, deleting data that had been acquired without lawful authorization, deleting the results of inappropriately conducted queries of otherwise lawfully collected data, restricting access to lawfully collected data to those appropriately trained, or recalling intelligence reports containing data acquired without lawful authorization or that were otherwise disseminated in a manner inconsistent with United States law. Appropriate remediation shall be narrowly tailored to redress the covered violation and to minimize adverse impacts on the operations of the Intelligence Community and the national security of the United States.
(b) "Bulk collection" means the authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data that, due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (for example, without the use of specific identifiers or selection terms).
(c) "Counterintelligence" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333 [
(d) "Covered violation" means a violation that:
(i) arises from signals intelligence activities conducted after the date of this order regarding data transferred to the United States from a qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General's designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;
(ii) adversely affects the complainant's individual privacy and civil liberties interests; and
(iii) violates one or more of the following:
(A) the United States Constitution;
(B) the applicable sections of FISA or any applicable FISC-approved procedures;
(C) Executive Order 12333 or any applicable agency procedures pursuant to Executive Order 12333;
(D) this order or any applicable agency policies and procedures issued or updated pursuant to this order (or the policies and procedures identified in section 2(c)(iv)(A) of this order before they are updated pursuant to section 2(c)(iv)(B) of this order);
(E) any successor statute, order, policies, or procedures to those identified in section 4(d)(iii)(B)–(D) of this order; or
(F) any other statute, order, policies, or procedures adopted after the date of this order that provides privacy and civil liberties safeguards with respect to United States signals intelligence activities within the scope of this order, as identified in a list published and updated by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
(e) "Foreign intelligence" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(f) "Intelligence" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(g) "Intelligence Community" and "elements of the Intelligence Community" shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333.
(h) "National security" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009 (Classified National Security Information) [
(i) "Non-United States person" means a person who is not a United States person.
(j) "Personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners" means any current or former member of the Armed Forces of the United States, any current or former official of the United States Government, and any other person currently or formerly employed by or working on behalf of the United States Government, as well as any current or former member of the military, current or former official, or other person currently or formerly employed by or working on behalf of an ally or partner.
(k) "Qualifying complaint" means a complaint, submitted in writing, that:
(i) alleges a covered violation has occurred that pertains to personal information of or about the complainant, a natural person, reasonably believed to have been transferred to the United States from a qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General's designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;
(ii) includes the following basic information to enable a review: information that forms the basis for alleging that a covered violation has occurred, which need not demonstrate that the complainant's data has in fact been subject to United States signals intelligence activities; the nature of the relief sought; the specific means by which personal information of or about the complainant was believed to have been transmitted to the United States; the identities of the United States Government entities believed to be involved in the alleged violation (if known); and any other measures the complainant pursued to obtain the relief requested and the response received through those other measures;
(iii) is not frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith;
(iv) is brought on behalf of the complainant, acting on that person's own behalf, and not as a representative of a governmental, nongovernmental, or intergovernmental organization; and
(v) is transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, after it has verified the identity of the complainant and that the complaint satisfies the conditions of section 5(k)(i)–(iv) of this order.
(l) "Significant incident of non-compliance" shall mean a systemic or intentional failure to comply with a principle, policy, or procedure of applicable United States law that could impugn the reputation or integrity of an element of the Intelligence Community or otherwise call into question the propriety of an Intelligence Community activity, including in light of any significant impact on the privacy and civil liberties interests of the person or persons concerned.
(m) "United States person" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.
(n) "Validated intelligence priority" shall mean, for most United States signals intelligence collection activities, a priority validated under the process described in section 2(b)(iii) of this order; or, in narrow circumstances (for example, when such process cannot be carried out because of a need to address a new or evolving intelligence requirement), shall mean a priority set by the President or the head of an element of the Intelligence Community in accordance with the criteria described in section 2(b)(iii)(A)(1)–(3) of this order to the extent feasible.
(o) "Weapons of mass destruction" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including orders of and procedures approved by the FISC, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) Nothing in this order precludes the application of more privacy-protective safeguards for United States signals intelligence activities that would apply in the absence of this order. In the case of any conflict between this order and other applicable law, the more privacy-protective safeguards shall govern the conduct of signals intelligence activities, to the maximum extent allowed by law.
(d) Nothing in this order prohibits elements of the Intelligence Community from disseminating information relating to a crime for law enforcement purposes; disseminating warnings of threats of killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; disseminating cyber threat, incident, or intrusion response information; notifying victims or warning potential victims of crime; or complying with dissemination obligations required by statute, treaty, or court order, including orders of and procedures approved by the FISC or other court orders.
(e) The collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United States persons is governed by multiple legal and policy requirements, such as those required by FISA and Executive Order 12333. This order is not intended to alter the rules applicable to United States persons adopted pursuant to FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.
(f) This order shall apply to signals intelligence activities consistent with the scope of PPD–28's application to such activities prior to PPD–28's partial revocation by the national security memorandum issued concurrently with this order. To implement this subsection, the head of each agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director, is hereby delegated the authority to issue guidance, which may be classified, as appropriate, as to the scope of application of this order with respect to the element or elements of the Intelligence Community within their agency. The CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court, in carrying out the functions assigned to it under this order, shall treat such guidance as authoritative and binding.
(g) Nothing in this order confers authority to declassify or disclose classified national security information except as authorized pursuant to Executive Order 13526 or any successor order. Consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court, and the special advocates shall not have authority to declassify classified national security information, nor shall they disclose any classified or otherwise privileged or protected information except to authorized and appropriately cleared individuals who have a need to know the information.
(h) This order creates an entitlement to submit qualifying complaints to the CLPO and to obtain review of the CLPO's decisions by the Data Protection Review Court in accordance with the redress mechanism established in section 3 of this order. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any other entitlement, right, or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. This order is not intended to, and does not, modify the availability or scope of any judicial review of the decisions rendered through the redress mechanism, which is governed by existing law.
J.R. Biden, Jr.
Effective Dates of Provisions in Title I of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of State[,] the Secretary of the Treasury[,] the Secretary of Defense[,] the Attorney General[,] the Secretary of Energy[,] the Secretary of Homeland Security[,] the Director of the Office of Management and Budget[, and] the Director of National Intelligence
Subsection 1097(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, this title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Subsection 1097(a) clearly contemplates that one or more of the provisions in Title I of the Act may take effect earlier than the date that is 6 months after the date of enactment of the Act, but does not state explicitly the mechanism for determining when such earlier effect shall occur, leaving it to the President in the execution of the Act. Moreover, given that section 1097(a) evinces a legislative intent to afford the President flexibility, and such flexibility is constitutionally appropriate with respect to intelligence matters (see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)), the executive branch shall construe section 1097(a) to authorize the President to select different effective dates that precede the 6-month deadline for different provisions in Title I.
Therefore, pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including subsection 1097(a) of the Act, I hereby determine and direct:
1. Sections 1097(a) and 1103 of the Act [set out in notes above], relating respectively to effective dates of provisions and to severability, shall take effect immediately upon the signing of this memorandum to any extent that they have not already taken effect.
2. Provisions in Title I of the Act other than those addressed in numbered paragraph 1 of this memorandum shall take effect immediately upon the signing of this memorandum, except:
(a) any provision in Title I of the Act for which the Act expressly provides the date on which the provision shall take effect; and
(b) sections 1021 and 1092 of the Act [enacting
The taking of effect of a provision pursuant to section 1097(a) of the Act and this memorandum shall not affect the construction of such provision by the executive branch as set forth in my Statement of December 17, 2004, upon signing the Act into law.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
George W. Bush.
§3002. Congressional declaration of purpose
In enacting this chapter, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, §2,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this legislation", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
1958—
1949—Act Aug. 10, 1949, provided that the military departments shall be separately administered but be under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, and that there shall not be a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff.
§3003. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) The term "intelligence" includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
(2) The term "foreign intelligence" means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.
(3) The term "counterintelligence" means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.
(4) The term "intelligence community" includes the following:
(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Space Force, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.
(5) The terms "national intelligence" and "intelligence related to national security" refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, that—
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one United States Government agency; and
(B) that involves—
(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or
(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.
(6) The term "National Intelligence Program" refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.
(7) The term "congressional intelligence committees" means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, §3, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Par. (4)(H).
2012—Par. (4)(K).
Par. (6).
2010—Par. (4)(H).
Par. (4)(K).
Par. (4)(L).
2004—Par. (4).
Par. (5).
"(A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and
"(B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title."
Par. (6).
2003—Par. (4)(E).
Par. (4)(H).
Par. (4)(J) to (L).
2002—Par. (4)(J), (K).
Par. (7).
2001—Par. (2).
Par. (3).
Par. (4)(H).
1996—Par. (4)(E).
1994—Par. (4)(E).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Amendment by
Authority of Secretary of State
Except as otherwise provided, Secretary of State to have and exercise any authority vested by law in any official or office of Department of State and references to such officials or offices deemed to refer to Secretary of State or Department of State, as appropriate, see
Definitions Applicable to Specific Acts
"(1)
"(2)
"(1)
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
"(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
Executive Documents
Delegation of Functions
For assignment of function of President under par. (5)(A) of this section to Director of National Intelligence, see Ex. Ord. No. 12333, §1.3(a)(1), Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59941, as amended, set out as a note under
§3004. Definitions of military departments
(a) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.
(b) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of the government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, §§205(b), 206, 207, formerly §§205(c), 206(a), 207(c),
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
A former section 205(b) of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II,
Section was formerly classified to
Prior to the enactment of Title 10, Armed Forces, by act Aug. 10, 1956, subsecs. (a), (b), and (c) of this section were classified to sections 181–1(c), 411a(a), and 626(c), respectively, of former Title 5.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§3005. Department of Defense
Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5 shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, §201, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section 6742(b)(6) of
Prior Provisions
A prior section 3005, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, §201(d), as added Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §4,
A prior section 201 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, as added Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §4,
§3006. Transferred
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §312, formerly title IV, §411, as added Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §11,
SUBCHAPTER I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
§3021. National Security Council
(a) National Security Council
There is a council known as the National Security Council (in this section referred to as the "Council").
(b) Functions
Consistent with the direction of the President, the functions of the Council shall be to—
(1) advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the Armed Forces and the other departments and agencies of the United States Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security;
(2) assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to the actual and potential military power of the United States, and make recommendations thereon to the President;
(3) make recommendations to the President concerning policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the United States Government concerned with the national security; and
(4) coordinate, without assuming operational authority, the United States Government response to malign foreign influence operations and campaigns.
(c) Membership
(1) In general
The Council consists of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy and such other officers of the United States Government as the President may designate.
(2) Attendance and participation in meetings
The President may designate such other officers of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, including the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National Drug Control Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Cyber Director, to attend and participate in meetings of the Council.
(d) Presiding officers
At meetings of the Council, the President shall preside or, in the absence of the President, a member of the Council designated by the President shall preside.
(e) Staff
(1) In general
The Council shall have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the President.
(2) Staff
Consistent with the direction of the President and subject to paragraph (3), the executive secretary may, subject to the civil service laws and
(3) Number of professional staff
The professional staff for which this subsection provides shall not exceed 200 persons, including persons employed by, assigned to, detailed to, under contract to serve on, or otherwise serving or affiliated with the staff. The limitation in this paragraph does not apply to personnel serving substantially in support or administrative positions.
(f) Special Advisor to the President on International Religious Freedom
It is the sense of Congress that there should be within the staff of the Council a Special Adviser to the President on International Religious Freedom, whose position should be comparable to that of a director within the Executive Office of the President. The Special Adviser should serve as a resource for executive branch officials, compiling and maintaining information on the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom (as defined in
(g) Coordinator for combating malign foreign influence operations and campaigns
(1) In general
The President shall designate an employee of the National Security Council to be responsible for the coordination of the interagency process for combating malign foreign influence operations and campaigns.
(2) Congressional briefing
(A) In general
Not less frequently than twice each year, the employee designated under this subsection, or the employee's designee, shall provide to the congressional committees specified in subparagraph (B) a briefing on the responsibilities and activities of the employee designated under this subsection.
(B) Committees specified
The congressional committees specified in this subparagraph are the following:
(i) The Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(ii) The Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(h) Definition of malign foreign influence operations and campaigns
In this section, the term "malign foreign influence operations and campaigns" means the coordinated, direct or indirect application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, business, corruption, educational, and other capabilities by hostile foreign powers to affect attitudes, behaviors, decisions, or outcomes within the United States.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §101,
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (c)(1).
2021—Subsec. (c)(2).
2018—Subsec. (b)(4).
Subsecs. (g), (h).
2017—Subsec. (c)(1).
2016—
2014—Subsec. (a)(5) to (8).
"(6) the Director for Mutual Security;
"(7) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and".
2007—Subsec. (a)(5) to (8).
Subsecs. (i), (k).
Subsec. (l).
2004—Subsec. (h)(2)(A).
Subsec. (h)(5).
Subsec. (i)(2)(A).
Subsec. (j).
1998—Subsecs. (f), (g).
Subsec. (i).
1996—Subsec. (h).
Subsec. (i).
Subsec. (j).
1992—Subsec. (h).
1988—Subsecs. (f), (g).
1986—Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
1951—Subsec. (a). Act Oct. 10, 1951, inserted cl. (5) relating to Director for Mutual Security, in fourth paragraph, and renumbered former cls. (5) and (6) thereof as cls. (6) and (7), respectively.
1949—Subsec. (a). Act Aug. 10, 1949, added the Vice President to the Council, removed the Secretaries of the military departments, to authorize the President to add, with the consent of the Senate, Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military department, and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.
Subsec. (c). Act Oct. 28, 1949, substituted "Classification Act of 1949" for "Classification Act of 1923, as amended".
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2019. Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
Effective Date of 2016 Amendment
Effective Date of 2007 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective and Termination Dates of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Repeals
Act Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, cited as a credit to this section, was repealed (subject to a savings clause) by
Construction of 2017 Amendment
Rule of Construction for Duplicate Authorization and Appropriation Provisions of Public Laws 99–500 , 99–591 , and 99–661
For rule of construction for certain duplicate provisions of Public Laws
Section as Unaffected by Repeals
Repeals by section 542(a) of Mutual Security Act of 1954 did not repeal amendment to this section by act Oct. 10, 1951.
Deadline for Appointment of Coordinator for Combating Malign Foreign Influence Operations and Campaigns
Pilot Program on Cryptologic Service Training
Executive Documents
Transfer of Functions
Office of Director for Mutual Security abolished and functions of Director, including those as a member of National Security Council, transferred to Director of Foreign Operations Administration by Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1953, eff. Aug. 1, 1953, 18 F.R. 4541, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. Foreign Operations Administration abolished by Ex. Ord. No. 10610, May 9, 1955, 20 F.R. 3179, and its functions and offices transferred to Department of State to be administered by International Cooperation Administration. For later transfer, see
National Security Resources Board, together with Office of Chairman, abolished by section 6 of Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1953, eff. June 12, 1953, 18 F.R. 3375,
Munitions Board, together with office of Chairman, abolished by section 2 of Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1953, eff. June 30, 1953, 18 F.R. 3743,
Research and Development Board, together with office of Chairman, abolished by section 2 of Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1953, eff. June 30, 1953, 18 F.R. 3743,
National Security Council, together with its functions, records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds (available or to be made available) transferred to Executive Office of President by Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1949, eff. Aug. 20, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227,
Executive Order No. 10483
Ex. Ord. No. 10483, Sept. 2, 1953, 18 F.R. 5379, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 10598, Feb. 28, 1955, 20 F.R. 1237, which provided for an Operations Coordinating Board, was superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 10700, Feb. 25, 1957, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 10700
Ex. Ord. No. 10700, Feb. 25, 1957, 22 F.R. 1111, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 10773, July 1, 1958, 23 F.R. 5061; Ex. Ord. No. 10782, Sept. 6, 1958, 23 F.R. 6971; Ex. Ord. 10838, Sept. 16, 1959, 24 F.R. 7519, which provided for the Operations Coordinating Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 10920, Feb. 18, 1961, 26 F.R. 1463.
Ex. Ord. No. 13228. Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council
Ex. Ord. No. 13228, Oct. 8, 2001, 66 F.R. 51812, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13284, §3, Jan. 23, 2003, 68 F.R. 4075; Ex. Ord. No. 13286, §8, Feb. 28, 2003, 68 F.R. 10622, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) National Strategy. The Office shall work with executive departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private entities to ensure the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States and shall periodically review and coordinate revisions to that strategy as necessary.
(b) Detection. The Office shall identify priorities and coordinate efforts for collection and analysis of information within the United States regarding threats of terrorism against the United States and activities of terrorists or terrorist groups within the United States. The Office also shall identify, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, priorities for collection of intelligence outside the United States regarding threats of terrorism within the United States.
(i) In performing these functions, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, as appropriate, to:
(A) facilitate collection from State and local governments and private entities of information pertaining to terrorist threats or activities within the United States;
(B) coordinate and prioritize the requirements for foreign intelligence relating to terrorism within the United States of executive departments and agencies responsible for homeland security and provide these requirements and priorities to the Director of Central Intelligence and other agencies responsible for collection of foreign intelligence;
(C) coordinate efforts to ensure that all executive departments and agencies that have intelligence collection responsibilities have sufficient technological capabilities and resources to collect intelligence and data relating to terrorist activities or possible terrorist acts within the United States, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as appropriate;
(D) coordinate development of monitoring protocols and equipment for use in detecting the release of biological, chemical, and radiological hazards; and
(E) ensure that, to the extent permitted by law, all appropriate and necessary intelligence and law enforcement information relating to homeland security is disseminated to and exchanged among appropriate executive departments and agencies responsible for homeland security and, where appropriate for reasons of homeland security, promote exchange of such information with and among State and local governments and private entities.
(ii) Executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, make available to the Office all information relating to terrorist threats and activities within the United States.
(c) Preparedness. The Office of Homeland Security shall coordinate national efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to:
(i) review and assess the adequacy of the portions of all Federal emergency response plans that pertain to terrorist threats or attacks within the United States;
(ii) coordinate domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack within the United States and coordinate programs and activities for training Federal, State, and local employees who would be called upon to respond to such a threat or attack;
(iii) coordinate national efforts to ensure public health preparedness for a terrorist attack, including reviewing vaccination policies and reviewing the adequacy of and, if necessary, increasing vaccine and pharmaceutical stockpiles and hospital capacity;
(iv) coordinate Federal assistance to State and local authorities and nongovernmental organizations to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats or attacks within the United States;
(v) ensure that national preparedness programs and activities for terrorist threats or attacks are developed and are regularly evaluated under appropriate standards and that resources are allocated to improving and sustaining preparedness based on such evaluations; and
(vi) ensure the readiness and coordinated deployment of Federal response teams to respond to terrorist threats or attacks, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, when appropriate.
(d) Prevention. The Office shall coordinate efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to:
(i) facilitate the exchange of information among such agencies relating to immigration and visa matters and shipments of cargo; and, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ensure coordination among such agencies to prevent the entry of terrorists and terrorist materials and supplies into the United States and facilitate removal of such terrorists from the United States, when appropriate;
(ii) coordinate efforts to investigate terrorist threats and attacks within the United States; and
(iii) coordinate efforts to improve the security of United States borders, territorial waters, and airspace in order to prevent acts of terrorism within the United States, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, when appropriate.
(e) Protection. The Office shall coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to:
(i) strengthen measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical facilities; other utilities; telecommunications; facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material; and other critical infrastructure services and critical facilities within the United States from terrorist attack;
(ii) coordinate efforts to protect critical public and privately owned information systems within the United States from terrorist attack;
(iii) develop criteria for reviewing whether appropriate security measures are in place at major public and privately owned facilities within the United States;
(iv) coordinate domestic efforts to ensure that special events determined by appropriate senior officials to have national significance are protected from terrorist attack;
(v) coordinate efforts to protect transportation systems within the United States, including railways, highways, shipping, ports and waterways, and airports and civilian aircraft, from terrorist attack;
(vi) coordinate efforts to protect United States livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food for human use and consumption from terrorist attack; and
(vii) coordinate efforts to prevent unauthorized access to, development of, and unlawful importation into the United States of, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, or other related materials that have the potential to be used in terrorist attacks.
(f) Response and Recovery. The Office shall coordinate efforts to respond to and promote recovery from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to:
(i) coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of transportation systems, energy production, transmission, and distribution systems; telecommunications; other utilities; and other critical infrastructure facilities after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack;
(ii) coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of public and private critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack;
(iii) work with the National Economic Council to coordinate efforts to stabilize United States financial markets after a terrorist threat or attack and manage the immediate economic and financial consequences of the incident;
(iv) coordinate Federal plans and programs to provide medical, financial, and other assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and their families; and
(v) coordinate containment and removal of biological, chemical, radiological, explosive, or other hazardous materials in the event of a terrorist threat or attack involving such hazards and coordinate efforts to mitigate the effects of such an attack.
(g) Incident Management. Consistent with applicable law, including the statutory functions of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall be the official primarily responsible for advising and assisting the President in the coordination of domestic incident management activities of all departments and agencies in the event of a terrorist threat, and during and in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies, within the United States. Generally, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall serve as the principal point of contact for and to the President with respect to the coordination of such activities. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as appropriate.
(h) Continuity of Government. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, shall review plans and preparations for ensuring the continuity of the Federal Government in the event of a terrorist attack that threatens the safety and security of the United States Government or its leadership.
(i) Public Affairs. The Office, subject to the direction of the White House Office of Communications, shall coordinate the strategy of the executive branch for communicating with the public in the event of a terrorist threat or attack within the United States. The Office also shall coordinate the development of programs for educating the public about the nature of terrorist threats and appropriate precautions and responses.
(j) Cooperation with State and Local Governments and Private Entities. The Office shall encourage and invite the participation of State and local governments and private entities, as appropriate, in carrying out the Office's functions.
(k) Review of Legal Authorities and Development of Legislative Proposals. The Office shall coordinate a periodic review and assessment of the legal authorities available to executive departments and agencies to permit them to perform the functions described in this order. When the Office determines that such legal authorities are inadequate, the Office shall develop, in consultation with executive departments and agencies, proposals for presidential action and legislative proposals for submission to the Office of Management and Budget to enhance the ability of executive departments and agencies to perform those functions. The Office shall work with State and local governments in assessing the adequacy of their legal authorities to permit them to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, and recover from terrorist threats and attacks.
(l) Budget Review. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the "Director") and the heads of executive departments and agencies, shall identify programs that contribute to the Administration's strategy for homeland security and, in the development of the President's annual budget submission, shall review and provide advice to the heads of departments and agencies for such programs. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall provide advice to the Director on the level and use of funding in departments and agencies for homeland security-related activities and, prior to the Director's forwarding of the proposed annual budget submission to the President for transmittal to the Congress, shall certify to the Director the funding levels that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security believes are necessary and appropriate for the homeland security-related activities of the executive branch.
(a) The Office of Homeland Security shall be directed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
(b) The Office of Administration within the Executive Office of the President shall provide the Office of Homeland Security with such personnel, funding, and administrative support, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, as directed by the Chief of Staff to carry out the provisions of this order.
(c) Heads of executive departments and agencies are authorized, to the extent permitted by law, to detail or assign personnel of such departments and agencies to the Office of Homeland Security upon request of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff.
(a) I hereby establish a Homeland Security Council (the "Council"), which shall be responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The Council shall serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.
(b) The Council shall have as its members the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President may from time to time designate. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior officials shall be invited to attend Council meetings when appropriate.
(c) The Council shall meet at the President's direction. When the President is absent from a meeting of the Council, at the President's direction the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall be responsible, at the President's direction, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording Council actions and Presidential decisions.
(a) This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
(b) References in this order to State and local governments shall be construed to include tribal governments and United States territories and other possessions.
(c) References to the "United States" shall be construed to include United States territories and possessions.
George W. Bush.
Executive Order No. 13260
Ex. Ord. No. 13260, Mar. 19, 2002, 67 F.R. 13241, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13286, §4, Feb. 28, 2003, 68 F.R. 10619, which established the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland Security, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13286, §4, Feb. 28, 2003, 68 F.R. 10619, eff. Mar. 31, 2003.
Ex. Ord. No. 13657. Changing the Name of the National Security Staff to the National Security Council Staff
Ex. Ord. No. 13657, Feb. 10, 2014, 79 F.R. 8823, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to reflect my decision to change the name of the National Security Staff to the National Security Council staff, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13729. A Comprehensive Approach to Atrocity Prevention and Response
Ex. Ord. No. 13729, May 18, 2016, 81 F.R. 32611, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) In order to ensure that emerging mass atrocity risks and mass atrocity situations are considered and addressed, the Board shall monitor developments around the world that heighten the risk of mass atrocities, and analyze and closely review specific mass atrocity threats or situations of heightened concern.
(b) The Board shall also identify any gaps related to the prevention of and response to mass atrocities in the current policies and ongoing interagency processes concerning particular regions or countries and shall make recommendations to strengthen policies, programs, resources, and tools related to mass atrocity prevention and response to relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies), including through the Board's function as an interagency policy committee, as detailed in section 4 of this order. In these efforts, the Board shall focus in particular on ways for the U.S. Government to develop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to:
(i) monitor, receive early warning of, and coordinate responses to potential mass atrocities;
(ii) deter and isolate perpetrators of mass atrocities through all available and appropriate authorities;
(iii) promote accountability of and deny impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities, including by denying safe haven for perpetrators found in the United States;
(iv) engage allies and partners, including the United Nations and other multilateral and regional institutions, to build capacity and mobilize action for preventing and responding to mass atrocities;
(v) deploy civilian personnel with expertise in conflict prevention, civilian protection, mediation, and other relevant skills, including on a rapid response basis, to assist in mass atrocity prevention and response efforts;
(vi) increase capacity for our diplomats, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in mass atrocity prevention and response activities;
(vii) develop and implement tailored foreign assistance programs as well as doctrine for our armed services to address and mitigate the risks of mass atrocities;
(viii) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing of information, as appropriate, relating to mass atrocity threats and situations; and
(ix) address any other issue regarding mass atrocity prevention and response that the Board determines is appropriate.
(a) The Board shall function as an interagency policy committee, or body of equivalent standing, chaired by a member of the National Security Council staff at the Senior Director level or higher who shall be designated by the President (Chair).
(b) The Chair shall convene the Board on a monthly basis to perform the responsibilities set forth in section 3 of this order. The Board shall also meet as needed on an ad hoc and time-sensitive basis to consider and address emerging mass atrocity threats or situations.
(c) The Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (Deputies) shall meet at least twice per year, and the Principals Committee of the National Security Council (Principals) shall meet at least once per year, to review and direct the work of the Board.
(d) The Board shall be composed of individuals at the Assistant Secretary-level or higher who shall be designated by the leadership of their respective departments or agencies. Within 60 days of a vacancy on the Board, the relevant department or agency or office head shall designate a replacement representative and notify the National Security Advisor. In addition to the Chair, the Board shall consist of the designated representatives from the following:
(i) the Office of the Vice President;
(ii) the Department of State;
(iii) the Department of the Treasury;
(iv) the Department of Defense;
(v) the Department of Justice;
(vi) the Department of Homeland Security;
(vii) the U.S. Mission to the United Nations;
(viii) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
(ix) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(x) the U.S. Agency for International Development;
(xi) the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
(xii) such other agencies or offices as may request to participate in coordination with the Chair.
(e) The Chair shall report, through the National Security Advisor, to the President by April 30 each year on the work of the U.S. Government in mass atrocity prevention and response, including the work of the Board.
(f) The Chair shall prepare written updates for the public, on an annual basis, on the work of the U.S. Government in mass atrocity prevention and response, including the work of the Board.
(g) Consistent with the objectives set out in this order and in accordance with applicable law, the Board shall conduct outreach, including regular consultations, with representatives of nongovernmental organizations with expertise in mass atrocity prevention and response and other appropriate parties. Such outreach shall be for the purpose of assisting the Board with its work on considering and addressing emerging mass atrocity threats or situations and on developing new or improved policies and tools, as well as for the purpose of providing transparency on the work of the Board.
(h) In order to conduct the work set forth in this order effectively, the Board may:
(i) request information or analysis from the Intelligence Community (IC), Chiefs of Mission, agencies, and offices;
(ii) develop policy recommendations and programmatic recommendations for agencies, offices, and existing interagency processes;
(iii) in conjunction with existing interagency processes, formulate policy recommendations and programmatic recommendations;
(iv) coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop guidance on mass atrocity prevention resource priorities for agencies and offices; and
(v) bring urgent or significant matters to the attention of the Deputies and, as appropriate, request that the Deputies convene to address a situation of concern, consistent with Presidential Policy Directive-1 or its successor.
(a) Agencies, in coordination with the Board, shall ensure that mass atrocity prevention and response staffing, training, funding, and activities are addressed in their strategic planning and budget processes, including Department Quadrennial Reviews, Mission Resource Requests, State Department Integrated Country Strategies, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Strategic Plans, State Department Bureau Strategic Resource Plans, and related strategic planning and budget processes and documents. The Chair shall make recommendations to the National Security Advisor on the inclusion of material in the President's National Security Strategy that addresses mass atrocity prevention and response.
(b) The Department of State and USAID shall work with OMB to support the maintenance of civilian assistance accounts and authorities that enable swift civilian responses to mass atrocity threats and situations.
(c) The Department of State and USAID shall offer mass atrocity prevention and response training courses to all officers deployed or planning deployment to countries deemed by the IC to be at high or substantial risk for mass atrocities.
(d) The Department of State and USAID shall continue to build and use civilian capacity (i.e., the ability to deploy personnel with expertise in conflict prevention, civilian protection, mediation, and other relevant skills) effectively for mass atrocity prevention and response, and shall develop mechanisms for enhanced partnerships with non-U.S. Government actors that could provide surge capacity, such as the United Nations and other multilateral and regional organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations.
(e) The IC shall continue to monitor developments worldwide and, as changing conditions warrant, prepare an IC-coordinated assessment updating IC judgments in its National Intelligence Estimate on the global risk of mass atrocities and genocide at regular intervals to inform the work of the Board.
(f) Recognizing mass atrocity prevention as a core national security interest of the United States, the IC shall allocate resources so as to permit a collection surge for countries where the Board determines, and the Deputies concur, that there are ongoing or acute risks of mass atrocities that merit increased attention, in accordance with the National Intelligence Priority Framework and available resources.
(g) The IC shall work with partner governments to encourage the collection and analysis of mass atrocity-related intelligence and the sharing of this intelligence with the U.S. Government and its partners in mass atrocity prevention and response.
(h) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of State, shall continue to develop proposals for legislative, regulatory, or administrative amendments or changes that would permit the more effective use and enforcement of immigration and other laws to deny impunity to perpetrators of mass atrocities and that would enhance our ability to prosecute such perpetrators subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and remove those who are not citizens.
(i) The Department of Defense (DOD) shall continue to develop joint doctrine and training that support mass atrocity prevention and response operations and shall address mass atrocity prevention and response as part of its general planning guidance to combatant commands and services.
(j) The Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, DHS, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), and other agencies as appropriate, shall coordinate with bilateral and multilateral partners on the deployment of mass atrocity prevention and response tools, including isolating and deterring perpetrators of mass atrocities through all available authorities (including administrative actions, visa authorities, and capacity-building support), as appropriate.
(k) The Department of State, in coordination with USUN, DOD, and other agencies as appropriate, shall work bilaterally, multilaterally, and with regionally based organizations to enhance effectiveness in the fields of early warning, analysis, prevention, response, and accountability, and shall work with international partners to build or encourage building the capacity of our allies and partners to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof, or the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13747. Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda To Achieve a World Safe and Secure From Infectious Disease Threats
Ex. Ord. No. 13747, Nov. 4, 2016, 81 F.R. 78701, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) GHSA Coordination and Policy Development. In furtherance of the policy described in section 1 of this order, I hereby direct the National Security Council staff, in accordance with the procedures and requirements in Presidential Policy Directive 1 (or any successor directive), to convene a GHSA Interagency Review Council (Council) to perform the responsibilities described in this order. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, shall designate a member of the National Security Council staff to serve as Chair for the Council. The Council shall meet not less than four times per year to advance its mission and fulfill its responsibilities.
(b) GHSA Interagency Review Council Responsibilities.
(i) The Council shall be responsible for the following activities:
(A) Provide, by consensus, policy-level guidance to participating agencies on GHSA goals, objectives, and implementation.
(B) Facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral engagement to carry out GHSA implementation.
(C) Provide a forum for raising and working to resolve interagency disagreements concerning the GHSA.
(D) Review the progress toward and work to resolve challenges in achieving U.S. commitments under the GHSA, including commitments to assist other countries in achieving the GHSA targets. The Council shall consider, among other issues, the status of U.S. financial commitments to the GHSA in the context of commitments by other donors, and the contributions of partner countries to achieve the GHSA targets; progress toward the milestones outlined in GHSA national plans for those countries where the United States Government has committed to assist in implementing the GHSA and in annual work-plans outlining agency priorities for implementing the GHSA; and external evaluations of United States and partner country capabilities to address infectious disease threats, including the ability to achieve the targets outlined within the WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, as well as gaps identified by such external evaluations.
(E) Provide, by consensus, within 30 days of the date of this order, initial policy-level guidance on GHSA implementation.
(F) Develop a report on an annual basis regarding the progress achieved and challenges concerning the United States Government's ability to advance the GHSA across priority countries. The report shall include recommendations to resolve, mitigate, or otherwise address the challenges identified therein. The report shall be transmitted to the President and, to the extent possible, made publicly available.
(G) Conduct an overall review of the GHSA for submission to the President by September 2019. The review should include an evaluation of the progress achieved during the 5 years of this initiative, as well as any challenges faced. The report should also provide recommendations on the future direction of the initiative.
(ii) The Council shall not perform any activities or functions that interfere with the foreign affairs responsibilities of the Secretary of State, including the responsibility to oversee the implementation of programs and policies that advance the GHSA within foreign countries.
(c) Participation. The Council shall consist of representatives, serving at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, from the following agencies:
(i) the Department of State;
(ii) the Department of Defense;
(iii) the Department of Justice;
(iv) the Department of Agriculture;
(v) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(vi) the Department of Homeland Security;
(vii) the Office of Management and Budget;
(viii) the United States Agency for International Development;
(ix) the Environmental Protection Agency;
(x) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
(xi) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(xii) the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and
(xiii) such other agencies as the agencies set forth above, by consensus, deem appropriate.
(a) The heads of agencies described in section 2(c) of this order shall:
(i) make the GHSA and its implementation a high priority within their respective agencies, and include GHSA-related activities within their respective agencies' strategic planning and budget processes;
(ii) designate a senior-level official to be responsible for the implementation of this order;
(iii) designate, in accordance with section 2(c) of this order, an appropriate representative at the Assistant Secretary level or higher to participate on the Council;
(iv) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-related activities undertaken within their respective agencies;
(v) maintain responsibility for agency-related programmatic functions in coordination with host governments, country teams, and GHSA in-country teams, and in conjunction with other relevant agencies;
(vi) coordinate with other agencies that are identified in this order to satisfy programmatic goals, and further facilitate coordination of country teams, implementers, and donors in host countries; and
(vii) coordinate across GHSA national plans and with GHSA partners to which the United States is providing assistance.
(b) The Secretary of State shall:
(i) engage Chiefs of Mission, country teams, and regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State to promote the GHSA with international partners and to facilitate country-level implementation of U.S. programmatic activities;
(ii) monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving GHSA targets, determine where more work is needed, and work with agencies and international partners to identify the partners best placed to improve performance and to achieve the GHSA targets for countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(iii) facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of State programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(iv) coordinate planning, implementation, and evaluation of GHSA activities with the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator at the United States Agency for International Development and the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator at the Department of State in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(v) lead diplomatic outreach, including at senior levels, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, to build international support for the GHSA with its members, other countries, and regional and multilateral bodies, including the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 (G20), the African Union, the WHO, the OIE, the FAO, INTERPOL, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, development banks, and other relevant partners;
(vi) work, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, with other donors and nongovernmental implementers in partner countries in order to leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners; and
(vii) coordinate, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States Government relationship with foreign and domestic GHSA nongovernmental stakeholders, including the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations, and develop, with consensus from the Council, an annual GHSA nongovernmental outreach strategy.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall:
(i) facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of Defense programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(ii) work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and nongovernmental implementers in partner countries in which Department of Defense programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners; and
(iii) coordinate and communicate, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, with defense ministries with regard to the GHSA, including at the GHSA Ministerial and Steering Group.
(d) The Attorney General, generally acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), shall:
(i) serve, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, as the United States Government lead for GHSA targets relating to linking public health and law enforcement, and coordinate with INTERPOL on the GHSA and its successful implementation;
(ii) facilitate implementation and coordination of FBI programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist; and
(iii) work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and nongovernmental implementers in partner countries in which FBI programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
(e) The Secretary of Agriculture shall:
(i) represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States in coordination and communication with the FAO and OIE with regard to the GHSA;
(ii) facilitate implementation and coordination of Department of Agriculture programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist; and
(iii) work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors, contributing international organizations, and nongovernmental implementers in partner countries in which Department of Agriculture programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
(f) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall:
(i) represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States at GHSA Ministerial and Steering Group meetings and in working with G7 and G20 Health Ministers on the GHSA, and coordinate United States Government support for those activities;
(ii) provide overall leadership and coordination for the GHSA Action Packages (Action Packages), which consist of country commitments to advance and share best practices toward specific GHSA targets, including serving as the primary point of contact for the Action Packages, providing support to Action Package leaders, and tracking overall progress on the Action Packages;
(iii) coordinate United States Government support for and participation in external evaluations, including the WHO JEE tool and the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation;
(iv) represent, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, the United States in coordination and communication with the WHO regarding the GHSA;
(v) facilitate, no less than every 4 years, the request for an external assessment, such as the process outlined within the WHO JEE tool, of United States Government domestic efforts to implement the IHR and the GHSA and work to publish the assessment to the general public; and
(vi) consolidate and publish to the general public an external assessment of United States domestic capability to address infectious disease threats and implement the IHR, including the ability to achieve the targets outlined within the WHO JEE tool and including the gaps identified by such external assessment.
(g) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
(i) assess the impacts of global health threats on homeland security operations; and
(ii) lead, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Agriculture, United States Government GHSA activities related to global health threats at U.S. borders and ports of entry.
(h) The Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development shall:
(i) facilitate implementation and coordination of United States Agency for International Development programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(ii) provide, in conjunction with other agencies, strategic technical guidance for achieving GHSA targets; and
(iii) work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA teams, with other donors and nongovernmental GHSA implementers in partner countries in which United States Agency for International Development programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
(i) The Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall:
(i) facilitate implementation and coordination of U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention programs to further the GHSA, as well as provide technical expertise to measure and evaluate progress in countries the United States has made a commitment to assist;
(ii) provide, in conjunction with other agencies, strategic technical guidance for achieving GHSA targets;
(iii) provide, in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, strategic technical support for and participate in external assessments, including the WHO JEE tool, and the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR implementation; and
(iv) work, in conjunction with interagency partners and the in-country GHSA team, with other donors and nongovernmental implementers in partner countries in which the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention programs are active in order to coordinate and leverage commitments to advance the GHSA with partners.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof;
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals; or
(iii) the coordination or implementation of emergency response operations during a health emergency.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13773. Enforcing Federal Law With Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking
Ex. Ord. No. 13773, Feb. 9, 2017, 82 F.R. 10691, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 14060, §3(a)(i), Dec. 15, 2021, 86 F.R. 71794, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
These groups are drivers of crime, corruption, violence, and misery. In particular, the trafficking by cartels of controlled substances has triggered a resurgence in deadly drug abuse and a corresponding rise in violent crime related to drugs. Likewise, the trafficking and smuggling of human beings by transnational criminal groups risks creating a humanitarian crisis. These crimes, along with many others, are enriching and empowering these organizations to the detriment of the American people.
A comprehensive and decisive approach is required to dismantle these organized crime syndicates and restore safety for the American people.
(a) strengthen enforcement of Federal law in order to thwart transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations, including criminal gangs, cartels, racketeering organizations, and other groups engaged in illicit activities that present a threat to public safety and national security and that are related to, for example:
(i) the illegal smuggling and trafficking of humans, drugs or other substances, wildlife, and weapons;
(ii) corruption, cybercrime, fraud, financial crimes, and intellectual-property theft; or
(iii) the illegal concealment or transfer of proceeds derived from such illicit activities.
(b) ensure that Federal law enforcement agencies give a high priority and devote sufficient resources to efforts to identify, interdict, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations, including through the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of members of such organizations, the extradition of members of such organizations to face justice in the United States and, where appropriate and to the extent permitted by law, the swift removal from the United States of foreign nationals who are members of such organizations;
(c) maximize the extent to which all Federal agencies share information and coordinate with Federal law enforcement agencies, as permitted by law, in order to identify, interdict, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations;
(d) enhance cooperation with foreign counterparts against transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations, including, where appropriate and permitted by law, through sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information and through increased security sector assistance to foreign partners by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(e) develop strategies, under the guidance of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to maximize coordination among agencies—such as through the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), Special Operations Division, the OCDETF Fusion Center, and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center—to counter the crimes described in subsection (a) of this section, consistent with applicable Federal law; and
(f) pursue and support additional efforts to prevent the operational success of transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations within and beyond the United States, to include prosecution of ancillary criminal offenses, such as immigration fraud and visa fraud, and the seizure of the implements of such organizations and forfeiture of the proceeds of their criminal activity.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Ex. Ord. No. 14060. Establishing the United States Council on Transnational Organized Crime
Ex. Ord. No. 14060, Dec. 15, 2021, 86 F.R. 71793, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:
These networks continue to expand in size and influence in the United States and abroad. Transnational criminal organizations contribute directly to tens of thousands of drug-overdose deaths in the United States each year and adversely affect American communities and economic prosperity. They also threaten United States national security by degrading the security and stability of allied and partner nations, undermining the rule of law, fostering corruption, acting as proxies for hostile state activities, directly or indirectly funding insurgent and terrorist groups, depleting natural resources, harming human health and the environment, contributing to climate change through illegal deforestation and logging, and exploiting and endangering vulnerable populations. In some regions, transnational criminal organizations wield state-like capabilities, disregarding sovereign borders, compromising the integrity of democratic institutions and threatening the legitimacy of fragile governments, and securing their power through intimidation, corruption, and violence. For these reasons, it is in the national interest of the United States to counter TOC. Addressing TOC requires a coordinated Federal framework accompanied by a cohesive whole-of-government effort executed in collaboration with State, local, Tribal, territorial, and civil society partners in the United States and in close coordination with foreign partners, international and regional organizations, and international and local civil society groups abroad.
(a) employ authorized intelligence and operational capabilities in an integrated manner to target, disrupt, and degrade transnational criminal organizations that pose the greatest threat to national security;
(b) collaborate with private entities and international, multilateral, and bilateral organizations to combat TOC, while also strengthening cooperation with and advancing efforts to build capacity in partner nations to reduce transnational criminal activity;
(c) improve information sharing between law enforcement entities and the Intelligence Community to enhance strategic analysis of, and efforts to combat, transnational criminal organizations and their activities, while also preserving our ability to speedily bring TOC actors to justice;
(d) expand tools and capabilities to combat illicit finance, which underpins all TOC activities; and
(e) develop and deploy new technologies to identify and disrupt existing and newly emerging TOC threats.
(i) The USCTOC shall replace the Threat Mitigation Working Group, previously directed to lead whole-of-government efforts on TOC under Executive Order 13773 of February 9, 2017 (Enforcing Federal Law With Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking) [set out above]. Accordingly, section 3 of Executive Order 13773 is hereby revoked.
(ii) The USCTOC shall consist of the following members or their designees:
(A) the Secretary of State;
(B) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(C) the Secretary of Defense;
(D) the Attorney General;
(E) the Secretary of Homeland Security; and
(F) the Director of National Intelligence.
(iii) The USCTOC may request other agencies to contribute to the USCTOC's efforts as necessary, including by detail or assignment of personnel consistent with subsection (b)(v) of this section.
(iv) The USCTOC shall meet not later than 60 days from the date of this order [Dec. 15, 2021] and periodically thereafter.
(b) There shall be established a USCTOC Strategic Division (Division), an interagency working group housed at the Department of Justice, comprising personnel from agencies designated in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.
(i) The Division shall produce coordinated strategic plans for whole-of-government counter-TOC efforts in support of and in alignment with policy priorities established by the President through the National Security Council. These strategic plans shall be informed by intelligence assessments, be developed in coordination with agencies, and include recommendations for actions by agencies. The Division shall submit its completed strategic plans to the USCTOC.
(ii) The Division shall be chaired by a senior official from the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security. The Chairperson shall serve a 2 year term. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their designees, shall alternate every 2 years selecting the Chairperson.
(iii) The Division shall be established for administrative purposes within the Department of Justice, and the Department of Justice shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, provide administrative support and funding for the Division.
(iv) Agencies designated in subsection (a)(ii) of this section are hereby directed, consistent with their authorities, budget priorities, and mission constraints, and to the extent permitted by law and consistent with the need to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations, to provide to the Division:
(A) details or assignments of personnel, who shall be qualified subject-matter experts and strategic planners, and who shall serve on full-time assignments of not less than 1 year;
(B) relevant information, research, intelligence, and analysis; and
(C) such other resources and assistance as the Division may request for the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities outlined in this section.
(v) To the extent permitted by law, agencies designated in subsection (a)(ii) of this section are encouraged to detail or assign their employees to the Division on a non-reimbursable basis.
(vi) The Division, within 120 days of the date of this order, shall submit to the USCTOC a report describing a process that the USCTOC can implement on an ongoing basis and as necessary to identify and prioritize the most significant TOC threats in alignment with policy priorities established by the President through the National Security Council.
(a) the term "Intelligence Community" has the meaning ascribed to it under
(b) the term "transnational criminal organizations" refers to groups, networks, and associated individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, or monetary or commercial gain, wholly or in part by illegal means, while advancing their activities through a pattern of crime, corruption, or violence, and while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of public corruption or transnational logistics, financial, or communication mechanisms.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
J.R. Biden, Jr.
Steps for Increased Legal and Policy Transparency Concerning the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations
Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 5, 2016, 81 F.R. 94213, provided:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Since my earliest days in office, I have emphasized the importance of transparency and my commitment to making as much information as possible available to the Congress and the public about the United States use of military force and related national security operations. Doing so, I believe, not only supports the process of democratic decision making, but also demonstrates the legitimacy and strengthens the sustainability of our operations while promoting mutual understanding with our allies and partners.
The United States has used military force and conducted related national security operations within legal and policy frameworks that are designed to ensure that such operations are lawful and effective and that they serve our interests and values. Consistent with my commitment to transparency, my Administration has provided to the public an unprecedented amount of information regarding these frameworks through speeches, public statements, reports, and other materials. We have attempted to explain, consistent with our national security and the proper functioning of the executive branch, when and why the United States conducts such operations, the legal basis and policy parameters for such operations, and how such operations have unfolded, so that the American people can better understand them.
In addition to the efforts we have made to date, there is still more work that can be done to inform the public. Thus, consistent with my Administration's previous efforts, by this memorandum I am directing national security departments and agencies to take additional steps to share with the public further information relating to the legal and policy frameworks within which the United States uses military force and conducts related national security operations. Accordingly, I hereby direct as follows:
"National security departments and agencies" include the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other agencies as the President may designate.
"Related national security operations" include operations deemed relevant and appropriate by national security departments and agencies for inclusion in the report described in section 1 of this memorandum, such as detention, transfer, and interrogation operations.
Barack Obama.
National Security Presidential Memorandum–2. Organization of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council
National Security Presidential Memorandum–2, Jan. 28, 2017, 82 F.R. 9119, which related to the organization and functions of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, National Security Council staff, Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees, was revoked by Memorandum of President of the United States, part E, Apr. 4, 2017, 82 F.R. 16884, set out below.
National Security Presidential Memorandum–4. Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees
National Security Presidential Memorandum–4, Apr. 4, 2017, 82 F.R. 16881, provided:
Memorandum for the Vice President[,] the Secretary of State[,] the Secretary of the Treasury[,] the Secretary of Defense[,] the Attorney General[,] the Secretary of Agriculture[,] the Secretary of Health and Human Services[,] the Secretary of Transportation[,] the Secretary of Commerce[,] the Secretary of Energy[,] the Secretary of Homeland Security[,] the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff[,] the Director of the Office of Management and Budget[,] the Representative of the United States to the United Nations[,] the United States Trade Representative[,] the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers[,] the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System[,] the Director of National Intelligence[,] the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency[,] the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[,] the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[,] the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism[,] the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy[,] the Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy[,] the Assistant to the President for Intragovernmental and Technology Initiatives[,] the Counsel to the President[,] the Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President[,] the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development[,] the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration[,] the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission[,] the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation[,] the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy[,] the Director of National Drug Control Policy[,] the Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board[,] the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency[, and] the Archivist of the United States
As President, my highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of the American people. In order to advise and assist me in executing this solemn responsibility, as well as to protect and advance the national interests of the United States at home and abroad, I hereby direct that my system for national security policy development and decision making shall be organized as follows:
A. The National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Supporting Staff
The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. There is also a Homeland Security Council (HSC)—established through Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001, and subsequently codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002—that has the purpose of advising the President on matters pertaining to homeland security. Each Council is also responsible for the effective coordination of the security-related activities and functions of the executive departments and agencies.
The security threats facing the United States in the 21st century transcend international boundaries. Accordingly, the United States Government's decision-making structures and processes to address these challenges must remain equally adaptive and transformative. Both Councils are statutory bodies that the President will continue to chair. Invitations to participate in specific Council meetings shall be extended to those heads of executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, who are needed to address the issue or issues under consideration. When the President is absent from a meeting of either Council, the Vice President may preside at the President's direction.
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) shall be responsible, as appropriate and at the President's direction, for determining the agenda for the NSC or HSC, respectively, ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared and recording Council actions and Presidential decisions in a timely manner. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Homeland Security Advisor) may, at the sole discretion of the National Security Advisor, perform those functions. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy may, at the sole discretion of the National Security Advisor, perform those functions.
The NSC and HSC shall have as their regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Security Advisor, the Homeland Security Advisor, and the Representative of the United States to the United Nations. The Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also be regular attendees, as will the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC's regular attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
The Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff (Chief of Staff to the President), the Counsel to the President, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited as attendees to any NSC meeting.
In addition to the NSC and HSC, there is also a single NSC staff within the Executive Office of the President that serves both the NSC and HSC. The staff is composed of regional, issue-focused, and functional directorates and headed by a single civilian Executive Secretary, pursuant to
B. The Principals Committee
The Principals Committee (PC) shall continue to serve as the Cabinet-level senior interagency forum for considering policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States. The PC shall be convened and chaired by the National Security Advisor. The Homeland Security Advisor may, at the sole discretion of the National Security Advisor, also convene and chair the PC. The Chair shall determine the agenda in consultation with the appropriate committee members, and the Executive Secretary shall ensure that necessary papers are prepared, and that conclusions and decisions are communicated in a timely manner. Invitations to participate in or attend a specific PC shall be extended at the discretion of the Chair, and may include those Cabinet-level heads of executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, who are needed to address any issue under consideration.
The PC shall have as its regular attendees the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Advisor, the Homeland Security Advisor, and the Representative of the United States to the United Nations. The Counsel to the President, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may attend all PC meetings.
The Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (Deputy National Security Advisor), the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy, the Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and the Executive Secretary (who shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the PC) shall attend all of the meetings of the PC, and the Assistant to the President for Intragovernmental and Technology Initiatives may attend as appropriate.
When international economic issues are on the agenda of the PC, the Committee's regular attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (who shall serve as Chair for agenda items that principally pertain to international economics).
C. The Deputies Committee
The Deputies Committee (DC) shall continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of, and where appropriate, decision making on, policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States. The DC shall be convened and chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor. The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor may, at the sole discretion of the National Security Advisor, also convene and Chair the DC. The Chair shall determine the agenda in consultation with the regular DC attendees, and the Executive Secretary shall ensure that necessary papers are prepared and that conclusions and decisions are communicated in a timely manner. Invitations to participate in or attend a specific DC meeting shall be extended by the Chair to those at the Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary level of executive departments and agencies, and to other senior officials, who are needed to address any issue under consideration.
The DC shall have as its regular attendees the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Deputy National Security Advisor, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy, the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, the Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.
The Executive Secretary shall attend the DC meetings. The Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs may attend all DC meetings. Other senior officials, including the Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations, may be invited when appropriate.
The DC shall review and monitor the work of the interagency national security process, including the interagency groups established pursuant to section D below. The DC shall help to ensure that issues brought before the NSC, HSC, and PC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The DC shall also focus significant attention on monitoring the implementation of policies and decisions and shall conduct periodic reviews of the Administration's major national security and foreign policy initiatives. The DC is responsible for establishing Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) and for providing objectives and clear guidance.
D. Policy Coordination Committees
Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple executive departments and agencies typically shall be accomplished by the PCCs, with participation primarily occurring at the Assistant Secretary level. As the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policies, the PCCs shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the national security system and ensure timely responses to the President's decisions.
Regional and issue-related PCCs shall be established at the direction of the DC. Members of the NSC staff (or National Economic Council staff, as appropriate) will chair the PCCs; the DC, at its discretion, may add co-chairs to any PCC. The PCCs shall review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their respective policy areas. The Chair of each PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, shall invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the PCC where appropriate. The Chair of each PCC, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, may establish subordinate working groups to assist that PCC in the performance of its duties.
E. General
The President and the Vice President may attend any and all meetings of any entity established by or under this memorandum.
This document is part of a series of National Security Presidential Memoranda, which have replaced both Presidential Policy Directives and Presidential Study Directives as the instrument for communicating relevant Presidential decisions. This memorandum shall supersede all other existing Presidential directives and guidance on the organization or support of the NSC and the HSC, including National Security Presidential Memorandum–2 (January 28, 2017), which is hereby revoked. With regard to its application to economic matters, this document shall be interpreted in concert with any Executive Order governing the National Economic Council and with Presidential Memoranda signed hereafter that implement it or those Executive Orders.
The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Donald J. Trump.
§3022. Joint Intelligence Community Council
(a) Joint Intelligence Community Council
There is a Joint Intelligence Community Council.
(b) Membership
The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall consist of the following:
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, who shall chair the Council.
(2) The Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) The Secretary of Defense.
(5) The Attorney General.
(6) The Secretary of Energy.
(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(8) Such other officers of the United States Government as the President may designate from time to time.
(c) Functions
The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort to protect national security by—
(1) advising the Director on establishing requirements, developing budgets, financial management, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the intelligence community, and on such other matters as the Director may request; and
(2) ensuring the timely execution of programs, policies, and directives established or developed by the Director.
(d) Meetings
The Director of National Intelligence shall convene meetings of the Joint Intelligence Community Council as the Director considers appropriate.
(e) Advice and opinions of members other than Chairman
(1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Director of National Intelligence to the President or the National Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council, as the case may be.
(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Council.
(f) Recommendations to Congress
Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such member considers appropriate.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §101A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3023. Director of National Intelligence
(a) Director of National Intelligence
(1) There is a Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall not be located within the Executive Office of the President.
(b) Principal responsibility
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1) serve as head of the intelligence community;
(2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and
(3) consistent with section 1018 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.
(c) Prohibition on dual service
The individual serving in the position of Director of National Intelligence shall not, while so serving, also serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or as the head of any other element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §102, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 1018 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), is section 1018 of
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 102 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added and amended
Another prior section 102 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Merger of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 314 of
Presidential Guidelines on Implementation and Preservation of Authorities
"(1) the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and
"(2) the authority of the principal officers of the executive departments as heads of their respective departments, including, but not limited to, under—
"(A) section 199 of the Revised Statutes (
"(B) title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act (
"(C) the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 [Act Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 841, see Tables for classification];
"(D) section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (
"(E)
Report on Lessons Learned From Military Operations in Iraq
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Executive Documents
Executive Order No. 10656
Ex. Ord. No. 10656, Feb. 6, 1956, 21 F.R. 859, which established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 10938, May 4, 1961, 26 F.R. 3951, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 10938
Ex. Ord. No. 10938, May 4, 1961, 26 F.R. 3951, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 11460, Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 11460
Ex. Ord. No. 11460, Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 11984, May 4, 1977, 42 F.R. 23129, set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 11984. Abolition of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Ex. Ord. No. 11984, May 4, 1977, 42 F.R. 23129, provided:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, and as President of the United States of America, in order to abolish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969, is hereby revoked.
Jimmy Carter.
Executive Order No. 12331
Ex. Ord. No. 12331, Oct. 20, 1981, 46 F.R. 51705, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12537, Oct. 28, 1985, 50 F.R. 45083, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 12537
Ex. Ord. No. 12537, Oct. 28, 1985, 50 F.R. 45083, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12624, Jan. 6, 1988, 53 F.R. 489, which established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12863, §3.3, Sept. 13, 1993, 58 F.R. 48441, formerly set out as a note under
§3024. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
(a) Provision of intelligence
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided—
(A) to the President;
(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch;
(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders;
(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and
(E) to such other persons as the Director of National Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities.
(b) Access to intelligence
Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any Federal department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Budget authorities
(1) With respect to budget requests and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) based on intelligence priorities set by the President, provide to the heads of departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community, and to the heads of such agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies and organizations;
(B) based on budget proposals provided to the Director of National Intelligence by the heads of agencies and organizations within the intelligence community and the heads of their respective departments and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence Program budget; and
(C) present such consolidated National Intelligence Program budget, together with any comments from the heads of departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community, to the President for approval.
(2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph (1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the intelligence community shall provide the Director of National Intelligence such other information as the Director shall request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budget for each element of the intelligence community that is not within the National Intelligence Program.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for managing appropriations for the National Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation of such appropriations through the heads of the departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate supporting information) to the head of the department containing an agency or organization receiving any such allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for allocation to the elements of the intelligence community through the relevant host executive departments and the Central Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence Program in an expeditious manner.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that manage programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program, which shall include audits and evaluations.
(D) Consistent with subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program, including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are structured and executed in a manner than enables budget traceability.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this subsection shall be subject to
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding implementation of this section.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the President and the Congress not later than 15 days after learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying out the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in transfer and reprogramming of funds
(1)(A) No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs.
(2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program—
(A) to another such program;
(B) to other departments or agencies of the United States Government for the development and fielding of systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; or
(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program to address critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)—
(A) with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and
(B) after consultation with the heads of departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community to the extent such agencies or organizations are affected, and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and the terms and conditions governing such transfers and reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual appropriations Acts and this subsection.
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under this subsection only if—
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency;
(iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year—
(I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts available to a department or agency under the National Intelligence Program; and
(v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate an acquisition program.
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph (A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by the head of the department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
(6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
(7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of December 17, 2004.
(e) Transfer of personnel
(1)(A) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first twelve months after establishment of a new national intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in consultation with the congressional committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this paragraph to—
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the intelligence community to another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
(B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph only if—
(i) the personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; and
(ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this paragraph to—
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(D) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community to enable such element to increase the total number of personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis—
(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of such element is absent to participate in critical language training; or
(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another element of the intelligence community to provide language-capable services.
(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
(D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall include a description of—
(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community;
(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled or partially fulfilled through the use of such transfers; and
(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
(4) It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the nature of the national security threats facing the United States will continue to challenge the intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging and unforeseen requirements;
(B) both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be necessary should be fully and properly supported with appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the President's yearly budget requests adequately support those needs; and
(C) the President should utilize all legal and administrative discretion to ensure that the Director of National Intelligence and all other elements of the intelligence community have the necessary resources and procedures to respond promptly and effectively to emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
(f) Tasking and other authorities
(1)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall—
(i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination (including access by users to collected data consistent with applicable law and, as appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection (b) and analytic products generated by or within the intelligence community) of national intelligence;
(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, including—
(I) approving requirements (including those requirements responding to needs provided by consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection requirements and in the tasking of national collection assets of the elements of the intelligence community; and
(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence elements of those agencies and departments not within the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subparagraph (A) shall not apply—
(i) insofar as the President so directs;
(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence; or
(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to State government and local government officials and private sector entities pursuant to
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such other national intelligence centers as the Director determines necessary.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe, in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, binding personnel policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that—
(i) require and facilitate assignments and details of personnel to national intelligence centers, and between elements of the intelligence community over the course of the careers of such personnel;
(ii) set standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community;
(iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities;
(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds;
(v) require service in more than one element of the intelligence community as a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify, and take requisite steps to ensure compliance among elements of the intelligence community; and
(vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters.
(B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed services.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the intelligence community through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community.
(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability review of an element of the intelligence community or the personnel of such element in relation to a failure or deficiency within the intelligence community.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting an accountability review under subparagraph (A).
(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the findings of an accountability review conducted under subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the applicable element of the intelligence community. Such recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of personnel.
(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice of the determination not to implement the recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) conduct assessments and audits of the compliance of each element of the intelligence community with minimum insider threat policy;
(B) receive information from each element of the intelligence community regarding the collection, sharing, and use by such element of audit and monitoring data for insider threat detection across all classified and unclassified information technology systems within such element;
(C) provide guidance and oversight to Federal departments and agencies to fully implement automated records checks, consistent with personnel vetting reforms and the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, or successor initiative, and ensure that information collected pursuant to such records checks is appropriately shared in support of intelligence community-wide insider threat initiatives;
(D) carry out evaluations of the effectiveness of counterintelligence, security, and insider threat program activities of each element of the intelligence community, including with respect to the lowest organizational unit of each such element, that include an identification of any gaps, shortfalls, or resource needs of each such element;
(E) identify gaps, shortfalls, resources needs, and recommendations for adjustments in allocations and additional resources and other remedies to strengthen counterintelligence, security, and insider threat detection programs;
(F) pursuant to final damage assessments facilitated by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center that have been undertaken as a result of an unauthorized disclosure, determine whether the heads of the elements of the intelligence community implement recommended mitigation, and notify the congressional intelligence committees of such determinations and notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in cases involving elements of the intelligence community withing 1 the Department of Defense; and
(G) study the data collected during the course of background investigations and adjudications for security clearances granted to individuals who subsequently commit unauthorized disclosures, and issue findings regarding the quality of such data as a predictor for insider threat activity, delineated by the severity of the unauthorized disclosure.
(9) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure there is established a policy for minimum insider threat standards for the intelligence community and ensure compliance by the elements of the intelligence community with that policy.
(10) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such other intelligence-related functions as the President may direct.
(11) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as affecting the role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [
(g) Intelligence information sharing
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with national security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) establish uniform security standards and procedures;
(B) establish common information technology standards, protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology systems that include multi-level security and intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to share intelligence information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence community and ensure that elements of the intelligence community comply with such architecture;
(F) have procurement approval authority over all enterprise architecture-related information technology items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding regulation), establish—
(i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate cases, the formats for classified and unclassified intelligence products created by elements of the intelligence community for purposes of promoting the sharing of intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures requiring the increased use, in appropriate cases, and including portion markings, of the classification of portions of information within one intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully and effectively implement paragraph (1).
(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the specific written agreement of the head of the department or agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be considered to have met any obligation to provide any information, report, assessment, or other material (including unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or agency solely by virtue of having provided that information, report, assessment, or other material to the Director of National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability of access to intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with the protection of the national security of the United States.
(h) Analysis
To ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1) implement policies and procedures—
(A) to require sound analytic methods and tradecraft, independent of political considerations, throughout the elements of the intelligence community;
(B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all sources available; and
(C) to ensure that the elements of the intelligence community regularly conduct competitive analysis of analytic products, whether such products are produced by or disseminated to such elements;
(2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence analysis is appropriately proportional to resource allocation for intelligence collection systems and operations in order to maximize analysis of all collected data;
(3) ensure that substantial differences in analytic judgment are fully considered, brought to the attention of policymakers, and documented in analytic products; and
(4) ensure that sufficient relationships are established between intelligence collectors and analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the needs of analysts.
(i) Protection of intelligence sources and methods
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall protect, and shall establish and enforce policies to protect, intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish and implement requirements for the intelligence community for the following purposes:
(A) Classification of information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a way that source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form to the extent practicable.
(3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall ensure that any congressionally mandated report submitted to Congress by the head, other than such a report submitted solely to the congressional intelligence committees, shall be consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods in accordance with the policies established by the Director under paragraph (1), regardless of whether the provision of law mandating the report explicitly requires such protection.
(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter any congressional leadership's or congressional committee's jurisdiction or access to information from any element of the intelligence community under the rules of either chamber of Congress.
(j) Uniform procedures for classified information
The Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of the President, shall—
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer or employee of any agency or department of the United States and to employees of contractors of those agencies or departments;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those standards and procedures throughout such agencies and departments;
(3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by those agencies;
(4) ensure that the process for investigation and adjudication of an application for access to sensitive compartmented information is performed in the most expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable standards for national security;
(5) ensure that the background of each employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, each contractor to an element of the intelligence community, and each individual employee of such a contractor who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information is monitored on a continual basis under standards developed by the Director, including with respect to the frequency of evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee to such a contractor to determine whether such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, and such individual employee of such a contractor continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information; and
(6) develop procedures to require information sharing between elements of the intelligence community concerning potentially derogatory security information regarding an employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence community, or an individual employee of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee of such a contractor for a security clearance.
(k) Coordination with foreign governments
Under the direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
(l) Enhanced personnel management
(1)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of the intelligence community to serve—
(i) on the staff of the Director of National Intelligence;
(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence centers;
(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center; and
(iv) in other positions in support of the intelligence community management functions of the Director.
(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed.
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities.
(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may include the following:
(i) The establishment of special occupational categories involving service, over the course of a career, in more than one element of the intelligence community.
(ii) The provision of rewards for service in positions undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two or more elements of the intelligence community.
(iii) The establishment of requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation for service involving more than one element of the intelligence community.
(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by
(D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any other policies of the Director—
(i) may not require an employee of an office of inspector general for an element of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a position in an office or organization of such an element over which such office of inspector general exercises jurisdiction; and
(ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts employees of an office of inspector general from a rotation that may impact the independence of such office.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who are members of the uniformed services.
(B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned to an element of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed services.
(C) The personnel policies and programs developed and implemented under this subsection with respect to law enforcement officers (as that term is defined in
(D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint officer management policies prescribed by
(m) Additional authority with respect to personnel
(1) In addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to the personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same rights and protections under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(n) Acquisition and other authorities
(1) In carrying out the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final.
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion, delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a determination or decision as the head of the agency under an authority referred to in paragraph (1).
(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) until—
(i) the head of such element (without delegation) submits to the Director of National Intelligence a written request that includes—
(I) a description of such authority requested to be exercised;
(II) an explanation of the need for such authority, including an explanation of the reasons that other authorities are insufficient; and
(III) a certification that the mission of such element would be—
(aa) impaired if such authority is not exercised; or
(bb) significantly and measurably enhanced if such authority is exercised; and
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a written authorization that includes—
(I) a description of the authority referred to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be exercised; and
(II) a justification to support the exercise of such authority.
(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of acquisitions described in the request and authorization referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the intelligence community located within one of the departments described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures established by the head of such department.
(ii) The departments described in this clause are the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such an authority for not more than 6 years.
(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension period of not more than 6 years.
(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit—
(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an extension of such authorization that includes the written authorization referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii); and
(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed $50,000,000 annually.
(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a period of at least 6 years following the date of such request or authorization.
(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [
(5) Any authority provided to the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community pursuant to this subsection to make an expenditure referred to in subsection (a) of section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (
(6)
(A)
(B)
(ii) The heads of elements of the intelligence community shall, to the maximum extent practicable, delegate the authority delegated under clause (i) to the official of the respective element of the intelligence community responsible for decisions with respect to basic, applied, or advanced research activities or the adoption of such activities within such element.
(C)
(ii) Subject to section 4022(a)(2) of such title, the Director may enter into transactions and agreements (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) of amounts not to exceed $75,000,000 under this paragraph to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.
(iii) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations specified in section 4022(a)(2) of such title shall apply to the intelligence community in lieu of the Department of Defense, and the Director shall—
(I) identify appropriate officials who can make the determinations required in subparagraph (B)(i) of such section for the intelligence community; and
(II) brief the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives in lieu of the congressional defense committees, as specified in subparagraph (B)(ii) of such section.
(iv) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitation in section 4022(a)(3) of such title shall not apply to elements of the intelligence community.
(v) In carrying out this paragraph, section 4022(d)(1) of such title shall be applied by substituting "Director of National Intelligence" for "Secretary of Defense".
(vi) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations in section 4022(d)(2) of such title shall not apply to elements of the intelligence community.
(vii) In addition to the follow-on production contract criteria in section 4022(f)(2) of such title, the following additional criteria shall apply:
(I) The authorizing official of the relevant element of the intelligence community determines that Government users of the proposed production product or production service have been consulted.
(II) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, there are mechanisms in place for Government users to provide ongoing feedback to participants to the follow-on production contract.
(III) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, there are mechanisms in place to promote the interoperability and accessibility with and between Government and commercial software providers, including by the promotion of open application programming interfaces and requirement of appropriate software documentation.
(IV) The award follows a documented market analysis as mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations surveying available and comparable products.
(V) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, the follow-on production contract includes a requirement that, for the duration of such contract (or such other period of time as may be agreed to as a term of such contract)—
(aa) the participants provide the most up-to-date version of the product that is available in the commercial marketplace and is consistent with security requirements;
(bb) there are mechanisms in place for the participants to provide timely updates to the production product; and
(cc) the authority specified in section 4022(f)(5) of such title shall be exercised by the Director in lieu of the Secretary of Defense.
(D)
(i) not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, establish and implement an intelligence community-wide policy prescribing the use and limitations of the authority under this paragraph, particularly with respect to the application of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(ii) periodically review and update the policy established under clause (i); and
(iii) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the policy when established under clause (i) or updated under clause (ii).
(E)
(i)
(ii)
(I)
(aa) The number of transactions.
(bb) The participants to such transactions.
(cc) The purpose of the transaction.
(dd) The amount of each transaction.
(ee) Concerns with the efficiency of the policy.
(ff) Any recommendations for how to improve the process.
(II)
(o) Consideration of views of elements of intelligence community
In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall take into account the views of a head of a department containing an element of the intelligence community and of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(p) Certain Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence Relating to National Intelligence Program
(1) Subject to the direction of the President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the intelligence community that are within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other Federal departments and agencies.
(2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part of the National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner that conforms with the requirements of the national intelligence strategy under
(3) Not later than March 1 of each year, the President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a copy of the most recently updated National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any such successor mechanism).
(q) Acquisitions of major systems
(1) For each intelligence program within the National Intelligence Program for the acquisition of a major system, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) require the development and implementation of a program management plan that includes cost, schedule, security risks, and performance goals and program milestone criteria, except that with respect to Department of Defense programs the Director shall consult with the Secretary of Defense;
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, except that with respect to Department of Defense programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the designee of the Secretary; and
(C) periodically—
(i) review and assess the progress made toward the achievement of the goals and milestones established in such plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such review and assessment.
(2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall resolve the conflict.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate to any other official any authority to perform the responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term "intelligence program", with respect to the acquisition of a major system, means a program that—
(i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an element of the intelligence community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The term "major system" has the meaning given such term in
(r) Performance of common services
The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of departments and agencies of the United States Government containing elements within the intelligence community and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the performance by the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program of such services as are of common concern to the intelligence community, which services the Director of National Intelligence determines can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(s) Pay authority for critical positions
(1) Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at the discretion of the head of the department or agency employing the individual in a position covered by such authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence when granting such authority.
(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or exercised only—
(A) with respect to a position that requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual exceptionally well qualified for the position.
(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under
(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under
(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence.
(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director grants authority to the head of a department or agency under this subsection.
(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30 days after the date on which such head exercises such authority.
(t) Award of rank to members of the Senior National Intelligence Service
(1) The President, based on the recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer not already covered by such a rank award program in the same manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded a rank under
(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the intelligence community whose identity as such a member or officer is classified information (as defined in section 3126(1) 1 of this title).
(u) Conflict of interest regulations
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance thereof.
(v) Authority to establish positions in excepted service
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the head of the covered department concerned and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, may—
(A) convert competitive service positions, and the incumbents of such positions, within an element of the intelligence community in such department, to excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element; and
(B) establish new positions in the excepted service within an element of the intelligence community in such department, if the Director of National Intelligence determines such positions are necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element.
(2) An incumbent occupying a position on January 3, 2012, selected to be converted to the excepted service under this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the position may be converted to the excepted service.
(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a position converted or established pursuant to this subsection without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II and III of title 5.
(4) In this subsection, the term "covered department" means the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements intelligence community addendum
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall provide to the President, the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-related transfers to such countries.
(x) Requirements for intelligence community contractors
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall—
(1) ensure that—
(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence community with access to a classified network or classified information develops and operates a security plan that is consistent with standards established by the Director of National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; and
(B) each contract awarded by an element of the intelligence community includes provisions requiring the contractor comply with such plan and such standards;
(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such security plan complies with the requirements of such paragraph; and
(3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities and insider threat policies of the intelligence community, including the policy under subsection (f)(8), apply to facilities of contractors with access to a classified network.
(y) Fundraising
(1) The Director of National Intelligence may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations that—
(A) provide support to surviving family members of a deceased employee of an element of the intelligence community; or
(B) otherwise provide support for the welfare, education, or recreation of employees of an element of the intelligence community, former employees of an element of the intelligence community, or family members of such employees.
(2) In this subsection, the term "fundraising" means the raising of funds through the active participation in the promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of money by any other means.
(3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such fundraising.
(4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety.
(z) Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States
(1) Not later than 20 days after the completion of a review or an investigation of any proposed investment into the United States for which the Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the Director.
(2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of consideration by the United States Government of any investment described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine whether such investment will have an operational impact on the intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Each such report shall—
(A) describe the operational impact of the investment on the intelligence community; and
(B) describe any actions that have been or will be taken to mitigate such impact.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §102A, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (c)(6), is
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, referred to in subsec. (f)(6), (11), is
Executive Order No. 13526, referred to in subsec. (g)(1)(G), is set out as a note under
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, referred to in subsec. (l)(3)(C), is
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, referred to in subsecs. (m) and (n)(1), is act June 20, 1949, ch. 227,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
In subsec. (q)(4)(B), "
Prior Provisions
A prior section 102A of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added
Another prior section 102a of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (f)(3)(A).
Subsec. (f)(3)(A)(i).
Subsec. (f)(3)(A)(v).
Subsec. (f)(8) to (11).
Subsec. (n)(5), (6).
Subsec. (p)(3).
2022—Subsec. (c)(5)(C).
Subsec. (c)(5)(D).
Subsec. (f)(8).
Subsec. (f)(9), (10).
Subsec. (h)(1)(A).
Subsec. (h)(3).
Subsec. (i)(1).
Subsec. (i)(2).
Subsec. (i)(4).
Subsec. (m)(1).
Subsec. (n)(5).
Subsec. (p).
Subsec. (p)(3).
Subsec. (x).
Subsec. (x)(3).
2019—Subsec. (g)(1)(G).
Subsec. (q)(1)(A).
Subsec. (v)(3).
2017—Subsec. (f)(2).
Subsec. (l)(3)(D).
Subsec. (y).
Subsec. (z).
2015—Subsec. (u).
Subsec. (v)(3), (4).
2014—Subsec. (g)(4).
Subsec. (j).
Subsec. (j)(5), (6).
Subsec. (x).
2012—Subsec. (e)(3)(D).
Subsec. (v).
Subsec. (w).
2010—Subsec. (c)(3)(A).
Subsec. (d)(1)(B).
Subsec. (d)(2).
Subsec. (d)(3).
Subsec. (d)(5)(A).
Subsec. (d)(5)(B).
Subsec. (e)(3), (4).
Subsec. (f)(7) to (9).
Subsec. (g)(1)(G).
Subsec. (l)(2)(B).
Subsec. (n).
Subsec. (n)(4).
Subsecs. (s) to (u).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2015 Amendment
Effective Date of 2014 Amendment
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Policy and Performance Framework for Mobility of Intelligence Community Workforce
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) Human resources.
"(2) Medical reviews.
"(3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 13467 (
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 7302 of
Intelligence Community Commercial Remote Sensing Requirements
"(a)
"(1) the United States benefits from a robust commercial remote sensing industry that supports a science, technology, engineering, and mathematics academic pipeline, enables skilled manufacturing jobs, and fosters technological innovation;
"(2) commercial remote sensing capabilities complement and augment dedicated Government remote sensing capabilities, both when integrated into Government architectures and leveraged as stand-alone services;
"(3) the Director of National Intelligence and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should serve as the United States Government leads for commercial remote sensing procurement and seek to accommodate commercial remote sensing needs of the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and Federal civil organizations under the preview of the cognizant functional managers; and
"(4) a transparent, sustained investment by the United States Government in commercial remote sensing capabilities—
"(A) is required to strengthen the United States commercial remote sensing commercial industry; and
"(B) should include electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, hyperspectral, and radio frequency detection and other innovative phenemonology that may have national security applications.
"(b)
"(1) Validation of the current and long-term commercial remote sensing capability needs, as determined by the relevant functional managers, of the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and Federal civil users under the preview of the cognizant functional managers.
"(2) Development of commercial remote sensing requirements documents that are unclassified and releasable to United States commercial industry.
"(3) Development of a cost estimate that is unclassified and releasable to United States commercial industry, covering at least 5 years, associated with fulfilling the requirements contained in the commercial remote sensing requirements documents referred developed [sic] under paragraph (2).
"(c)
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives];
"(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
"(D) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 7509 of
Improving Onboarding of Personnel in Intelligence Community
"(a)
"(1) the date on which the individual is offered one or more entrance on duty dates; or
"(2) the date on which the individual enters on duty.
"(b)
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(e)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6601 of
Implementation Plan and Advisability Study for Offices of Commercial Integration
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) a plan for the establishment of a centralized office or offices within each appropriate element of the intelligence community, to be known as the 'Office of Commercial Integration', for the purpose of—
"(i) assisting persons desiring to submit an offer for a contract with the intelligence community; and
"(ii) assisting with the procurement of commercial products and commercial services; and
"(B) the findings of a study conducted by the Director into the advisability of implementing such plan, including an assessment of—
"(i) whether there should be a single Office of Commercial Integration for the intelligence community or whether each element of the intelligence community shall establish such an Office;
"(ii) the costs and benefits of the implementation of such plan; and
"(iii) whether there is within any element of the intelligence community an existing office or program similar to the proposed Office of Commercial Integration.
"(2)
"(A) A recommendation by the Director, based on the findings of the study under paragraph (1)(B), on—
"(i) how the plan under paragraph (1)(A) compares to specific alternative actions of the intelligence community that could be taken to assist persons desiring to submit an offer for a contract with the intelligence community and assist with the procurement of commercial products and commercial services; and
"(ii) whether to implement such plan.
"(B) A proposal for the designation of a senior official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who would be responsible for the coordination across the intelligence community or across the Offices of Commercial Integration, depending on the findings of the study under paragraph (1)(B).
"(C) Draft guidelines that would require the coordination and sharing of best practices and other information across the intelligence community.
"(D) A timeline of the steps that would be necessary to establish each Office of Commercial Integration by the date that is not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
"(E) An assessment of the personnel requirements, and any other resource requirements, that would be necessary to establish the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration by such date, including—
"(i) the amount of personnel necessary for the establishment of the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration; and
"(ii) the necessary qualifications of any such personnel.
"(F) Policies regarding the types of assistance that, if an Office or Offices of Commercial Integration were to be established, could be provided to contractors by the Director of such Office, taking into account the role of such assistance as an incentive for emerging technology companies to enter into contracts with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community.
"(G) Eligibility criteria for determining the types of offerors or contractors that would be eligible to receive assistance provided by each Office of Commercial Integration.
"(H) Policies regarding outreach efforts that would be required to be conducted by the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration with respect to eligible contractors.
"(I) Policies regarding how the intelligence community would coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide proactive counterintelligence risk analysis and assistance to entities in the private sector.
"(J) Draft guidelines that would require the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration to appoint and assign personnel with expertise in a range of disciplines necessary for the accelerated integration of commercial technologies into the intelligence community (as determined by the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration), including expertise in the following:
"(i) Authorizations to operate.
"(ii) Contracting.
"(iii) Facility clearances.
"(iv) Security clearances.
"(K) Such other intelligence community-wide policies as the Director of National Intelligence may prescribe relating to the improvement of commercial integration (and the coordination of such improvements) by and among the elements of the intelligence community.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) information, as appropriate, on the elements under subsection (a)(2) relating to that Office; and
"(B) contact information for the relevant senior officers of the Office or Offices."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6712 of
[For definitions of "commercial product", "commercial service", "emerging technology", and "authorization to operate" as used in section 6712 of
Pilot Program on Designated Emerging Technology Transition Projects
"(a)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a prioritized list of not more than 10 eligible projects per year to be considered for designation by the Director of National Intelligence as Emerging Technology Transition Projects during the budget formulation process.
"(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall designate not more than 10 eligible projects per year as Emerging Technology Transition Projects.
"(C) No eligible project may be designated by the Director of National Intelligence as an Emerging Technology Transition Project unless the head of an element of the intelligence community includes the project in the prioritized list under subparagraph (A) and submits to the Director of National Intelligence, with respect to the project, each of the following:
"(i) A justification of why the product was nominated for transition, including a description of the importance of the proposed product to the mission of the intelligence community and the nominating agency.
"(ii) A certification that the project provides new technologies or processes, or new applications of existing technologies, that shall enable more effective alternatives to existing programs, systems, or initiatives of the intelligence community.
"(iii) A certification that the project provides future cost savings, significantly reduces the time to deliver capabilities to the intelligence community, or significantly improves a capability of the intelligence community.
"(iv) A certification that funding is not proposed for the project in the budget request of the respective covered element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the project is submitted for consideration.
"(v) A certification in writing by the nominating head that the project meets all applicable criteria and requirements of the respective covered element for transition to production and that the nominating head would fund the project if additional funds were made available for such purpose.
"(vi) A description of the means by which the proposed production product shall be incorporated into the activities and long-term budget of the respective covered element following such transition.
"(vii) A description of steps taken to ensure that the use of the product shall reflect commercial best practices, as applicable.
"(D) A clear description of the selection of eligible projects, including specific criteria, that shall include, at a minimum, the requirements specified in subparagraph (C).
"(E) The designation of an official responsible for implementing this section and coordinating with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community with respect to the guidelines issued pursuant to paragraph (1) and overseeing the awards of funds to Emerging Technology Transition Projects with respect to that element.
"(3)
"(A) the Director of National Intelligence; or
"(B) the relevant head of a covered element of the intelligence community that previously submitted a project under subsection (b), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(d)
"(1)
"(A) A description of each designated project.
"(B) A summary of the potential of each designated project, as specified in subsection (b)(2)(C).
"(C) For each designated project, a description of the progress made toward delivering on such potential.
"(D) A description of any funding proposed for the designated project in the future-years intelligence program, including by program, appropriation account, expenditure center, and project.
"(E) Such other information on the status of such pilot program as the Director considers appropriate.
"(2)
"(e)
"(f)
"(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
"(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
"(3) The National Security Agency.
"(4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
"(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
"(6) The Defense Intelligence Agency."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6713 of
Harmonization of Authorizations To Operate
"(a)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
"(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
"(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
"(5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) A policy for reciprocal recognition, as appropriate, among the elements of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense of authorizations to operate held by commercial providers. Such reciprocal recognition shall be limited to authorizations to operate for systems that collect, process, maintain, use, share, disseminate, or dispose of data classified at an equal or lower classification level than the original authorization.
"(2) Procedures under which, subject to such criteria as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence jointly with the Secretary of Defense, a provider that holds an authorization to operate for a Department of Defense or intelligence community system may provide to the head of an element of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense the most recently updated version of any software, data, or application for use on such system without being required to submit an application for new or renewed authorization.
"(3) Procedures for the review, renewal, and revocation of authorizations to operate held by commercial providers, including procedures for maintaining continuous authorizations to operate, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. Such procedures may encourage greater use of modern security practices already being adopted by the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies, such as continuous authorization with system security focused on continuous monitoring of risk and security controls, active system defense, and the use of an approved mechanism for secure and continuous delivery of software (commonly referred to as 'DevSecOps').
"(4) A policy for the harmonization of documentation requirements for commercial providers submitting applications for authorizations to operate, with the goal of a uniform requirement across the Department of Defense and the elements of the intelligence community (subject to exceptions established by the Director and the Secretary). Such policy shall include the following requirements:
"(A) A requirement for the full disclosure of evidence in the reciprocity process across the Department of Defense and the elements of the intelligence community.
"(B) With respect to a system with an existing authorization to operate, a requirement for approval by the Chief Information Officer or a designated official (as the head of the respective element of the intelligence community determines appropriate) for such system to operate at an equal or higher level classification level, to be granted prior to the performance of an additional security assessment with respect to such system, and regardless of which element of the intelligence community or Department of Defense granted the original authorization.
"(5) A requirement to establish a joint secure portal of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense for the maintenance of records, applications, and system requirements for authorizations to operate.
"(6) A plan to examine, and if necessary, address, the shortage of intelligence community and Department of Defense personnel authorized to support and grant an authorization to operate. Such plan shall include—
"(A) a report on the current average wait times for authorizations to operate and backlogs, disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense;
"(B) appropriate recommendations to increase pay or implement other incentives to recruit and retain such personnel; and
"(C) a plan to leverage independent third-party assessment organizations to support assessments of applications for authorizations to operate.
"(7) Procedures to ensure data security and safety with respect to the implementation of the protocol.
"(8) A proposed timeline for the implementation of the protocol by the deadline specified in subsection (g).
"(e)
"(1) the Director of National Intelligence shall designate an official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence responsible for implementing this section on behalf of the Director and leading coordination across the intelligence community for such implementation;
"(2) the Secretary of Defense shall designate an official of the Department of Defense responsible for implementing this section on behalf of the Secretary and leading coordination across the Department of Defense for such implementation; and
"(3) each head of an element of the intelligence community shall designate an official of that element responsible for implementing this section and overseeing implementation of the protocol under subsection (b) with respect to the element.
"(f)
"(g)
[For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" as used in section 6714 of
[For definition of "authorization to operate" as used in section 6714 of
Compliance by Intelligence Community With Requirements of Federal Acquisition Regulation Relating to Commercially Available Off-the-Shelf Items and Commercial Services
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) Written criteria for an element of the intelligence community to evaluate when a procurement of a covered item or service is permissible, including—
"(i) requiring the element to conduct an independent market analysis to determine whether a commercially available off-the-shelf item, nondevelopmental item, or commercial service is viable; and
"(ii) a description of the offeror for such covered item or service and how the covered item or service to be acquired will be integrated into existing systems of the intelligence community.
"(B) A detailed set of performance measures for the acquisition personnel of the intelligence community that—
"(i) prioritizes adherence to parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation;
"(ii) encourages acquisition of commercially available off-the-shelf items, nondevelopmental items, or commercial services; and
"(iii) incentivizes such personnel of the intelligence community that enter into contracts for covered items or services only when necessary.
"(3)
"(A) the policy developed pursuant to paragraph (1); and
"(B) the plan to implement such policy by not later than 1 year after the date of such enactment.
"(4)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) An evaluation of the success of the policy, including with respect to the progress the elements have made in complying with parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
"(B) A description of how any market analyses are conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A)(i).
"(C) Any recommendations to improve compliance with such parts 10 and 12."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6716 of
[For definitions of "covered item or service", "commercial product", and "commercial service" as used in section 6716 of
Policy on Required User Adoption Metrics in Certain Contracts for Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Software Products
"(a)
"(1) With respect to a contract or other agreement entered into between the head of an element of the intelligence community and a commercial provider for the procurement of a covered product for users within the intelligence community, a requirement that each such contract or other agreement include, as a term of the contract or agreement, an understanding of the anticipated use of the covered product with a clear metric for success and for collecting user adoption metrics, as appropriate, for assessing the adoption of the covered product by such users.
"(2) Such exceptions to the requirements under paragraph (1) as may be determined appropriate pursuant to guidance established by the Director of National Intelligence.
"(3) A requirement that prior to the procurement of, or the continuation of the use of, any covered product procured by the head of an element of the intelligence community, the head has determined a method for assessing the success of the covered product from user adoption metrics.
"(b)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6717 of
[For definitions of "artificial intelligence", "emerging technology", and "covered product" as used in section 6717 of
Emerging Technology Education and Training
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(b)
"(1) the appropriate courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University;
"(2) the training curriculum established under subsection (a); and
"(3) best practices for monitoring, identifying, and procuring emerging technologies with potential benefit to the intelligence community, including commercial services and products.
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(A) an overview of—
"(i) the managers described in paragraph (1) who participated in the training activities; and
"(ii) what technologies were included in the training activities; and
"(B) an identification of other incentives, activities, resources, or programs the Director determines may be necessary to ensure the managers are generally trained in the most emerging technologies and able to retain and incorporate such technologies across the intelligence community."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6732 of
[For definitions of "emerging technology", "commercial service", and "commercial product" as used in section 6732 of
Improvements to Use of Commercial Software Products
"(a)
"(1) using, to the extent practicable, standardized terminology; and
"(2) in accordance with acquisition and operation best practices reflecting modern software as a service capabilities.
"(b)
"(1) Guidelines for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to determine which contracts for commercial software products are covered by the policy, including with respect to agreements, authorizations to operate, and other acquisition activities.
"(2) Guidelines for using standardized terms in such contracts, modeled after commercial best practices, including common procedures and language regarding—
"(A) terms for the responsible party and timelines for system integration under the contract;
"(B) a mechanism included in each contract to ensure the ability of the vendor to provide, and the United States Government to receive, continuous updates and version control for the software, subject to appropriate security considerations;
"(C) automatic technological mechanisms for security and data validation, including security protocols that are predicated on commercial best practices; and
"(D) procedures to provide incentives, and a technical framework, for system integration for new commercial software solutions to fit within existing workflows and information technology infrastructure.
"(3) Guidelines and a timeline for enforcing the policy.
"(c)
"(1) An evaluation of compliance with such policy by each of the elements of the intelligence community.
"(2) Additional recommendations to better coordinate system integration throughout the intelligence community using best practices."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6741 of
[For definitions of "commercial product" and "authorization to operate" as used in section 6741 of
Establishment of Fifth-Generation Technology Prize Competition
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
Establishment of Deepfakes Prize Competition
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
Identification of and Countermeasures Against Certain International Mobile Subscriber Identity-Catchers
"(a)
"(1) undertake an effort to identify International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers operated within the United States by—
"(A) hostile foreign governments; and
"(B) individuals who have violated a criminal law of the United States or of any State, or who have committed acts that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State; and
"(2) when appropriate, develop countermeasures against such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers, with prioritization given to such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers identified in the National Capital Region.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) commence carrying out the pilot program required by paragraph (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 [Dec. 23, 2022]; and
"(B) complete the pilot program not later than 2 years after the date on which the Director commences carrying out the pilot program under subparagraph (A).
"(c)
"(1) the placement of sensors designed to identify International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers capable of conducting surveillance against the United States Capitol or associated buildings and facilities; and
"(2) the discovery of any International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers capable of conducting surveillance against the United States Capitol or associated buildings and facilities and any countermeasures against such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers.
"(d)
"(1) the use of International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers operated by the individuals and governments described in subsection (a)(1);
"(2) potential countermeasures deployed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers; and
"(3) any legal or policy limitations with respect to the development or carrying out of such countermeasures.
"(e)
"(1)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
"(C) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
"(2)
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 5725 of
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable environment rules and regulations of such environment.
"(B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for such environment.
"(C) Documenting standards and practices of such environment.
"(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence community related to any disagreements arising out of the implementation of such environment.
"(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the intelligence community and carrying out such other responsibilities as are necessary for the effective implementation of such environment.
"(2)
"(A) providing core services, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence; and
"(B) providing the Director with information requested and required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director under paragraph (1).
"(3)
"(A)
"(B)
"(c)
"(1) management, financial control, and integration of such environment;
"(2) overseeing the performance of each core service, including establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;
"(3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core service of such environment, including testing by the intended users, to evaluate performance against measurable service requirements and to ensure the capability meets user requirements; and
"(4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
"(d)
"(e)
"(1) A description of the minimum required and desired core service requirements, including—
"(A) key performance parameters; and
"(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
"(2) Implementation milestones for the intelligence community information technology environment, including each of the following:
"(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core service capabilities during each of the following phases:
"(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity demonstration.
"(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.
"(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
"(iv) System retirement.
"(B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
"(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to incorporate core service capabilities.
"(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued capabilities to be phased out.
"(3) Such other matters as the Director determines appropriate.
"(f)
"(1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding requests for the intelligence community information technology environment within the proposed budget, including multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection (e).
"(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy information technology or alternative capabilities where services of the intelligence community information technology environment will also be available.
"(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify transition and restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services of the intelligence community information technology environment, as well as services of such environment that have changed designations as a core service.
"(g)
"(h)
"(i)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6312 of
Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards
"(a)
"(b)
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6314 of
Reports and Briefings on National Security Effects of Global Water Insecurity and Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics
"(a)
"(1)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest to the United States—
"(I) that are, as of the date of the report, at the greatest risk of instability, conflict, human insecurity, or mass displacement; or
"(II) where challenges relating to water insecurity are likely to emerge and become significant during the 5-year or the 20-year period beginning on the date of the report; and
"(ii) where challenges relating to water insecurity are likely to imperil the national security interests of the United States or allies of the United States.
"(C)
"(i) such stakeholders within the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State as the Director considers appropriate; and
"(ii) such additional Federal agencies and persons in the private sector as the Director considers appropriate.
"(D)
"(2)
"(b)
"(1)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the United States and the international political and economic system;
"(ii) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the United States and the international political and economic system; and
"(iii) contributing trends and factors to the matters assessed under clauses (i) and (ii).
"(C)
"(i) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic;
"(ii) the role and capacity of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
"(iii) the effectiveness of current international frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
"(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate."
[
[For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" as used in section 6722 of
Limitation on Activities of Employees of an Office of Inspector General
"(1)
"(A) provisions to prevent any conflict of interest related to a matter any employee of a covered office of an inspector general personally and substantially participated in during previous employment;
"(B) standards to ensure personnel of a covered office of an inspector general are free both in fact and in appearance from personal, external, and organizational impairments to independence;
"(C) provisions to permit the head of each covered office of an inspector general to waive the application of the policy with respect to an individual if such head—
"(i) prepares a written and signed justification for such waiver that sets out, in detail, the need for such waiver, provided that waivers shall not be issued for in fact impairments to independence; and
"(ii) submits to the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives] each such justification; and
"(D) any other protections the Director determines appropriate.
"(2)
"(A) the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; and
"(B) the office of an inspector general for—
"(i) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
"(ii) the Central Intelligence Agency;
"(iii) the National Security Agency;
"(iv) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
"(v) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
"(vi) the National Reconnaissance Office.
"(3)
Designation of Lead Intelligence Officer for Tunnels
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors; and
"(2) collaboration efforts between the United States and partner countries to address the use of tunnels by adversaries."
Reporting Process Required for Tracking Certain Requests for Country Clearance
"(a)
"(b)
Insider Threat Detection Program
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 402 of
Joint Procedures for Operational Coordination Between Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency
"(a)
"(1) Methods by which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense can improve communication and coordination in the planning, execution, and sustainment of operations, including, as a minimum—
"(A) information exchange between senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and senior officers and officials of the Department of Defense when planning for such an operation commences by either organization; and
"(B) exchange of information between the Secretary and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that senior operational officials in both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have knowledge of the existence of the ongoing operations of the other.
"(2) When appropriate, in cases where the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are conducting separate missions in the same geographical area, a mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.
"(b)
Alternative Analysis of Intelligence by the Intelligence Community
"(a)
"(b)
Enhancing Classified Counterterrorist Travel Efforts
"(1)
"(2)
Intelligence Community Use of National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
"(a)
"(b)
Pilot Program on Analysis of Signals and Other Intelligence by Intelligence Analysts of Various Elements of the Intelligence Community
Standardized Transliteration of Names Into the Roman Alphabet
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) all communications among the elements of the intelligence community; and
"(2) all intelligence products of the intelligence community."
Standards for Spelling of Foreign Names and Places and for Use of Geographic Coordinates
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(c)
"(1) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
"(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives."
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Periodic Reports on Expenditures
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Database Program Tracking
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Definitions
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(5)
"(6)
"(7)
"(8)
"(A) technology that is in a developmental stage or that may be developed during the subsequent 10-year period; or
"(B) any technology included in the Critical and Emerging Technologies List published by the White House in February 2022, or any successor document."
Executive Documents
Establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center
Memorandum of President of the United States, Feb. 25, 2015, 80 F.R. 11317, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of State[,] the Secretary of Defense[,] the Secretary of the Treasury[,] the Secretary of Commerce[,] the Attorney General[,] the Secretary of Homeland Security[,] the Director of National Intelligence[,] the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[,] the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency[,] the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation[, and] the Director of the National Security Agency
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct as follows:
(a) provide integrated all-source analysis of intelligence related to foreign cyber threats or related to cyber incidents affecting U.S. national interests;
(b) support the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, U.S. Cyber Command, and other relevant United States Government entities by providing access to intelligence necessary to carry out their respective missions;
(c) oversee the development and implementation of intelligence sharing capabilities (including systems, programs, policies, and standards) to enhance shared situational awareness of intelligence related to foreign cyber threats or related to cyber incidents affecting U.S. national interests among the organizations referenced in subsection (b) of this section;
(d) ensure that indicators of malicious cyber activity and, as appropriate, related threat reporting contained in intelligence channels are downgraded to the lowest classification possible for distribution to both United States Government and U.S. private sector entities through the mechanism described in section 4 of Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity); and
(e) facilitate and support interagency efforts to develop and implement coordinated plans to counter foreign cyber threats to U.S. national interests using all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities.
(b) Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide a status report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism on the establishment of the CTIIC. This report shall further refine the CTIIC's mission, roles, and responsibilities, consistent with this memorandum, ensuring that those roles and responsibilities are appropriately aligned with other Presidential policies as well as existing policy coordination mechanisms.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The DNI is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
1 So in original. Probably should be "within".
1 See References in Text note below.
§3025. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(a) Office of Director of National Intelligence
There is an Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Function
The function of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is to assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other applicable provisions of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law.
(c) Composition
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(3) Any Deputy Director of National Intelligence appointed under
(4) The National Intelligence Council.
(5) The General Counsel.
(6) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer.
(7) The Director of Science and Technology.
(8) The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.1
(13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
(14) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office, including national intelligence centers.
(d) Staff
(1) To assist the Director of National Intelligence in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
(2) The staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under section 1091 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
(e) Temporary filling of vacancies
With respect to filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the Director of National Intelligence),
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by substituting "an element of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (
(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting "the intelligence community" for "such agency".
(f) Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan region, as that term is defined in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This Act, referred to in subsec. (b), probably means
Section 1091 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, referred to in subsec. (d)(2), is section 1091 of
Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, referred to in subsec. (e)(1), was classified to
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 103 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added
Another prior section 103 of act July 26, 1947, was renumbered section 107 and is classified to former
Amendments
2017—Subsec. (c)(8).
2012—Subsecs. (e), (f).
2010—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c)(9) to (14).
Subsec. (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Reference to the National Counter Proliferation Center deemed to be a reference to the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, see section 401(e) of div. X of
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Required Staffing Document for Office of Director of National Intelligence
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) A description of the position.
"(B) The directorate, center, office, or other component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence within which the position is.
"(C) The element of the intelligence community designated to fill the position, if applicable.
"(D) The requisite type and level of skills for the position, including any special skills or certifications required.
"(E) The requisite security clearance level for the position.
"(F) The pay grade for the position.
"(G) Any special pay or incentive pay payable for the position.
"(3)
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 7307(b) of
Intelligence Community Coordinator for Accountability of Atrocities of the People's Republic of China
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(A) a member, official, or employee of the government of the People's Republic of China;
"(B) a member, official, or employee of the Chinese Communist Party;
"(C) a member of the armed forces, security, or other defense services of the People's Republic of China; or
"(D) an agent or contractor of a person specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
"(3)
"(4)
"(A) any person or entity that is not a United States person; or
"(B) any entity not organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States.
"(5)
"(6)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) Identifying and, as appropriate, disseminating within the United States Government, intelligence relating to atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
"(B) Identifying analytic and other intelligence needs and priorities of the United States Government with respect to the commitment of atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
"(C) Collaborating with appropriate counterparts across the intelligence community to ensure appropriate coordination on, and integration of the analysis of, the commitment of atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
"(D) Ensuring that relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government receive appropriate support from the intelligence community with respect to the collection, analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, downgrade and dissemination of intelligence products relating to the commitment of atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
"(3)
"(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1);
"(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the prioritization and integration of intelligence relating to atrocities of the People's Republic of China, including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall support the implementation of such strategy; and
"(C) the plan of the intelligence community to conduct a review of classified and unclassified intelligence reporting regarding atrocities of the People's Republic of China for downgrading, dissemination, and, as appropriate, public release.
"(4)
"(A) the analytical findings, changes in collection, and other activities of the intelligence community with respect to atrocities of the People's Republic of China; and
"(B) the recipients of intelligence reporting shared pursuant to this section in the prior quarter, including for the purposes of ensuring that the public is informed about atrocities of the People's Republic of China and to support efforts by the United States Government to seek accountability for the atrocities of the People's Republic of China, and the date of any such sharing.
"(c)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 7401 of
Intelligence Community Coordinator for Russian Atrocities Accountability
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(5)
"(A) a member of the armed forces, or the security or other defense services, of the Russian Federation;
"(B) an employee of any other element of the Russian Government; or
"(C) an agent or contractor of an individual specified in subparagraph (A) or (B).
"(6)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) Identifying, and (as appropriate) disseminating within the United States Government, intelligence relating to the identification, location, or activities of foreign persons suspected of playing a role in committing Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
"(B) Identifying analytic and other intelligence needs and priorities of the intelligence community with respect to the commitment of such Russian atrocities.
"(C) Addressing any gaps in intelligence collection relating to the commitment of such Russian atrocities and developing recommendations to address any gaps so identified, including by recommending the modification of the priorities of the intelligence community with respect to intelligence collection.
"(D) Collaborating with appropriate counterparts across the intelligence community to ensure appropriate coordination on, and integration of the analysis of, the commitment of such Russian atrocities.
"(E) Identifying intelligence and other information that may be relevant to preserve evidence of potential war crimes by Russia, consistent with the public commitments of the United States to support investigations into the conduct of Russia.
"(F) Ensuring the Atrocities Early Warning Task Force and other relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government receive appropriate support from the intelligence community with respect to the collection, analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
"(3)
"(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1); and
"(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the collection of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine, including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall support, and assist in facilitating the implementation of, such strategy.
"(4)
"(A)
"(i) the analytical findings and activities of the intelligence community with respect to Russian atrocities in Ukraine; and
"(ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant to this section for the purpose of ensuring accountability for such Russian atrocities, and the date of any such sharing.
"(B)
"(C)
"(c)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6512 of
1 See Change of Name note below.
2 See References in Text note below.
§3026. Deputy Directors of National Intelligence
(a) Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
(1) There is a Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise.
(4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community.
(5) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director.
(6) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of National Intelligence during the absence or disability of the Director of National Intelligence or during a vacancy in the position of Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Deputy Directors of National Intelligence
(1) There may be not more than four Deputy Directors of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Each Deputy Director of National Intelligence appointed under this subsection shall have such duties, responsibilities, and authorities as the Director of National Intelligence may assign or are specified by law.
(c) Military status of Director of National Intelligence and Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
(1) Not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in paragraph (2) may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status.
(2) The positions referred to in this paragraph are the following:
(A) The Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(3) It is the sense of Congress that, under ordinary circumstances, it is desirable that one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in paragraph (2)—
(A) be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, in active status; or
(B) have, by training or experience, an appreciation of military intelligence activities and requirements.
(4) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, while serving in a position specified in paragraph (2)—
(A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense;
(B) shall not exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law; and
(C) shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officer authorized for the military department of that officer.
(5) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (4), the appointment of an officer of the Armed Forces to a position specified in paragraph (2) shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade.
(6) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active duty who is appointed to a position specified in paragraph (2), while serving in such position and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances and shall not receive the pay prescribed for such position. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of National Intelligence.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3027. National Intelligence Council
(a) National Intelligence Council
There is a National Intelligence Council.
(b) Composition
(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.
(c) Duties and responsibilities
(1) The National Intelligence Council shall—
(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community and other information as specified in paragraph (2);
(B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and
(C) otherwise assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other consumers of intelligence.
(d) Service as senior intelligence advisers
Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government.
(e) Authority to contract
Subject to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section.
(f) Staff
The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
(g) Availability of Council and staff
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence.
(2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.
(h) Support
The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the Director of National Intelligence.
(i) National Intelligence Council product
For purposes of this section, the term "National Intelligence Council product" includes a National Intelligence Estimate and any other intelligence community assessment that sets forth the judgment of the intelligence community as a whole on a matter covered by such product.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103B, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3028. General Counsel
(a) General Counsel
There is a General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Prohibition on dual service as General Counsel of another agency
The individual serving in the position of General Counsel may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government.
(c) Scope of position
The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Functions
The General Counsel shall perform such functions as the Director of National Intelligence may prescribe.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103C, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3029. Civil Liberties Protection Officer
(a) Civil Liberties Protection Officer
(1) Within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, there is a Civil Liberties Protection Officer who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Duties
The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall—
(1) ensure that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program;
(2) oversee compliance by the Office and the Director of National Intelligence with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy;
(3) review and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in the administration of the programs and operations of the Office and the Director of National Intelligence and, as appropriate, investigate any such complaint or information;
(4) ensure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information;
(5) ensure that personal information contained in a system of records subject to
(6) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and
(7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law.
(c) Use of agency Inspectors General
When appropriate, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer may refer complaints to the Office of Inspector General having responsibility for the affected element of the department or agency of the intelligence community to conduct an investigation under paragraph (3) of subsection (b).
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103D, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Privacy Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(5), probably means the Privacy Act of 1974,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3030. Director of Science and Technology
(a) Director of Science and Technology
There is a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Requirement relating to appointment
An individual appointed as Director of Science and Technology shall have a professional background and experience appropriate for the duties of the Director of Science and Technology. In making such appointment, the Director of National Intelligence may give preference to an individual with experience outside of the United States Government.
(c) Duties
The Director of Science and Technology shall—
(1) act as the chief representative of the Director of National Intelligence for science and technology;
(2) chair the Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee under subsection (d);
(3) assist the Director in formulating a long-term strategy for scientific advances in the field of intelligence;
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(5) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee
(1) There is within the Office of the Director of Science and Technology a Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee.
(2) The Committee shall be composed of the principal science officers of the National Intelligence Program.
(3) The Committee shall—
(A) coordinate advances in research and development related to intelligence; and
(B) perform such other functions as the Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103E, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Emerging Technology Adoption
"(1) conduct reviews of the policies, standards, and procedures of the intelligence community that relate to emerging technologies and, as appropriate, recommend to the Director of National Intelligence changes to such policies, standards, and procedures, to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by the intelligence community;
"(2) make recommendations, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, to the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the budgets of such elements, to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by such elements; and
"(3) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on initiatives, policies, and programs carried out jointly between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies."
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6703(a) of
[For definition of "emerging technology" as used in section 6703(a) of
§3031. Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center
(a) Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center
The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center appointed under section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (
(b) Duties
The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103F, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, referred to in subsec. (b), is title IX of
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3032. Chief Information Officer
(a) Chief Information Officer
To assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under this chapter and other applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by the Director. The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Duties and responsibilities
Subject to the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall—
(1) manage activities relating to the information technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture requirements of the intelligence community;
(2) have procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all intelligence community components;
(3) direct and manage all information technology-related procurement for the intelligence community; and
(4) ensure that all expenditures for information technology and research and development activities are consistent with the intelligence community enterprise architecture and the strategy of the Director for such architecture.
(c) Prohibition on simultaneous service as other chief information officer
An individual serving in the position of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the United States Government.
(d) Prohibition on simultaneous service as Chief Data Officer and Chief Information Officer
An individual serving in the position of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community or chief information officer of any other element of the intelligence community shall not concurrently serve as the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103G, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (d).
2019—Subsec. (a).
2010—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b) to (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
§3033. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
(a) Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose
The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is—
(1) to create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed—
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and activities; and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and activities;
(3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about—
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of—
(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
(1) There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made—
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with security standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the substantive rationale, including detailed and case-specific reasons, for the removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.
(B) If there is an open or completed inquiry into the Inspector General that relates to the removal or transfer of the Inspector General under subparagraph (A), the written communication required under that subparagraph shall—
(i) identify each entity that is conducting, or that conducted, the inquiry; and
(ii) in the case of a completed inquiry, contain the findings made during the inquiry.
(5)(A) Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, only the President may place the Inspector General on nonduty status.
(B) If the President places the Inspector General on nonduty status, the President shall communicate in writing the substantive rationale, including detailed and case-specific reasons, for the change in status to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 15 days before the date on which the change in status takes effect, except that the President may submit that communication not later than the date on which the change in status takes effect if—
(i) the President has made a determination that the continued presence of the Inspector General in the workplace poses a threat described in any of clauses (i) through (iv) of
(ii) in the communication, the President includes a report on the determination described in clause (i), which shall include—
(I) a specification of which clause of
(II) the substantive rationale, including detailed and case-specific reasons, for the determination made under clause (i);
(III) an identification of each entity that is conducting, or that conducted, any inquiry upon which the determination under clause (i) was made; and
(IV) in the case of an inquiry described in subclause (III) that is completed, the findings made during that inquiry.
(C) The President may not place the Inspector General on nonduty status during the 30-day period preceding the date on which the Inspector General is removed or transferred under paragraph (4)(A) unless the President—
(i) has made a determination that the continued presence of the Inspector General in the workplace poses a threat described in any of clauses (i) through (iv) of
(ii) not later than the date on which the change in status takes effect, submits to the congressional intelligence committees a written communication that contains the information required under subparagraph (B), including the report required under clause (ii) of that subparagraph.
(6)(A) In this subsection, the term "first assistant to the position of Inspector General" has the meaning given in section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).1
(B) If the Inspector General dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the position—
(i)
(ii) subject to subparagraph (D), the first assistant to the position of Inspector General shall perform the functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of
(iii) notwithstanding clause (ii), and subject to subparagraphs (D) and (E), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee of any Office of an Inspector General to perform the functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of
(I) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the Inspector General, the officer or employee served in a position in an Office of an Inspector General for not less than 90 days, except that—
(aa) the requirement under this subclause shall not apply if the officer is an Inspector General; and
(bb) for the purposes of this clause, performing the functions and duties of an Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity does not qualify as service in a position in an Office of an Inspector General;
(II) the rate of pay for the position of the officer or employee described in subclause (I) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS–15 of the General Schedule;
(III) the officer or employee has demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations; and
(IV) not later than 30 days before the date on which the direction takes effect, the President communicates in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the substantive rationale, including the detailed and case-specific reasons, for such direction, including the reason for the direction that someone other than the individual who is performing the functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity (as of the date on which the President issues that direction) perform those functions and duties temporarily in an acting capacity.
(C) Notwithstanding
(i) the first assistant to the position of Inspector General shall perform the functions and duties of the position temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of
(ii) if the first assistant described in clause (i) dies, resigns, or becomes otherwise unable to perform those functions and duties, the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee in the Office of Inspector General to perform those functions and duties temporarily in an acting capacity, subject to the time limitations of
(I) that direction satisfies the requirements under subclauses (II), (III), and (IV) of subparagraph (B)(iii); and
(II) that officer or employee served in a position in that Office of Inspector General for not fewer than 90 of the 365 days preceding the date on which the President makes that direction.
(D) An individual may perform the functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily and in an acting capacity under clause (ii) or (iii) of subparagraph (B), or under subparagraph (C), with respect to only 1 Inspector General position at any given time.
(E) If the President makes a direction under subparagraph (B)(iii), during the 30-day period preceding the date on which the direction of the President takes effect, the functions and duties of the position of the Inspector General shall be performed by—
(i) the first assistant to the position of Inspector General; or
(ii) the individual performing those functions and duties temporarily in an acting capacity, as of the date on which the President issues that direction, if that individual is an individual other than the first assistant to the position of Inspector General.
(d) Assistant Inspectors General
Subject to the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall—
(1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of auditing activities relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director;
(2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of investigative activities relating to such programs and activities; and
(3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that, in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
(e) Duties and responsibilities
It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community—
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning such problems, and to report on the progress made in implementing such corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing.
(f) Limitations on activities
(1) The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate.
(g) Authorities
(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and reports relating to the administration of the programs and activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General, necessary or desirable.
(B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.
(D) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (C).
(E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director, another appropriate official of the intelligence community, shall take appropriate administrative actions against an employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the intelligence community—
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken, and this provision shall qualify as a withholding statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such information to the Inspector General may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including electronically stored information, as well as any tangible thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States.
(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized by
(7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
(h) Coordination among Inspectors General
(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the inspectors general.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the inspectors general concerned may request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a dispute between an inspector general within a department or agency of the United States Government and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not been resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors general shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency for resolution.
(2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory or administrative inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
(B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph (A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than one of its members.
(3) The inspector general conducting an investigation, inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review.
(i) Counsel to the Inspector General
(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall—
(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or
(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another inspector general or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1) shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may prescribe.
(j) Staff and other support
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General has final approval of—
(A) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of the Inspector General; and
(B) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal, State (as defined in
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence community and in coordination with that element's inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(k) Reports
(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the head of that department simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted during the period covered by such report.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities of the intelligence community within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action.
(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and activities.
(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of the report involving a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such department simultaneously with transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.
(3)(A) In the event that—
(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
(ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former intelligence community official who—
(I) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis;
(II) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community, including a position held on an acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or
(III) holds or held a position as head of an element of the intelligence community or a position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
(iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in clause (ii);
(iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in clause (ii); or
(v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such matter.
(B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by the Inspector General focused on any current or former official of a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.
(4) The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted by the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either committee.
(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee—
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G)(i) In this paragraph, the term "urgent concern" means any of the following:
(I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity of the Federal Government that is—
(aa) a matter of national security; and
(bb) not a difference of opinion concerning public policy matters.
(II) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.
(III) An action, including a personnel action described in
(ii) Within the executive branch, the Inspector General shall have sole authority to determine whether any complaint or information reported to the Inspector General is a matter of urgent concern under this paragraph.
(H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the protections afforded to an employee under
(I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.
(6) In accordance with
(l) Construction of duties regarding elements of Intelligence Community
Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating to such element.
(m) Separate budget account
The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(n) Budget
(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate and request to the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such fiscal year—
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training requirements of the Inspector General, including a certification from the Inspector General that the amount requested is sufficient to fund all training requirements for the Office of the Inspector General; and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including a justification for such amount.
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall include for such fiscal year—
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, with respect to such proposed budget.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal year—
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the Director for the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director for the training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director for support for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector General from performing the duties of the Office of the Inspector General.
(o) Information on website
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103H, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, referred to in subsec. (c)(6)(A), is section 3 of
GS–15 of the General Schedule, referred to in subsec. (c)(6)(B)(iii)(II), is set out under
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (c)(4).
Subsec. (c)(5).
Subsec. (c)(6).
Subsec. (k)(5)(G).
Subsec. (k)(5)(G)(i)(I).
Subsec. (k)(5)(H).
2019—Subsec. (j)(4)(A).
2015—Subsec. (j)(4)(A).
Subsec. (j)(4)(B).
2014—Subsec. (g)(3)(A).
Subsec. (k)(5)(I).
2013—Subsec. (k)(1)(A).
2012—Subsec. (o).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2022 Amendment
Amendment by section 5203(b) of
Construction
Oversight by Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Over Intelligence Community Whistleblower Matters
"(a)
"(1) Submission of complaints by whistleblowers to inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community relating to the programs and activities under the jurisdiction of the Director of National Intelligence, and information related to such complaints.
"(2) Actions taken by an inspector general of an element of the Intelligence Community relating to such complaints.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) protect the privacy of whistleblowers, including by preventing dissemination without the consent of the whistleblower, of any information submitted previously by a whistleblower to an inspector general of an element of the intelligence community; and
"(B) ensure compliance with the requirements of subsection (a), while—
"(i) ensuring that the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community can oversee whistleblower policies and practices and identify matters that, in the judgment of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, may be the subject of an investigation, inspection, audit, or review by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; and
"(ii) avoiding the imposition of inappropriate resource burdens on inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community."
[For definition of "whistleblower" as used in section 5334 of
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 5334 of
Definitions
"(1)
"(2)
1 See References in Text note below.
2 So in original. Probably should be "involve".
§3034. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community
(a) Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community
To assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under this chapter and other applicable provisions of law, there is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by the Director. The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Duties and responsibilities
Subject to the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community shall—
(1) serve as the principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on the management and allocation of intelligence community budgetary resources;
(2) participate in overseeing a comprehensive and integrated strategic process for resource management within the intelligence community;
(3) ensure that the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence—
(A) is based on budgetary constraints as specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans and Long-term Budget Projections required under
(B) contains specific goals and objectives to support a performance-based budget;
(4) prior to the obligation or expenditure of funds for the acquisition of any major system pursuant to a Milestone A or Milestone B decision, receive verification from appropriate authorities that the national requirements for meeting the strategic plan of the Director have been established, and that such requirements are prioritized based on budgetary constraints as specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans and the Long-term Budget Projections for such major system required under
(5) ensure that the collection architectures of the Director are based on budgetary constraints as specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans and the Long-term Budget Projections required under
(6) coordinate or approve representations made to Congress by the intelligence community regarding National Intelligence Program budgetary resources;
(7) participate in key mission requirements, acquisitions, or architectural boards formed within or by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(8) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Other law
The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the Chief Financial Officer of the intelligence community and, to the extent applicable, shall have the duties, responsibilities, and authorities specified in
(d) Prohibition on simultaneous service as other Chief Financial Officer
An individual serving in the position of Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community may not, while so serving, serve as the chief financial officer of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the United States Government.
(e) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "major system" has the meaning given that term in
(2) The term "Milestone A" has the meaning given that term in section 3103(f) 1 of this title.
(3) The term "Milestone B" has the meaning given that term in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103I, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a).
1 So in original.
§3034a. Functional Managers for the intelligence community
(a) Functional Managers authorized
The Director of National Intelligence may establish within the intelligence community one or more positions of manager of an intelligence function. Any position so established may be known as the "Functional Manager" of the intelligence function concerned.
(b) Personnel
The Director shall designate individuals to serve as manager of intelligence functions established under subsection (a) from among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community.
(c) Duties
Each manager of an intelligence function established under subsection (a) shall have the duties as follows:
(1) To act as principal advisor to the Director on the intelligence function.
(2) To carry out such other responsibilities with respect to the intelligence function as the Director may specify for purposes of this section.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103J, as added
§3034b. Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer
(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer
There is an Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Requirement relating to appointment
An individual appointed as the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer shall have a professional background and experience appropriate for the duties of the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer. In making such appointment, the Director of National Intelligence may give preference to an individual with experience outside of the United States Government.
(c) Duties
The Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer shall—
(1) act as the chief representative of the Director of National Intelligence for data issues within the intelligence community;
(2) coordinate, to the extent practicable and advisable, with the Chief Data Officer of the Department of Defense to ensure consistent data policies, standards, and procedures between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense;
(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence regarding data elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(4) perform other such duties relating to data as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified in law.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103K, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (c)(4).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Removal of Unrelated Duties and Functions
§3034c. Intelligence Community Innovation Unit
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Emerging technology
the term "emerging technology" has the meaning given that term in section 6701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (
(2) Unit
The term "Unit" means the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.
(b) Plan for implementation of Intelligence Community Innovation Unit
(1) Plan required
Not later than 180 days after December 22, 2023, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan for how to implement the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit within the intelligence community.
(2) Matters covered
The plan developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall cover how the Unit will—
(A) benefit heads of the elements of the intelligence community in identifying commercial emerging technologies and associated capabilities to address critical mission needs of elements of the intelligence community;
(B) provide to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community seeking to field commercial emerging technologies technical expertise with respect to such technologies.
(C) facilitate the transition of potential prototypes and solutions to critical mission needs of the intelligence community from research and prototype projects to production; and
(D) serve as a liaison between the intelligence community and the private sector, in which capacity such liaison shall focus on small- and medium-sized companies and other organizations that do not have significant experience engaging with the intelligence community.
(3) Requirements
The plan developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—
(A) plan for not more than 50 full-time equivalent personnel; and
(B) include an assessment as to how the establishment of the Unit would benefit the identification and evaluation of commercial emerging technologies for prototyping and potential adoption by the intelligence community to fulfill critical mission needs.
(4) Submission to Congress
Upon completing development of the plan pursuant to paragraph (1), the Director shall—
(A) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a copy of the plan; and
(B) provide such committees and subcommittees a briefing on the plan.
(c) Establishment
To the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in this section, not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits the plan pursuant to subsection (b)(4)(A), the Director of National Intelligence shall establish the Unit within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Limitation
The Unit shall not abrogate or otherwise constrain any element of the intelligence community from conducting authorized activities.
(e) Director of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit
(1) Appointment; reporting
The head of the Unit is the Director of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Qualifications
In selecting an individual for appointment as the Director of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit, the Director of National Intelligence shall give preference to individuals who the Director of National Intelligence determines have—
(A) significant relevant experience involving commercial emerging technology within the private sector; and
(B) a demonstrated history of fostering the adoption of commercial emerging technologies by the United States Government or the private sector.
(f) Staff
(1) In general
In addition to the Director of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit, the Unit shall be composed of not more than 50 full-time equivalent positions.
(2) Staff with certain expertise
The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that there is a sufficient number of staff of the Unit, as determined by the Director, with expertise in—
(A) other transaction authorities and nontraditional and rapid acquisition pathways for emerging technology;
(B) engaging and evaluating small- and medium-sized emerging technology companies;
(C) the mission needs of the intelligence community; and
(D) such other skills or experiences as the Director determines necessary.
(g) Authority relating to detailees
Upon request of the Unit, each head of an element of the intelligence community may detail to the Unit any of the personnel of that element to assist in carrying out the duties under subsection (b) on a reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
(h) Ensuring transition from prototyping to production
The Director of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit shall transition research and prototype projects to products in a production stage upon identifying a demonstrated critical mission need of one or more elements of the intelligence community and a potential mission partner likely to field and further fund upon maturation, including by designating projects as Emerging Technology Transition Projects under the pilot program required by section 6713 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (
(i) Encouragement of use by elements
The Director of National Intelligence shall take such steps as may be necessary to encourage the use of the Unit by the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community.
(j) Rules of construction
(1) No preferential treatment for private sector
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any element of the intelligence community to provide preferential treatment for any private sector entity with regard to procurement of technology construed as restricting or preempting any activities of the intelligence community.
(2) No additional authority
The Unit established pursuant to subsection (c) will be limited to the existing authorities possessed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(k) Sunset
The authorities and requirements of this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the establishment of the Unit.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §103L, as added
§3035. Central Intelligence Agency
(a) Central Intelligence Agency
There is a Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Function
The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the responsibilities specified in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §104, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 104 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added
Another prior section 104 of act July 26, 1947, was renumbered section 108 and is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Executive Documents
Communication of Restricted Data
Authorization for the communication of Restricted Data by the Central Intelligence Agency, see Ex. Ord. No. 10899, eff. Dec. 9, 1960, 25 F.R. 12729, set out as a note under
§3036. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency
There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Supervision
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Duties
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—
(1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
(2) carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (d).
(d) Responsibilities
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—
(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;
(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and
(4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.
(e) Termination of employment of CIA employees
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the Director deems the termination of employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of Personnel Management.
(f) Coordination with foreign governments
Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §104A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (g).
2012—Subsec. (g)(1).
Subsec. (g)(2).
2010—Subsec. (g)(1).
2004—Subsec. (g).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Creating an Official Record of the Osama Bin Laden Operation
"(a)
"(1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
"(2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat to the United States and the international community.
"(3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian passengers to disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
"(4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England.
"(5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden to justice.
"(6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as 'the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism'.
"(7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world.
"(8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism.
"(9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and the intelligence community prompted the Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, 'Never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.'.
"(10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national security.
"(11) President Obama said, 'For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda.'.
"(b)
"(1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the best of the intelligence community's capabilities and teamwork;
"(2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this event as a defining point in the history of the United States;
"(3) it is vitally important that the United States memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that future generations will have an official record of the events that transpired before, during, and as a result of the operation; and
"(4) preserving this history now will allow the United States to have an accurate account of the events while those that participated in the events are still serving in the Government.
"(c)
"(d)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 414 of
Annual Report on Foreign Companies Involved in the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction That Raise Funds in the United States Capital Markets
Executive Documents
Executive Order No. 13355
Ex. Ord. No. 13355, Aug. 27, 2004, 69 F.R. 53593, which related to strengthened management of the Intelligence Community, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12333, §3.6, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59954, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13470, §4(j), July 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 45341, set out as a note under
§3037. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President.
(b) Duties
The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—
(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
(2) during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, act for and exercise the powers of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §104B, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
"(1) the date of the appointment by the President of an individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency pursuant to section 104B of the National Security Act of 1947 [
"(2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the individual administratively performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act."
§3038. Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense pertaining to National Intelligence Program
(a) In general
Consistent with
(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such elements are performing governmentwide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies;
(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director by elements of the Department of Defense within the National Intelligence Program;
(3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of the Department of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under the National Intelligence Program;
(4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces;
(5) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense; and
(6) ensure that intelligence activities of the Department of Defense are conducted jointly where appropriate.
(b) Responsibility for performance of specific functions
Consistent with
(1) through the National Security Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall ensure that the product is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized recipients;
(2) through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), with appropriate representation from the intelligence community, the continued operation of an effective unified organization within the Department of Defense—
(A) for carrying out tasking of imagery collection;
(B) for the coordination of imagery processing and exploitation activities;
(C) for ensuring the dissemination of imagery in a timely manner to authorized recipients; and
(D) notwithstanding any other provision of law, for—
(i) prescribing technical architecture and standards related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information and ensuring compliance with such architecture and standards; and
(ii) developing and fielding systems of common concern related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information;
(3) through the National Reconnaissance Office (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the research and development, acquisition, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy the requirements of all elements of the intelligence community;
(4) through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified system within the Department of Defense for the production of timely, objective military and military-related intelligence, based upon all sources available to the intelligence community, and shall ensure the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to authorized recipients;
(5) through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), effective management of Department of Defense human intelligence and counterintelligence activities, including defense attaches; and
(6) that the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence to meet—
(A) the requirements of the Director of National Intelligence;
(B) the requirements of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
(C) the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands and of joint operations; and
(D) the specialized requirements of the military departments for intelligence necessary to support tactical commanders, military planners, the research and development process, the acquisition of military equipment, and training and doctrine.
(c) Expenditure of funds by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may expend amounts made available to the Director under the National Intelligence Program for human intelligence and counterintelligence activities for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, without regard to the provisions of law or regulation relating to the expenditure of Government funds.
(2) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not expend more than five percent of the amounts made available to the Director under the National Intelligence Program for human intelligence and counterintelligence activities for a fiscal year for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature in accordance with paragraph (1) during such fiscal year unless—
(A) the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of the intent to expend the amounts; and
(B) 30 days have elapsed from the date on which the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in accordance with subparagraph (A).
(3) For each expenditure referred to in paragraph (1), the Director shall certify that such expenditure was made for an object of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature.
(4) Not later than December 31 of each year, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on any expenditures made during the preceding fiscal year in accordance with paragraph (1).
(d) Use of elements of Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense, in carrying out the functions described in this section, may use such elements of the Department of Defense as may be appropriate for the execution of those functions, in addition to, or in lieu of, the elements identified in this section.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §105, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1).
2016—Subsec. (c)(2), (4).
2011—Subsec. (b)(5).
Subsecs. (c), (d).
2004—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(6)(A).
2003—Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (d)(3).
2002—Subsec. (d).
1996—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (d).
1994—Subsec. (b)(2).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date of 2003 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Amendment by
Department of Defense Strategy for Open-source Intelligence
"(a)
"(1) Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.
"(2) With the Information Revolution, the amount, significance, and accessibility of open-source information has expanded significantly, but the intelligence community has not expanded its exploitation efforts and systems to produce open-source intelligence.
"(3) The production of open-source intelligence is a valuable intelligence discipline that must be integrated into intelligence tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination to ensure that United States policymakers are fully and completely informed.
"(4) The dissemination and use of validated open-source intelligence inherently enables information sharing since open-source intelligence is produced without the use of sensitive sources and methods. Open-source intelligence products can be shared with the American public and foreign allies because of the unclassified nature of open-source intelligence.
"(5) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (popularly referred to as the '9/11 Commission'), in its final report released on July 22, 2004, identified shortfalls in the ability of the United States to use all-source intelligence, a large component of which is open-source intelligence.
"(6) In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (
"(7) The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, in its report to the President released on March 31, 2005, found that 'the need for exploiting open-source material is greater now than ever before,' but that 'the Intelligence Community's open source programs have not expanded commensurate with either the increase in available information or with the growing importance of open source data to today's problems'.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(c)
"(1) A plan for providing funds over the period of the future-years defense program for the development of a robust open-source intelligence capability for the Department of Defense, with particular emphasis on exploitation and dissemination.
"(2) A description of how management of the collection of open-source intelligence is currently conducted within the Department of Defense and how that management can be improved.
"(3) A description of the tools, systems, centers, organizational entities, and procedures to be used within the Department of Defense to perform open-source intelligence tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
"(4) A description of proven tradecraft for effective exploitation of open-source intelligence, to include consideration of operational security.
"(5) A detailed description on how open-source intelligence will be fused with all other intelligence sources across the Department of Defense.
"(6) A description of—
"(A) a training plan for Department of Defense intelligence personnel with respect to open-source intelligence; and
"(B) open-source intelligence guidance for Department of Defense intelligence personnel.
"(7) A plan to incorporate the function of oversight of open-source intelligence—
"(A) into the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; and
"(B) into service intelligence organizations.
"(8) A plan to incorporate and identify an open-source intelligence specialty into personnel systems of the Department of Defense, including military personnel systems.
"(9) A plan for the use of intelligence personnel of the reserve components to augment and support the open-source intelligence mission.
"(10) A plan for the use of the Open-Source Information System for the purpose of exploitation and dissemination of open-source intelligence."
Role of Director of Central Intelligence in Experimental Personnel Program for Certain Scientific and Technical Personnel
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
§3039. Assistance to United States law enforcement agencies
(a) Authority to provide assistance
Subject to subsection (b), elements of the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements may collect such information notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency intends to use the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement investigation or counterintelligence investigation.
(b) Limitation on assistance by elements of Department of Defense
(1) With respect to elements within the Department of Defense, the authority in subsection (a) applies only to the following:
(A) The National Security Agency.
(B) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(2) Assistance provided under this section by elements of the Department of Defense may not include the direct participation of a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an arrest or similar activity.
(3) Assistance may not be provided under this section by an element of the Department of Defense if the provision of such assistance will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.
(4) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations governing the exercise of authority under this section by elements of the Department of Defense, including regulations relating to the protection of sources and methods in the exercise of such authority.
(c) Definitions
For purposes of subsection (a):
(1) The term "United States law enforcement agency" means any department or agency of the Federal Government that the Attorney General designates as law enforcement agency for purposes of this section.
(2) The term "United States person" means the following:
(A) A United States citizen.
(B) An alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien.
(C) An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens.
(D) A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §105A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2003—Subsec. (b)(1)(C).
§3040. Disclosure of foreign intelligence acquired in criminal investigations; notice of criminal investigations of foreign intelligence sources
(a) Disclosure of foreign intelligence
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to paragraph (2), the Attorney General, or the head of any other department or agency of the Federal Government with law enforcement responsibilities, shall expeditiously disclose to the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to guidelines developed by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director, foreign intelligence acquired by an element of the Department of Justice or an element of such department or agency, as the case may be, in the course of a criminal investigation.
(2) The Attorney General by regulation and in consultation with the Director may provide for exceptions to the applicability of paragraph (1) for one or more classes of foreign intelligence, or foreign intelligence with respect to one or more targets or matters, if the Attorney General determines that disclosure of such foreign intelligence under that paragraph would jeopardize an ongoing law enforcement investigation or impair other significant law enforcement interests.
(b) Procedures for notice of criminal investigations
Not later than 180 days after October 26, 2001, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop guidelines to ensure that after receipt of a report from an element of the intelligence community of activity of a foreign intelligence source or potential foreign intelligence source that may warrant investigation as criminal activity, the Attorney General provides notice to the Director, within a reasonable period of time, of his intention to commence, or decline to commence, a criminal investigation of such activity.
(c) Procedures
The Attorney General shall develop procedures for the administration of this section, including the disclosure of foreign intelligence by elements of the Department of Justice, and elements of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, under subsection (a) and the provision of notice with respect to criminal investigations under subsection (b).
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §105B, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 105B of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, as added
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3040a. Prohibition on collection and maintenance of information of United States persons based on first amendment-protected activities
No element of the intelligence community may collect or maintain information concerning a United States person (as defined in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §105C, as added
§3041. Appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-related activities
(a) Recommendation of DNI in certain appointments
(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Concurrence of DNI in appointments to positions in the intelligence community
(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be). In the case in which the Director does not concur in such a recommendation, the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned may advise the President directly of the intention to withhold concurrence or to make a recommendation, as the case may be.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.
(E) The Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
(F) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(G) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any successor to that position.
(H) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
(c) Consultation with DNI in certain positions
(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall consult with the Director of National Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(B) The Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence.
(C) The Assistant Attorney General designated as the Assistant Attorney General for National Security under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §106, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—
Subsec. (b)(2)(E).
Subsec. (b)(2)(F) to (H).
Subsec. (b)(2)(I).
2007—Subsec. (b)(2)(I).
2006—Subsec. (c)(2)(C).
2004—
2003—Subsec. (a)(2)(C).
Subsec. (b)(2)(E).
2001—Subsec. (b)(2)(C), (D).
1996—
1994—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3041a. Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
(a) In general
There is a Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
(b) Appointment
The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(c) Functions and duties
The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be the head of the National Reconnaissance Office and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this chapter or otherwise by law or executive order.
(d) Advisory Board
(1) Establishment
There is established in the National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section referred to as the "Board").
(2) Duties
The Board shall—
(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to promoting innovation, competition, and resilience in space, overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
(B) advise and report directly to the Director with respect to such matters.
(3) Members
(A) Number and appointment
(i) In general
The Board shall be composed of five members appointed by the Director, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, from among individuals with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the National Reconnaissance Office.
(ii) Notification
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in
(B) Terms
Each member shall be appointed for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more than three terms.
(C) Vacancy
Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken office.
(D) Chair
The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be appointed by the Director from among the members.
(E) Travel expenses
Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of
(F) Executive secretary
The Director may appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
(4) Meetings
The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.
(5) Reports
Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the activities and significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) 1 shall not apply to the Board.
(7) Termination
The Board shall terminate on September 30, 2024.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §106A, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (c), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
The Federal Advisory Committee Act, referred to in subsec. (d)(6), is
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (d)(3)(A)(i).
Subsec. (d)(7).
2019—Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
"(a)
"(1) in the case of section 411—
"(A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or
"(B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office by the individual performing such duties on October 1, 2014; and
"(2) in the case of section 412—
"(A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or
"(B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office by the individual performing such duties on October 1, 2014.
"(b)
"(c)
Initial Appointments
Position of Importance and Responsibility
"(1)
"(2)
1 See References in Text note below.
§3042. Repealed. Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, §6742(b)(3), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2240
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §107, formerly §103,
§3043. Annual national security strategy report
(a) Transmittal to Congress
(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a "national security strategy report").
(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under
(3) Not later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office, the President shall transmit to Congress a national security strategy report under this section. That report shall be in addition to the report for that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph (2).
(b) Contents
Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.
(c) Classified and unclassified form
Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted to Congress in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §108, formerly §104, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (c).
2016—Subsec. (c).
1999—Subsec. (a)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
National Security Planning Guidance To Deny Safe Havens to Al-Qaeda and Its Violent Extremist Affiliates
"(a)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) A prioritized list of specified geographic areas that the President determines are necessary to address and an explicit discussion and list of the criteria or rationale used to prioritize the areas on the list, including a discussion of the conditions that would hamper the ability of the United States to strengthen at-risk states or other entities in such areas.
"(B) For each specified geographic area, a description, analysis, and discussion of the core problems and contributing issues that allow or could allow al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates to use the area as a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks, engage in propaganda, or raise funds and other support, including any ongoing or potential radicalization of the population, or to use the area as a key transit route for personnel, weapons, funding, or other support.
"(C) For each specified geographic area, a description of the following:
"(i) The feasibility of conducting multilateral programs to train and equip the military forces of relevant countries in the area.
"(ii) The authority and funding that would be required to support such programs.
"(iii) How such programs would be implemented.
"(iv) How such programs would support the national security priorities and interests of the United States and complement other efforts of the United States Government in the area and in other specified geographic areas.
"(D) A list of short-term, mid-term, and long-term goals for each specified geographic area, prioritized by importance.
"(E) A description of the role and mission of each Federal department and agency involved in executing the guidance, including the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State and the Agency for International Development.
"(F) A description of gaps in United States capabilities to meet the goals listed pursuant to subparagraph (D), and the extent to which those gaps can be met through coordination with nongovernmental, international, or private sector organizations, entities, or companies.
"(3)
"(A) The overall progress made toward achieving the goals listed pursuant to paragraph (2)(D), including an overall assessment of the progress in denying a safe haven to al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates.
"(B) The performance of each Federal department and agency involved in executing the guidance.
"(C) The performance of the unified country team and appropriate combatant command, or in the case of a cross-border effort, country teams in the area and the appropriate combatant command.
"(D) Any addition to, deletion from, or change in the order of the prioritized list maintained pursuant to paragraph (2)(A).
"(4)
"(A)
"(B)
"(C)
"(i) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives]; and
"(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
"(5)
"(A) that serves or may potentially serve as a safe haven for al-Qaeda or a violent extremist affiliate of al-Qaeda—
"(i) from which to plan and launch attacks, engage in propaganda, or raise funds and other support; or
"(ii) for use as a key transit route for personnel, weapons, funding, or other support; and
"(B) over which one or more governments or entities exert insufficient governmental or security control to deny al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates the ability to establish a large scale presence."
Implementation Plan for Whole-of-Government Vision Prescribed in the National Security Strategy
"(a)
"(1) a description of ongoing and future actions planned to be taken by the President and the Executive agencies to implement organizational changes, programs, and any other efforts to achieve each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy;
"(2) a timeline for specific actions taken and planned to be taken by the President and the Executive agencies to implement each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy;
"(3) an outline of specific actions desired or required to be taken by Congress to achieve each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy, including suggested timing and sequencing of actions proposed for Congress and the Executive agencies;
"(4) any progress made and challenges or obstacles encountered since May 2010 in implementing each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy; and
"(5) such other information as the President determines is necessary to understand progress in implementing each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy.
"(b)
"(1) The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—
"(A) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives];
"(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Committee on the Budget, Committee on the Judiciary, and Committee on Appropriations in the Senate; and
"(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, Committee on the Budget, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [now Committee on Oversight and Accountability], and Committee on Appropriations in the House of Representatives.
"(2) The term 'Executive agency' has the meaning given that term by
National Commission on the Future Role of United States Nuclear Weapons, Problems of Command, Control, and Safety of Soviet Nuclear Weapons, and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
§3043a. National intelligence strategy
(a) In general
Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a comprehensive national intelligence strategy to meet national security objectives for the following 4-year period, or a longer period, if appropriate.
(b) Requirements
Each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) shall—
(1) delineate a national intelligence strategy consistent with—
(A) the most recent national security strategy report submitted pursuant to
(B) the strategic plans of other relevant departments and agencies of the United States; and
(C) other relevant national-level plans;
(2) address matters related to national and military intelligence, including counterintelligence;
(3) identify the major national security missions that the intelligence community is currently pursuing and will pursue in the future to meet the anticipated security environment;
(4) describe how the intelligence community will utilize personnel, technology, partnerships, and other capabilities to pursue the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3);
(5) assess current, emerging, and future threats to the intelligence community, including threats from foreign intelligence and security services and insider threats;
(6) outline the organizational roles and missions of the elements of the intelligence community as part of an integrated enterprise to meet customer demands for intelligence products, services, and support;
(7) identify sources of strategic, institutional, programmatic, fiscal, and technological risk; and
(8) analyze factors that may affect the intelligence community's performance in pursuing the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3) during the following 10-year period.
(c) Submission to Congress
The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the date of the completion of such strategy.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §108A, as added
§3043b. Annual reports on worldwide threats
(a) Definition of appropriate congressional committees
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(b) Annual reports
Not later than the first Monday in February 2021, and each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of the intelligence community with respect to worldwide threats to the national security of the United States.
(c) Form
Each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex only for the protection of intelligence sources and methods relating to the matters contained in the report.
(d) Hearings
(1) Open hearings
Upon request by the appropriate congressional committees, the Director (and any other head of an element of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the committees in consultation with the Director) shall testify before such committees in an open setting regarding a report under subsection (b).
(2) Closed hearings
Any information that may not be disclosed during an open hearing under paragraph (1) in order to protect intelligence sources and methods may instead be discussed in a closed hearing that immediately follows such open hearing.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §108B, as added
§3044. Software licensing
(a) Requirement for inventories of software licenses
The chief information officer of each element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall biennially—
(1) conduct an inventory of all existing software licenses of such element, including utilized and unutilized licenses;
(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated cost savings in software procurement and usage, including—
(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;
(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and
(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training; and
(3) submit to the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community each inventory required by paragraph (1) and each assessment required by paragraph (2).
(b) Inventories by the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, based on the inventories and assessments required by subsection (a), shall biennially—
(1) compile an inventory of all existing software licenses of the intelligence community, including utilized and unutilized licenses;
(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by the intelligence community to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated cost savings in software procurement and usage, including—
(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;
(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and
(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training; and
(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2), make such recommendations with respect to software procurement and usage to the Director of National Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate.
(c) Reports to Congress
The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each inventory compiled under subsection (b)(1).
(d) Implementation of recommendations
Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue guidelines for the intelligence community on software procurement and usage based on such recommendations.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §109, as added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 3044, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §109, as added
Amendments
2014—Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Inventory
"(1)
"(A)
"(B)
"(2)
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 307(b) of
§3045. National mission of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(a) In general
In addition to the Department of Defense missions set forth in
(b) Requirements and priorities
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish requirements and priorities governing the collection of national intelligence by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency under subsection (a).
(c) Correction of deficiencies
The Director of National Intelligence shall develop and implement such programs and policies as the Director and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine necessary to review and correct deficiencies identified in the capabilities of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to accomplish assigned national missions, including support to the all-source analysis and production process. The Director shall consult with the Secretary of Defense on the development and implementation of such programs and policies. The Secretary shall obtain the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the matters on which the Director and the Secretary are to consult under the preceding sentence.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §110, formerly §120, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 110 of title I of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
2003—
Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b), (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Research Partnership on Activities of People's Republic of China
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) carry out joint unclassified geospatial intelligence analyses of the activities of the People's Republic of China that pose risks to the national security interests of the United States; and
"(B) make available on a publicly available internet website unclassified geospatial intelligence products relating to such analyses.
"(2)
"(A) Any notable developments relating to the global activities of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force, the People's Liberation Army Navy, the People's Liberation Army Air Force, the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Coast Guard Corps.
"(B) Infrastructure projects associated with the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative.
"(C) Maritime land reclamation activities conducted by China in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean region, and the broader maritime commons.
"(D) Matters relevant to global public health and climate security, including—
"(i) indications and warnings of disease outbreaks with pandemic potential;
"(ii) the activities of China likely contributing to climate change; and
"(iii) any environmental degradation directly resulting from the practices of China.
"(3)
"(A) one research institution; or
"(B) a consortium of research institutions if the Director determines that the inclusion of multiple institutions will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.
"(4)
"(5)
"(A) the Director consults with the congressional intelligence committees with respect to the proposed modified or new partnership;
"(B) the modified or new partnership is carried out in accordance with this section; and
"(C) the Director determines that the modified or new partnership will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) identify raw, unclassified geospatial data that could improve the research conducted under the partnership if the data was made publicly available; and
"(B) make such data publicly available.
"(2)
"(c)
"(1) The outcomes of research conducted under the partnership.
"(2) Identification of the actions that have been taken to increase the quantity and quality of unclassified geospatial analysis products made publicly available under the partnership, including the quantity and types of raw data the partnership has made publicly available.
"(3) Identification of actual and projected costs to carry out the partnership.
"(d)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives];
"(2) Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
§3046. Repealed. Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1075, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3694
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §111, formerly §121, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
For Determination by President that repeal take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Repeal effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3047. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with United Nations
(a) Provision of intelligence information to United Nations
(1) No United States intelligence information may be provided to the United Nations or any organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any officials or employees thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented procedures, and has worked with the United Nations to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods connected to such information.
(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written certification by the President to the appropriate committees of Congress that providing such information to the United Nations or an organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any officials or employees thereof, is in the national security interests of the United States.
(b) Delegation of duties
The President may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under this section.
(c) Relationship to existing law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to—
(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of subchapter III of this chapter.
(d) "Appropriate committees of Congress" defined
As used in this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §112, formerly §110, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (c)(1).
2010—Subsecs. (b) to (e).
"(1) The President shall report annually to the appropriate committees of Congress on the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the report. The President shall also report to the appropriate committees of Congress within 15 days after it has become known to the United States Government that there has been an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided by the United States to the United Nations.
"(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, appropriately cleared United States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.
"(3) In the case of the annual reports required to be submitted under the first sentence of paragraph (1) to the congressional intelligence committees, the submittal dates for such reports shall be as provided in
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (d)(1).
2003—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (d)(1).
2002—Subsec. (b)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date of 2003 Amendment
Amendment by section 361(b) of
§3048. Detail of intelligence community personnel—Intelligence Community Assignment Program
(a) Detail
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of a department with an element in the intelligence community or the head of an intelligence community agency or element may detail any employee within that department, agency, or element to serve in any position in the Intelligence Community Assignment Program on a reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as are agreed to between the heads of the parent and host agencies, up to a maximum of three years, except that such details may be extended for a period not to exceed one year when the heads of the parent and host agencies determine that such extension is in the public interest.
(b) Benefits, allowances, travel, incentives
(1) An employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the organization from which the employee is detailed.
(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the following conditions:
(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and—
(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and
(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and departments, the head of such agency or department.
(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such duty station before the detail.
(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host agency duty station.
(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency duty station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles.
(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station.
(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS–15 of the General Schedule.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §113, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
GS–15 of the General Schedule, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(F), is set out under
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (b)(2)(A).
2002—Subsec. (c).
2001—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date
§3049. Non-reimbursable detail of other personnel
An officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program from another element of the intelligence community or from another element of the United States Government on a non-reimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a period not to exceed three years. This section does not limit any other source of authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details. A non-reimbursable detail made under this section shall not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the receiving element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §113A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2013—
2011—
§3049a. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and positions requiring banking or financial services expertise
(a) Special rates of pay for positions requiring expertise in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics or in banking or financial services
(1) In general
Notwithstanding part III of title 5, the head of each element of the intelligence community may, for one or more categories of positions in such element that require expertise in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics or in banking or financial services (including expertise relating to critical financial infrastructure operations, capital markets, banking compliance programs, or international investments)—
(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection (b) or (c), as applicable.
(2) Limitation on number of recipients
For each element of the intelligence community, the number of individuals serving in a position in such element who receive a higher rate of pay established or increased under paragraph (1) may not, at any time during a given fiscal year, exceed 50 individuals or 5 percent of the total number of full-time equivalent positions authorized for such element for the preceding fiscal year, whichever is greater.
(3) Treatment
The special rate supplements resulting from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified in
(b) Special rates of pay for cyber positions
(1) In general
Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Director of the National Security Agency may establish a special rate of pay—
(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under
(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the Vice President of the United States under
(2) Pay limitation
Employees receiving a special rate under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay limitation that parallels the limitation established in
(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is authorized under title 10 (or any other applicable law in addition to title 5, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (
(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate established for the Vice President of the United States under
(3) Limitation on number of recipients
The number of individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may not be used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions under
(c) Maximum special rate of pay
Except as provided in subsection (b), a minimum rate of pay established for a category of positions under subsection (a) may not exceed the maximum rate of basic pay (excluding any locality-based comparability payment under
(d) Notification of removal from special rate of pay
If the head of an element of the intelligence community removes a category of positions from coverage under a rate of pay authorized by subsection (a) or (b) after that rate of pay takes effect—
(1) the head of such element shall provide notice of the loss of coverage of the special rate of pay to each individual in such category; and
(2) the loss of coverage will take effect on the first day of the first pay period after the date of the notice.
(e) Revision of special rates of pay
Subject to the limitations in this section, rates of pay established under this section by the head of an element of the intelligence community may be revised from time to time by the head of such element and the revisions have the force and effect of statute.
(f) Regulations
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall promulgate regulations to carry out this section with respect to such element, which shall, to the extent practicable, be comparable to the regulations promulgated to carry out
(g) Reports
(1) Requirement for reports
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019,1 the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on any rates of pay established for such element under this section.
(2) Contents
Each report required by paragraph (1) shall contain for each element of the intelligence community—
(A) a description of any rates of pay established under subsection (a) or (b); and
(B) the number of positions in such element that will be subject to such rates of pay.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §113B, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(A), is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676,
The date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, referred to in subsec. (g)(1), probably means the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020, div. E of
Amendments
2023—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2), (3).
Subsec. (e).
2022—Subsec. (b)(1)(A).
Subsec. (b)(4).
2019—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsecs. (e), (f).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (g)(1).
Subsec. (g)(2)(A).
1 See References in Text note below.
§3050. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees
(a) In general
The Director of National Intelligence shall, on an annual basis, submit to Congress a report on the employment of covered persons within each element of the intelligence community for the preceding fiscal year and the preceding 5 fiscal years.
(b) Content
Each such report shall include data, disaggregated by category of covered person and by element of the intelligence community, on the following:
(1) Of all individuals employed in the element during the fiscal year involved, the aggregate percentage of such individuals who are covered persons.
(2) Of all individuals employed in the element during the fiscal year involved at the levels referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the percentage of covered persons employed at such levels:
(A) Positions at levels 1 through 15 of the General Schedule.
(B) Positions at levels above GS–15.
(3) Of all individuals hired by the element involved during the fiscal year involved, the percentage of such individuals who are covered persons.
(c) Form
Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing for the substitution of any similar report required under another provision of law.
(e) "Covered persons" defined
In this section the term "covered persons" means—
(1) racial and ethnic minorities;
(2) women; and
(3) individuals with disabilities.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §114, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The General Schedule, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is set out under
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
2014—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
2013—
2004—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (c)(1).
2003—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b), (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
2002—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2) to (4).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
"(1) The term 'congressional intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
"(2) The term 'congressional leadership' means the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate."
Subsec (e).
Subsec. (f).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007.
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date of 2003 Amendment
Amendment by
Report and Strategic Plan on Biological Weapons
"(a)
"(1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to assessing the threat from biological weapons from state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; and
"(2) efforts to protect the biodefense knowledge and infrastructure of the United States.
"(b)
"(1) an assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to detecting the development or use of biological weapons by state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic;
"(2) information on fiscal, human, technical, open-source, and other intelligence collection resources of the United States dedicated for use to detect or protect against the threat of biological weapons;
"(3) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and protect biological weapons targets, including—
"(A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies;
"(B) inadequate information sharing practices; or
"(C) inadequate cooperation among departments or agencies of the United States;
"(4) a strategic plan prepared by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, that provides for actions for the appropriate elements of the intelligence community to close important intelligence gaps related to biological weapons;
"(5) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in paragraph (4); and
"(6) any long-term resource and human capital issues related to the collection of intelligence regarding biological weapons, including any recommendations to address shortfalls of experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, language, and technical skills.
"(c)
[For definitions of terms used in section 335 of
Date for First Report on Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies
§3051. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–259, title III, §347(c), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2698
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §114A, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Correcting Long-Standing Material Weaknesses
§3052. Limitation on establishment or operation of diplomatic intelligence support centers
(a) In general
(1) A diplomatic intelligence support center may not be established, operated, or maintained without the prior approval of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director may only approve the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a diplomatic intelligence support center if the Director determines that the establishment, operation, or maintenance of such center is required to provide necessary intelligence support in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.
(b) Prohibition of use of appropriations
Amounts appropriated pursuant to authorizations by law for intelligence and intelligence-related activities may not be obligated or expended for the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a diplomatic intelligence support center that is not approved by the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "diplomatic intelligence support center" means an entity to which employees of the various elements of the intelligence community (as defined in
(A) consists of intelligence analyses on military or political matters and expertise to conduct limited assessments and dynamic taskings for a chief of mission; and
(B) is not intelligence support traditionally provided to a chief of mission by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The term "chief of mission" has the meaning given that term by
(d) Termination
This section shall cease to be effective on October 1, 2000.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §115, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c)(1)(B).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3053. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize travel on any common carrier when such travel, in the discretion of the Director—
(1) is consistent with intelligence community mission requirements, or
(2) is required for cover purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional circumstances necessary for the successful performance of an intelligence community mission.
(b) Authorized delegation of duty
The Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the authority granted by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who may delegate such authority to other appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §116, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (b).
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3054. POW/MIA analytic capability
(a) Requirement
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence in support of the activities of the United States relating to individuals who, after December 31, 1990, are unaccounted for United States personnel.
(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph (1) shall be known as the "POW/MIA analytic capability of the intelligence community".
(b) Unaccounted for United States personnel
In this section, the term "unaccounted for United States personnel" means the following:
(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in
(2) Any United States national who was killed while engaged in activities on behalf of the United States and whose remains have not been repatriated to the United States.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §117, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3055. Annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
(a) Annual report
On an annual basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that fully informs the committees concerning operations against terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall include with respect to the preceding one-year period—
(1) the total number of asset seizures, designations, and other actions against individuals or entities found to have engaged in financial support of terrorism;
(2) the total number of physical searches of offices, residences, or financial records of individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in financial support for terrorist activity; and
(3) whether the financial intelligence information seized in these cases has been shared on a full and timely basis with the all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
(b) Immediate notification for emergency designation
In the case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the assets of an individual or entity, as having been found to have engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the Treasury shall report such designation within 24 hours of such a designation to the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Submittal date of reports to congressional intelligence committees
In the case of the reports required to be submitted under subsection (a) to the congressional intelligence committees, the submittal dates for such reports shall be as provided in
(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:
(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §118, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a).
2010—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (a)(2) to (4).
Subsec. (d)(1), (2).
§3056. National Counterterrorism Center
(a) Establishment of Center
There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Counterterrorism Center.
(b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center
(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not simultaneously serve in any other capacity in the executive branch.
(c) Reporting
(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the Director of National Intelligence with respect to matters described in paragraph (2) and the President with respect to matters described in paragraph (3).
(2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) The budget and programs of the National Counterterrorism Center.
(B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (i).
(C) The conduct of intelligence operations implemented by other elements of the intelligence community; and
(3) The matters described in this paragraph are the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations (other than intelligence operations).
(d) Primary missions
The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.
(2) To conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.
(3) To assign roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic operational planning duties to lead Departments or agencies, as appropriate, for counterterrorism activities that are consistent with applicable law and that support counterterrorism strategic operational plans, but shall not direct the execution of any resulting operations.
(4) To ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis.
(5) To ensure that such agencies have access to and receive intelligence needed to accomplish their assigned activities.
(6) To serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.
(e) Domestic counterterrorism intelligence
(1) The Center may, consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the guidelines referred to in
(2) Any agency authorized to conduct counterterrorism activities may request information from the Center to assist it in its responsibilities, consistent with applicable law and the guidelines referred to in
(f) Duties and responsibilities of Director
(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall—
(A) serve as the principal adviser to the Director of National Intelligence on intelligence operations relating to counterterrorism;
(B) provide strategic operational plans for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and for the effective integration of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States;
(C) advise the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government conform to the priorities established by the President;
(D) disseminate terrorism information, including current terrorism threat analysis, to the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other officials of the executive branch as appropriate, and to the appropriate committees of Congress;
(E) support the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies, in fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism information, consistent with applicable law, guidelines referred to in
(F) develop a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence operations and law enforcement planning and operations into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility;
(G) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for conducting net assessments of terrorist threats;
(H) consistent with priorities approved by the President, assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing requirements for the intelligence community for the collection of terrorism information; and
(I) perform such other duties as the Director of National Intelligence may prescribe or are prescribed by law.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1)(G) shall limit the authority of the departments and agencies of the United States to conduct net assessments.
(g) Limitation
The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations.
(h) Resolution of disputes
The Director of National Intelligence shall resolve disagreements between the National Counterterrorism Center and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government on designations, assignments, plans, or responsibilities under this section. The head of such a department, agency, or element may appeal the resolution of the disagreement by the Director of National Intelligence to the President.
(i) Directorate of Intelligence
The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence which shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations (except for purely domestic terrorism and domestic terrorist organizations) from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States.
(j) Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning
(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning which shall provide strategic operational plans for counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States Government.
(2) Strategic operational planning shall include the mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities.
(3) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans, and shall obtain information from each element of the intelligence community, and from each other department, agency, or element of the United States Government relevant for monitoring the progress of such entity in implementing such plans.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §119, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (c)(2)(B).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Strategy for Counterterrorist Travel Intelligence
Executive Documents
Executive Order No. 13354
Ex. Ord. No. 13354, Aug. 27, 2004, 69 F.R. 53589, which established a National Counterterrorism Center, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12333, §3.6, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59954, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13470, §4(j), July 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 45341, set out as a note under
§3057. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
(a) Establishment
(1) The President shall establish a National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to—
(A) prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies; and
(B) lead integration and mission management of all intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats.
(2) The head of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) The National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for the intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity and foreign biological threats.
(b) Missions and objectives
(1) Counterproliferation
In establishing the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President shall address the following missions and objectives to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies:
(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to proliferation.
(B) Ensuring that appropriate agencies have full access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their counterproliferation plans or activities, and perform independent, alternative analyses.
(C) Establishing a central repository on known and suspected proliferation activities, including the goals, strategies, capabilities, networks, and any individuals, groups, or entities engaged in proliferation.
(D) Disseminating proliferation information, including proliferation threats and analyses, to the President, to the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(E) Conducting net assessments and warnings about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies.
(F) Coordinating counterproliferation plans and activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies.
(G) Conducting strategic operational counterproliferation planning for the United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies.
(2) Biosecurity
In establishing the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure that the Center serves as the lead for the intelligence community for the integration, mission management, and coordination of intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats, regardless of origin:
(A) Ensuring that the elements of the intelligence community provide timely and effective warnings to the President and the Director of National Intelligence regarding emerging foreign biological threats, including diseases with pandemic potential.
(B) Overseeing and coordinating the collection and analysis of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign biological threats in support of the intelligence needs of the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health, including by conveying collection priorities to elements of the intelligence community.
(C) Coordinating intelligence support to the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health, including by ensuring that intelligence pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats is disseminated among appropriately cleared personnel of such departments and agencies.
(D) Coordinating with the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health to encourage information sharing with the intelligence community.
(E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of the intelligence community regarding biosecurity and countering foreign biological threats and providing to the Director of National Intelligence recommended solutions for such gaps, including by encouraging research and development of new capabilities to counter foreign biological threats.
(c) National security waiver
The President may waive the requirements of this section, and any parts thereof, if the President determines that such requirements do not materially improve the ability of the United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall include a description of how the missions and objectives in subsection (b) are being met.
(d) Report to Congress
(1) Not later than nine months after the implementation of this chapter, the President shall submit to Congress, in classified form if necessary, the findings and recommendations of the President's Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction established by Executive Order in February 2004, together with the views of the President regarding the establishment of a National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
(2) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver authority granted by subsection (c), the President shall submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the establishment of a National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
(e) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that a central feature of counterproliferation activities, consistent with the President's Proliferation Security Initiative, should include the physical interdiction, by air, sea, or land, of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies, and enhanced law enforcement activities to identify and disrupt proliferation networks, activities, organizations, and persons.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §119A, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (d)(1), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
The Executive Order in February 2004 establishing the President's Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, referred to in subsec. (d)(1), is Ex. Ord. No. 13328, Feb. 6, 2004, 69 F.R. 6901, which was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13385, §3(a), Sept. 29, 2005, 70 F.R. 57990, and was formerly set out as a note under
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(4).
Subsec. (b).
2010—Subsec. (a).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Reference to National Counter Proliferation Center
Executive Documents
Delegation of Functions
Reporting functions of President under this section assigned to the Director of National Intelligence by section 3 of Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 48633, set out as a note under
§3058. National Intelligence Centers
(a) Authority to establish
The Director of National Intelligence may establish one or more national intelligence centers to address intelligence priorities, including, but not limited to, regional issues.
(b) Resources of directors of centers
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the head of each national intelligence center under subsection (a) has appropriate authority, direction, and control of such center, and of the personnel assigned to such center, to carry out the assigned mission of such center.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that each national intelligence center has appropriate personnel to accomplish effectively the mission of such center.
(c) Information sharing
The Director of National Intelligence shall, to the extent appropriate and practicable, ensure that each national intelligence center under subsection (a) and the other elements of the intelligence community share information in order to facilitate the mission of such center.
(d) Mission of centers
Pursuant to the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, each national intelligence center under subsection (a) may, in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to such center—
(1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source analysis of intelligence based upon intelligence gathered both domestically and abroad;
(2) have primary responsibility for identifying and proposing to the Director of National Intelligence intelligence collection and analysis and production requirements; and
(3) perform such other duties as the Director of National Intelligence shall specify.
(e) Review and modification of centers
The Director of National Intelligence shall determine on a regular basis whether—
(1) the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to each national intelligence center under subsection (a) continues to meet appropriate intelligence priorities; and
(2) the staffing and management of such center remains appropriate for the accomplishment of the mission of such center.
(f) Termination
The Director of National Intelligence may terminate any national intelligence center under subsection (a).
(g) Separate budget account
The Director of National Intelligence shall, as appropriate, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate line item for each national intelligence center under subsection (a).
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §119B, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3059. Foreign Malign Influence Center
(a) Establishment
There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Foreign Malign Influence Center (in this section referred to as the "Center").
(b) Functions and composition
The Center shall—
(1) be comprised of analysts from all elements of the intelligence community, including elements with diplomatic and law enforcement functions;
(2) have access to all intelligence and other reporting possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign malign influence;
(3) serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign malign influence; and
(4) provide to employees and officers of the Federal Government in policy-making positions and Congress comprehensive assessments, and indications and warnings, of foreign malign influence.
(c) Director
(1) Appointment
There is a Director of the Center, who shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Role
The Director of the Center shall—
(A) report directly to the Director of National Intelligence;
(B) carry out the functions under subsection (b); and
(C) at the request of the President or the Director of National Intelligence, develop and provide recommendations for potential responses by the United States to foreign malign influence.
(d) Annual reports
(1) In general
In addition to the matters submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(4), at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the Director of the Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on foreign malign influence.
(2) Matters included
Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a discussion of the following:
(A) The most significant activities of the Center.
(B) Any recommendations the Director determines necessary for legislative or other actions to improve the ability of the Center to carry out its functions, including recommendations regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
(e) Termination
After December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence may terminate the Center, but only if the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a determination that the termination of the Center is appropriate, which includes—
(1) a detailed description that other offices or entities within the intelligence community—
(A) have the capabilities to perform the functions of the Center; and
(B) will exercise the functions of the Center upon the termination of the Center; and
(2) a detailed description of—
(A) the actions the Director of National Intelligence will take to conduct an orderly wind-down of the activities of the Center; and
(B) the proposed timeline for such actions.
(f) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered foreign country
The term "covered foreign country" means the following:
(A) The Russian Federation.
(B) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(D) The People's Republic of China.
(E) Any other foreign country that the Director of the Center determines appropriate for purposes of this section.
(2) Foreign malign influence
The term "foreign malign influence" means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a covered foreign country with the objective of influencing, through overt or covert means—
(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the United States Government or State or local governments, including any election within the United States; or
(B) the public opinion within the United States.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §119C, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—
Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (e), (f).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Reference to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center
§3060. Climate Security Advisory Council
(a) Establishment
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the purpose of—
(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community with respect to analysis of climate security and its impact on the areas of focus of such analysts;
(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community in collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out its activities.
(b) Composition of Council
(1) Members
The Council shall be composed of the following individuals appointed by the Director of National Intelligence:
(A) An appropriate official from the National Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
(B) The lead official with respect to climate and environmental security analysis from—
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
(iii) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security; and
(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that are responsible for—
(i) providing decision makers with a predictive understanding of the climate;
(ii) making observations of our Earth system that can be used by the public, policymakers, and to support strategic decisions; or
(iii) coordinating Federal research and investments in understanding the forces shaping the global environment, both human and natural, and their impacts on society.
(D) Any other officials as the Director of National Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine appropriate.
(2) Responsibilities of chair
The chair of the Council shall have responsibility for—
(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community;
(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency heads for the participation of such individuals on the Council; and
(C) any other duties that the Director of National Intelligence may direct.
(c) Duties and responsibilities of Council
The Council shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) To meet at least quarterly to—
(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of the intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community;
(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of such data and implementation of such processes; and
(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at each meeting.
(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect to the analysis of climate security, including identifying publicly available information and intelligence acquired through clandestine means that enables such analysis.
(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate security.
(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying and disseminating climate intelligence indications and warnings.
(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of climate security and the best practices identified under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training programs.
(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing information about ongoing efforts and avoiding duplication of existing efforts.
(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security—
(A) to exchange appropriate data between such elements, establish processes, procedures and practices for the routine exchange of such data, discuss the implementation of such processes; and
(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of findings and analysis between such elements.
(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security may inform the research direction of academic work and the sponsored work of the United States Government.
(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to convene conferences of analysts and nonintelligence community personnel working on climate change or climate security on subjects that the chair shall direct.
(d) Annual report
(1) Requirement
Not later than January 31, 2021, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the chair of the Council shall submit, on behalf of the Council, to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the activities of the Council as described in subsection (c) during the year preceding the year during which the report is submitted.
(2) Matters included
Each report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of any obstacles or gaps relating to—
(A) the Council fulfilling its duties and responsibilities under subsection (c); or
(B) the responsiveness of the intelligence community to the climate security needs and priorities of the policymaking elements of the Federal Government.
(e) Sunset
The Council shall terminate on December 31, 2024.
(f) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Climate security
The term "climate security" means the effects of climate change on the following:
(A) The national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure.
(B) Subnational, national, and regional political stability.
(C) The security of allies and partners of the United States.
(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.
(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings
The term "climate intelligence indications and warnings" means developments relating to climate security with the potential to—
(A) imminently and substantially alter the political stability or degree of human security in a country or region; or
(B) imminently and substantially threaten—
(i) the national security of the United States;
(ii) the military, political, or economic interests of allies and partners of the United States; or
(iii) citizens of the United States abroad.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §120, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (e).
2022—Subsec. (b)(1)(B)(v).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
2020—Subsec. (c)(4).
Subsecs. (d), (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Appointments
§3061. Counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence community grant funding
(a) Disclosure as condition for receipt of grant
The head of an element of the intelligence community may not award a grant to a person or entity unless the person or entity has certified to the head of the element that the person or entity has disclosed to the head of the element any material financial or material in-kind support that the person or entity knows, or should have known, derives from the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the Republic of Cuba, during the 5-year period ending on the date of the person or entity's application for the grant.
(b) Process for review of grant applicants prior to award
(1) In general
The head of an element of the intelligence community may not award a grant to a person or entity who submitted a certification under subsection (a) until such certification is received by the head of an element of the intelligence community and submitted to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to the process set forth in paragraph (2).
(2) Process
(A) In general
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a process to review the awarding of a grant to an applicant who submitted a certification under subsection (a).
(B) Elements
The process established under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) The immediate transmission of a copy of each applicant's certification made under subsection (a) to the Director of National Intelligence.
(ii) The review of the certification and any accompanying disclosures submitted under subsection (a) as soon as practicable.
(iii) Authorization for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to take such actions as may be necessary, including denial or revocation of a grant, to ensure a grant does not pose an unacceptable risk of—
(I) misappropriation of United States intellectual property, research and development, and innovation efforts; or
(II) other counterintelligence threats.
(c) Annual report required
Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report identifying the following for the 1-year period covered by the report:
(1) The number of applications for grants received by each element of the intelligence community.
(2) The number of such applications that were reviewed using the process established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.
(3) The number of such applications that were denied and the number of grants that were revoked, pursuant to the process established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §121, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6302(b) of
§3062. Office of Engagement
(a) Establishment
There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence an Office of Engagement (in this section referred to as the "Office").
(b) Head; staff
(1) Head
The Director of National Intelligence shall appoint as head of the Office an individual with requisite experience in matters relating to the duties of the Office, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. Such head of the Office shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Staff
To assist the head of the Office in fulfilling the duties of the Office, the head shall employ full-time equivalent staff in such number, and with such requisite expertise in matters relating to such duties, as may be determined by the head.
(c) Duties
The duties of the Office shall be as follows:
(1) To ensure coordination across the elements of the intelligence community efforts regarding outreach, relationship development, and associated knowledge and relationship management, with covered entities, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(2) To assist in sharing best practices regarding such efforts among the elements of the intelligence community.
(3) To establish and implement metrics to assess the effectiveness of such efforts.
(d) Covered entity defined
In this section, the term "covered entity" means an entity that is not an entity of the United States Government, including private sector companies, institutions of higher education, trade associations, think tanks, laboratories, international organizations, and foreign partners and allies.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §122, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Rule of Construction
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 7503(e) of
Deadline
Transfer
Definitions
SUBCHAPTER II—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
§3071. National Security Agency voluntary separation
(a) Short title
This section may be cited as the "National Security Agency Voluntary Separation Act".
(b) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term "Director" means the Director of the National Security Agency; and
(2) the term "employee" means an employee of the National Security Agency, serving under an appointment without time limitation, who has been currently employed by the National Security Agency for a continuous period of at least 12 months prior to the effective date of the program established under subsection (c), except that such term does not include—
(A) a reemployed annuitant under subchapter III of
(B) an employee having a disability on the basis of which such employee is or would be eligible for disability retirement under any of the retirement systems referred to in subparagraph (A).
(c) Establishment of program
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director, in his sole discretion, may establish a program under which employees may, after October 1, 2000, be eligible for early retirement, offered separation pay to separate from service voluntarily, or both.
(d) Early retirement
An employee who—
(1) is at least 50 years of age and has completed 20 years of service; or
(2) has at least 25 years of service,
may, pursuant to regulations promulgated under this section, apply and be retired from the National Security Agency and receive benefits in accordance with
(e) Amount of separation pay and treatment for other purposes
(1) Amount
Separation pay shall be paid in a lump sum and shall be equal to the lesser of—
(A) an amount equal to the amount the employee would be entitled to receive under
(B) $25,000.
(2) Treatment
Separation pay shall not—
(A) be a basis for payment, and shall not be included in the computation, of any other type of Government benefit; and
(B) be taken into account for the purpose of determining the amount of any severance pay to which an individual may be entitled under
(f) Reemployment restrictions
An employee who receives separation pay under such program may not be reemployed by the National Security Agency for the 12-month period beginning on the effective date of the employee's separation. An employee who receives separation pay under this section on the basis of a separation occurring on or after March 30, 1994, and accepts employment with the Government of the United States within 5 years after the date of the separation on which payment of the separation pay is based shall be required to repay the entire amount of the separation pay to the National Security Agency. If the employment is with an Executive agency (as defined by
(g) Bar on certain employment
(1) Bar
An employee may not be separated from service under this section unless the employee agrees that the employee will not—
(A) act as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represent, any other person (except the United States) in any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence, make any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person (except the United States) to the National Security Agency; or
(B) participate in any manner in the award, modification, or extension of any contract for property or services with the National Security Agency,
during the 12-month period beginning on the effective date of the employee's separation from service.
(2) Penalty
An employee who violates an agreement under this subsection shall be liable to the United States in the amount of the separation pay paid to the employee pursuant to this section multiplied by the proportion of the 12-month period during which the employee was in violation of the agreement.
(h) Limitations
Under this program, early retirement and separation pay may be offered only—
(1) with the prior approval of the Director;
(2) for the period specified by the Director; and
(3) to employees within such occupational groups or geographic locations, or subject to such other similar limitations or conditions, as the Director may require.
(i) Regulations
Before an employee may be eligible for early retirement, separation pay, or both, under this section, the Director shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(j) Notification of exercise of authority
The Director may not make an offer of early retirement, separation pay, or both, pursuant to this section until 15 days after submitting to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the occupational groups or geographic locations, or other similar limitations or conditions, required by the Director under subsection (h), and including the proposed regulations issued pursuant to subsection (i).
(k) Remittance of funds
In addition to any other payment that is required to be made under subchapter III of
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §301, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, referred to in subsec. (k), is section 4(a) of
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 301 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III,
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (j).
2002—Subsec. (j).
"(2)
§3072. Authority of Federal Bureau of Investigation to award personal services contracts
(a) In general
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may enter into personal services contracts if the personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Inapplicability of certain requirements
Contracts under subsection (a) shall not be subject to the annuity offset requirements of
(c) Contract to be appropriate means of securing services
The Chief Contracting Officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each personal services contract entered into by the Director under this section is the appropriate means of securing the services to be provided under such contract.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §302, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 302 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III,
§3072a. Reports on exercise of authority
(1) Not later than one year after December 13, 2003, and annually thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the exercise of the authority in
(2) Each report under this section shall include, for the one-year period ending on the date of such report, the following:
(A) The number of contracts entered into during the period.
(B) The cost of each such contract.
(C) The length of each such contract.
(D) The types of services to be provided under each such contract.
(E) The availability, if any, of United States Government personnel to perform functions similar to the services to be provided under each such contract.
(F) The efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to fill available personnel vacancies, or request additional personnel positions, in areas relating to the intelligence or counterintelligence mission of the Bureau.
(3) Each report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(4) In this section—
(A) for purposes of the submittal of the classified annex to any report under this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—
(i) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(ii) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) for purposes of the submittal of the unclassified portion of any report under this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—
(i) the committees specified in subparagraph (A);
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations, Governmental Affairs, and the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(iii) the Committees on Appropriations, Government Reform and Oversight, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Section was enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and not as part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Government Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Jan. 6, 1999. Committee on Government Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2019. Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
§3073. Advisory committees; appointment; compensation of part-time personnel; applicability of other laws
(a) The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Council, acting through its Executive Secretary, are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this chapter, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation, while serving as members of such committees, shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Retired members of the uniformed services employed by the Director of National Intelligence who hold no other office or position under the United States for which they receive compensation, other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a daily rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the rate of pay in effect for grade GS–18 of the General Schedule established by
(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §303,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a).
1988—Subsec. (a).
1981—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1956—Subsec. (a). Act Aug. 10, 1956, struck out "Secretary of Defense, the" after "The".
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, amended section generally, substituting the "Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization" for "Chairman of the National Security Resources Board" in subsec. (a), and substituting "
1949—Subsec. (a). Act Aug. 10, 1949, inserted reference to National Security Council, and increased per diem payable to consultants from $35 to $50.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1981 Amendment
Amendment by
Transfer of Functions
For abolition of Office of Defense Mobilization and its Director and transfers and delegations of their functions to Office of Emergency Planning, Office of Emergency Preparedness, President, Federal Preparedness Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Secretary of Homeland Security, see Transfer of Functions notes set out under former
Termination of Advisory Committees
Advisory committees in existence on Jan. 5, 1973, to terminate not later than the expiration of the 2-year period following Jan. 5, 1973, unless, in the case of a committee established by the President or an officer of the Federal Government, such committee is renewed by appropriate action prior to the expiration of such 2-year period, or in the case of a committee established by the Congress, its duration is otherwise provided by law. Advisory committees established after Jan. 5, 1973, to terminate not later than the expiration of the 2-year period beginning on the date of their establishment, unless, in the case of a committee established by the President or an officer of the Federal Government, such committee is renewed by appropriate action prior to the expiration of such 2-year period, or in the case of a committee established by the Congress, its duration is otherwise provided by law. See
Advisory Committee Members and Personnel; Per Diem Compensation
Act June 24, 1948, ch. 632,
References in Other Laws to GS–16, 17, or 18 Pay Rates
References in laws to the rates of pay for GS–16, 17, or 18, or to maximum rates of pay under the General Schedule, to be considered references to rates payable under specified sections of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, see section 529 [title I, §101(c)(1)] of
Executive Documents
Transfer of Functions
National Security Council transferred to Executive Office of President by Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1949, eff. Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227,
§3073a. Requirements for certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees
(a) Post-employment restrictions
(1) Covered post-service position
(A) Permanent restriction
Except as provided by paragraph (2)(A)(i), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may not occupy a covered post-service position for a designated prohibited foreign country following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
(B) Temporary restriction
Except as provided by paragraph (2)(A)(ii), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may not occupy a covered post-service position during the 30-month period following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
(2) Waiver
(A) Authority to grant temporary waiver
(i) Waivers of permanent restriction
On a case-by-case basis, the Director of National Intelligence may temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1)(A) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—
(I) the employee or former employee submits to the Director a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the Director determines appropriate;
(II) the Director determines that not granting such waiver would result in a grave detrimental impact to current or future intelligence operations of the United States; and
(III) the Director provides the congressional intelligence committees with a detailed justification stating why not granting such waiver would result in a grave detrimental impact to current or future intelligence operations of the United States.
(ii) Waivers of temporary restriction
On a case-by-case basis, the Director may temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1)(B) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—
(I) the employee or former employee submits to the Director a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the Director determines appropriate; and
(II) the Director determines that such waiver is necessary to advance the national security interests of the United States.
(B) Period of waiver
A waiver issued under subparagraph (A) shall apply for a period not exceeding 5 years. The Director may renew such a waiver.
(C) Revocation
The Director may revoke a waiver issued under subparagraph (A) to an employee or former employee, effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the Director provides the employee or former employee written notice of such revocation.
(D) Tolling
The 30-month restriction in paragraph (1)(B) shall be tolled for an employee or former employee during the period beginning on the date on which a waiver is issued under subparagraph (A) and ending on the date on which the waiver expires or on the effective date of a revocation under subparagraph (C), as the case may be.
(E) Notification
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director issues a waiver under subparagraph (A) or a revocation of a waiver under subparagraph (C), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification of the waiver or revocation, as the case may be. Such notification shall include the following:
(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—
(I) the details of the application, including the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee;
(II) the nature of the activities of the employee or former employee after ceasing to occupy a covered intelligence position;
(III) a description of the national security interests that will be advanced by reason of issuing such waiver; and
(IV) the specific reasons why the Director determines that issuing such waiver will advance such interests.
(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—
(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and
(II) the specific reasons why the Director determined that such revocation is warranted.
(b) Covered post-service employment reporting
(1) Requirement
During the period described in paragraph (2), an employee who ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position shall—
(A) report covered post-service employment to the head of the element of the intelligence community that employed such employee in such covered intelligence position upon accepting such covered post-service employment; and
(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of such element considers it appropriate) report covered post-service employment to the head of such element.
(2) Period described
The period described in this paragraph is the period beginning on the date on which an employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
(3) Regulations
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee of such element occupying a covered intelligence position to sign a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered post-service employment to the head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).
(c) Penalties
(1) Criminal penalties
A former employee who knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a) or who knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each report under subsection (b) shall be subject to
(2) Security clearances
The head of an element of the intelligence community shall revoke the security clearance of a former employee if the former employee knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b) or knowingly and willfully makes a false report under such subsection.
(d) Provision of information
(1) Training
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall regularly provide training on the restrictions under subsection (a) and the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to employees of that element who occupy a covered intelligence position.
(2) Written notice about reporting requirements
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall provide written notice of the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an employee when the employee occupies a covered intelligence position.
(3) Written notice about restrictions
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall provide written notice of the restrictions under subsection (a) to any person who may be subject to such restrictions on or after December 23, 2022—
(A) when the head of the element determines that such person may become subject to such covered intelligence position restrictions; and
(B) when the person occupies a covered intelligence position.
(e) Annual reports
(1) Requirement
Not later than March 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on covered post-service employment occurring during the year covered by the report.
(2) Elements
Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) The number of former employees who occupy a covered post-service position, broken down by—
(i) the name of the employer;
(ii) the foreign government, including by the specific foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-service employment is being performed; and
(iii) the nature of the services provided as part of the covered post-service employment.
(B) A certification by the Director that—
(i) each element of the intelligence community maintains adequate systems and processes for ensuring that former employees are submitting reports required under subsection (b);
(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, all former employees who occupy a covered post-service position are in compliance with this section;
(iii) the services provided by former employees who occupy a covered post-service position do not—
(I) pose a current or future threat to the national security of the United States; or
(II) pose a counterintelligence risk; and
(iv) the Director and the heads of such elements are not aware of any credible information or reporting that any former employee who occupies a covered post-service position has engaged in activities that violate Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United States persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
(3) Form
Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(f) Notification
In addition to the annual reports under subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence community determines that the services provided by a former employee who occupies a covered post-service position pose a threat or risk described in clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of such subsection, or include activities described in clause (iv) of such paragraph, the head shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such determination by not later than 7 days after making such determination. The notification shall include the following:
(1) The name of the former employee.
(2) The name of the employer.
(3) The foreign government, including the specific foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-service employment is being performed.
(4) As applicable, a description of—
(A) the risk to national security, the counterintelligence risk, or both; and
(B) the activities that may violate Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United States persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
(g) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence position
The term "covered intelligence position" means a position within an element of the intelligence community that, based on the level of access of a person occupying such position to information regarding sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such element determines should be subject to the requirements of this section.
(2) Covered post-service employment
The term "covered post-service employment" means direct or indirect employment by, representation of, or any provision of advice or services relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to, the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country.
(3) Covered post-service position
The term "covered post-service position" means a position of employment described in paragraph (2).
(4) Designated prohibited foreign country
The term "designated prohibited foreign country" means the following:
(A) The People's Republic of China.
(B) The Russian Federation.
(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(D) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(E) The Republic of Cuba.
(F) The Syrian Arab Republic.
(5) Employee
The term "employee", with respect to an employee occupying a covered intelligence position, includes an officer or official of an element of the intelligence community, a contractor of such an element, a detailee to such an element, or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to such an element.
(6) Former employee
The term "former employee" means an individual—
(A) who was an employee occupying a covered intelligence position; and
(B) who is subject to the requirements under subsection (a) or (b).
(7) Government of a foreign country
The term "government of a foreign country" has the meaning given the term in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §304, as added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 304 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III,
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (d)(2).
Subsec. (d)(3)(B).
2022—
Subsecs. (a), (b).
Subsec. (d)(2).
Subsec. (d)(3).
Subsec. (g)(4) to (7).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2022 Amendment
Revised Regulations
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(A) include provisions that advise personnel of the intelligence community of the appropriate manner in which such personnel may opt out of positions that—
"(i) have been designated as covered intelligence positions before the effective date established in subsection (e) of this section; or
"(ii) may be designated as covered intelligence provisions before such designation becomes final; and
"(B) establish a period of not fewer than 30 days and not more than 60 days after receipt of the written notice required under paragraph (3) of subsection (d) of such section 304 [
"(4)
"(A) a written certification for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has issued new or updated regulations pursuant to paragraph (2); and
"(B) for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has not issued such new or updated regulations, an explanation for the failure to issue such new or updated regulations."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6301(d) of
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) a written certification for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has issued the updated regulations under such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1); and
"(ii) for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has not issued such updated regulations, an explanation for the failure to issue such updated regulations."
[For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" as used in section 308(a)(3) of div. X of
Regulations and Certification
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) a certification that each head of an element of the intelligence community has prescribed the regulations required under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; or
"(B) if the Director is unable to submit the certification described under subparagraph (A), an explanation as to why the Director is unable to submit such certification, including a designation of which heads of an element of the intelligence community have prescribed the regulations required under such section 304 and which have not."
[For definitions of terms used in section 305(b) of
Initial Report
§3074. Authorization of appropriations
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this chapter (other than the provisions and purposes of
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §307,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
1993—
§3075. "Function" and "Department of Defense" defined
(a) As used in
(b) As used in this Act, the term "Department of Defense" shall be deemed to include the military departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and all agencies created under title II of this Act.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §308,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Title II of this Act, referred to in subsec. (b), means title II of the National Security Act of 1947, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a).
1949—Subsec. (b). Act Aug. 10, 1949, substituted definition of "Department of Defense" for definition of "budget program".
§3076. Separability
If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the chapter and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §309,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified as a note under
§3077. Effective date
(a) The first sentence of section 202(a),1 this section, and
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this chapter shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after July 26, 1947.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §310,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The first sentence of section 202(a), referred to in subsec. (a), means the first sentence of section 202(a) of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, which was classified to section 171a of former Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Officers and Employees, prior to the enactment of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, by
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified as a note under
1 See References in Text note below.
§3078. Repealing and savings provisions
All laws, orders, and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this title 1 are repealed insofar as they are inconsistent with the powers, duties, and responsibilities enacted hereby: Provided, That the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under this title 1 shall be administered in conformance with the policy and requirements for administration of budgetary and fiscal matters in the Government generally, including accounting and financial reporting, and that nothing in this title 1 shall be construed as eliminating or modifying the powers, duties, and responsibilities of any other department, agency, or officer of the Government in connection with such matters, but no such department, agency, or officer shall exercise any such powers, duties, or responsibilities in a manner that will render ineffective the provisions of this title.1
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §312, formerly title IV, §411, as added Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §11,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This title, referred to in text, meant, when enacted, title IV of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, which was added by section 11 of act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412,
Codification
When originally enacted, this section was section 411 of title IV of the National Security Act of 1947, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343 ("the Act"). Title IV of the Act, consisting of sections 401 to 411, was added by section 11 of act Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412,
Section was classified to
Section was formerly classified to
1 See References in Text note below.
§3079. Insider threat policy compliance and reporting
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall—
(1) implement the policy established in accordance with
(2) concurrent with the submission to Congress of budget justification materials in support of the budget of the President for a fiscal year that is submitted to Congress under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, §313, as added
SUBCHAPTER III—ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
§3091. General congressional oversight provisions
(a) Reports to congressional committees of intelligence activities and anticipated activities
(1) The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity as required by this subchapter.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as requiring the approval of the congressional intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.
(b) Reports concerning illegal intelligence activities
The President shall ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is reported promptly to the congressional intelligence committees, as well as any corrective action that has been taken or is planned in connection with such illegal activity.
(c) Procedures for reporting information
The President and the congressional intelligence committees shall each establish such written procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.
(d) Procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure
The House of Representatives and the Senate shall each establish, by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified information, and all information relating to intelligence sources and methods, that is furnished to the congressional intelligence committees or to Members of Congress under this subchapter. Such procedures shall be established in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. In accordance with such procedures, each of the congressional intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees.
(e) Construction of authority conferred
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authority to withhold information from the congressional intelligence committees on the grounds that providing the information to the congressional intelligence committees would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources and methods.
(f) "Intelligence activities" defined
As used in this section, the term "intelligence activities" includes covert actions as defined in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §501, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (e), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 501 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, as added
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (c).
2004—Subsec. (d).
2002—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (a)(2), (3).
Subsecs. (b) to (e).
Subsec. (f).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3091a. Congressional oversight of controlled access programs
(a) Periodic briefings
(1) Requirement
Not less frequently than semiannually or upon request by one of the appropriate congressional committees or a member of congressional leadership, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to such committees and congressional leadership a briefing on each controlled access program in effect.
(2) Contents
Each briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the activity of the controlled access programs during the period covered by the briefing.
(B) Documentation with respect to how the controlled access programs have achieved outcomes consistent with requirements documented by the Director and, as applicable, the Secretary of Defense.
(b) Limitation on establishment
A head of an element of the intelligence community may not establish a controlled access program, or a compartment or subcompartment therein, until the head notifies the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership of such controlled access program, compartment, or subcompartment, as the case may be.
(c) Annual reports
(1) Requirement
On an annual basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a report on controlled access programs administered by the head.
(2) Matters included
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(A) A list of all compartments and subcompartments of controlled access programs active as of the date of the report.
(B) A list of all compartments and subcompartments of controlled access programs terminated during the period covered by the report.
(C) With respect to the report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence, in addition to the matters specified in clauses (A) and (B)—
(i) a certification regarding whether the creation, validation, or substantial modification, including termination, for all existing and proposed controlled access programs, and the compartments and subcompartments within each, are substantiated and justified based on the information required by clause (ii); and
(ii) for each certification—
(I) the rationale for the revalidation, validation, or substantial modification, including termination, of each controlled access program, compartment, and subcompartment;
(II) the identification of a control officer for each controlled access program; and
(III) a statement of protection requirements for each controlled access program.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership
The term "congressional leadership" means—
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Controlled access program
The term "controlled access program" means a program created or managed pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 906, or successor directive.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §501A, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Intelligence Community Directive 906, referred to in subsec. (d)(3), is located at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD906.pdf.
§3092. Reporting of intelligence activities other than covert actions
(a) In general
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities shall—
(1) keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than a covert action (as defined in
(2) furnish the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities (including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted), other than covert actions, which is within their custody or control, and which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
(b) Form and contents of certain reports
Any report relating to a significant anticipated intelligence activity or a significant intelligence failure that is submitted to the congressional intelligence committees for purposes of subsection (a)(1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following:
(1) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report.
(2) An explanation of the significance of the intelligence activity or intelligence failure covered by such report.
(c) Standards and procedures for certain reports
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the departments, agencies, and entities referred to in subsection (a), shall establish standards and procedures applicable to reports covered by subsection (b).
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §502, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 502 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was renumbered section 504 and is classified to
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (a)(2).
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
2002—Subsecs. (a), (b).
2001—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Furnishing of Intelligence Information to Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence
"(a)
"(b)
§3093. Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions
(a) Presidential findings
The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions:
(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the decision is made.
(2) Except as permitted by paragraph (1), a finding may not authorize or sanction a covert action, or any aspect of any such action, which already has occurred.
(3) Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern such participation.
(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element of, or a contractor or contract agent of, the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies and regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned, or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States.
(5) A finding may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States.
(b) Reports to congressional intelligence committees; production of information
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action—
(1) shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including significant failures; and
(2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning covert actions (including the legal basis under which the covert action is being or was conducted) which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government and which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
(c) Timing of reports; access to finding
(1) The President shall ensure that any finding approved pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported in writing to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) and paragraph (3).
(2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President.
(3) Whenever a finding is not reported pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, the President shall fully inform the congressional intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
(4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each congressional intelligence committee.
(5)(A) When access to a finding, or a notification provided under subsection (d)(1), is limited to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2), a written statement of the reasons for limiting such access shall also be provided.
(B) Not later than 180 days after a statement of reasons is submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this subparagraph, the President shall ensure that—
(i) all members of the congressional intelligence committees are provided access to the finding or notification; or
(ii) a statement of reasons that it is essential to continue to limit access to such finding or such notification to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States is submitted to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2).
(d) Changes in previously approved actions
(1) The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are notified in writing of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c).
(2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether the activity—
(A) involves significant risk of loss of life;
(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations;
(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources;
(D) requires notification under
(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or
(F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.
(e) "Covert action" defined
As used in this subchapter, the term "covert action" means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include—
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.
(f) Prohibition on covert actions intended to influence United States political processes, etc.
No covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
(g) Notice and general description where access to finding or notification limited; maintenance of records and written statements
(1) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall notify all members of such committee that such finding or such notification has been provided only to the members specified in subsection (c)(2).
(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide to all members of such committee a general description regarding the finding or notification, as applicable, consistent with the reasons for not yet fully informing all members of such committee.
(3) The President shall maintain—
(A) a record of the members of Congress to whom a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notification is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each member of Congress receives such finding or notification; and
(B) each written statement provided under subsection (c)(5).
(h) Plan to respond to unauthorized public disclosure of covert action
For each type of activity undertaken as part of a covert action, the President shall establish in writing a plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that type of activity.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §503, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 503 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was renumbered section 505 and is classified to
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (c)(3).
2019—Subsecs. (c)(5), (d)(2).
2014—Subsec. (h).
2010—Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (c)(4).
Subsec. (c)(5)(A).
Subsec. (c)(5)(B).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (g).
2004—Subsec. (b).
2002—Subsecs. (b), (c)(1) to (3).
Subsec. (c)(4).
Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3094. Funding of intelligence activities
(a) Obligations and expenditures for intelligence or intelligence-related activity; prerequisites
Appropriated funds available to an intelligence agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if—
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by Congress for use for such intelligence or intelligence-related activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and consistent with the provisions of
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the Congress for a different activity—
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority intelligence or intelligence-related activity;
(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
(C) the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, has notified the appropriate congressional committees of the intent to make such funds available for such activity;
(4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation or expenditure of funds available to an intelligence agency in accordance with
(b) Activities denied funding by Congress
Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which funds were denied by the Congress.
(c) Presidential finding required for expenditure of funds on covert action
No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any covert action, as defined in
(d) Report to congressional committees required for expenditure of nonappropriated funds for intelligence activity
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, funds available to an intelligence agency that are not appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if those funds are used for activities reported to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to procedures which identify—
(A) the types of activities for which nonappropriated funds may be expended; and
(B) the circumstances under which an activity must be reported as a significant anticipated intelligence activity before such funds can be expended.
(2) Procedures for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be jointly agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees and, as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense.
(e) Definitions
As used in this section—
(1) the term "intelligence agency" means any department, agency, or other entity of the United States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related activities;
(2) the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the term "specifically authorized by the Congress" means that—
(A) the activity and the amount of funds proposed to be used for that activity were identified in a formal budget request to the Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be specifically authorized for that activity only to the extent that the Congress both authorized the funds to be appropriated for that activity and appropriated the funds for that activity; or
(B) although the funds were not formally requested, the Congress both specifically authorized the appropriation of the funds for the activity and appropriated the funds for the activity.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §504, formerly §502, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1).
2019—Subsec. (a)(3)(B).
2010—Subsec. (a)(3)(B).
2004—Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (a)(3)(C).
Subsec. (d)(2).
2002—Subsec. (d)(2).
1991—Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsecs. (c) to (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Sense of Congress Regarding Disclosure of Annual Intelligence Budget
Enhanced Security Countermeasures Capabilities; Application of Section
§3095. Notice to Congress of certain transfers of defense articles and defense services
(a)(1) The transfer of a defense article or defense service, or the anticipated transfer in any fiscal year of any aggregation of defense articles or defense services, exceeding $1,000,000 in value by an intelligence agency to a recipient outside that agency shall be considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the purpose of this subchapter.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if—
(A) the transfer is being made to a department, agency, or other entity of the United States (so long as there will not be a subsequent retransfer of the defense articles or defense services outside the United States Government in conjunction with an intelligence or intelligence-related activity); or
(B) the transfer—
(i) is being made pursuant to authorities contained in part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [
(ii) is not being made in conjunction with an intelligence or intelligence-related activity.
(3) An intelligence agency may not transfer any defense articles or defense services outside the agency in conjunction with any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which funds were denied by the Congress.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) the term "intelligence agency" means any department, agency, or other entity of the United States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related activities;
(2) the terms "defense articles" and "defense services" mean the items on the United States Munitions List pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act [
(3) the term "transfer" means—
(A) in the case of defense articles, the transfer of possession of those articles; and
(B) in the case of defense services, the provision of those services; and
(4) the term "value" means—
(A) in the case of defense articles, the greater of—
(i) the original acquisition cost to the United States Government, plus the cost of improvements or other modifications made by or on behalf of the Government; or
(ii) the replacement cost; and
(B) in the case of defense services, the full cost to the Government of providing the services.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §505, formerly §503, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i), is
The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i), is
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
In subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i), "chapters 1 to 11 of title 40 and division C (except sections 3302, 3307(e), 3501(b), 3509, 3906, 4710, and 4711) of subtitle I of title 41" substituted for "the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949" on authority of
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i).
1993—Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i).
1991—Subsec. (a)(1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2018 Amendment
Amendment by
§3096. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and counterintelligence
(a) In general
The budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for a fiscal year that is submitted to Congress under
(1) Counterterrorism.
(2) Counterproliferation.
(3) Counternarcotics.
(4) Counterintelligence.
(b) Election of classified or unclassified form
Amounts set forth under subsection (a) may be set forth in unclassified form or classified form, at the election of the Director of National Intelligence.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2012—Subsec. (b).
2004—
Subsec. (a).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Inclusion of Counternarcotics as Special Topic in Certain Budget Justification Materials
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) a summary of the main activities and investments that such requested funding would support;
"(2) a breakdown of such requested funding by program, budget category, intelligence discipline, and any other appropriate classification;
"(3) a comparison of aggregate requested funding and aggregate enacted funding for counternarcotics for the current fiscal year and the previous fiscal year;
"(4) the number of full-time equivalent civilian and military personnel assigned to the counternarcotics mission of the intelligence community; and
"(5) such other information as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate."
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 7320 of
§3097. Budget treatment of costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community
(a) Independent cost estimates
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an independent cost estimate of the full life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of each major system to be acquired by the intelligence community.
(2)(A) Each independent cost estimate for a major system shall, to the maximum extent practicable, specify the amount required to be appropriated and obligated to develop, procure, and operate the major system in each fiscal year of the proposed period of development, procurement, and operation of the major system.
(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program. If such costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall identify and annotate such costs for such other elements accordingly.
(3)(A) In the case of a program of the intelligence community that qualifies as a major system, an independent cost estimate shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for the development or procurement of such major system.
(B) In the case of a program of the intelligence community for which an independent cost estimate was not previously required to be prepared under this section, including a program for which development or procurement commenced before December 13, 2003, if the aggregate future costs of development or procurement (or any combination of such activities) of the program will exceed $500,000,000 (in current fiscal year dollars), the program shall qualify as a major system for purposes of this section, and an independent cost estimate for such major system shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year thereafter in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for such major system.
(4) The independent cost estimate for a major system shall be updated upon—
(A) the completion of any preliminary design review associated with the major system;
(B) any significant modification to the anticipated design of the major system; or
(C) any change in circumstances that renders the current independent cost estimate for the major system inaccurate.
(5) Any update of an independent cost estimate for a major system under paragraph (4) shall meet all requirements for independent cost estimates under this section, and shall be treated as the most current independent cost estimate for the major system until further updated under that paragraph.
(b) Preparation of independent cost estimates
(1) The Director shall establish within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for Community Management an office which shall be responsible for preparing independent cost estimates, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a), unless a designation is made under paragraph (2).
(2) In the case of the acquisition of a major system for an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, the Director and the Secretary of Defense shall provide that the independent cost estimate, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a) be prepared by an entity jointly designated by the Director and the Secretary in accordance with section 2434(b)(1)(A) 1 of title 10.
(c) Utilization in budgets of President
(1) If the budget of the President requests appropriations for any fiscal year for the development or procurement of a major system by the intelligence community, the President shall, subject to paragraph (2), request in such budget an amount of appropriations for the development or procurement, as the case may be, of the major system that is equivalent to the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate for the major system for obligation for each fiscal year for which appropriations are requested for the major system in such budget.
(2) If the amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for the development or procurement of a major system is less than the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate for the major system for obligation for each fiscal year for which appropriations are requested for the major system in such budget, the President shall include in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of such budget—
(A) an explanation for the difference between the amount of appropriations requested and the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate;
(B) a description of the importance of the major system to the national security;
(C) an assessment of the consequences for the funding of all programs of the National Intelligence Program in future fiscal years if the most current independent cost estimate for the major system is accurate and additional appropriations are required in future fiscal years to ensure the continued development or procurement of the major system, including the consequences of such funding shortfalls on the major system and all other programs of the National Intelligence Program; and
(D) such other information on the funding of the major system as the President considers appropriate.
(d) Inclusion of estimates in budget justification materials
The budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President shall include the most current independent cost estimate under this section for each major system for which appropriations are requested in such budget for any fiscal year.
(e) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "budget of the President" means the budget of the President for a fiscal year as submitted to Congress under
(2)(A) The term "independent cost estimate" means a pragmatic and neutral analysis, assessment, and quantification of all costs and risks associated with the development, acquisition, procurement, operation, and sustainment of a major system across its proposed life cycle, which shall be based on programmatic and technical specifications provided by the office within the element of the intelligence community with primary responsibility for the development, procurement, or operation of the major system.
(B) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each independent cost estimate shall include all costs required across elements of the intelligence community to develop, acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system, including—
(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program; and
(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community.
(3) The term "major system" means any significant program of an element of the intelligence community with projected total development and procurement costs exceeding $500,000,000 (based on fiscal year 2010 constant dollars), which costs shall include all end-to-end program costs, including costs associated with the development and procurement of the program and any other costs associated with the development and procurement of systems required to support or utilize the program.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506A, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2012—Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (c)(2)(C).
Subsec. (e)(2).
2010—Subsec. (e)(3).
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2012 Amendment
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date
Congressional Findings
"(1) Funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program often must be shifted from program to program and from fiscal year to fiscal year to address funding shortfalls caused by significant increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community.
"(2) While some increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community are unavoidable, the magnitude of growth in the costs of acquisition of many major systems indicates a systemic bias within the intelligence community to underestimate the costs of such acquisition, particularly in the preliminary stages of development and production.
"(3) Decisions by Congress to fund the acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community rely significantly upon initial estimates of the affordability of acquiring such major systems and occur within a context in which funds can be allocated for a variety of alternative programs. Thus, substantial increases in costs of acquisition of major systems place significant burdens on the availability of funds for other programs and new proposals within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
"(4) Independent cost estimates, prepared by independent offices, have historically represented a more accurate projection of the costs of acquisition of major systems.
"(5) Recognizing the benefits associated with independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems, the Secretary of Defense has built upon the statutory requirement in [former]
"(6) The mandatory use throughout the intelligence community of independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems will assist the President and Congress in the development and funding of budgets which more accurately reflect the requirements and priorities of the United States Government for intelligence and intelligence-related activities."
Limitations on Major System Procurement, Acquisition, and Development
"(1)(A) For each major system for which funds have been authorized for a fiscal year before fiscal year 2005, or for which funds are sought in the budget of the President for fiscal year 2005, as submitted to Congress pursuant to
"(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not affect any contract for procurement or acquisition that was entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 13, 2003].
"(2) Commencing as of the date of the submittal to Congress of the budget of the President for fiscal year 2006 pursuant to
"(3) In this subsection, the terms 'independent cost estimate' and 'major system' have the meaning given such terms in subsection (e) of section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (as so added) [
1 See References in Text note below.
§3098. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community
(a) Requirement to provide
The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the personnel levels for such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted.
(b) Schedule
Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year pursuant to
(c) Contents
Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted during a fiscal year shall contain the following information for the element of the intelligence community concerned:
(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year.
(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal year.
(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 fiscal years.
(4) The number of full-time equivalent positions that is the basis for which personnel funds are requested for the upcoming fiscal year.
(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions of the current fiscal year.
(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions during the prior 5 fiscal years.
(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of core contract personnel to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year.
(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the best estimate of the costs of core contract personnel of the current fiscal year.
(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such number and such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the number and cost of core contract personnel during the prior 5 fiscal years.
(10) A justification for the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels.
(11) The best estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed by each element of the intelligence community.
(12) The best estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts contracted by each element of the intelligence community and a description of the functions performed by such contractors.
(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element concerned will have sufficient—
(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels;
(B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and
(C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506B, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2014—Subsec. (c)(11).
Subsec. (c)(12), (13).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Personnel Information Notification Policy by the Director of National Intelligence
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) constitutes the head of an entity or a significant component within an agency;
"(2) is involved in the management or oversight of matters of significant import to the leadership of an entity of the intelligence community;
"(3) provides significant responsibility on behalf of the intelligence community;
"(4) requires the management of a significant number of personnel or funds;
"(5) requires responsibility management or oversight of sensitive intelligence activities; and
"(6) is held by an individual designated as a senior intelligence management official as such term is defined in section 368(a)(6) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (
"(c)
"(1) The name of the individual occupying the position.
"(2) Any previous senior level position held by the individual, if applicable, or the position held by the individual immediately prior to the appointment.
"(3) The position to be occupied by the individual.
"(4) Any other information the Director determines appropriate.
"(d)
"(e)
[For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" as used in section 308 of div. M of
Implementation
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 305(b) of
§3099. Vulnerability assessments of major systems
(a) Initial vulnerability assessments
(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence shall conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees an initial vulnerability assessment for each major system and its significant items of supply—
(i) except as provided in clause (ii), prior to the completion of Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision for the major system; or
(ii) prior to the date that is 1 year after October 7, 2010, in the case of a major system for which Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision—
(I) was completed prior to such date; or
(II) is completed on a date during the 180-day period following such date.
(B) The Director may submit to the congressional intelligence committees an initial vulnerability assessment required by clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) not later than 180 days after the date such assessment is required to be submitted under such clause if the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees of the extension of the submission date under this subparagraph and provides a justification for such extension.
(C) The initial vulnerability assessment of a major system and its significant items of supply shall include use of an analysis-based approach to—
(i) identify vulnerabilities;
(ii) define exploitation potential;
(iii) examine the system's potential effectiveness;
(iv) determine overall vulnerability; and
(v) make recommendations for risk reduction.
(2) If an initial vulnerability assessment for a major system is not submitted to the congressional intelligence committees as required by paragraph (1), funds appropriated for the acquisition of the major system may not be obligated for a major contract related to the major system. Such prohibition on the obligation of funds for the acquisition of the major system shall cease to apply on the date on which the congressional intelligence committees receive the initial vulnerability assessment.
(b) Subsequent vulnerability assessments
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, periodically throughout the procurement of a major system or if the Director determines that a change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a subsequent vulnerability assessment, conduct a subsequent vulnerability assessment of each major system and its significant items of supply within the National Intelligence Program.
(2) Upon the request of a congressional intelligence committee, the Director of National Intelligence may, if appropriate, recertify the previous vulnerability assessment or may conduct a subsequent vulnerability assessment of a particular major system and its significant items of supply within the National Intelligence Program.
(3) Any subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major system and its significant items of supply shall include use of an analysis-based approach and, if applicable, a testing-based approach, to monitor the exploitation potential of such system and reexamine the factors described in clauses (i) through (v) of subsection (a)(1)(C).
(c) Major system management
The Director of National Intelligence shall give due consideration to the vulnerability assessments prepared for a given major system when developing and determining the National Intelligence Program budget.
(d) Congressional oversight
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each vulnerability assessment conducted under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 10 days after the date of the completion of such assessment.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a proposed schedule for subsequent periodic vulnerability assessments of a major system under subsection (b)(1) when providing such committees with the initial vulnerability assessment under subsection (a) of such system as required by paragraph (1).
(e) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "item of supply" has the meaning given that term in section 4(10) 1 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (
(2) The term "major contract" means each of the 6 largest prime, associate, or Government-furnished equipment contracts under a major system that is in excess of $40,000,000 and that is not a firm, fixed price contract.
(3) The term "major system" has the meaning given that term in
(4) The term "Milestone B" means a decision to enter into major system development and demonstration pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(5) The term "vulnerability assessment" means the process of identifying and quantifying vulnerabilities in a major system and its significant items of supply.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506C, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 4(10) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, referred to in subsec. (e)(1), which was classified to section 403(10) of former Title 41, Public Contracts, was repealed and reenacted as
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
1 See References in Text note below.
§3100. Intelligence community business system transformation
(a) Limitation on obligation of funds
(1) Subject to paragraph (3), no funds appropriated to any element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an intelligence community business system transformation that will have a total cost in excess of $3,000,000 unless—
(A) the Director of the Office of Business Transformation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence makes a certification described in paragraph (2) with respect to such intelligence community business system transformation; and
(B) such certification is approved by the board established under subsection (f).
(2) The certification described in this paragraph for an intelligence community business system transformation is a certification made by the Director of the Office of Business Transformation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that the intelligence community business system transformation—
(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under subsection (b) and such other policies and standards that the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate; or
(B) is necessary—
(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or address a critical requirement; or
(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking into consideration any alternative solutions for preventing such adverse effect.
(3) With respect to a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010, the amount referred to in paragraph (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the sum of—
(A) the amount in effect under such paragraph (1) for the preceding fiscal year (determined after application of this paragraph), plus
(B) such amount multiplied by the annual percentage increase in the consumer price index (all items; U.S. city average) as of September of the previous fiscal year.
(b) Enterprise architecture for intelligence community business systems
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, acting through the board established under subsection (f), develop and implement an enterprise architecture to cover all intelligence community business systems, and the functions and activities supported by such business systems. The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of interoperable intelligence community business system solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An information infrastructure that will enable the intelligence community to—
(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements;
(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable financial information for management purposes;
(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program information and systems; and
(iv) provide for the measurement of performance, including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and reliable cost information.
(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the intelligence community.
(c) Responsibilities for intelligence community business system transformation
The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for the entire life cycle of an intelligence community business system transformation, including review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance of the business system transformation.
(d) Intelligence community business system investment review
(1) The Director of the Office of Business Transformation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall establish and implement, not later than 60 days after October 7, 2010, an investment review process for the intelligence community business systems for which the Director of the Office of Business Transformation is responsible.
(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall—
(A) meet the requirements of
(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the Director of the Office of Business Transformation under such review process.
(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
(A) Review and approval by an investment review board (consisting of appropriate representatives of the intelligence community) of each intelligence community business system as an investment before the obligation of funds for such system.
(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of every intelligence community business system investment.
(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate review of intelligence community business system investments depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system involved.
(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
(e) Repealed. Pub. L. 112–277, title III, §310(a)(3), Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2475
(f) Intelligence community business system transformation governance board
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a board within the intelligence community business system transformation governance structure (in this subsection referred to as the "Board").
(2) The Board shall—
(A) recommend to the Director policies and procedures necessary to effectively integrate all business activities and any transformation, reform, reorganization, or process improvement initiatives undertaken within the intelligence community;
(B) review and approve any major update of—
(i) the enterprise architecture developed under subsection (b); and
(ii) any plans for an intelligence community business systems modernization;
(C) manage cross-domain integration consistent with such enterprise architecture;
(D) coordinate initiatives for intelligence community business system transformation to maximize benefits and minimize costs for the intelligence community, and periodically report to the Director on the status of efforts to carry out an intelligence community business system transformation;
(E) ensure that funds are obligated for intelligence community business system transformation in a manner consistent with subsection (a); and
(F) carry out such other duties as the Director shall specify.
(g) Relation to annual registration requirements
Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (
(h) Relationship to defense business enterprise architecture
Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense from the requirements of
(i) Relation to Clinger-Cohen Act
(1) Executive agency responsibilities in
(A) the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; and
(B) the head of the executive agency that contains the element of the intelligence community involved and the chief information officer of that executive agency.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence and the head of the executive agency referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall enter into a Memorandum of Understanding to carry out the requirements of this section in a manner that best meets the needs of the intelligence community and the executive agency.
(j) Reports
Not later than March 31 of each of the years 2011 through 2014, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the compliance of the intelligence community with the requirements of this section. Each such report shall—
(1) describe actions taken and proposed for meeting the requirements of subsection (a), including—
(A) specific milestones and actual performance against specified performance measures, and any revision of such milestones and performance measures; and
(B) specific actions on the intelligence community business system transformations submitted for certification under such subsection;
(2) identify the number of intelligence community business system transformations that received a certification described in subsection (a)(2); and
(3) describe specific improvements in business operations and cost savings resulting from successful intelligence community business systems transformation efforts.
(k) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "enterprise architecture" has the meaning given that term in
(2) The terms "information system" and "information technology" have the meanings given those terms in
(3) The term "intelligence community business system" means an information system, including a national security system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of an element of the intelligence community, including a financial system, mixed system, financial data feeder system, and the business infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the business enterprise architecture, including people, process, and technology, that build upon the core infrastructure used to support business activities, such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource management.
(4) The term "intelligence community business system transformation" means—
(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence community business system; or
(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an existing intelligence community business system (other than necessary to maintain current services).
(5) The term "national security system" has the meaning given that term in section 3542 1 of title 44.
(6) The term "Office of Business Transformation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence" includes any successor office that assumes the functions of the Office of Business Transformation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as carried out by the Office of Business Transformation on October 7, 2010.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506D, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 8083 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, referred to in subsec. (g), is section 8083 of
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2014—Subsec. (j).
2013—Subsec. (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Implementation
"(1)
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) An acquisition strategy for new systems that are expected to be needed to complete such enterprise architecture, including specific time-phased milestones, performance metrics, and a statement of the financial and nonfinancial resource needs.
"(ii) An identification of the intelligence community business systems in operation or planned as of the date that is 60 days after the enactment of this Act that will not be a part of such enterprise architecture, together with the schedule for the phased termination of the utilization of any such systems.
"(iii) An identification of the intelligence community business systems in operation or planned as of such date, that will be a part of such enterprise architecture, together with a strategy for modifying such systems to ensure that such systems comply with such enterprise architecture.
"(C)
[For definitions of terms used in section 322(b) of
1 See References in Text note below.
§3101. Reports on the acquisition of major systems
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "cost estimate"—
(A) means an assessment and quantification of all costs and risks associated with the acquisition of a major system based upon reasonably available information at the time the Director establishes the 2010 adjusted total acquisition cost for such system pursuant to subsection (h) or restructures such system pursuant to
(B) does not mean an "independent cost estimate".
(2) The term "critical cost growth threshold" means a percentage increase in the total acquisition cost for a major system of at least 25 percent over the total acquisition cost for the major system as shown in the current Baseline Estimate for the major system.
(3)(A) The term "current Baseline Estimate" means the projected total acquisition cost of a major system that is—
(i) approved by the Director, or a designee of the Director, at Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision for the development, procurement, and construction of such system;
(ii) approved by the Director at the time such system is restructured pursuant to
(iii) the 2010 adjusted total acquisition cost determined pursuant to subsection (h).
(B) A current Baseline Estimate may be in the form of an independent cost estimate.
(4) Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term "Director" means the Director of National Intelligence.
(5) The term "independent cost estimate" has the meaning given that term in
(6) The term "major contract" means each of the 6 largest prime, associate, or Government-furnished equipment contracts under a major system that is in excess of $40,000,000 and that is not a firm, fixed price contract.
(7) The term "major system" has the meaning given that term in
(8) The term "Milestone B" means a decision to enter into major system development and demonstration pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Director.
(9) The term "program manager" means—
(A) the head of the element of the intelligence community that is responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of a major system; or
(B) in the case of a major system within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the deputy who is responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of the major system.
(10) The term "significant cost growth threshold" means the percentage increase in the total acquisition cost for a major system of at least 15 percent over the total acquisition cost for such system as shown in the current Baseline Estimate for such system.
(11) The term "total acquisition cost" means the amount equal to the total cost for development and procurement of, and system-specific construction for, a major system.
(b) Major system cost reports
(1) The program manager for a major system shall, on a quarterly basis, submit to the Director a major system cost report as described in paragraph (2).
(2) A major system cost report shall include the following information (as of the last day of the quarter for which the report is made):
(A) The total acquisition cost for the major system.
(B) Any cost variance or schedule variance in a major contract for the major system since the contract was entered into.
(C) Any changes from a major system schedule milestones or performances that are known, expected, or anticipated by the program manager.
(D) Any significant changes in the total acquisition cost for development and procurement of any software component of the major system, schedule milestones for such software component of the major system, or expected performance of such software component of the major system that are known, expected, or anticipated by the program manager.
(3) Each major system cost report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted not more than 30 days after the end of the reporting quarter.
(c) Reports for breach of significant or critical cost growth thresholds
If the program manager of a major system for which a report has previously been submitted under subsection (b) determines at any time during a quarter that there is reasonable cause to believe that the total acquisition cost for the major system has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold or critical cost growth threshold and if a report indicating an increase of such percentage or more has not previously been submitted to the Director, then the program manager shall immediately submit to the Director a major system cost report containing the information, determined as of the date of the report, required under subsection (b).
(d) Notification to Congress of cost growth
(1) Whenever a major system cost report is submitted to the Director, the Director shall determine whether the current acquisition cost for the major system has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold or the critical cost growth threshold.
(2) If the Director determines that the current total acquisition cost has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold or critical cost growth threshold, the Director shall submit to Congress a Major System Congressional Report pursuant to subsection (e).
(e) Requirement for Major System Congressional Report
(1) Whenever the Director determines under subsection (d) that the total acquisition cost of a major system has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold for the major system, a Major System Congressional Report shall be submitted to Congress not later than 45 days after the date on which the Director receives the major system cost report for such major system.
(2) If the total acquisition cost of a major system (as determined by the Director under subsection (d)) increases by a percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold for the program or subprogram, the Director shall take actions consistent with the requirements of
(f) Major System Congressional Report elements
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each Major System Congressional Report shall include the following:
(A) The name of the major system.
(B) The date of the preparation of the report.
(C) The program phase of the major system as of the date of the preparation of the report.
(D) The estimate of the total acquisition cost for the major system expressed in constant base-year dollars and in current dollars.
(E) The current Baseline Estimate for the major system in constant base-year dollars and in current dollars.
(F) A statement of the reasons for any increase in total acquisition cost for the major system.
(G) The completion status of the major system—
(i) expressed as the percentage that the number of years for which funds have been appropriated for the major system is of the number of years for which it is planned that funds will be appropriated for the major system; and
(ii) expressed as the percentage that the amount of funds that have been appropriated for the major system is of the total amount of funds which it is planned will be appropriated for the major system.
(H) The fiscal year in which the major system was first authorized and in which funds for such system were first appropriated by Congress.
(I) The current change and the total change, in dollars and expressed as a percentage, in the total acquisition cost for the major system, stated both in constant base-year dollars and in current dollars.
(J) The quantity of end items to be acquired under the major system and the current change and total change, if any, in that quantity.
(K) The identities of the officers responsible for management and cost control of the major system.
(L) The action taken and proposed to be taken to control future cost growth of the major system.
(M) Any changes made in the performance or schedule milestones of the major system and the extent to which such changes have contributed to the increase in total acquisition cost for the major system.
(N) The following contract performance assessment information with respect to each major contract under the major system:
(i) The name of the contractor.
(ii) The phase that the contract is in at the time of the preparation of the report.
(iii) The percentage of work under the contract that has been completed.
(iv) Any current change and the total change, in dollars and expressed as a percentage, in the contract cost.
(v) The percentage by which the contract is currently ahead of or behind schedule.
(vi) A narrative providing a summary explanation of the most significant occurrences, including cost and schedule variances under major contracts of the major system, contributing to the changes identified and a discussion of the effect these occurrences will have on the future costs and schedule of the major system.
(O) In any case in which one or more problems with a software component of the major system significantly contributed to the increase in costs of the major system, the action taken and proposed to be taken to solve such problems.
(2) A Major System Congressional Report prepared for a major system for which the increase in the total acquisition cost is due to termination or cancellation of the entire major system shall include only—
(A) the information described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1); and
(B) the total percentage change in total acquisition cost for such system.
(g) Prohibition on obligation of funds
If a determination of an increase by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold is made by the Director under subsection (d) and a Major System Congressional Report containing the information described in subsection (f) is not submitted to Congress under subsection (e)(1), or if a determination of an increase by a percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold is made by the Director under subsection (d) and the Major System Congressional Report containing the information described in subsection (f) and
(1) on which Congress receives the Major System Congressional Report under subsection (e)(1) with respect to that major system, in the case of a determination of an increase by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold (as determined in subsection (d)); or
(2) on which Congress receives both the Major System Congressional Report under subsection (e)(2) and the certification of the Director under
(h) Treatment of cost increases prior to October 7, 2010
(1) Not later than 180 days after October 7, 2010, the Director—
(A) shall, for each major system, determine if the total acquisition cost of such major system increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold or the critical cost growth threshold prior to such date;
(B) shall establish for each major system for which the total acquisition cost has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the significant cost growth threshold or the critical cost growth threshold prior to such date a revised current Baseline Estimate based upon an updated cost estimate;
(C) may, for a major system not described in subparagraph (B), establish a revised current Baseline Estimate based upon an updated cost estimate; and
(D) shall submit to Congress a report describing—
(i) each determination made under subparagraph (A);
(ii) each revised current Baseline Estimate established for a major system under subparagraph (B); and
(iii) each revised current Baseline Estimate established for a major system under subparagraph (C), including the percentage increase of the total acquisition cost of such major system that occurred prior to October 7, 2010.
(2) The revised current Baseline Estimate established for a major system under subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1) shall be the 2010 adjusted total acquisition cost for the major system and may include the estimated cost of conducting any vulnerability assessments for such major system required under
(i) Requirements to use base year dollars
Any determination of a percentage increase under this section shall be stated in terms of constant base year dollars.
(j) Form of report
Any report required to be submitted under this section may be submitted in a classified form.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506E, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Applicability Date of Quarterly Reports
Major Defense Acquisition Programs
§3102. Critical cost growth in major systems
(a) Reassessment of major system
If the Director of National Intelligence determines under
(1) determine the root cause or causes of the critical cost growth, in accordance with applicable statutory requirements, policies, procedures, and guidance; and
(2) carry out an assessment of—
(A) the projected cost of completing the major system if current requirements are not modified;
(B) the projected cost of completing the major system based on reasonable modification of such requirements;
(C) the rough order of magnitude of the costs of any reasonable alternative system or capability; and
(D) the need to reduce funding for other systems due to the growth in cost of the major system.
(b) Presumption of termination
(1) After conducting the reassessment required by subsection (a) with respect to a major system, the Director shall terminate the major system unless the Director submits to Congress a Major System Congressional Report containing a certification in accordance with paragraph (2) and the information described in paragraph (3). The Director shall submit such Major System Congressional Report and certification not later than 90 days after the date the Director receives the relevant major system cost report under subsection (b) or (c) of
(2) A certification described by this paragraph with respect to a major system is a written certification that—
(A) the continuation of the major system is essential to the national security;
(B) there are no alternatives to the major system that will provide acceptable capability to meet the intelligence requirement at less cost;
(C) the new estimates of the total acquisition cost have been determined by the Director to be reasonable;
(D) the major system is a higher priority than other systems whose funding must be reduced to accommodate the growth in cost of the major system; and
(E) the management structure for the major system is adequate to manage and control the total acquisition cost.
(3) A Major System Congressional Report accompanying a written certification under paragraph (2) shall include, in addition to the requirements of
(c) Actions if major system not terminated
If the Director elects not to terminate a major system pursuant to subsection (b), the Director shall—
(1) restructure the major system in a manner that addresses the root cause or causes of the critical cost growth, as identified pursuant to subsection (a), and ensures that the system has an appropriate management structure as set forth in the certification submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(E);
(2) rescind the most recent Milestone approval for the major system;
(3) require a new Milestone approval for the major system before taking any action to enter a new contract, exercise an option under an existing contract, or otherwise extend the scope of an existing contract under the system, except to the extent determined necessary by the Milestone Decision Authority, on a nondelegable basis, to ensure that the system may be restructured as intended by the Director without unnecessarily wasting resources;
(4) establish a revised current Baseline Estimate for the major system based upon an updated cost estimate; and
(5) conduct regular reviews of the major system.
(d) Actions if major system terminated
If a major system is terminated pursuant to subsection (b), the Director shall submit to Congress a written report setting forth—
(1) an explanation of the reasons for terminating the major system;
(2) the alternatives considered to address any problems in the major system; and
(3) the course the Director plans to pursue to meet any intelligence requirements otherwise intended to be met by the major system.
(e) Form of report
Any report or certification required to be submitted under this section may be submitted in a classified form.
(f) Waiver
(1) The Director may waive the requirements of subsections (d)(2), (e), and (g) of
(2)(A) If the Director grants a waiver under paragraph (1) with respect to a major system, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notice of the waiver that includes—
(i) the information described in
(ii) if the current total acquisition cost of the major system has increased by a percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold—
(I) a determination of the root cause or causes of the critical cost growth, as described in subsection (a)(1); and
(II) a certification that includes the elements described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (E) of subsection (b)(2).
(B) The Director shall submit the written notice required by subparagraph (A) not later than 90 days after the date that the Director receives a major system cost report under subsection (b) or (c) of
(g) Definitions
In this section, the terms "cost estimate", "critical cost growth threshold", "current Baseline Estimate", "major system", and "total acquisition cost" have the meaning given those terms in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506F, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3103. Future budget projections
(a) Future Year Intelligence Plans
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a Future Year Intelligence Plan, as described in paragraph (2), for—
(A) each expenditure center in the National Intelligence Program; and
(B) each major system in the National Intelligence Program.
(2)(A) A Future Year Intelligence Plan submitted under this subsection shall include the year-by-year proposed funding for each center or system referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), for the budget year for which the Plan is submitted and not less than the 4 subsequent fiscal years.
(B) A Future Year Intelligence Plan submitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) for a major system shall include—
(i) the estimated total life-cycle cost of such major system; and
(ii) major milestones that have significant resource implications for such major system.
(b) Long-term Budget Projections
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a Long-term Budget Projection for each element of the intelligence community funded under the National Intelligence Program acquiring a major system that includes the budget for such element for the 5-year period that begins on the day after the end of the last fiscal year for which year-by-year proposed funding is included in a Future Year Intelligence Plan for such major system in accordance with subsection (a)(2)(A).
(2) A Long-term Budget Projection submitted under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) projections for the appropriate element of the intelligence community for—
(i) pay and benefits of officers and employees of such element;
(ii) other operating and support costs and minor acquisitions of such element;
(iii) research and technology required by such element;
(iv) current and planned major system acquisitions for such element;
(v) any future major system acquisitions for such element; and
(vi) any additional funding projections that the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate;
(B) a budget projection based on effective cost and schedule execution of current or planned major system acquisitions and application of Office of Management and Budget inflation estimates to future major system acquisitions;
(C) any additional assumptions and projections that the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate; and
(D) a description of whether, and to what extent, the total projection for each year exceeds the level that would result from applying the most recent Office of Management and Budget inflation estimate to the budget of that element of the intelligence community.
(c) Submission to Congress
The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees each Future Year Intelligence Plan or Long-term Budget Projection required under subsection (a) or (b) for a fiscal year at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for such fiscal year pursuant to
(d) Major system affordability report
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall prepare a report on the acquisition of a major system funded under the National Intelligence Program before the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for the first fiscal year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for the development or procurement of such major system.
(2) The report on such major system shall include an assessment of whether, and to what extent, such acquisition, if developed, procured, and operated, is projected to cause an increase in the most recent Future Year Intelligence Plan and Long-term Budget Projection submitted under this section for an element of the intelligence community.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall update the report whenever an independent cost estimate must be updated pursuant to
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit each report required by this subsection at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year pursuant to
(e) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Budget year
The term "budget year" means the next fiscal year for which the President is required to submit to Congress a budget pursuant to
(2) Independent cost estimate; major system
The terms "independent cost estimate" and "major system" have the meaning given those terms in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506G, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Applicability Date
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 325(b) of
Future-Years Intelligence Program
Similar provisions were contained in the following appropriation acts:
§3104. Reports on security clearances
(a) Report on security clearance determinations
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the security clearance process. Such report shall include, for each security clearance level—
(A) the number of employees of the United States Government who—
(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level during the preceding fiscal year; and
(B) the number of contractors to the United States Government who—
(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level during the preceding fiscal year.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the President may consider—
(A) security clearances at the level of confidential and secret as one security clearance level; and
(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or higher as one security clearance level.
(b) Intelligence community reports
(1)(A) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives regarding the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year.
(B) The Director shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives such portions of the report submitted under subparagraph (A) as the Director determines address elements of the intelligence community that are within the Department of Defense.
(C) Each report submitted under this paragraph shall separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1)(A) shall include, for each element of the intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the report, the following:
(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
(B) The total number of security clearance periodic reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—
(i) the total number of such adjudications that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and
(ii) the total number of such adjudications that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—
(i) the total number of such adjudications that were adjudicated favorably; and
(ii) the total number of such adjudications that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending, categorized as follows:
(i) For 180 days or shorter.
(ii) For longer than 180 days, but shorter than 12 months.
(iii) For 12 months or longer, but shorter than 18 months.
(iv) For 18 months or longer, but shorter than 24 months.
(v) For 24 months or longer.
(F) For any security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—
(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred during the period covered by the report; and
(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph requirement.
(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.
(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.
(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Form
The reports required under subsections (a)(1) and (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506H, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a)(1)(C).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
2015—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b), (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
Initial Audit
§3105. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
(a) In general
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of—
(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.
(b) Updates
Not less frequently than annually, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506I, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Update
§3105a. Classified intelligence budget justification materials
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Budget
The term "budget" has the meaning given the term "budget of the President" in
(2) Classified intelligence budget justification materials
The term "classified intelligence budget justification materials" means, with respect to a fiscal year, the materials submitted to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence in support of the budget for that fiscal year that are classified or otherwise protected from public disclosure.
(b) Timely submission
Not later than 5 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for each fiscal year pursuant to
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506J, as added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 3105a, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §506J, as added
§3106. Dates for submittal of various annual and semiannual reports to the congressional intelligence committees
(a) Annual reports
The date for the submittal to the congressional intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1):
(1) The annual report of the Inspectors General of the intelligence community on proposed resources and activities of their offices required by
(2) The annual report on certifications for immunity in interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking required by
(3) The annual report on activities under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (title VIII of
(4) The annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees in the intelligence community required by
(5) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by
(6) An annual report submitted under
(b) Semiannual reports
The dates for the submittal to the congressional intelligence committees of the following semiannual reports shall be the dates each year provided in subsection (c)(2):
(1) The semiannual reports on decisions not to prosecute certain violations of law under the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.) as required by section 13 of that Act.
(2) The semiannual reports on the disclosure of information and consumer reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for counterintelligence purposes required by
(3) The semiannual provision of information on requests for financial information for foreign counterintelligence purposes required by
(c) Submittal dates for reports
(1) Except as provided in subsection (d), each annual report listed in subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 1.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (d), each semiannual report listed in subsection (b) shall be submitted not later than February 1 and August 1.
(d) Postponement of submittal
(1) Subject to paragraph (3), the date for the submittal of—
(A) an annual report listed in subsection (a) may be postponed until March 1; and
(B) a semiannual report listed in subsection (b) may be postponed until March 1 or September 1, as the case may be,
if the official required to submit such report submits to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of such postponement.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to paragraph (3), the date for the submittal to the congressional intelligence committees of any report described in subparagraph (B) may be postponed by not more than 30 days from the date otherwise specified in the provision of law for the submittal of such report if the official required to submit such report submits to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of such postponement.
(B) A report described in this subparagraph is any report on intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the United States Government that is submitted under a provision of law requiring the submittal of only a single report.
(3)(A) The date for the submittal of a report whose submittal is postponed under paragraph (1) or (2) may be postponed beyond the time provided for the submittal of such report under such paragraph if the official required to submit such report submits to the congressional intelligence committees a written certification that preparation and submittal of such report at such time will impede the work of officers or employees of the intelligence community in a manner that will be detrimental to the national security of the United States.
(B) A certification with respect to a report under subparagraph (A) shall include a proposed submittal date for such report, and such report shall be submitted not later than that date.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §507, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, referred to in subsec. (a)(3), is title VIII of
The Classified Information Procedures Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(1), is
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1).
2019—Subsec. (a)(6).
2015—Subsec. (a)(5), (6).
Subsec. (c)(1).
2014—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (d)(1).
2013—Subsec. (a)(1).
"(A) The annual report on the protection of the identities of covert agents required by
"(C) The annual report on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions required by
"(D) The annual report on commercial activities as security for intelligence collection required by
Subsec. (a)(1)(D).
Subsec. (a)(2).
"(A) The annual report on the safety and security of Russian nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces required by
"(B) The annual report on the threat of attack on the United States from weapons of mass destruction required by
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c)(1)(B).
Subsec. (d)(1)(B).
2010—Subsec. (a)(1).
"(A) The annual report on intelligence required by
"(B) The annual report on intelligence provided to the United Nations required by
"(G) The annual update on foreign industrial espionage required by section 2170b(b) of the Appendix to this title."
Subsec. (a)(2)(C), (D).
"(C) The annual report on improvements of the financial statements of the intelligence community for auditing purposes required by
"(D) The annual report on counterdrug intelligence matters required by section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003."
Subsec. (b)(3) to (5).
"(3) The semiannual reports on the activities of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS–PO) required by
Subsec. (b)(6).
"(6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by
2003—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(1)(B).
Subsec. (a)(1)(C).
Subsec. (a)(1)(D).
Subsec. (a)(1)(E).
Subsec. (a)(1)(G).
Subsec. (a)(1)(H).
Subsec. (a)(1)(I).
Subsec. (a)(1)(J).
Subsec. (a)(1)(K).
Subsec. (a)(1)(L).
Subsec. (a)(1)(M).
Subsec. (a)(1)(N).
Subsec. (a)(2).
"(C) The annual report on covert leases required by
"(E) The annual report on activities of personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation outside the United States required by
"(F) The annual report on intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China required by section 308(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (
Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(B).
Subsec. (b).
"(1) The periodic reports on intelligence provided to the United Nations required by
"(4) The semiannual reports on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions required by
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2003 Amendment
Amendment by
Preparation and Submittal of Reports, Reviews, Studies, and Plans Relating to Intelligence Activities of Department of Defense or Department of Energy
"(a)
"(2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose.
"(b)
"(1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
"(2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives."
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior acts:
Deadline for Submittal of Various Overdue Reports
1 See References in Text note below.
§3107. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements
The head of each element of the intelligence community shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of the head of such element—
(A) the head of such element is in full compliance with the requirements of this subchapter; and
(B) any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this chapter before the date of the submission of such certification has been properly submitted; or
(2) if the head of such element is unable to submit a certification under paragraph (1), a statement—
(A) of the reasons the head of such element is unable to submit such a certification;
(B) describing any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this chapter before the date of the submission of such statement that has not been properly submitted; and
(C) that the head of such element will submit such information as soon as possible after the submission of such statement.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §508, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in pars. (1)(B) and (2)(B), was in the original "this Act", meaning act July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Applicability Date
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 332(b) of
§3108. Auditability of certain elements of the intelligence community
(a) Requirement for annual audits
The head of each covered entity shall ensure that there is a full financial audit of such covered entity each year beginning with fiscal year 2014. Such audits may be conducted by an internal or external independent accounting or auditing organization.
(b) Requirement for unqualified opinion
Beginning as early as practicable, but in no event later than the audit required under subsection (a) for fiscal year 2016, the head of each covered entity shall take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure that each audit required under subsection (a) contains an unqualified opinion on the financial statements of such covered entity for the fiscal year covered by such audit.
(c) Reports to Congress
The chief financial officer of each covered entity shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an annual audit report from an accounting or auditing organization on each audit of the covered entity conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
(d) Covered entity defined
In this section, the term "covered entity" means the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §509, as added
§3109. Significant interpretations of law concerning intelligence activities
(a) Notification
Except as provided in subsection (c) and to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the General Counsel of each element of the intelligence community shall notify the congressional intelligence committees, in writing, of any significant legal interpretation of the United States Constitution or Federal law affecting intelligence activities conducted by such element by not later than 30 days after the date of the commencement of any intelligence activity pursuant to such interpretation.
(b) Content
Each notification under subsection (a) shall provide a summary of the significant legal interpretation and the intelligence activity or activities conducted pursuant to such interpretation.
(c) Exceptions
A notification under subsection (a) shall not be required for a significant legal interpretation if—
(1) notice of the significant legal interpretation was previously provided to the congressional intelligence committees under subsection (a); or
(2) the significant legal interpretation was made before July 7, 2014.
(d) Limited access for covert action
If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §510, as added
§3110. Annual report on violations of law or executive order
(a) Annual reports required
The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on violations of law or executive order relating to intelligence activities by personnel of an element of the intelligence community that were identified during the previous calendar year.
(b) Elements
Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal investigations, include a description of, and any action taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order (including Executive Order No. 12333 (
(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel of any element of the intelligence community to have occurred;
(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution; or
(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §511, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Construction
Initial Report
Guidelines
"(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947 [
"(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees."
[For definitions of terms used in section 323(c) of
§3111. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(a) Quarterly briefings
In addition to, and without any derogation of, the requirement under
(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
(3) any other information relating to the counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the Director determines necessary.
(b) Notifications
In addition to the quarterly briefings under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees of any counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau with respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an election or campaign for Federal office.
(c) Guidelines
(1) Development and consultation
The Director shall develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided under subsection (b), and the information required by
(2) Submission
The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon issuance; and
(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later than 15 days after making such update.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §512, as added
§3112. Annual reports on the domestic activities of the intelligence community
(a) Reports
Not later than January 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report—
(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by each element of the intelligence community during the prior fiscal year; and
(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), a statement of the legal authority authorizing such activity to be undertaken.
(b) Form
Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §513, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
First Report; Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
"(2) the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and the Subcommittees on Homeland Security of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate."
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 505(d) of div. X of
§3113. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community: annual report
(a) Annual report
Not later than 10 days after the date on which the budget of the President for a fiscal year is submitted to Congress pursuant to
(b) Elements
(1) In general
Each report under subsection (a) shall specify, for each unfunded priority covered by such report, the following:
(A) A summary description of such priority, including the objectives to be achieved if such priority is funded (whether in whole or in part).
(B) Whether such priority will satisfy a covert action or support collection against requirements identified in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities), including a description of such requirements and the related prioritization level.
(C) The additional amount of funds recommended in connection with the objectives under subparagraph (A).
(D) Budget information with respect to the unfunded priority, including—
(i) the appropriation account;
(ii) the expenditure center; and
(iii) the project and, if applicable, subproject.
(2) Prioritization of priorities
Each report shall present the unfunded priorities covered by such report in overall order of urgency of priority among unfunded priorities.
(c) Unfunded priority defined
In this section, the term "unfunded priority", in the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or mission requirement of an element of the intelligence community that—
(1) is not funded in the budget of the President for the fiscal year as submitted to Congress pursuant to
(2) is necessary to fulfill a covert action or to satisfy an information requirement associated with the collection, analysis, or dissemination of intelligence that has been documented within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework; and
(3) would have been recommended for funding by the head of the element of the intelligence community if—
(A) additional resources had been available for the budget to fund the program, activity, or mission requirement; or
(B) the program, activity, or mission requirement has emerged since the budget was formulated.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §514, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (a).
§3114. Submission of covered documents and classified annexes
(a) Covered document defined
In this section, the term "covered document" means any executive order, memorandum, or policy directive issued by the President, including national security Presidential memoranda and Presidential policy directives, or such successor memoranda and directives.
(b) Requirement
Not later than 7 days after the date on which the President issues or amends a covered document, the President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the covered document and any classified annex accompanying that document if such covered document or annex contains a direction to, establishes a requirement for, or includes a restriction on any element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §515, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Submission
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6316(b) of
§3115. Submission of legislative proposals
Not later than 45 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for each fiscal year pursuant to
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title V, §516, as added
SUBCHAPTER IV—PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
§3121. Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources
(a) Disclosure of information by persons having or having had access to classified information that identifies covert agent
Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Disclosure of information by persons who learn identity of covert agents as result of having access to classified information
Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(c) Disclosure of information by persons in course of pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents
Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(d) Imposition of consecutive sentences
A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §601, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1999—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
§3122. Defenses and exceptions
(a) Disclosure by United States of identity of covert agent
It is a defense to a prosecution under
(b) Conspiracy, misprision of felony, aiding and abetting, etc.
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), no person other than a person committing an offense under
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply (A) in the case of a person who acted in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, or (B) in the case of a person who has authorized access to classified information.
(c) Disclosure to select congressional committees on intelligence
It shall not be an offense under
(d) Disclosure by agent of own identity
It shall not be an offense under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §602, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2002—Subsec. (c).
§3123. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–277, title III, §310(a)(4)(A), Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2475
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §603, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3124. Extraterritorial jurisdiction
There is jurisdiction over an offense under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §603, formerly §604, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 603 of act July 26, 1947, was classified to
§3125. Providing information to Congress
Nothing in this subchapter may be construed as authority to withhold information from the Congress or from a committee of either House of Congress.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §604, formerly §605, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 604 of act July 26, 1947, was renumbered section 603 and is classified to
§3126. Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(1) The term "classified information" means information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
(2) The term "authorized", when used with respect to access to classified information, means having authority, right, or permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute, Executive order, directive of the head of any department or agency engaged in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, order of any United States court, or provisions of any Rule of the House of Representatives or resolution of the Senate which assigns responsibility within the respective House of Congress for the oversight of intelligence activities.
(3) The term "disclose" means to communicate, provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise make available.
(4) The term "covert agent" means—
(A) a present or retired officer or employee of an intelligence agency or a present or retired member of the Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelligence agency whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information; or
(B) a United States citizen whose intelligence relationship to the United States is classified information, and—
(i) who acts as an agent of, or informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency, or
(ii) who is at the time of the disclosure acting as an agent of, or informant to, the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; or
(C) an individual, other than a United States citizen, whose past or present intelligence relationship to the United States is classified information and who is a present or former agent of, or a present or former informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.
(5) The term "intelligence agency" means the elements of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in
(6) The term "informant" means any individual who furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a confidential relationship protecting the identity of such individual from public disclosure.
(7) The terms "officer" and "employee" have the meanings given such terms by section 2104 and 2105, respectively, of title 5.
(8) The term "Armed Forces" means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
(9) The term "United States", when used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(10) The term "pattern of activities" requires a series of acts with a common purpose or objective.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VI, §605, formerly §606, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 605 of act July 26, 1947, was renumbered section 604 and is classified to
Amendments
2019—Par. (4)(A).
Par. (4)(B)(i).
2014—
2013—Par. (5).
1999—Par. (4)(A).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2014 Amendment
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
Executive Documents
Termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
For termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, see note set out preceding
SUBCHAPTER V—PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES
§3141. Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency
(a) Exemption by Director of Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency from the provisions of
(b) "Operational files" defined
In this section, the term "operational files" means—
(1) files of the National Clandestine Service which document the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations or intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information exchanges with foreign governments or their intelligence or security services;
(2) files of the Directorate for Science and Technology which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems; and
(3) files of the Office of Personnel Security which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources;
except that files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence are not operational files.
(c) Search and review for information
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning—
(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
(2) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
(3) the specific subject matter of an investigation by the congressional intelligence committees, the Intelligence Oversight Board, the Department of Justice, the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity.
(d) Information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files
(1) Files that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(2) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section shall not affect the exemption under subsection (a) of this section of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(3) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
(e) Supersedure of prior law
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after October 15, 1984, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its provisions.
(f) Allegation; improper withholding of records; judicial review
Whenever any person who has requested agency records under
(1) in any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign relations which is filed with, or produced for, the court by the Central Intelligence Agency, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court;
(2) the court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties;
(3) when a complaint alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission, based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence;
(4)(A) when a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, the Central Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under
(B) the court may not order the Central Intelligence Agency to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, unless the complainant disputes the Central Intelligence Agency's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence;
(5) in proceedings under paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection, the parties shall not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admission may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36;
(6) if the court finds under this subsection that the Central Intelligence Agency has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, the court shall order the Central Intelligence Agency to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of
(7) if at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this subsection the Central Intelligence Agency agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(g) Decennial review of exempted operational files
(1) Not less than once every ten years, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from any category of exempted files or any portion thereof.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant who alleges that the Central Intelligence Agency has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following:
(A) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before October 15, 1994, or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §701, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (f)(5), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
The text of former
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (b)(1).
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c)(3).
Subsec. (g)(1).
2003—
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (g)(1).
Subsec. (g)(2).
Subsec. (g)(3).
2002—Subsec. (c)(3).
1996—Subsec. (b)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Effective Date
§3142. Operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(a) Exemption of certain operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure
(1) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from the provisions of
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this section, the term "operational files" means files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as "NGA") concerning the activities of NGA that before the establishment of NGA were performed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems.
(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence are not operational files.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning—
(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity:
(i) The congressional intelligence committees.
(ii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
(iii) The Department of Justice.
(iv) The Office of General Counsel of NGA.
(v) The Office of the Director of NGA.
(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(C) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after December 3, 1999, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its provisions.
(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under
(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NGA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties.
(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NGA shall meet its burden under
(II) The court may not order NGA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NGA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36.
(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NGA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NGA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of
(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NGA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence prior to submission to the court.
(b) Decennial review of exempted operational files
(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from the category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of National Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant that alleges that NGA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following:
(A) Whether NGA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on December 3, 1999, or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether NGA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §702, formerly title I, §105B, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a)(6)(B)(v), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 702 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, as added
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (a)(3)(C)(vi).
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(iv)(I).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(viii).
Subsec. (b)(1).
2003—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (a)(3)(C)(iv), (v), (6)(A), (B)(i), (iv)(I).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(iv)(II).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(vi), (vii).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(3).
2002—Subsec. (a)(3)(C).
"(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate."
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Treatment of Certain Transferred Records
§3143. Operational files of the National Reconnaissance Office
(a) Exemption of certain operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure
(1) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Reconnaissance Office from the provisions of
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this section, the term "operational files" means files of the National Reconnaissance Office (hereafter in this section referred to as "NRO") that document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems.
(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence are not operational files.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning—
(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity:
(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
(iv) The Department of Justice.
(v) The Office of General Counsel of NRO.
(vi) The Office of the Director of NRO.
(vii) The Office of the Inspector General of the NRO.
(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after November 27, 2002, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its provisions.
(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under
(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NRO, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties.
(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NRO shall meet its burden under
(II) The court may not order NRO to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NRO's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36.
(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NRO has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NRO to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of
(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NRO agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence prior to submission to the court.
(b) Decennial review of exempted operational files
(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of National Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from the category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of National Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant that alleges that NRO has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following:
(A) Whether NRO has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on November 27, 2002, or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether NRO, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §703, formerly title I, §105D, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a)(6)(B)(v), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (a)(3)(C)(vii).
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(iv)(I).
Subsec. (a)(6)(B)(viii).
Subsec. (b)(1).
2003—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3144. Operational files of the National Security Agency
(a) Exemption of certain operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure
The Director of the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Security Agency from the provisions of
(b) Operational files defined
(1) In this section, the term "operational files" means—
(A) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate of the National Security Agency (and any successor organization of that directorate) that document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and
(B) files of the Research Associate Directorate of the National Security Agency (and any successor organization of that directorate) that document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems.
(2) Files that are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into the National Security Agency Archives (or any successor organization) are not operational files.
(c) Search and review for information
Notwithstanding subsection (a), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning any of the following:
(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
(2) Any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
(3) The specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(C) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
(D) The Department of Justice.
(E) The Office of General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
(F) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
(G) The Office of the Director of the National Security Agency.
(H) The Office of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
(d) Information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files
(1) Files that are not exempted under subsection (a) that contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review.
(2) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under subsection (a) shall not affect the exemption under subsection (a) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(3) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure.
(4) Records from exempted operational files that have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under subsection (a) and that have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
(e) Supersedure of other laws
The provisions of subsection (a) may not be superseded except by a provision of law that is enacted after November 24, 2003, and that specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions.
(f) Allegation; improper withholding of records; judicial review
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whenever any person who has requested agency records under
(2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under paragraph (1) as follows:
(A) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by the National Security Agency, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
(B) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties.
(C) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, the National Security Agency shall meet its burden under
(ii) The court may not order the National Security Agency to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under clause (i), unless the complainant disputes the National Security Agency's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(E) In proceedings under subparagraphs (C) and (D), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36.
(F) If the court finds under this subsection that the National Security Agency has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order the Agency to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of
(G) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph the National Security Agency agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(H) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (D) shall be coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence before submission to the court.
(g) Decennial review of exempted operational files
(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of National Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant that alleges that the National Security Agency has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following:
(A) Whether the National Security Agency has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on November 24, 2003, or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether the National Security Agency, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §704, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (f)(2)(E), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (c)(3)(H).
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (f)(2)(D)(i).
Subsec. (f)(2)(H).
Subsec. (g)(1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3145. Omitted
Section, July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §705, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3146. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(a) Inapplicability of FOIA to exempted operational files provided to ODNI
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the provisions of
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a record of the Office that—
(A) contains information derived or disseminated from an exempted operational file, unless such record is created by the Office for the sole purpose of organizing such exempted operational file for use by the Office;
(B) is disseminated by the Office to a person other than an officer, employee, or contractor of the Office; or
(C) is no longer designated as an exempted operational file in accordance with this subchapter.
(b) Effect of providing files to ODNI
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, an exempted operational file that is provided to the Office by an element of the intelligence community shall not be subject to the provisions of
(c) Search and review for certain purposes
Notwithstanding subsection (a) or (b), an exempted operational file shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning any of the following:
(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of
(2) Any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of
(3) The specific subject matter of an investigation for any impropriety or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity by any of the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(C) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
(D) The Department of Justice.
(E) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(F) The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(d) Decennial review of exempted operational files
(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from any category of exempted files or any portion thereof.
(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein.
(3) A complainant that alleges that the Director of National Intelligence has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following:
(A) Whether the Director has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on October 7, 2010, or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review.
(B) Whether the Director of National Intelligence, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.
(e) Supersedure of other laws
The provisions of this section may not be superseded except by a provision of law that is enacted after October 7, 2010, and that specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions.
(f) Allegation; improper withholding of records; judicial review
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whenever any person who has requested agency records under
(2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under paragraph (1) as follows:
(A) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by the Office, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
(B) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties.
(C)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, the Office may meet the burden of the Office under
(ii) The court may not order the Office to review the content of any exempted file in order to make the demonstration required under clause (i), unless the complainant disputes the Office's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
(D) In proceedings under subparagraph (C), a party may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(E) If the court finds under this subsection that the Office has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, the court shall order the Office to search and review each appropriate exempted file for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of
(F) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph the Office agrees to search each appropriate exempted file for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
(g) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "exempted operational file" means a file of an element of the intelligence community that, in accordance with this subchapter, is exempted from the provisions of
(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term "Office" means the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VII, §706, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (f)(2)(D), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
SUBCHAPTER VI—ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
§3161. Procedures
(a) Not later than 180 days after October 14, 1994, the President shall, by Executive order or regulation, establish procedures to govern access to classified information which shall be binding upon all departments, agencies, and offices of the executive branch of Government. Such procedures shall, at a minimum—
(1) provide that, except as may be permitted by the President, no employee in the executive branch of Government may be given access to classified information by any department, agency, or office of the executive branch of Government unless, based upon an appropriate background investigation, such access is determined to be clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States;
(2) establish uniform minimum requirements governing the scope and frequency of background investigations and reinvestigations for all employees in the executive branch of Government who require access to classified information as part of their official responsibilities;
(3) provide that all employees in the executive branch of Government who require access to classified information shall be required as a condition of such access to provide to the employing department or agency written consent which permits access by an authorized investigative agency to relevant financial records, other financial information, consumer reports, travel records, and computers used in the performance of Government duties, as determined by the President, in accordance with
(4) provide that all employees in the executive branch of Government who require access to particularly sensitive classified information, as determined by the President, shall be required, as a condition of maintaining access to such information, to submit to the employing department or agency, during the period of such access, relevant information concerning their financial condition and foreign travel, as determined by the President, as may be necessary to ensure appropriate security; and
(5) establish uniform minimum standards to ensure that employees in the executive branch of Government whose access to classified information is being denied or terminated under this subchapter are appropriately advised of the reasons for such denial or termination and are provided an adequate opportunity to respond to all adverse information which forms the basis for such denial or termination before final action by the department or agency concerned.
(b)(1) Subsection (a) shall not be deemed to limit or affect the responsibility and power of an agency head pursuant to other law or Executive order to deny or terminate access to classified information if the national security so requires. Such responsibility and power may be exercised only when the agency head determines that the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) cannot be invoked in a manner that is consistent with the national security.
(2) Upon the exercise of such responsibility, the agency head shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VIII, §801, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2002—Subsec. (b)(2).
1999—Subsec. (a)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1999 Amendment
Effective Date
Intelligence Community-Wide Policy on Prepublication Review
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 7322 of
Declassification of Information Related to the Origin of COVID–19
"SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
"This Act may be cited as the 'COVID–19 Origin Act of 2023'.
"SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
"It is the sense of Congress that—
"(1) identifying the origin of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) is critical for preventing a similar pandemic from occurring in the future;
"(2) there is reason to believe the COVID–19 pandemic may have originated at the Wuhan Institute of Virology; and
"(3) the Director of National Intelligence should declassify and make available to the public as much information as possible about the origin of COVID–19 so the United States and like-minded countries can—
"(A) identify the origin of COVID–19 as expeditiously as possible, and
"(B) use that information to take all appropriate measures to prevent a similar pandemic from occurring again.
"SEC. 3. DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ORIGIN OF COVID–19.
"Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Mar. 20, 2023], the Director of National Intelligence shall—
"(1) declassify any and all information relating to potential links between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19), including—
"(A) activities performed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology with or on behalf of the People's Liberation Army;
"(B) coronavirus research or other related activities performed at the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to the outbreak of COVID–19; and
"(C) researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who fell ill in autumn 2019, including for any such researcher—
"(i) the researcher's name;
"(ii) the researcher's symptoms;
"(iii) the date of the onset of the researcher's symptoms;
"(iv) the researcher's role at the Wuhan Institute of Virology;
"(v) whether the researcher was involved with or exposed to coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology;
"(vi) whether the researcher visited a hospital while they were ill; and
"(vii) a description of any other actions taken by the researcher that may suggest they were experiencing a serious illness at the time; and
"(2) submit to Congress an unclassified report that contains—
"(A) all of the information described under paragraph (1); and
"(B) only such redactions as the Director determines necessary to protect sources and methods."
Director of National Intelligence Declassification Review of Information Relating to Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) Information relating to the direction, facilitation, and other support provided to the individuals who carried out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
"(2) Information from Operation Encore and the PENTTBOM investigation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"(c)
[For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community" as used in section 310 of div. X of
Efficient Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
Trusted Information Provider Program for National Security Positions and Positions of Trust
Review of Position Designations for Determining Appropriate Background Investigations
"SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
"In this Act [see Short Title of 2018 Amendment note set out under
"(1) the term 'Bureau' means the National Background Investigations Bureau of the Office;
"(2) the term 'Director' means the Director of National Intelligence acting as the Security Executive Agent; and
"(3) the term 'Office' means the Office of Personnel Management acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent.
"SEC. 7. REVIEW AND UPDATE OF POSITION DESIGNATION GUIDANCE.
"(a)
"(1) the term 'agency' has the meaning given the term in Executive Order 13467 (73 Fed. Reg. 38103) [set out below], or any successor thereto;
"(2) the term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—
"(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [now Committee on Oversight and Accountability] and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
"(3) the term 'background investigation' means any investigation required for the purpose of determining the—
"(A) eligibility of a covered individual for logical and physical access to Federally controlled facilities or information systems;
"(B) suitability or fitness of a covered individual for Federal employment;
"(C) eligibility of a covered individual for access to classified information or to hold a national security sensitive position; or
"(D) fitness of a covered individual to perform work for or on behalf of the United States Government as a contractor employee; and
"(4) the term 'covered individual'—
"(A) means a person who performs work for or on behalf of the executive branch or seeks to perform work for or on behalf of the executive branch;
"(B) is not limited to Federal employees;
"(C) includes all persons, not excluded under subparagraph (D), who require eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including, but not limited to, contractors, subcontractors, licensees, certificate holders, grantees, experts, consultants, and government employees; and
"(D) does not include—
"(i) the President;
"(ii) employees of the President under
"(iii) the Vice President; or
"(iv) employees of the Vice President under
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) position sensitivity designation; and
"(B) the appropriate background investigation to initiate for each position designation.
"(2)
"(c)
"(1) any issues identified in the review; and
"(2) the number of position designations revised as a result of the review.
"(d)
Classification Review of Executive Branch Materials in the Possession of the Congressional Intelligence Committees
"(1) are not less than 25 years old; and
"(2) were created, or provided to that committee, by an entity in the executive branch."
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 702 of
Promotion of Accurate Classification of Information
"(a)
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) to assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and effectively administered within such department, agency, or component; and
"(B) to identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices that may be contributing to persistent misclassification of material within such department, agency or component.
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(3)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) the policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices, if any, identified by the inspector general under paragraph (1)(B); and
"(ii) the recommendations, if any, of the inspector general to address any such identified policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices.
"(C)
"(4)
"(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
"(B) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [now Committee on Oversight and Accountability], and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
"(C) any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over a department or agency referred to in paragraph (1);
"(D) the head of a department or agency referred to in paragraph (1); and
"(E) the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office."
[For definitions of terms used in section 6 of
Declassification of Information
Certification and Report Related to Automatic Declassification of Department of Defense Records
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) An assessment of whether the Department will be able to review all relevant records for declassification before any date established for automatic declassification.
"(2) An estimate of the cost of reviewing records to meet any requirement to review all relevant records for declassification by a date established for automatic declassification.
"(3) An estimate of the number of records, if any, that the Department will be unable to review for declassification before any such date and the affect [sic] on national security of the automatic declassification of those records.
"(4) An estimate of the length of time by which any such date would need to be extended to avoid the automatic declassification of records that have not yet been reviewed as of such date."
Supplement to Plan for Declassification of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
Identification in Budget Materials of Amounts for Declassification Activities and Limitation on Expenditures for Such Activities
Protection Against Inadvertent Release of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
Voluntary Service Program
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
Disclosure of Information Concerning Unaccounted for United States Personnel of Cold War, Korean Conflict, and Vietnam Era
"(a)
"(2) Paragraph (1) applies to any record, live-sighting report, or other information in the custody of the official custodian referred to in subsection (d)(3) that may pertain to the location, treatment, or condition of (A) United States personnel who remain not accounted for as a result of service in the Armed Forces or other Federal Government service during the Korean conflict, the Vietnam era, or the Cold War, or (B) their remains.
"(b)
"(A) the record or other information is exempt from the disclosure requirements of
"(B) the record or other information is in a system of records exempt from the requirements of subsection (d) of section 552a of such title pursuant to subsection (j) or (k) of that section.
"(2) The Secretary of Defense may not make a record or other information available to the public pursuant to subsection (a) if the record or other information specifically mentions a person by name unless—
"(A) in the case of a person who is alive (and not incapacitated) and whose whereabouts are known, that person expressly consents in writing to the disclosure of the record or other information; or
"(B) in the case of a person who is dead or incapacitated or whose whereabouts are unknown, a family member or family members of that person determined by the Secretary of Defense to be appropriate for such purpose expressly consent in writing to the disclosure of the record or other information.
"(3)(A) The limitation on disclosure in paragraph (2) does not apply in the case of a person who is dead or incapacitated or whose whereabouts are unknown if the family member or members of that person determined pursuant to subparagraph (B) of that paragraph cannot be located by the Secretary of Defense—
"(i) in the case of a person missing from the Vietnam era, after a reasonable effort; and
"(ii) in the case of a person missing from the Korean Conflict or Cold War, after a period of 90 days from the date on which any record or other information referred to in paragraph (2) is received by the Department of Defense for disclosure review from the Archivist of the United States, the Library of Congress, or the Joint United States-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs.
"(B) Paragraph (2) does not apply to the access of an adult member of the family of a person to any record or information to the extent that the record or other information relates to that person.
"(C) The authority of a person to consent to disclosure of a record or other information for the purposes of paragraph (2) may be delegated to another person or an organization only by means of an express legal power of attorney granted by the person authorized by that paragraph to consent to the disclosure.
"(c)
"(2) Whenever a department or agency of the Federal Government receives any record or other information referred to in subsection (a) that is required by this section to be made available to the public, the head of that department or agency shall ensure that such record or other information is provided to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary shall make such record or other information available in accordance with subsection (a) as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than one year after the date on which the record or information is received by the department or agency of the Federal Government.
"(3) If the Secretary of Defense determines that the disclosure of any record or other information referred to in subsection (a) by the date required by paragraph (1) or (2) may compromise the safety of any United States personnel referred to in subsection (a)(2) who remain not accounted for but who may still be alive in captivity, then the Secretary may withhold that record or other information from the disclosure otherwise required by this section. Whenever the Secretary makes a determination under the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall immediately notify the President and the Congress of that determination.
"(d)
"(1) The terms 'Korean conflict' and 'Vietnam era' have the meanings given those terms in
"(2) The term 'Cold War' means the period from the end of World War II to the beginning of the Korean conflict and the period from the end of the Korean conflict to the beginning of the Vietnam era.
"(3) The term 'official custodian' means—
"(A) in the case of records, reports, and information relating to the Korean conflict or the Cold War, the Archivist of the United States; and
"(B) in the case of records, reports, and information relating to the Vietnam era, the Secretary of Defense."
Disclosure of Information Concerning American Personnel Listed as Prisoner, Missing, or Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia
"(a) This section is enacted to ensure that current disclosure policy is incorporated into law.
"(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the head of each department or agency—
"(1) with respect to which funds are authorized under this Act [see Tables for classification], and
"(2) which holds or receives live sighting reports of any United States citizen reported missing in action, prisoner of war, or unaccounted for from the Vietnam Conflict,
shall make available to the next-of-kin of that United States citizen all reports, or portions thereof, held by that department or agency which have been correlated or possibly correlated to that citizen.
"(c) Subsection (b) does not apply with respect to—
"(1) information that would reveal or compromise sources and methods of intelligence collection; or
"(2) specific information that previously has been made available to the next-of-kin.
"(d) The head of each department or agency covered by subsection (a) shall make information available under this section in a timely manner."
Executive Documents
Executive Order No. 10501
Ex. Ord. No. 10501, Nov. 5, 1953, 18 F.R. 7049, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 10816, May 7, 1959, 24 F.R. 3777; Ex. Ord. No. 10901, Jan. 9, 1961, 26 F.R. 217; Ex. Ord. No. 10964, Sept. 20, 1961, 26 F.R. 8932; Ex. Ord. No. 10985, Jan. 12, 1962, 27 F.R. 439; Ex. Ord. No. 11097, Feb. 28, 1963, 28 F.R. 2225; Ex. Ord. No. 11382, Nov. 28, 1967, 32 F.R. 16247, which related to safeguarding official information, was superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 11652, Mar. 8, 1972, 37 F.R. 5209, formerly set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 10865. Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry
Ex. Ord. No. 10865, Feb. 20, 1960, 25 F.R. 1583, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 10909, Jan. 17, 1961, 26 F.R. 508; Ex. Ord. No. 11382, Nov. 28, 1967, 32 F.R. 16247; Ex. Ord. No. 12829, §203(g), Jan. 6, 1993, 58 F.R. 3479; Ex. Ord. No. 13284, §15, Jan. 23, 2003, 68 F.R. 4076, provided:
WHEREAS it is mandatory that the United States protect itself against hostile or destructive activities by preventing unauthorized disclosures of classified information relating to the national defense; and
WHEREAS it is a fundamental principle of our Government to protect the interests of individuals against unreasonable or unwarranted encroachment; and
WHEREAS I find that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this order are necessary to assure the preservation of the integrity of classified defense information and to protect the national interest; and
WHEREAS I find that those provisions and procedures recognize the interest of individuals affected thereby and provide maximum possible safeguards to protect such interests:
NOW, THEREFORE, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(1) A written statement of the reasons why his access authorization may be denied or revoked, which shall be as comprehensive and detailed as the national security permits.
(2) A reasonable opportunity to reply in writing under oath or affirmation to the statement of reasons.
(3) After he has filed under oath or affirmation a written reply to the statement of reasons, the form and sufficiency of which may be prescribed by regulations issued by the head of the department concerned, an opportunity to appear personally before the head of the department concerned or his designee including, but not limited to, those officials named in section 8 of this order for the purpose of supporting his eligibility for access authorization and to present evidence on his behalf.
(4) A reasonable time to prepare for that appearance.
(5) An opportunity to be represented by counsel.
(6) An opportunity to cross-examine persons either orally or through written interrogatories in accordance with section 4 on matters not relating to the characterization in the statement of reasons of any organization or individual other than the applicant.
(7) A written notice of the final decision in his case which, if adverse, shall specify whether the head of the department or his designee, including, but not limited to, those officials named in section 8 of this order, found for or against him with respect to each allegation in the statement of reasons.
(1) The head of the department supplying the statement certifies that the person who furnished the information is a confidential informant who has been engaged in obtaining intelligence information for the Government and that disclosure of his identity would be substantially harmful to the national interest.
(2) The head of the department concerned or his special designee for that particular purpose has preliminarily determined, after considering information furnished by the investigative agency involved as to the reliability of the person and the accuracy of the statement concerned, that the statement concerned appears to be reliable and material, and the head of the department or such special designee has determined that failure to receive and consider such statement would, in view of the level of access sought, be substantially harmful to the national security and that the person who furnished the information cannot appear to testify (A) due to death, severe illness, or similar cause, in which case the identity of the person and the information to be considered shall be made available to the applicant, or (B) due to some other cause determined by the head of the department to be good and sufficient.
(b) Whenever procedures under paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section are used (1) the applicant shall be given a summary of the information which shall be as comprehensive and detailed as the national security permits, (2) appropriate consideration shall be accorded to the fact that the applicant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine such person or persons, and (3) a final determination adverse to the applicant shall be made only by the head of the department based upon his personal review of the case.
(b) Records compiled in the regular course of business, or other physical evidence other than investigative reports, relating to a controverted issue which, because they are classified, may not be inspected by the applicant, may be received and considered provided that: (1) the head of the department concerned or his special designee for that purpose has made a preliminary determination that such physical evidence appears to be material, (2) the head of the department concerned or such designee has made a determination that failure to receive and consider such physical evidence would, in view of the level of access sought, be substantially harmful to the national security, and (3) to the extent that the national security permits, a summary or description of such physical evidence is made available to the applicant. In every such case, information as to the authenticity and accuracy of such physical evidence furnished by the investigative agency involved shall be considered. In such instances a final determination adverse to the applicant shall be made only by the head of the department based upon his personal review of the case.
Modification of Executive Order No. 10865
Ex. Ord. No. 10865, Feb. 20, 1960, 25 F.R. 1583, as amended, set out above, when referring to functions of the Atomic Energy Commission is modified to provide that all such functions shall be exercised by the Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, see section 4(a)(1) of Ex. Ord. No. 12038, Feb. 3, 1978, 43 F.R. 4957, set out under
Executive Order No. 10985
Ex. Ord. No. 10985, Jan. 12, 1962, 27 F.R. 439, which amended Executive Order No. 10501, which related to safeguarding official information, was superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 11652, Mar. 8, 1972, 37 F.R. 5209, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 11097
Ex. Ord. No. 11097, Feb. 28, 1963, 28 F.R. 2225, which amended Executive Order No. 10501, which related to safeguarding official information, was superseded by Ex. Ord. No. 11652, Mar. 8, 1972, 37 F.R. 5209, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 11652
Ex. Ord. No. 11652, Mar. 8, 1972, 37 F.R. 5209, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 11714, Apr. 24, 1973, 38 F.R. 10245; Ex. Ord. No. 11862, June 11, 1975, 40 F.R. 25197; Ex. Ord. No. 12038, Feb. 3, 1978, 43 F.R. 4957, which related to the classification and declassification of national security information and material, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12065, June 28, 1978, 43 F.R. 28949, formerly set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 11932. Classification of Certain Information and Material Obtained From Advisory Bodies Created To Implement the International Energy Program
Ex. Ord. No. 11932, Aug. 4, 1976, 41 F.R. 32691, provided:
The United States has entered into the Agreement on an International Energy Program of November 18, 1974, which created the International Energy Agency. This program is a substantial factor in the conduct of our foreign relations and an important element of our national security. The effectiveness of the Agreement depends significantly upon the provision and exchange of information and material by participants in advisory bodies created by the International Energy Agency. Confidentiality is essential to assure the free and open discussion necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned to those bodies. I have consulted with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration concerning the handling and safeguarding of information and material in the possession of the United States which has been obtained pursuant to the program, and I find that some of such information and material requires protection as provided in Executive Order No. 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended [formerly set out above].
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) Section 252(c)(3), (d)(2), or (e)(3) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (
(b) The Voluntary Agreement and Program relating to the International Energy Program (40 F.R. 16041, April 8, 1975), or
(c) Any similar Voluntary Agreement and Program entered into under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act [
(b) The directives issued under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 11652 [formerly set out above] shall not apply to information and material classified under this Order. However, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State shall:
(1) conform, to the extent practicable, to the policies set forth in Section 6 of Executive Order No. 11652 [formerly set out above], and
(2) provide that he may take such measures as he deems necessary and appropriate to ensure the confidentiality of any information and material classified under this Order that may remain in the custody or control of any person outside the United States Government.
Gerald R. Ford.
Executive Order No. 12065
Ex. Ord. No. 12065, June 28, 1978, 43 F.R. 28949, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12148, July 20, 1979, 44 F.R. 43239; Ex. Ord. No. 12163, Sept. 29, 1979, 44 F.R. 56673, which related to classification and declassification of national security information and material, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12356, Apr. 2, 1982, 47 F.R. 14874, 15557, formerly set out below.
Executive Order No. 12356
Ex. Ord. No. 12356, Apr. 2, 1982, 47 F.R. 14874, 15557, which prescribed a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12958, §6.1(d), Apr. 17, 1995, 60 F.R. 19843, formerly set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 12812. Declassification and Release of Materials Pertaining to Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
Ex. Ord. No. 12812, July 22, 1992, 57 F.R. 32879, provided:
WHEREAS, the Senate, by S. Res. 324 of July 2, 1992, has asked that I "expeditiously issue an Executive order requiring all executive branch departments and agencies to declassify and publicly release without compromising United States national security all documents, files, and other materials pertaining to POWs and MIAs;" and
WHEREAS, indiscriminate release of classified material could jeopardize continuing United States Government efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Vietnam-era POWs and MIAs; and
WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be served by the declassification and public release of materials pertaining to Vietnam-era POWs and MIAs as provided below;
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:
George Bush.
Ex. Ord. No. 12829. National Industrial Security Program
Ex. Ord. No. 12829, Jan. 6, 1993, 58 F.R. 3479, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12885, Dec. 14, 1993, 58 F.R. 65863; Ex. Ord. No. 13691, §6, Feb. 13, 2015, 80 F.R. 9351; Ex. Ord. No. 13708, §4, Sept. 30, 2015, 80 F.R. 60273, provided:
This order establishes a National Industrial Security Program to safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of the United States Government. To promote our national interests, the United States Government issues contracts, licenses, and grants to nongovernment organizations. When these arrangements require access to classified information, the national security requires that this information be safeguarded in a manner equivalent to its protection within the executive branch of Government. The national security also requires that our industrial security program promote the economic and technological interests of the United States. Redundant, overlapping, or unnecessary requirements impede those interests. Therefore, the National Industrial Security Program shall serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect classified information and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological interests.
Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (
PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT AND POLICY
(b) The National Industrial Security Program shall provide for the protection of information classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009 [set out below], or any predecessor or successor order, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (
(c) For the purposes of this order, the term "contractor" does not include individuals engaged under personal services contracts.
(b) In consultation with the National Security Advisor, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, in accordance with Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, shall be responsible for implementing and monitoring the National Industrial Security Program and shall:
(1) develop, in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this order, which shall be binding on the agencies;
(2) oversee agency, contractor, licensee, and grantee actions to ensure compliance with this order and implementing directives;
(3) review all agency implementing regulations, internal rules, or guidelines. The Director shall require any regulation, rule, or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this order or implementing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The agency regulation, rule, or guideline shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;
(4) have the authority, pursuant to terms of applicable contracts, licenses, grants, or regulations, to conduct on-site reviews of the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program by each agency, contractor, licensee, and grantee that has access to or stores classified information and to require of each agency, contractor, licensee, and grantee those reports, information, and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill the Director's responsibilities. If these reports, inspections, or access to specific classified information, or other forms of cooperation, would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior official designated under section 203(a) of this order may request the National Security Council to deny access to the Director. The Director shall not have access pending a prompt decision by the National Security Council;
(5) report any violations of this order or its implementing directives to the head of the agency or to the senior official designated under section 203(a) of this order so that corrective action, if appropriate, may be taken. Any such report pertaining to the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program by a contractor, licensee, or grantee shall be directed to the agency that is exercising operational oversight over the contractor, licensee, or grantee under section 202 of this order;
(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the National Industrial Security Program;
(7) consider, in consultation with the advisory committee established by this order, affected agencies, contractors, licensees, and grantees, and recommend to the President through the National Security Council changes to this order; and
(8) report at least annually to the President through the National Security Council on the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program.
(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede the authority of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (
(b) Functions. (1) The Committee members shall advise the Chairman of the Committee on all matters concerning the policies of the National Industrial Security Program, including recommended changes to those policies as reflected in this order, its implementing directives, or the operating manual established under this order, and serve as a forum to discuss policy issues in dispute.
(2) The Committee shall meet at the request of the Chairman, but at least twice during the calendar year.
(c) Administration. (1) Members of the Committee shall serve without compensation for their work on the Committee. However, nongovernment members may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (
(2) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of funds, the National Archives and Records Administration shall provide the Committee with administrative services, facilities, staff, and other support services necessary for the performance of its functions.
(d) General. Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended [see
PART 2. OPERATIONS
(b) The Manual shall prescribe specific requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards that are necessary to preclude unauthorized disclosure and control authorized disclosure of classified information to contractors, licensees, or grantees. The Manual shall apply to the release of classified information during all phases of the contracting process including bidding, negotiation, award, performance, and termination of contracts, the licensing process, or the grant process, with or under the control of departments or agencies.
(c) The Manual shall also prescribe requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards that are necessary to protect special classes of classified information, including Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, intelligence sources and methods information, Sensitive Compartmented Information, and Special Access Program information.
(d) The Manual shall also prescribe arrangements necessary to permit and enable secure sharing of classified information under a designated critical infrastructure protection program to such authorized individuals and organizations as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(e) In establishing particular requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards within the Manual, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take into account these factors: (i) the damage to the national security that reasonably could be expected to result from an unauthorized disclosure; (ii) the existing or anticipated threat to the disclosure of information; and (iii) the short- and long-term costs of the requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards.
(f) To the extent that is practicable and reasonable, the requirements, restrictions, and safeguards that the Manual establishes for the protection of classified information by contractors, licensees, and grantees shall be consistent with the requirements, restrictions, and safeguards that directives implementing Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009 [set out below], or any successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, establish for the protection of classified information by agencies. Upon request by the Chairman of the Committee, the Secretary of Defense shall provide an explanation and justification for any requirement, restriction, or safeguard that results in a standard for the protection of classified information by contractors, licensees, and grantees that differs from the standard that applies to agencies.
(b) The Director of National Intelligence retains authority over access to intelligence sources and methods, including Sensitive Compartmented Information. The Director of National Intelligence may inspect and monitor contractor, licensee, and grantee programs and facilities that involve access to such information or may enter into written agreements with the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent, or with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to inspect and monitor these programs or facilities, in whole or in part, on the Director's behalf.
(c) The Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission retain authority over access to information under their respective programs classified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [
(d) The Secretary of Homeland Security may determine the eligibility for access to Classified National Security Information of contractors, licensees, and grantees and their respective employees under a designated critical infrastructure protection program, including parties to agreements with such program; the Secretary of Homeland Security may inspect and monitor contractor, licensee, and grantee programs and facilities or may enter into written agreements with the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent, or with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to inspect and monitor these programs or facilities in whole or in part, on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(e) The Executive Agent shall have the authority to issue, after consultation with affected agencies, standard forms or other standardization that will promote the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program.
(b) Agency implementing regulations, internal rules, or guidelines shall be consistent with this order, its implementing directives, and the Manual. Agencies shall issue these regulations, rules, or guidelines no later than 180 days from the issuance of the Manual. They may incorporate all or portions of the Manual by reference.
(c) Each agency head or the senior official designated under paragraph (a) above shall take appropriate and prompt corrective action whenever a violation of this order, its implementing directives, or the Manual occurs.
(d) The senior agency official designated under paragraph (a) above shall account each year for the costs within the agency associated with the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program. These costs shall be reported to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, who shall include them in the reports to the President prescribed by this order.
(e) The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Administrator of General Services, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and such other agency heads or officials who may be responsible, shall amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation to be consistent with the implementation of the National Industrial Security Program.
(f) All contracts, licenses, or grants that involve access to classified information and that are advertised or proposed following the issuance of agency regulations, rules, or guidelines described in paragraph (b) above shall comply with the National Industrial Security Program. To the extent that is feasible, economical, and permitted by law, agencies shall amend, modify, or convert preexisting contracts, licenses, or grants, or previously advertised or proposed contracts, licenses, or grants, that involve access to classified information for operation under the National Industrial Security Program. Any direct inspection or monitoring of contractors, licensees, or grantees specified by this order shall be carried out pursuant to the terms of a contract, license, grant, or regulation.
(g) [Amended Ex. Ord. No. 10865, set out above.]
(h) All delegations, rules, regulations, orders, directives, agreements, contracts, licenses, and grants issued under preexisting authorities, including section 1(a) and (b) of Executive Order No. 10865 of February 20, 1960, as amended, by Executive Order No. 10909 of January 17, 1961, and Executive Order No. 11382 of November 27, 1967, shall remain in full force and effect until amended, modified, or terminated pursuant to authority of this order.
(i) This order shall be effective immediately.
Extension of Term of National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee
Term of National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee extended until Sept. 30, 2025, by Ex. Ord. No. 14109, Sept. 29, 2023, 88 F.R. 68447, set out as a note under
Previous extensions of term of National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee were contained in the following prior Executive Orders:
Ex. Ord. No. 14048, Sept. 30, 2021, 86 F.R. 55465, extended term until Sept. 30, 2023.
Ex. Ord. No. 13889, Sept. 27, 2019, 84 F.R. 52743, extended term until Sept. 30, 2021.
Ex. Ord. No. 13811, Sept. 29, 2017, 82 F.R. 46363, extended term until Sept. 30, 2019.
Ex. Ord. No. 13708, Sept. 30, 2015, 80 F.R. 60271, extended term until Sept. 30, 2017.
Ex. Ord. No. 13652, Sept. 30, 2013, 78 F.R. 61817, extended term until Sept. 30, 2015.
Ex. Ord. No. 13585, Sept. 30, 2011, 76 F.R. 62281, extended term until Sept. 30, 2013.
Ex. Ord. No. 12937. Declassification of Selected Records Within National Archives of United States
Ex. Ord. No. 12937, Nov. 10, 1994, 59 F.R. 59097, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
William J. Clinton.
Records in the following record groups ("RG") in the National Archives of the United States shall be declassified. Page numbers are approximate. A complete list of the selected records is available from the Archivist of the United States.
I. All unreviewed World War II and earlier records, including: | ||||
A. | RG 18, Army Air Forces | 1,722,400 pp. | ||
B. | RG 65, Federal Bureau of Investigation | 362,500 pp. | ||
C. | RG 127, United States Marine Corps | 195,000 pp. | ||
D. | RG 216, Office of Censorship | 112,500 pp. | ||
E. | RG 226, Office of Strategic Services | 415,000 pp. | ||
F. | RG 60, United States Occupation Headquarters | 4,422,500 pp. | ||
G. | RG 331, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II (including 350 reels of Allied Force Headquarters) | 3,097,500 pp. | ||
H. | RG 332, United States Theaters of War, World War II | 1,182,500 pp. | ||
I. | RG 338, Mediterranean Theater of Operations and European Command | 9,500,000 pp. | ||
Subtotal for World War II and earlier | 21.0 million pp. | |||
II. Post-1945 Collections (Military and Civil) | ||||
A. | RG 19, Bureau of Ships, Pre-1950 General Correspondence (selected records) | 1,732,500 pp. | ||
B. | RG 51, Bureau of the Budget, 52.12 Budget Preparation Branch, 1952–69 | 142,500 pp. | ||
C. | RG 72, Bureau of Aeronautics (Navy) (selected records) | 5,655,000 pp. | ||
D. | RG 166, Foreign Agricultural Service, Narrative Reports, 1955–61 | 1,272,500 pp. | ||
E. | RG 313, Naval Operating Forces (selected records) | 407,500 pp. | ||
F. | RG 319, Office of the Chief of Military History | |||
Manuscripts and Background Papers (selected records) | 933,000 pp. | |||
G. | RG 337, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces (selected records) | 1,269,700 pp. | ||
H. | RG 341, Headquarters, United States Air Force (selected records) | 4,870,000 pp. | ||
I. | RG 389, Office of the Provost Marshal General (selected records) | 448,000 pp. | ||
J. | RG 391, United States Army Regular Army Mobil Units | 240,000 pp. | ||
K. | RG 428, General Records of the Department of the Navy (selected records) | 31,250 pp. | ||
L. | RG 472, Army Vietnam Collection (selected records) | 5,864,000 pp. | ||
Subtotal for Other | 22.9 million pp. | |||
TOTAL | 43.9 million pp. |
Ex. Ord. No. 12951. Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems
Ex. Ord. No. 12951, Feb. 22, 1995, 60 F.R. 10789, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to release certain scientifically or environmentally useful imagery acquired by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems, consistent with the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(b) The criteria referred to in section 2(a) of this order consist of the following: imagery acquired by a space-based national intelligence reconnaissance system other than the Corona, Argon, and Lanyard missions.
(b) Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
William J. Clinton.
Executive Order No. 12958
Ex. Ord. No. 12958, Apr. 17, 1995, 60 F.R. 19825, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12972, Sept. 18, 1995, 60 F.R. 48863; Ex. Ord. No. 13142, Nov. 19, 1999, 64 F.R. 66089; Ex. Ord. No. 13292, Mar. 25, 2003, 68 F.R. 15315, which related to classified national security information, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13526, §6.2(g), Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 731, set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 12968. Access to Classified Information
Ex. Ord. No. 12968, Aug. 2, 1995, 60 F.R. 40245, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13467, §3(b), June 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 38107; Ex. Ord. No. 13764, §3(v), Jan. 17, 2017, 82 F.R. 8128, provided:
The national interest requires that certain information be maintained in confidence through a system of classification in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, and our participation within the community of nations. The unauthorized disclosure of information classified in the national interest can cause irreparable damage to the national security and loss of human life.
Security policies designed to protect classified information must ensure consistent, cost effective, and efficient protection of our Nation's classified information, while providing fair and equitable treatment to those Americans upon whom we rely to guard our national security.
This order establishes a uniform Federal personnel security program for employees who will be considered for initial or continued access to classified information.
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
PART 1—DEFINITIONS, ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, AND OTHER ITEMS
(b) "Applicant" means a person other than an employee who has received an authorized conditional offer of employment for a position that requires access to classified information.
(c) "Authorized investigative agency" means an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigation of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information.
(d) "Classified information" means information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12958 [formerly set out above], or any successor order, Executive Order No. 12951 [set out above], or any successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (
(e) "Employee" means a person, other than the President and Vice President, employed by, detailed or assigned to, an agency, including members of the Armed Forces; an expert or consultant to an agency; an industrial or commercial contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency, including all subcontractors; a personal services contractor; or any other category of person who acts for or on behalf of an agency as determined by the appropriate agency head.
(f) "Foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power" have the meaning provided in
(g) "Need for access" means a determination that an employee requires access to a particular level of classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.
(h) "Need-to-know" means a determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.
(i) "Overseas Security Executive Agent" means the Board established by the President to consider, develop, coordinate and promote policies, standards and agreements on overseas security operations, programs and projects that affect all United States Government agencies under the authority of a Chief of Mission.
(j) "Security Executive Agent" means the Security Executive Agent established by the President to consider, coordinate, and recommend policy directives for U.S. security policies, procedures, and practices.
(k) "Special access program" has the meaning provided in section 4.1 of Executive Order No. 12958 [formerly set out above], or any successor order.
(b) Agency heads shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective program to ensure that access to classified information by each employee is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
(c) Employees shall not be granted access to classified information unless they:
(1) have been determined to be eligible for access under section 3.1 of this order by agency heads or designated officials based upon a favorable adjudication of an appropriate investigation of the employee's background;
(2) have a demonstrated need-to-know; and
(3) have signed an approved nondisclosure agreement.
(d) All employees shall be subject to investigation by an appropriate government authority prior to being granted access to classified information and at any time during the period of access to ascertain whether they continue to meet the requirements for access.
(e)(1) All employees granted access to classified information shall be required as a condition of such access to provide to the employing agency written consent permitting access by an authorized investigative agency, for such time as access to classified information is maintained and for a period of 3 years thereafter, to:
(A) relevant financial records that are maintained by a financial institution as defined in
(B) consumer reports pertaining to the employee under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (
(C) records maintained by commercial entities within the United States pertaining to any travel by the employee outside the United States.
(2) Information may be requested pursuant to employee consent under this section where:
(A) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible information, that the employee or former employee is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power;
(B) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the employee or former employee has incurred excessive indebtedness or has acquired a level of affluence that cannot be explained by other information; or
(C) circumstances indicate the employee or former employee had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified information that is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of an investigating agency to obtain information pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act [of 1978,
(1) the identity of covert agents as defined in the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (
(2) technical or specialized national intelligence collection and processing systems that, if disclosed in an unauthorized manner, would substantially negate or impair the effectiveness of the system;
(3) the details of:
(A) the nature, contents, algorithm, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system or;
(B) the design, construction, functioning, maintenance, or repair of any cryptographic equipment; but not including information concerning the use of cryptographic equipment and services;
(4) particularly sensitive special access programs, the disclosure of which would substantially negate or impair the effectiveness of the information or activity involved; or
(5) especially sensitive nuclear weapons design information (but only for those positions that have been certified as being of a high degree of importance or sensitivity, as described in section 145(f) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [
(b) An employee may not be granted access, or hold a position designated as requiring access, to information described in subsection (a) unless, as a condition of access to such information, the employee:
(1) files with the head of the agency a financial disclosure report, including information with respect to the spouse and dependent children of the employee, as part of all background investigations or reinvestigations;
(2) is subject to annual financial disclosure requirements, if selected by the agency head; and
(3) files relevant information concerning foreign travel, as determined by the Security Executive Agent.
(c) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this order, the Security Executive Agent shall develop procedures for the implementation of this section, including a standard financial disclosure form for use by employees under subsection (b) of this section, and agency heads shall identify certain employees, by position or category, who are subject to annual financial disclosure.
(b) inform employees about guidance and assistance available concerning issues that may affect their eligibility for access to classified information, including sources of assistance for employees who have questions or concerns about financial matters, mental health, or substance abuse.
PART 2—ACCESS ELIGIBILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURE
(b) The number of employees that each agency determines are eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required for the conduct of agency functions.
(1) Eligibility for access to classified information shall not be requested or granted solely to permit entry to, or ease of movement within, controlled areas when the employee has no need for access and access to classified information may reasonably be prevented. Where circumstances indicate employees may be inadvertently exposed to classified information in the course of their duties, agencies are authorized to grant or deny, in their discretion, facility access approvals to such employees based on an appropriate level of investigation as determined by each agency.
(2) Except in agencies where eligibility for access is a mandatory condition of employment, eligibility for access to classified information shall only be requested or granted based on a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Requesting or approving eligibility in excess of actual requirements is prohibited.
(3) Eligibility for access to classified information may be granted where there is a temporary need for access, such as one-time participation in a classified project, provided the investigative standards established under this order have been satisfied. In such cases, a fixed date or event for expiration shall be identified and access to classified information shall be limited to information related to the particular project or assignment.
(4) Access to classified information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need for access.
(b) Access to classified information relating to a special access program shall be granted in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency that created the program or, for programs pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs) or intelligence sources and methods, by the Director of Central Intelligence. To the extent possible and consistent with the national security interests of the United States, such procedures shall be consistent with the standards and procedures established by and under this order.
(1) is necessary to meet operational or contractual exigencies not expected to be of a recurring nature;
(2) will not exceed 180 days; and
(3) is limited to specific, identifiable information that is made the subject of a written access record.
(b) Where the access granted under subsection (a) of this section involves another agency's classified information, that agency must concur before access to its information is granted.
(b) Except where there is substantial information indicating that the employee may not satisfy the standards in section 3.1 of this order, an employee with existing access to a special access program shall not be denied eligibility for access to another special access program at the same sensitivity level as determined personally by the agency head or deputy agency head, or have an existing access eligibility readjudicated, so long as the employee has a need for access to the information involved.
(c) This section shall not preclude agency heads from establishing additional, but not duplicative, investigative or adjudicative procedures for a special access program or for candidates for detail or assignment to their agencies, where such procedures are required in exceptional circumstances to protect the national security.
(d) Where temporary eligibility for access is granted under sections 2.3 or 3.3 of this order or where the determination of eligibility for access is conditional, the fact of such temporary or conditional access shall be conveyed to any other agency that considers affording the employee access to its information.
(b) It is the responsibility of employees who are authorized holders of classified information to verify that a prospective recipient's eligibility for access has been granted by an authorized agency official and to ensure that a need-to-know exists prior to allowing such access, and to challenge requests for access that do not appear well-founded.
(b) Exceptions to these requirements may be permitted only by the agency head or the senior agency official designated under section 6.1 of this order to further substantial national security interests.
PART 3—ACCESS ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS
(b) Except as provided in sections 2.6 and 3.3 of this order, eligibility for access to classified information shall be granted only to employees who are United States citizens for whom an appropriate investigation has been completed and whose personal and professional history affirmatively indicates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information. A determination of eligibility for access to such information is a discretionary security decision based on judgments by appropriately trained adjudicative personnel or appropriate automated procedures. Eligibility shall be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the national security.
(c) The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.
(d) In determining eligibility for access under this order, agencies may investigate and consider any matter that relates to the determination of whether access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. No inference concerning the standards in this section may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.
(e) No negative inference concerning the standards in this section may be raised solely on the basis of mental health counseling. Such counseling can be a positive factor in eligibility determinations. However, mental health counseling, where relevant to the adjudication of access to classified information, may justify further inquiry to determine whether the standards of subsection (b) of this section are satisfied, and mental health may be considered where it directly relates to those standards.
(f) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this order, the Security Executive Agent shall develop a common set of adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified information, including access to special access programs.
(b) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this order, the Security Executive Agent shall develop a common set of investigative standards for background investigations for access to classified information. These standards may vary for the various levels of access.
(c) Nothing in this order shall prohibit an agency from utilizing any lawful investigative procedure in addition to the investigative requirements set forth in this order and its implementing regulations to resolve issues that may arise during the course of a background investigation or reinvestigation.
(1) Temporary eligibility for access under this section shall include a justification, and the employee must be notified in writing that further access is expressly conditioned on the favorable completion of the investigation and issuance of an access eligibility approval. Access will be immediately terminated, along with any assignment requiring an access eligibility approval, if such approval is not granted.
(2) Temporary eligibility for access may be granted only by security personnel authorized by the agency head to make access eligibility determinations and shall be based on minimum investigative standards developed by the Security Executive Agent not later than 180 days after the effective date of this order.
(3) Temporary eligibility for access may be granted only to particular, identified categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful and authorized functions that are the basis for the granting of temporary access.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed as altering the authority of an agency head to waive requirements for granting access to classified information pursuant to statutory authority.
(c) Where access has been terminated under section 2.1(b)(4) of this order and a new need for access arises, access eligibility up to the same level shall be reapproved without further investigation as to employees who were determined to be eligible based on a favorable adjudication of an investigation completed within the prior 5 years, provided they have remained employed by the same employer during the period in question, the employee certifies in writing that there has been no change in the relevant information provided by the employee for the last background investigation, and there is no information that would tend to indicate the employee may no longer satisfy the standards established by this order for access to classified information.
(d) Access eligibility shall be reapproved for individuals who were determined to be eligible based on a favorable adjudication of an investigation completed within the prior 5 years and who have been retired or otherwise separated from United States Government employment for not more than 2 years; provided there is no indication the individual may no longer satisfy the standards of this order, the individual certifies in writing that there has been no change in the relevant information provided by the individual for the last background investigation, and an appropriate record check reveals no unfavorable information.
(b) Employees who are eligible for access to classified information shall be the subject of periodic reinvestigations and may also be reinvestigated if, at any time, there is reason to believe that they may no longer meet the standards for access established in this order.
(c) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this order, the Security Executive Agent shall develop a common set of reinvestigative standards, including the frequency of reinvestigations.
PART 4—INVESTIGATIONS FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
PART 5—REVIEW OF ACCESS DETERMINATIONS
(1) provided as comprehensive and detailed a written explanation of the basis for that conclusion as the national security interests of the United States and other applicable law permit;
(2) provided within 30 days, upon request and to the extent the documents would be provided if requested under the Freedom of Information Act (
(3) informed of their right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense; to request any documents, records, and reports as described in section 5.2(a)(2) upon which a denial or revocation is based; and to request the entire investigative file, as permitted by the national security and other applicable law, which, if requested, shall be promptly provided prior to the time set for a written reply;
(4) provided a reasonable opportunity to reply in writing to, and to request a review of, the determination;
(5) provided written notice of and reasons for the results of the review, the identity of the deciding authority, and written notice of the right to appeal;
(6) provided an opportunity to appeal in writing to a high level panel, appointed by the agency head, which shall be comprised of at least three members, two of whom shall be selected from outside the security field. Decisions of the panel shall be in writing, and final except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; and
(7) provided an opportunity to appear personally and to present relevant documents, materials, and information at some point in the process before an adjudicative or other authority, other than the investigating entity, as determined by the agency head. A written summary or recording of such appearance shall be made part of the applicant's or employee's security record, unless such appearance occurs in the presence of the appeals panel described in subsection (a)(6) of this section.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit an agency head from personally exercising the appeal authority in subsection (a)(6) of this section based upon recommendations from an appeals panel. In such case, the decision of the agency head shall be final.
(c) Agency heads shall promulgate regulations to implement this section and, at their sole discretion and as resources and national security considerations permit, may provide additional review proceedings beyond those required by subsection (a) of this section. This section does not require additional proceedings, however, and creates no procedural or substantive rights.
(d) When the head of an agency or principal deputy personally certifies that a procedure set forth in this section cannot be made available in a particular case without damaging the national security interests of the United States by revealing classified information, the particular procedure shall not be made available. This certification shall be conclusive.
(e) This section shall not be deemed to limit or affect the responsibility and power of an agency head pursuant to any law or other Executive order to deny or terminate access to classified information in the interests of national security. The power and responsibility to deny or terminate access to classified information pursuant to any law or other Executive order may be exercised only where the agency head determines that the procedures prescribed in subsection (a) of this section cannot be invoked in a manner that is consistent with national security. This determination shall be conclusive.
(f)(1) This section shall not be deemed to limit or affect the responsibility and power of an agency head to make determinations of suitability for employment.
(2) Nothing in this section shall require that an agency provide the procedures prescribed in subsection (a) of this section to an applicant where a conditional offer of employment is withdrawn for reasons of suitability or any other reason other than denial of eligibility for access to classified information.
(3) A suitability determination shall not be used for the purpose of denying an applicant or employee the review proceedings of this section where there has been a denial or revocation of eligibility for access to classified information.
PART 6—IMPLEMENTATION
(b) cooperate, under the guidance of the Security Executive Agent, with other agencies to achieve practical, consistent, and effective adjudicative training and guidelines; and
(c) conduct periodic evaluations of the agency's implementation and administration of this order, including the implementation of section 1.3(a) of this order. Copies of each report shall be provided to the Security Executive Agent.
(1) protect classified information in their custody from unauthorized disclosure;
(2) report all contacts with persons, including foreign nationals, who seek in any way to obtain unauthorized access to classified information;
(3) report all violations of security regulations to the appropriate security officials; and
(4) comply with all other security requirements set forth in this order and its implementing regulations.
(b) Employees are encouraged and expected to report any information that raises doubts as to whether another employee's continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security.
(b) Any guidelines, standards, or procedures developed by the Security Executive Agent pursuant to this order shall be consistent with those guidelines issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in March 1994 on Background Investigations Policy/Guidelines Regarding Sexual Orientation.
(c) In carrying out its responsibilities under this order, the Security Executive Agent shall consult where appropriate with the Overseas Security Executive Agent. In carrying out its responsibilities under section 1.3(c) of this order, the Security Executive Agent shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
PART 7—GENERAL PROVISIONS
(1) the agency employing the employee who is the subject of the records or information;
(2) the Department of Justice for law enforcement or counterintelligence purposes; or
(3) any agency if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.
(b) The Attorney General, at the request of the head of an agency, shall render an interpretation of this order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.
(c) No prior Executive orders are repealed by this order. To the extent that this order is inconsistent with any provision of any prior Executive order, this order shall control, except that this order shall not diminish or otherwise affect the requirements of Executive Order No. 10450 [
(d) If any provision of this order or the application of such provision is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order shall not be affected.
(e) This Executive order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not, create any right to administrative or judicial review, or any other right or benefit or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
(f) This order is effective immediately.
Ex. Ord. No. 13467. Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information
Ex. Ord. No. 13467, June 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 38103, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13741, §1, Sept. 29, 2016, 81 F.R. 68289; Ex. Ord. No. 13764, §3, Jan. 17, 2017, 82 F.R. 8117; Ex. Ord. No. 13869, §2, Apr. 24, 2019, 84 F.R. 18125, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including
PART 1—POLICY, APPLICABILITY, AND DEFINITIONS
(b) The Government's tools, systems, and processes for conducting these background investigations and managing sensitive investigative information should keep pace with technological advancements, regularly integrating current best practices to better anticipate, detect, and counter malicious activities, and threats posed by external or internal actors who may seek to do harm to the Government's personnel, property, and information. To help fulfill these responsibilities, there shall be a primary executive branch investigative service provider whose mission is to provide effective, efficient, and secure background investigations for the Federal Government.
(c) Executive branch vetting policies and procedures shall be sustained by an enhanced risk-management approach that facilitates early detection of issues by an informed, aware, and responsible Federal workforce; results in quality decisions enabled by improved vetting capabilities; and advances Government-wide capabilities through enterprise approaches.
(d) The appointment or retention of each covered individual shall be subject to an investigation. Federal investigative standards established pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, and the scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of material adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security." [sic]
(e) Investigative agencies shall control the reports, information, and other investigative materials that are developed during the vetting process. Recipient departments and agencies may retain and use the received reports, information, and other investigative material within that recipient for authorized purposes (including, but not limited to, adjudications, hearings and appeals, continuous evaluation, inspector general functions, counterintelligence, research, and insider threat programs), in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (
(i) the provisions regarding eligibility for physical access to federally controlled facilities and logical access to federally controlled information systems do not apply to individuals exempted in accordance with guidance pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act (title III of
(ii) the qualification standards for enlistment, appointment, and induction into the Armed Forces pursuant to
(b) This order also applies to vetting for employees of agencies working in or for the legislative or judicial branches when the vetting is conducted by the executive branch.
(i) suitable for Government employment;
(ii) eligible for logical and physical access;
(iii) eligible for access to classified information;
(iv) eligible to hold a sensitive position; or
(v) fit to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a Federal employee, contractor, or nonappropriated fund employee.
(b) "Agency" means any "Executive agency" as defined in
(c) "Classified information" means information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, or a successor or predecessor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (
(d) "Continuous evaluation (CE)" means a vetting process to review the background of an individual who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position at any time during the period of eligibility. CE leverages a set of automated record checks and business rules to assist in the on-going assessment of an individual's continued eligibility. CE is intended to complement continuous vetting efforts.
(e) "Continuous performance improvement" means assessing national policy and operations, adverse events, and emerging trends and technology throughout the Government's end-to-end vetting program. It relies on research to generate data-driven decisions and uses outcome-based measurements to adjust policy and operations.
(f) "Continuous vetting" means reviewing the background of a covered individual at any time to determine whether that individual continues to meet applicable requirements.
(g) "Contractor" means an expert or consultant (not appointed under
(h) "Covered individual" means a person who performs, or who seeks to perform, work for or on behalf of the executive branch (e.g., Federal employee, military member, or contractor), or otherwise interacts with the executive branch such that the individual must undergo vetting, but does not include:
(i) the President or (except to the extent otherwise directed by the President) employees of the President under
(ii) the Vice President or (except to the extent otherwise directed by the Vice President) employees of the Vice President under
(iii) with respect to background investigations only, [the] duly elected or appointed governor of a State or territory, or an official who has succeeded to that office under applicable law in accordance with Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, and its implementing directive.
(i) "End-to-end automation" means an executive branch-wide federated system that uses automation to manage and monitor cases and maintain relevant documentation of the application (but not an employment application), investigation, adjudication, and continuous evaluation processes.
(j) "Federally controlled facilities" and "federally controlled information systems" have the meanings prescribed in guidance pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act (title III of
(k) "Fitness" means the level of character and conduct determined necessary for an individual to perform work for or on behalf of a Federal agency as an employee in the excepted service (other than a position subject to suitability), or as a "contractor employee" or a "nonappropriated fund employee" as those terms are defined in Executive Order 13488 of January 16, 2009, as amended.
(l) "Investigation" means the collection and analysis of pertinent facts and data to support a determination of whether a covered individual is, and continues to be:
(i) eligible for access to classified information;
(ii) eligible to hold a sensitive position;
(iii) suitable or fit for Federal employment;
(iv) fit to perform work for or on behalf of the Federal Government as a contractor or nonappropriated fund employee; or
(v) authorized to be issued a Federal credential.
(m) "Logical and physical access" means access other than occasional or intermittent access to federally controlled facilities or information systems.
(n) "National Background Investigations Bureau" (NBIB) means the National Background Investigations Bureau, established within the Office of Personnel Management under
(o) "Sensitive Position" means any position within or in support of a department or agency, the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security, regardless of whether the occupant has access to classified information, and regardless of whether the occupant is an employee, a military service member, or a contractor.
(p) "Suitability" has the meaning and coverage provided in 5 CFR Part 731.
(q) "Vetting" is the process by which covered individuals undergo investigation, evaluation, and adjudication of whether they are, and remain over time, suitable or fit for Federal employment, eligible to occupy a sensitive position, eligible for access to classified information, eligible to serve as a nonappropriated fund employee or a contractor, eligible to serve in the military, or authorized to be issued a Federal credential. Vetting includes all steps in the end-to-end process, including determining need (appropriate position designation), validating need (existence of a current investigation or adjudication), collecting background information via standard forms, investigative activity, adjudication, providing administrative due process or other procedural rights, and ongoing assessments to ensure that individuals continue to meet the applicable standards for the position for which they were favorably adjudicated.
PART 2—VETTING ENTERPRISE, RECIPROCITY, CONTINUOUS PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT, AND GOVERNANCE
(b) The aligned executive branch-wide vetting enterprise shall employ modern and consistent standards and methods, enable innovations with enterprise information technology capabilities and end-to-end automation to the extent practicable, and ensure that relevant information maintained by agencies can be accessed and shared rapidly across the executive branch, while protecting national security, protecting privacy-related information, protecting civil rights and civil liberties, ensuring resulting decisions are in the national interest and in accordance with due process requirements, and providing the Federal Government with an effective trusted workforce.
(c) The investigative and adjudicative standards for fitness shall, to the extent practicable, be consistent with the standards for suitability. The Executive Agents shall establish in Federal investigative standards the elements of the level of investigation necessary for vetting for fitness.
(d) All covered individuals shall be subject to continuous vetting under standards (including, but not limited to, the frequency of such vetting) as determined by the Security Executive Agent or the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent exercising its Suitability Executive Agent functions, as applicable.
(e) Vetting shall include a search of records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including a fingerprint-based search, and any other appropriate biometric or database searches not precluded by law.
(b) The Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget, shall serve as Chair of the Council and shall have authority, direction, and control over the Council's functions. Membership on the Council shall include the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, the Security Executive Agent, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [now Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security]. These four officials collectively shall constitute "the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals." The Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency shall also serve as a member of the Council. The Chair shall select a Vice Chair to act in the Chair's absence. The Chair shall have authority to designate officials from additional agencies who shall serve as members of the Council. Council membership shall be limited to Federal Government employees in leadership positions.
(c) The Council shall be accountable to the President to achieve, consistent with this order, the goals of the executive branch vetting enterprise, and is responsible for driving implementation of reform efforts and enterprise development, ensuring accountability by agencies, ensuring the Executive Agents align their respective processes, and sustaining continuous performance improvement and reform momentum.
(d) The Council shall:
(i) ensure enterprise-wide alignment of suitability, security, credentialing, and as appropriate, fitness processes;
(ii) hold agencies accountable for the implementation of suitability, security, fitness, and credentialing processes and procedures;
(iii) define requirements for enterprise-wide reciprocity management information technology, and develop standards for enterprise-wide information technology;
(iv) work with agencies to implement continuous performance improvement programs, policies, and procedures; establish annual goals and progress metrics; and prepare annual reports on results;
(v) ensure and oversee the development of tools and techniques for enhancing background investigations and adjudications;
(vi) enable discussion and consensus resolution of differences in processes, policies, and procedures among the Council Principals, and other agencies as appropriate;
(vii) share best practices;
(viii) advise the Executive Agents on policies affecting the alignment of investigations and adjudications;
(ix) work with agencies to develop agency policies and procedures to enable sharing of vetting information consistent with the law and the protection of privacy and civil liberties and to the extent necessary for enterprise-wide efficiency, effectiveness, and security;
(x) monitor performance to identify and drive enterprise-level process enhancements, and make recommendations for changes to executive branch-wide guidance and authorities to resolve overlaps or close policy gaps where they may exist;
(xi) promote data-driven, transparent, and expeditious policy-making processes; and
(xii) develop and continuously reevaluate and revise outcome-based metrics that measure the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the vetting enterprise.
(e) The Chair shall, to further the goals of the vetting enterprise and to the extent consistent with law, establish subordinate entities, mechanisms, and policies to support and assist in exercising the Council's authorities and responsibilities, and facilitate, consistent with the executive branch's enterprise strategy, adoption of enterprise-wide standards and solutions to ensure security, quality, reciprocity, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness. The Chair may assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any agency (solely or jointly) any function within the Council's authority or responsibilities pursuant to this order.
(b) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall serve as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent. With respect to the Suitability Executive Agent functions, the Director:
(i) shall, pursuant to
(ii) shall issue regulations, guidance, and standards to fulfill the Director's responsibilities related to suitability and fitness under Executive Order 13488 of January 16, 2009, as amended;
(iii) shall promote reciprocal recognition of suitability or fitness determinations among the agencies, including acting as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among the agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of suitability and fitness;
(iv) shall continue to initially approve, and periodically review for renewal, agencies' requests to administer polygraphs in connection with appointment in the competitive service, in consultation with the Security Executive Agent as appropriate;
(v) shall make a continuing review of agency programs for suitability and fitness vetting to determine whether they are being implemented according to this order;
(vi) may issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of agencies to promote appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, reciprocity, timeliness, and security in processes relating to determining suitability or fitness; and
(vii) shall, pursuant to
(c) With respect to the Credentialing Executive Agent functions, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management:
(i) shall develop standards for investigations, reinvestigations, and continuous vetting for a covered individual's eligibility for a personal identity verification credential permitting logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities and federally controlled information systems (PIV credential);
(ii) shall develop adjudicative guidelines for a covered individual's eligibility for a PIV credential;
(iii) shall develop guidelines on reporting and recording determinations of eligibility for a PIV credential;
(iv) shall develop standards for unfavorable determinations of eligibility for a PIV credential, including procedures for denying and revoking the eligibility for a PIV credential, for reconsideration of unfavorable determinations, and for rendering the PIV credential inoperable;
(v) shall develop standards and procedures for suspending eligibility for a PIV credential when there is a reasonable basis to believe there may be an unacceptable risk pending an inquiry or investigation, including special standards and procedures for imminent risk;
(vi) shall be responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure completion of investigations and adjudications relating to eligibility for a PIV credential;
(vii) may develop guidelines and instructions to the heads of agencies as necessary to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness in processes relating to eligibility for a PIV credential;
(viii) shall monitor and make a continuing review of agency programs for determining eligibility for a PIV credential to determine whether they are being implemented according to this order; and
(ix) shall consult to the extent practicable with other agencies with responsibilities related to PIV credentials to ensure that policies and procedures are consistent with law including:
(A) the Office of Management and Budget, in exercising its responsibilities under
(B) the Department of Homeland Security, in exercising its responsibilities under sections 3553(b), (f), and (g) of
(C) the Department of Defense, in exercising its responsibilities under
(D) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in exercising its responsibilities under
(E) the Department of Commerce and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in exercising their responsibilities under
(F) the General Services Administration, in exercising its responsibilities under division A, section 1086(b)(2) of
(G) the Federal Acquisition Regulation agencies, in exercising their responsibilities under [former]
(d) In fulfilling the Credentialing Executive Agent function of developing policies and procedures for determining eligibility for a PIV credential and to protect the national security, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall coordinate with and obtain the concurrence of the other Council Principals. Agencies with authority to establish standards or guidelines or issue instructions related to PIV credentials shall retain the discretion as to whether to establish policies, guidelines, or instructions developed by the Credentialing Executive Agent.
(e) The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the Security Executive Agent. The Security Executive Agent:
(i) shall direct the oversight of investigations, reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any agency;
(ii) shall make a continuing review of agencies' national security background investigation and adjudication programs to determine whether they are being implemented according to this order;
(iii) shall be responsible for developing and issuing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position;
(iv) may issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and security in processes relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, to include such matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;
(v) may, if consistent with the national security, authorize exceptions to or waivers of national security investigative requirements, and may issue implementing or clarifying guidance as necessary;
(vi) shall serve as the final authority to designate an agency or agencies, to the extent that it is not practicable to use the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position;
(vii) shall serve as the final authority to designate an agency or agencies to determine eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order 12968 of August 2, 1995, as amended;
(viii) shall ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position among the agencies, including acting as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among the agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of eligibility; and
(ix) may assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any agency (solely or jointly) any of the functions detailed in (i) through (viii) of this subsection, with the agency's exercise of such assigned functions to be subject to the Security Executive Agent's oversight and with such terms and conditions (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security Executive Agent determines appropriate.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed in a manner that would limit the authorities of the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Secretary of Defense under law.
(a) The National Background Investigations Bureau shall, until such functions are transferred or delegated, as applicable, to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency:
(i) serve as the primary executive branch service provider for background investigations for eligibility for access to classified information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a contractor; fitness to work as a nonappropriated fund employee, as defined in Executive Order 13488 of January 16, 2009, as amended; and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities or information systems;
(ii) provide effective, efficient, and secure personnel background investigations for the Federal Government;
(iii) provide the Council information, to the extent permitted by law, on matters of performance, timeliness, capacity, information technology modernization, continuous performance improvement, and other relevant aspects of NBIB operations;
(iv) be headquartered in or near Washington, District of Columbia;
(v) have dedicated resources, including but not limited to a senior privacy and civil liberties official;
(vi) institutionalize interagency collaboration and leverage expertise across the executive branch;
(vii) continuously improve investigative operations, emphasizing information accuracy and protection, and regularly integrate best practices, including those identified by subject matter experts from industry, academia, or other relevant sources;
(viii) conduct personnel background investigations in accordance with uniform and consistent policies, procedures, standards, and requirements established by the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent exercising its Suitability Executive Agent functions; and
(ix) conduct other personnel background investigations as authorized by law, rule, regulation, or Executive Order;" [sic]
except that throughout the transition period ending on or before September 30, 2019, as described in sections 2.6(d)(vi) and 2.6(e)(viii) of this order, the National Background Investigations Bureau and its personnel may continue to perform background investigations for the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall design, develop, deploy, operate, secure, defend, and continuously update and modernize, as necessary, vetting information technology systems that support all background investigation processes conducted by the National Background Investigations Bureau. Design and operation of the information technology systems for the National Background Investigations Bureau shall comply with applicable information technology standards and, to the extent practicable, ensure security and interoperability with other background investigation information technology systems. The Secretary of Defense shall operate the database in the information technology systems containing appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or revocation of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility for a sensitive position pertaining to military, civilian, or Government contractor personnel, see
(i) Pursuant to
(ii) Pursuant to and consistent with section 3001(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (
(iii) Pursuant to and consistent with sections [sic] 925(a)(1) and (d)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (
(iv) Consistent with and following an explicit delegation from the Director of the Office of Personnel Management pursuant to
(v) The DCSA shall conduct other background investigations as authorized by law, designation, rule, regulation, or Executive Order.
(vi) The DCSA shall provide information to the Council established by section 2.4 of this order regarding matters of performance, including timeliness and continuous improvement, capacity, information technology modernization, and other relevant aspects of its operations. The DCSA shall be subject to the oversight of the Security Executive Agent, including implementation of Security Executive Agent policies, procedures, guidance, and instructions, in conducting investigations for eligibility to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position. The DCSA, through the Secretary of Defense, also shall be subject to the oversight of the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, including implementation of Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent policies, procedures, guidance, and instructions, and applicable Office of Personnel Management regulations, in conducting investigations of suitability or fitness and eligibility for logical and physical access.
(vii) The Secretary of Defense shall design, develop, deploy, operate, secure, defend, and continuously update and modernize, as necessary, information technology systems that support all personnel vetting processes conducted by the Department of Defense. Design and operation of these information technology systems shall comply with applicable information technology standards and, to the extent practicable, ensure security and interoperability with other personnel vetting or related information technology systems. The Secretary of Defense shall maintain and safeguard the information relevant to the granting, denial, or revocation of eligibility for access to classified information, or eligibility for a sensitive position, or relevant to suitability, fitness, or credentialing determinations pertaining to military, civilian, or Government contractor personnel. The Secretary of Defense shall operate the database in the information technology systems containing appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or revocation of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility for a sensitive position pertaining to military, civilian, or Government contractor personnel, see
(viii) The Secretary of Defense shall, by June 24, 2019, execute a written agreement with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management designating the appropriate support functions to be transferred as part of the investigative mission, consistent with section 925(d)(2)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (
(ix) The Secretary of Defense shall, upon finalization of the agreement described in paragraph (viii) of this subsection and in accordance with its terms:
(A) establish the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office within the Department of Defense, which will include personnel from the Department of Defense and other stakeholder agencies, as appropriate; and
(B) commence efforts to receive transferred or delegated functions and, as appropriate, associated Office of Personnel Management operations, resources, and personnel, to the DCSA.
(x) The Secretary of Defense shall:
(A) no later than June 24, 2019, and every 180 days thereafter until the transfer is complete, provide a report to the President, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, regarding the status of the transfer, including any resource or funding shortfall and gaps in authority;
(B) take necessary actions to enable the Department of Defense to receive any resources, including personnel, made available as a result of subsection (d) of this section; and
(C) notify the President upon completion of the transition period.
(xi) In the event the agreement described in paragraph (viii) of this subsection and section 2.6(e)(v) of this order is not executed by June 24, 2019, beginning on such date, the Secretary of Defense shall begin to take necessary actions to begin execution of paragraph (ix) until the agreement described in paragraph (viii) of this subsection is executed, at which time the Secretary of Defense shall ensure actions subject to such agreement under paragraph (ix) of this subsection are executed in accordance with its terms." [sic]
(c) Existing delegations of authority to conduct background investigations made by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent or as otherwise authorized by statute or Executive Order, to any agency relating to suitability, fitness, or credentialing determinations, existing designations made by the Director of National Intelligence, as the Security Executive Agent or as otherwise authorized by statute or Executive Order, relating to investigating persons who are proposed for access to classified information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position, or existing delegations of authority to conduct background investigations made by the President to any other agency through any Executive Order shall remain in effect. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the authority of any agency to conduct its own background investigations when specifically authorized or directed to do so by statute or any preexisting delegation from the President.
(d) Consistent with
(i) be executed with the assistance of the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office established pursuant to paragraph (b)(ix) of this section, which shall, in providing such assistance, consider input from other stakeholder agencies, as appropriate;
(ii) be conducted in accordance with a risk management approach that is consistent with Office of Management and Budget Circular A–123;
(iii) include any appropriate funds that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determine to be available and necessary to finance and discharge the functions transferred;
(iv) be consistent with the transition from legacy information technology as required by subsection (b)(vii) of this section;
(v) build upon the implementation plan developed pursuant to section 951(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (
(vi) permit NBIB to conduct background investigations for DCSA, as necessary, until September 30, 2019.
(e) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall:
(i) no later than June 24, 2019, take any steps necessary to make effective the delegation, pursuant to
(ii) promptly establish appropriate performance standards and oversight as required by
(iii) work in coordination with the Secretary of Defense to reassign appropriate resources, including personnel, to the DCSA and provide all necessary and appropriate support to the DCSA in a timely manner to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities under this order;
(iv) no later than June 24, 2019, provide the Secretary of Defense with a complete inventory of NBIB personnel, resources, and assets, and other Office of Personnel Management personnel and resources that primarily support NBIB;
(v) no later than June 24, 2019, execute a written agreement with the Secretary of Defense designating the appropriate support functions to be transferred as part of the investigative mission, consistent with section 925(d)(2)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (
(vi) immediately upon the finalization of the agreement described in paragraph (v) of this subsection and section 2.6(b)(viii) of this order, commence efforts to transition transferred or delegated functions and, as appropriate, associated Office of Personnel Management authorities, operations, resources, and personnel, to the DCSA;
(vii) during the transition period, coordinate with the Department of Defense regarding any decisions concerning NBIB's personnel structure, finances, contracts, or organization to the extent provided in the written agreement described by paragraph (b)(viii) of this section;
(viii) no later than September 30, 2019, complete the transfer of all designated administrative and operational functions to the Department of Defense and revoke any applicable delegation or designation to NBIB of investigative or other authority; and
(ix) in the event the agreement described in paragraph (v) of this subsection and section 2.6(b)(viii) of this order is not executed by June 24, 2019, beginning on such date, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall begin to take necessary actions to begin execution of paragraphs (iii) through (viii) of this subsection until the agreement described in paragraph (v) of this subsection and section 2.6(b)(viii) of this order is executed, at which time the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall ensure actions subject to such agreement under paragraphs (iii) through (viii) of this subsection are executed in accordance with its terms.
(f) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:
(i) facilitate an effective transfer of functions, including personnel and resources;
(ii) support the Department of Defense's efforts to establish a single, centralized funding capability for its background investigations, as required by section 925(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (
(iii) mediate any disagreements between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management that may arise during or outside of the transition period and facilitate resolution of the conflicting positions; and
(iv) develop, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, an appropriate funding plan for the activities undertaken pursuant to this order.
(b) Heads of agencies shall:
(i) designate, or cause to be designated, as a "sensitive position," any position occupied by a covered individual in which the occupant could bring about by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security;
(ii) establish and maintain within their respective agencies, an effective program to ensure that employment and retention of any covered individual within the agency is clearly consistent with the interests of national security and, as applicable, meets standards for eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position, suitability, fitness, or credentialing, established by the respective Executive Agent;
(iii) carry out any function assigned to the agency head by the Chair, and shall assist the Chair, the Council, the Executive Agents, the National Background Investigations Bureau, and the Department of Defense in carrying out any function under sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 of this order;
(iv) implement any policy or procedure established pursuant to this order;
(v) to the extent permitted by law, make available to the Council, the Executive Agents, the National Background Investigations Bureau, and the Department of Defense such information as may be requested to implement this order, including information necessary to implement enterprise-wide vetting policies and procedures;
(vi) except as authorized by
(vii) ensure that all actions taken under this order take account of the counterintelligence interests of the United States, as appropriate; and
(viii) ensure that actions taken under this order are consistent with the President's constitutional authority to:
(A) conduct the foreign affairs of the United States;
(B) withhold information the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties;
(C) recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President may judge necessary or expedient; and
(D) supervise the unitary executive branch.
(c) All investigations being conducted by agencies that develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information that the individual may pose a counterintelligence or terrorist threat, or as otherwise provided by law, shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for potential investigation, and may also be referred to other agencies where appropriate.
PART 3—MISCELLANEOUS
(i) supersede, impede, or otherwise affect:
(A) Executive Order 10577 of November 23, 1954, as amended;
(B) Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended;
(C) Executive Order 12829 of January 6, 1993, as amended; or
(D) Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009; or
(ii) diminish or otherwise affect the denial and revocation procedures provided to individuals covered by Executive Order 10865 of February 20, 1960, as amended; or
(iii) be applied in such a way as to affect any administrative proceeding pending on the date of this order.
(b) [Amended Ex. Ord. No. 12968, set out as a note above.]
(c) Provisions of Executive Order 12968 of August 2, 1995, as amended, that apply to eligibility for access to classified information shall apply to eligibility to hold any sensitive position regardless of whether that sensitive position requires access to classified information, subject to the Security Executive Agent issuing implementing or clarifying guidance regarding requirements for sensitive positions. Nothing in this order shall supersede, impede, or otherwise affect the remainder of Executive Order 12968 of August 2, 1995, as amended.
(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the:
(i) authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(e) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(f) Existing delegations of authority made pursuant to Executive Order 13381 of June 27, 2005, as amended, to any agency relating to granting eligibility for access to classified information shall remain in effect, subject to the exercise of authorities pursuant to this order to revise or revoke such delegation.
(g) Existing delegations of authority made by the Office of Personnel Management to any agency relating to suitability or fitness shall remain in effect, subject to the exercise of authorities to revise or revoke such delegations.
(h) If any provision of this order or the application of such provision is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order shall not be affected.
(i) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Ex. Ord. No. 13526. Classified National Security Information
Ex. Ord. No. 13526, Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 707, 1013, provided:
This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism. Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information both within the Government and to the American people. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's security and demonstrating our commitment to open Government through accurate and accountable application of classification standards and routine, secure, and effective declassification are equally important priorities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
PART 1—Original Classification
(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified. This provision does not:
(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or
(2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.
(c) Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.
(d) The unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is presumed to cause damage to the national security.
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify United States classified information.
(c) If there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower level.
(1) the President and the Vice President;
(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President; and
(3) United States Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) Officials authorized to classify information at a specified level are also authorized to classify information at a lower level.
(c) Delegation of original classification authority.
(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this order. Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.
(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President, the Vice President, or an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President, the Vice President, an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4(d) of this order, provided that official has been delegated "Top Secret" original classification authority by the agency head.
(4) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided in this order. Each delegation shall identify the official by name or position.
(5) Delegations of original classification authority shall be reported or made available by name or position to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.
(d) All original classification authorities must receive training in proper classification (including the avoidance of over-classification) and declassification as provided in this order and its implementing directives at least once a calendar year. Such training must include instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified information and on the sanctions in section 5.5 of this order that may be brought against an individual who fails to classify information properly or protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Original classification authorities who do not receive such mandatory training at least once within a calendar year shall have their classification authority suspended by the agency head or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4(d) of this order until such training has taken place. A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive such training due to unavoidable circumstances. Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.
(e) Exceptional cases. When an employee, government contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that person to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with this order and its implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall decide within 30 days whether to classify this information.
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
(b) If the original classification authority cannot determine an earlier specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision, unless the original classification authority otherwise determines that the sensitivity of the information requires that it be marked for declassification for up to 25 years from the date of the original decision.
(c) An original classification authority may extend the duration of classification up to 25 years from the date of origin of the document, change the level of classification, or reclassify specific information only when the standards and procedures for classifying information under this order are followed.
(d) No information may remain classified indefinitely. Information marked for an indefinite duration of classification under predecessor orders, for example, marked as "Originating Agency's Determination Required," or classified information that contains incomplete declassification instructions or lacks declassification instructions shall be declassified in accordance with part 3 of this order.
(1) one of the three classification levels defined in section 1.2 of this order;
(2) the identity, by name and position, or by personal identifier, of the original classification authority;
(3) the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise evident;
(4) declassification instructions, which shall indicate one of the following:
(A) the date or event for declassification, as prescribed in section 1.5(a);
(B) the date that is 10 years from the date of original classification, as prescribed in section 1.5(b);
(C) the date that is up to 25 years from the date of original classification, as prescribed in section 1.5(b); or
(D) in the case of information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction, the marking prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant to this order; and
(5) a concise reason for classification that, at a minimum, cites the applicable classification categories in section 1.4 of this order.
(b) Specific information required in paragraph (a) of this section may be excluded if it would reveal additional classified information.
(c) With respect to each classified document, the agency originating the document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are unclassified. In accordance with standards prescribed in directives issued under this order, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may grant and revoke temporary waivers of this requirement. The Director shall revoke any waiver upon a finding of abuse.
(d) Markings or other indicia implementing the provisions of this order, including abbreviations and requirements to safeguard classified working papers, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.
(e) Foreign government information shall retain its original classification markings or shall be assigned a U.S. classification that provides a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Foreign government information retaining its original classification markings need not be assigned a U.S. classification marking provided that the responsible agency determines that the foreign government markings are adequate to meet the purposes served by U.S. classification markings.
(f) Information assigned a level of classification under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Whenever such information is used in the derivative classification process or is reviewed for possible declassification, holders of such information shall coordinate with an appropriate classification authority for the application of omitted markings.
(g) The classification authority shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.
(h) Prior to public release, all declassified records shall be appropriately marked to reflect their declassification.
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
(3) restrain competition; or
(4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security.
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security shall not be classified.
(c) Information may not be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority unless:
(1) the reclassification is personally approved in writing by the agency head based on a document-by-document determination by the agency that reclassification is required to prevent significant and demonstrable damage to the national security;
(2) the information may be reasonably recovered without bringing undue attention to the information;
(3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office; and
(4) for documents in the physical and legal custody of the National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives) that have been available for public use, the agency head has, after making the determinations required by this paragraph, notified the Archivist of the United States (Archivist), who shall suspend public access pending approval of the reclassification action by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed by the agency head to the President through the National Security Advisor. Public access shall remain suspended pending a prompt decision on the appeal.
(d) Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (
(e) Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that:
(1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and
(2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information.
(b) In accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency head or senior agency official shall establish procedures under which authorized holders of information, including authorized holders outside the classifying agency, are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of information that they believe is improperly classified or unclassified. These procedures shall ensure that:
(1) individuals are not subject to retribution for bringing such actions;
(2) an opportunity is provided for review by an impartial official or panel; and
(3) individuals are advised of their right to appeal agency decisions to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (Panel) established by section 5.3 of this order.
(c) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication review or other administrative process pursuant to an approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this section.
(b) The classification guidance review shall include an evaluation of classified information to determine if it meets the standards for classification under section 1.4 of this order, taking into account an up-to-date assessment of likely damage as described under section 1.2 of this order.
(c) The classification guidance review shall include original classification authorities and agency subject matter experts to ensure a broad range of perspectives.
(d) Agency heads shall provide a report summarizing the results of the classification guidance review to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and shall release an unclassified version of this report to the public.
PART 2—Derivative Classification
(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:
(1) be identified by name and position, or by personal identifier, in a manner that is immediately apparent for each derivative classification action;
(2) observe and respect original classification decisions; and
(3) carry forward to any newly created documents the pertinent classification markings. For information derivatively classified based on multiple sources, the derivative classifier shall carry forward:
(A) the date or event for declassification that corresponds to the longest period of classification among the sources, or the marking established pursuant to section 1.6(a)(4)(D) of this order; and
(B) a listing of the source materials.
(c) Derivative classifiers shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.
(d) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall receive training in the proper application of the derivative classification principles of the order, with an emphasis on avoiding over-classification, at least once every 2 years. Derivative classifiers who do not receive such training at least once every 2 years shall have their authority to apply derivative classification markings suspended until they have received such training. A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive such training due to unavoidable circumstances. Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.
(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:
(1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official; and
(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.
(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under this order.
(d) Agencies shall incorporate original classification decisions into classification guides on a timely basis and in accordance with directives issued under this order.
(e) Agencies may incorporate exemptions from automatic declassification approved pursuant to section 3.3(j) of this order into classification guides, provided that the Panel is notified of the intent to take such action for specific information in advance of approval and the information remains in active use.
(f) The duration of classification of a document classified by a derivative classifier using a classification guide shall not exceed 25 years from the date of the origin of the document, except for:
(1) information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction; and
(2) specific information incorporated into classification guides in accordance with section 2.2(e) of this order.
PART 3—Declassification and Downgrading
(b) Information shall be declassified or downgraded by:
(1) the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position and has original classification authority;
(2) the originator's current successor in function, if that individual has original classification authority;
(3) a supervisory official of either the originator or his or her successor in function, if the supervisory official has original classification authority; or (4) officials delegated declassification authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency official of the originating agency.
(c) The Director of National Intelligence (or, if delegated by the Director of National Intelligence, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence) may, with respect to the Intelligence Community, after consultation with the head of the originating Intelligence Community element or department, declassify, downgrade, or direct the declassification or downgrading of information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources, methods, or activities.
(d) It is presumed that information that continues to meet the classification requirements under this order requires continued protection. In some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified. When such questions arise, they shall be referred to the agency head or the senior agency official. That official will determine, as an exercise of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure. This provision does not:
(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or
(2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.
(e) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.
(f) The provisions of this section shall also apply to agencies that, under the terms of this order, do not have original classification authority, but had such authority under predecessor orders.
(g) No information may be excluded from declassification under section 3.3 of this order based solely on the type of document or record in which it is found. Rather, the classified information must be considered on the basis of its content.
(h) Classified nonrecord materials, including artifacts, shall be declassified as soon as they no longer meet the standards for classification under this order.
(i) When making decisions under sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 of this order, agencies shall consider the final decisions of the Panel.
(a) In the case of classified records transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order.
(b) In the case of classified records that are not officially transferred as described in paragraph (a) of this section, but that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of such records shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order. Such records may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession of the records after consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the records.
(c) Classified records accessioned into the National Archives shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist in accordance with this order, the directives issued pursuant to this order, agency declassification guides, and any existing procedural agreement between the Archivist and the relevant agency head.
(d) The originating agency shall take all reasonable steps to declassify classified information contained in records determined to have permanent historical value before they are accessioned into the National Archives. However, the Archivist may require that classified records be accessioned into the National Archives when necessary to comply with the provisions of the Federal Records Act. This provision does not apply to records transferred to the Archivist pursuant to
(e) To the extent practicable, agencies shall adopt a system of records management that will facilitate the public release of documents at the time such documents are declassified pursuant to the provisions for automatic declassification in section 3.3 of this order.
(a) Subject to paragraphs (b)–(d) and (g)–(j) of this section, all classified records that (1) are more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under
(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a) of this section specific information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to:
(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development;
(2) reveal information that would assist in the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state-of-the-art technology within a U.S. weapon system;
(5) reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans;
(6) reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
(7) reveal information that would impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;
(8) reveal information that would seriously impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, or infrastructures relating to the national security; or
(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit the automatic or unilateral declassification of information at 25 years.
(c)(1) An agency head shall notify the Panel of any specific file series of records for which a review or assessment has determined that the information within that file series almost invariably falls within one or more of the exemption categories listed in paragraph (b) of this section and that the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification at 25 years.
(2) The notification shall include:
(A) a description of the file series;
(B) an explanation of why the information within the file series is almost invariably exempt from automatic declassification and why the information must remain classified for a longer period of time; and
(C) except when the information within the file series almost invariably identifies a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction, a specific date or event for declassification of the information, not to exceed December 31 of the year that is 50 years from the date of origin of the records.
(3) The Panel may direct the agency not to exempt a designated file series or to declassify the information within that series at an earlier date than recommended. The agency head may appeal such a decision to the President through the National Security Advisor.
(4) File series exemptions approved by the President prior to December 31, 2008, shall remain valid without any additional agency action pending Panel review by the later of December 31, 2010, or December 31 of the year that is 10 years from the date of previous approval.
(d) The following provisions shall apply to the onset of automatic declassification:
(1) Classified records within an integral file block, as defined in this order, that are otherwise subject to automatic declassification under this section shall not be automatically declassified until December 31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of the most recent record within the file block.
(2) After consultation with the Director of the National Declassification Center (the Center) established by section 3.7 of this order and before the records are subject to automatic declassification, an agency head or senior agency official may delay automatic declassification for up to five additional years for classified information contained in media that make a review for possible declassification exemptions more difficult or costly.
(3) Other than for records that are properly exempted from automatic declassification, records containing classified information that originated with other agencies or the disclosure of which would affect the interests or activities of other agencies with respect to the classified information and could reasonably be expected to fall under one or more of the exemptions in paragraph (b) of this section shall be identified prior to the onset of automatic declassification for later referral to those agencies.
(A) The information of concern shall be referred by the Center established by section 3.7 of this order, or by the centralized facilities referred to in section 3.7(e) of this order, in a prioritized and scheduled manner determined by the Center.
(B) If an agency fails to provide a final determination on a referral made by the Center within 1 year of referral, or by the centralized facilities referred to in section 3.7(e) of this order within 3 years of referral, its equities in the referred records shall be automatically declassified.
(C) If any disagreement arises between affected agencies and the Center regarding the referral review period, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall determine the appropriate period of review of referred records.
(D) Referrals identified prior to the establishment of the Center by section 3.7 of this order shall be subject to automatic declassification only in accordance with subparagraphs (d)(3)(A)–(C) of this section.
(4) After consultation with the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, an agency head may delay automatic declassification for up to 3 years from the date of discovery of classified records that were inadvertently not reviewed prior to the effective date of automatic declassification.
(e) Information exempted from automatic declassification under this section shall remain subject to the mandatory and systematic declassification review provisions of this order.
(f) The Secretary of State shall determine when the United States should commence negotiations with the appropriate officials of a foreign government or international organization of governments to modify any treaty or international agreement that requires the classification of information contained in records affected by this section for a period longer than 25 years from the date of its creation, unless the treaty or international agreement pertains to information that may otherwise remain classified beyond 25 years under this section.
(g) The Secretary of Energy shall determine when information concerning foreign nuclear programs that was removed from the Restricted Data category in order to carry out provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, may be declassified. Unless otherwise determined, such information shall be declassified when comparable information concerning the United States nuclear program is declassified.
(h) Not later than 3 years from the effective date of this order, all records exempted from automatic declassification under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of a year that is no more than 50 years from the date of origin, subject to the following:
(1) Records that contain information the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the following are exempt from automatic declassification at 50 years:
(A) the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source; or
(B) key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction.
(2) In extraordinary cases, agency heads may, within 5 years of the onset of automatic declassification, propose to exempt additional specific information from declassification at 50 years.
(3) Records exempted from automatic declassification under this paragraph shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of a year that is no more than 75 years from the date of origin unless an agency head, within 5 years of that date, proposes to exempt specific information from declassification at 75 years and the proposal is formally approved by the Panel.
(i) Specific records exempted from automatic declassification prior to the establishment of the Center described in section 3.7 of this order shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph (h) of this section in a scheduled and prioritized manner determined by the Center.
(j) At least 1 year before information is subject to automatic declassification under this section, an agency head or senior agency official shall notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, serving as Executive Secretary of the Panel, of any specific information that the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification under paragraphs (b) and (h) of this section.
(1) The notification shall include:
(A) a detailed description of the information, either by reference to information in specific records or in the form of a declassification guide;
(B) an explanation of why the information should be exempt from automatic declassification and must remain classified for a longer period of time; and
(C) a specific date or a specific and independently verifiable event for automatic declassification of specific records that contain the information proposed for exemption.
(2) The Panel may direct the agency not to exempt the information or to declassify it at an earlier date than recommended. An agency head may appeal such a decision to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information will remain classified while such an appeal is pending.
(k) For information in a file series of records determined not to have permanent historical value, the duration of classification beyond 25 years shall be the same as the disposition (destruction) date of those records in each Agency Records Control Schedule or General Records Schedule, although the duration of classification shall be extended if the record has been retained for business reasons beyond the scheduled disposition date.
(a) Each agency that has originated classified information under this order or its predecessors shall establish and conduct a program for systematic declassification review for records of permanent historical value exempted from automatic declassification under section 3.3 of this order. Agencies shall prioritize their review of such records in accordance with priorities established by the Center.
(b) The Archivist shall conduct a systematic declassification review program for classified records:
(1) accessioned into the National Archives; (2) transferred to the Archivist pursuant to
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all information classified under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification by the originating agency if:
(1) the request for a review describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort;
(2) the document or material containing the information responsive to the request is not contained within an operational file exempted from search and review, publication, and disclosure under
(3) the information is not the subject of pending litigation.
(b) Information originated by the incumbent President or the incumbent Vice President; the incumbent President's White House Staff or the incumbent Vice President's Staff; committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the incumbent President; or other entities within the Executive Office of the President that solely advise and assist the incumbent President is exempted from the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section. However, the Archivist shall have the authority to review, downgrade, and declassify papers or records of former Presidents and Vice Presidents under the control of the Archivist pursuant to
(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declassify information that no longer meets the standards for classification under this order. They shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise authorized and warranted under applicable law.
(d) If an agency has reviewed the requested information for declassification within the past 2 years, the agency need not conduct another review and may instead inform the requester of this fact and the prior review decision and advise the requester of appeal rights provided under subsection (e) of this section.
(e) In accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order, agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They also shall provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request, and for notifying the requester of the right to appeal a final agency decision to the Panel.
(f) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review of cryptologic information; the Director of National Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and activities; and the Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National Archives.
(g) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication review or other administrative process pursuant to an approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this section.
(h) This section shall not apply to any request for a review made to an element of the Intelligence Community that is made by a person other than an individual as that term is defined by
(a) An agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its predecessors.
(b) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that contain classified information that originated with other agencies or the disclosure of which would affect the interests or activities of other agencies with respect to the classified information, or identifies such documents in the process of implementing sections 3.3 or 3.4 of this order, it shall refer copies of any request and the pertinent documents to the originating agency for processing and may, after consultation with the originating agency, inform any requester of the referral unless such association is itself classified under this order or its predecessors. In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response under paragraph (a) of this section is required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that paragraph.
(c) Agencies may extend the classification of information in records determined not to have permanent historical value or nonrecord materials, including artifacts, beyond the time frames established in sections 1.5(b) and 2.2(f) of this order, provided:
(1) the specific information has been approved pursuant to section 3.3(j) of this order for exemption from automatic declassification; and
(2) the extension does not exceed the date established in section 3.3(j) of this order.
(b) Under the administration of the Director, the Center shall coordinate:
(1) timely and appropriate processing of referrals in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order for accessioned Federal records and transferred presidential records.
(2) general interagency declassification activities necessary to fulfill the requirements of sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this order;
(3) the exchange among agencies of detailed declassification guidance to enable the referral of records in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order;
(4) the development of effective, transparent, and standard declassification work processes, training, and quality assurance measures;
(5) the development of solutions to declassification challenges posed by electronic records, special media, and emerging technologies;
(6) the linkage and effective utilization of existing agency databases and the use of new technologies to document and make public declassification review decisions and support declassification activities under the purview of the Center; and
(7) storage and related services, on a reimbursable basis, for Federal records containing classified national security information.
(c) Agency heads shall fully cooperate with the Archivist in the activities of the Center and shall:
(1) provide the Director with adequate and current declassification guidance to enable the referral of records in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order; and
(2) upon request of the Archivist, assign agency personnel to the Center who shall be delegated authority by the agency head to review and exempt or declassify information originated by their agency contained in records accessioned into the National Archives, after consultation with subject-matter experts as necessary.
(d) The Archivist, in consultation with representatives of the participants in the Center and after input from the general public, shall develop priorities for declassification activities under the purview of the Center that take into account the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood of declassification.
(e) Agency heads may establish such centralized facilities and internal operations to conduct internal declassification reviews as appropriate to achieve optimized records management and declassification business processes. Once established, all referral processing of accessioned records shall take place at the Center, and such agency facilities and operations shall be coordinated with the Center to ensure the maximum degree of consistency in policies and procedures that relate to records determined to have permanent historical value.
(f) Agency heads may exempt from automatic declassification or continue the classification of their own originally classified information under section 3.3(a) of this order except that in the case of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall also retain such authority with respect to the Intelligence Community.
(g) The Archivist shall, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, provide the National Security Advisor with a detailed concept of operations for the Center and a proposed implementing directive under section 5.1 of this order that reflects the coordinated views of the aforementioned agencies.
PART 4—Safeguarding
(a) A person may have access to classified information provided that:
(1) a favorable determination of eligibility for access has been made by an agency head or the agency head's designee;
(2) the person has signed an approved nondisclosure agreement; and
(3) the person has a need-to-know the information.
(b) Every person who has met the standards for access to classified information in paragraph (a) of this section shall receive contemporaneous training on the proper safeguarding of classified information and on the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be imposed on an individual who fails to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.
(c) An official or employee leaving agency service may not remove classified information from the agency's control or direct that information be declassified in order to remove it from agency control.
(d) Classified information may not be removed from official premises without proper authorization.
(e) Persons authorized to disseminate classified information outside the executive branch shall ensure the protection of the information in a manner equivalent to that provided within the executive branch.
(f) Consistent with law, executive orders, directives, and regulations, an agency head or senior agency official or, with respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish uniform procedures to ensure that automated information systems, including networks and telecommunications systems, that collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, or store classified information:
(1) prevent access by unauthorized persons;
(2) ensure the integrity of the information; and
(3) to the maximum extent practicable, use:
(A) common information technology standards, protocols, and interfaces that maximize the availability of, and access to, the information in a form and manner that facilitates its authorized use; and
(B) standardized electronic formats to maximize the accessibility of information to persons who meet the criteria set forth in section 4.1(a) of this order.
(g) Consistent with law, executive orders, directives, and regulations, each agency head or senior agency official, or with respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish controls to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed under conditions that provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.
(h) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency shall safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization of governments that furnished the information. When adequate to achieve equivalency, these standards may be less restrictive than the safeguarding standards that ordinarily apply to U.S. "Confidential" information, including modified handling and transmission and allowing access to individuals with a need-to-know who have not otherwise been cleared for access to classified information or executed an approved nondisclosure agreement.
(i)(1) Classified information originating in one agency may be disseminated to another agency or U.S. entity by any agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency, as long as the criteria for access under section 4.1(a) of this order are met, unless the originating agency has determined that prior authorization is required for such dissemination and has marked or indicated such requirement on the medium containing the classified information in accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.
(2) Classified information originating in one agency may be disseminated by any other agency to which it has been made available to a foreign government in accordance with statute, this order, directives implementing this order, direction of the President, or with the consent of the originating agency. For the purposes of this section, "foreign government" includes any element of a foreign government, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof.
(3) Documents created prior to the effective date of this order shall not be disseminated outside any other agency to which they have been made available without the consent of the originating agency. An agency head or senior agency official may waive this requirement for specific information that originated within that agency.
(4) For purposes of this section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency, except that any dissemination of information regarding intelligence sources, methods, or activities shall be consistent with directives issued pursuant to section 6.2(b) of this order.
(5) Prior consent of the originating agency is not required when referring records for declassification review that contain information originating in more than one agency.
(a) The head of each agency shall establish procedures in accordance with applicable law and consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order to ensure that classified information is accessible to the maximum extent possible by individuals who meet the criteria set forth in section 4.1(a) of this order.
(b) In an emergency, when necessary to respond to an imminent threat to life or in defense of the homeland, the agency head or any designee may authorize the disclosure of classified information (including information marked pursuant to section 4.1(i)(1) of this order) to an individual or individuals who are otherwise not eligible for access. Such actions shall be taken only in accordance with directives implementing this order and any procedure issued by agencies governing the classified information, which shall be designed to minimize the classified information that is disclosed under these circumstances and the number of individuals who receive it. Information disclosed under this provision or implementing directives and procedures shall not be deemed declassified as a result of such disclosure or subsequent use by a recipient. Such disclosures shall be reported promptly to the originator of the classified information. For purposes of this section, the Director of National Intelligence may issue an implementing directive governing the emergency disclosure of classified intelligence information.
(c) Each agency shall update, at least annually, the automatic, routine, or recurring distribution mechanism for classified information that it distributes. Recipients shall cooperate fully with distributors who are updating distribution lists and shall notify distributors whenever a relevant change in status occurs.
(1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional; and
(2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.
(b) Requirements and limitations.
(1) Special access programs shall be limited to programs in which the number of persons who ordinarily will have access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the information involved.
(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order.
(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the oversight program established under section 5.4(d) of this order. In addition, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded access to these programs, in accordance with the security requirements of each program, in order to perform the functions assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office under this order. An agency head may limit access to a special access program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and no more than one other employee of the Information Security Oversight Office or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and vulnerable, to the Director only.
(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review annually each special access program to determine whether it continues to meet the requirements of this order.
(5) Upon request, an agency head shall brief the National Security Advisor, or a designee, on any or all of the agency's special access programs.
(6) For the purposes of this section, the term "agency head" refers only to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each.
(c) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under
(a) The requirement in section 4.1(a)(3) of this order that access to classified information may be granted only to individuals who have a need-to-know the information may be waived for persons who:
(1) are engaged in historical research projects;
(2) previously have occupied senior policy-making positions to which they were appointed or designated by the President or the Vice President; or
(3) served as President or Vice President.
(b) Waivers under this section may be granted only if the agency head or senior agency official of the originating agency:
(1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of the national security;
(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this order; and
(3) limits the access granted to former Presidential appointees or designees and Vice Presidential appointees or designees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a Presidential or Vice Presidential appointee or designee.
PART 5—Implementation and Review
(1) classification, declassification, and marking principles;
(2) safeguarding classified information, which shall pertain to the handling, storage, distribution, transmittal, and destruction of and accounting for classified information;
(3) agency security education and training programs;
(4) agency self-inspection programs; and
(5) classification and declassification guides.
(b) The Archivist shall delegate the implementation and monitoring functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.
(c) The Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, may issue directives to implement this order with respect to the protection of intelligence sources, methods, and activities. Such directives shall be consistent with this order and directives issued under paragraph (a) of this section.
(b) Under the direction of the Archivist, acting in consultation with the National Security Advisor, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall:
(1) develop directives for the implementation of this order;
(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this order and its implementing directives;
(3) review and approve agency implementing regulations prior to their issuance to ensure their consistency with this order and directives issued under section 5.1(a) of this order;
(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of each agency's program established under this order, and to require of each agency those reports and information and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. If granting access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior agency official shall submit a written justification recommending the denial of access to the President through the National Security Advisor within 60 days of the request for access. Access shall be denied pending the response;
(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend Presidential approval through the National Security Advisor;
(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the program established under this order;
(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standardization of forms or procedures that will promote the implementation of the program established under this order;
(8) report at least annually to the President on the implementation of this order; and
(9) convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the program established by this order.
(a) Establishment and administration.
(1) There is established an Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the National Archives, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Advisor shall each be represented by a senior-level representative who is a full-time or permanent part-time Federal officer or employee designated to serve as a member of the Panel by the respective agency head. The President shall designate a Chair from among the members of the Panel.
(2) Additionally, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may appoint a temporary representative who meets the criteria in paragraph (a)(1) of this section to participate as a voting member in all Panel deliberations and associated support activities concerning classified information originated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) A vacancy on the Panel shall be filled as quickly as possible as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(4) The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Panel. The staff of the Information Security Oversight Office shall provide program and administrative support for the Panel.
(5) The members and staff of the Panel shall be required to meet eligibility for access standards in order to fulfill the Panel's functions.
(6) The Panel shall meet at the call of the Chair. The Chair shall schedule meetings as may be necessary for the Panel to fulfill its functions in a timely manner.
(7) The Information Security Oversight Office shall include in its reports to the President a summary of the Panel's activities.
(b) Functions. The Panel shall:
(1) decide on appeals by persons who have filed classification challenges under section 1.8 of this order;
(2) approve, deny, or amend agency exemptions from automatic declassification as provided in section 3.3 of this order;
(3) decide on appeals by persons or entities who have filed requests for mandatory declassification review under section 3.5 of this order; and
(4) appropriately inform senior agency officials and the public of final Panel decisions on appeals under sections 1.8 and 3.5 of this order.
(c) Rules and procedures. The Panel shall issue bylaws, which shall be published in the Federal Register. The bylaws shall establish the rules and procedures that the Panel will follow in accepting, considering, and issuing decisions on appeals. The rules and procedures of the Panel shall provide that the Panel will consider appeals only on actions in which:
(1) the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies within the responsible agency;
(2) there is no current action pending on the issue within the Federal courts; and
(3) the information has not been the subject of review by the Federal courts or the Panel within the past 2 years.
(d) Agency heads shall cooperate fully with the Panel so that it can fulfill its functions in a timely and fully informed manner. The Panel shall report to the President through the National Security Advisor any instance in which it believes that an agency head is not cooperating fully with the Panel.
(e) The Panel is established for the sole purpose of advising and assisting the President in the discharge of his constitutional and discretionary authority to protect the national security of the United States. Panel decisions are committed to the discretion of the Panel, unless changed by the President.
(f) An agency head may appeal a decision of the Panel to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information shall remain classified pending a decision on the appeal.
(a) demonstrate personal commitment and commit senior management to the successful implementation of the program established under this order;
(b) commit necessary resources to the effective implementation of the program established under this order;
(c) ensure that agency records systems are designed and maintained to optimize the appropriate sharing and safeguarding of classified information, and to facilitate its declassification under the terms of this order when it no longer meets the standards for continued classification; and
(d) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer the program, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) overseeing the agency's program established under this order, provided an agency head may designate a separate official to oversee special access programs authorized under this order. This official shall provide a full accounting of the agency's special access programs at least annually;
(2) promulgating implementing regulations, which shall be published in the Federal Register to the extent that they affect members of the public;
(3) establishing and maintaining security education and training programs;
(4) establishing and maintaining an ongoing self-inspection program, which shall include the regular reviews of representative samples of the agency's original and derivative classification actions, and shall authorize appropriate agency officials to correct misclassification actions not covered by sections 1.7(c) and 1.7(d) of this order; and reporting annually to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office on the agency's self-inspection program;
(5) establishing procedures consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that:
(A) require that a need for access to classified information be established before initiating administrative clearance procedures; and
(B) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information meets the mission needs of the agency while also satisfying operational and security requirements and needs;
(6) developing special contingency plans for the safeguarding of classified information used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas;
(7) ensuring that the performance contract or other system used to rate civilian or military personnel performance includes the designation and management of classified information as a critical element or item to be evaluated in the rating of:
(A) original classification authorities;
(B) security managers or security specialists; and
(C) all other personnel whose duties significantly involve the creation or handling of classified information, including personnel who regularly apply derivative classification markings;
(8) accounting for the costs associated with the implementation of this order, which shall be reported to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office for publication;
(9) assigning in a prompt manner agency personnel to respond to any request, appeal, challenge, complaint, or suggestion arising out of this order that pertains to classified information that originated in a component of the agency that no longer exists and for which there is no clear successor in function; and
(10) establishing a secure capability to receive information, allegations, or complaints regarding over-classification or incorrect classification within the agency and to provide guidance to personnel on proper classification as needed.
(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contractors, licensees, certificate holders, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they knowingly, willfully, or negligently:
(1) disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under this order or predecessor orders;
(2) classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this order or any implementing directive;
(3) create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order; or
(4) contravene any other provision of this order or its implementing directives.
(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.
(d) The agency head, senior agency official, or other supervisory official shall, at a minimum, promptly remove the classification authority of any individual who demonstrates reckless disregard or a pattern of error in applying the classification standards of this order.
(e) The agency head or senior agency official shall:
(1) take appropriate and prompt corrective action when a violation or infraction under paragraph (b) of this section occurs; and
(2) notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office when a violation under paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section occurs.
PART 6—General Provisions
(a) "Access" means the ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of classified information.
(b) "Agency" means any "Executive agency," as defined in
(c) "Authorized holder" of classified information means anyone who satisfies the conditions for access stated in section 4.1(a) of this order.
(d) "Automated information system" means an assembly of computer hardware, software, or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store, or control data or information.
(e) "Automatic declassification" means the declassification of information based solely upon:
(1) the occurrence of a specific date or event as determined by the original classification authority; or
(2) the expiration of a maximum time frame for duration of classification established under this order.
(f) "Classification" means the act or process by which information is determined to be classified information.
(g) "Classification guidance" means any instruction or source that prescribes the classification of specific information.
(h) "Classification guide" means a documentary form of classification guidance issued by an original classification authority that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element.
(i) "Classified national security information" or "classified information" means information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.
(j) "Compilation" means an aggregation of preexisting unclassified items of information.
(k) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation that the information or relationship, or both, are to be held in confidence.
(l) "Damage to the national security" means harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration such aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that information.
(m) "Declassification" means the authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information.
(n) "Declassification guide" means written instructions issued by a declassification authority that describes the elements of information regarding a specific subject that may be declassified and the elements that must remain classified.
(o) "Derivative classification" means the incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on classification guidance. The duplication or reproduction of existing classified information is not derivative classification.
(p) "Document" means any recorded information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the method or circumstances of recording.
(q) "Downgrading" means a determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.
(r) "File series" means file units or documents arranged according to a filing system or kept together because they relate to a particular subject or function, result from the same activity, document a specific kind of transaction, take a particular physical form, or have some other relationship arising out of their creation, receipt, or use, such as restrictions on access or use.
(s) "Foreign government information" means:
(1) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, with the expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence;
(2) information produced by the United States Government pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or
(3) information received and treated as "foreign government information" under the terms of a predecessor order.
(t) "Information" means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.
(u) "Infraction" means any knowing, willful, or negligent action contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives that does not constitute a "violation," as defined below.
(v) "Integral file block" means a distinct component of a file series, as defined in this section, that should be maintained as a separate unit in order to ensure the integrity of the records. An integral file block may consist of a set of records covering either a specific topic or a range of time, such as a Presidential administration or a 5-year retirement schedule within a specific file series that is retired from active use as a group. For purposes of automatic declassification, integral file blocks shall contain only records dated within 10 years of the oldest record in the file block.
(w) "Integrity" means the state that exists when information is unchanged from its source and has not been accidentally or intentionally modified, altered, or destroyed.
(x) "Intelligence" includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as defined by Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended, or by a successor order.
(y) "Intelligence activities" means all activities that elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to law or Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a successor order.
(z) "Intelligence Community" means an element or agency of the U.S. Government identified in or designated pursuant to section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, or section 3.5(h) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.
(aa) "Mandatory declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information in response to a request for declassification that meets the requirements under section 3.5 of this order.
(bb) "Multiple sources" means two or more source documents, classification guides, or a combination of both.
(cc) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.
(dd) "Need-to-know" means a determination within the executive branch in accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.
(ee) "Network" means a system of two or more computers that can exchange data or information.
(ff) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of the national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure.
(gg) "Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.
(hh) "Records" means the records of an agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as those terms are defined in
(ii) "Records having permanent historical value" means Presidential papers or Presidential records and the records of an agency that the Archivist has determined should be maintained permanently in accordance with
(jj) "Records management" means the planning, controlling, directing, organizing, training, promoting, and other managerial activities involved with respect to records creation, records maintenance and use, and records disposition in order to achieve adequate and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal Government and effective and economical management of agency operations.
(kk) "Safeguarding" means measures and controls that are prescribed to protect classified information.
(ll) "Self-inspection" means the internal review and evaluation of individual agency activities and the agency as a whole with respect to the implementation of the program established under this order and its implementing directives.
(mm) "Senior agency official" means the official designated by the agency head under section 5.4(d) of this order to direct and administer the agency's program under which information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified.
(nn) "Source document" means an existing document that contains classified information that is incorporated, paraphrased, restated, or generated in new form into a new document.
(oo) "Special access program" means a program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level.
(pp) "Systematic declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information contained in records that have been determined by the Archivist to have permanent historical value in accordance with
(qq) "Telecommunications" means the preparation, transmission, or communication of information by electronic means.
(rr) "Unauthorized disclosure" means a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.
(ss) "U.S. entity" includes:
(1) State, local, or tribal governments;
(2) State, local, and tribal law enforcement and firefighting entities;
(3) public health and medical entities;
(4) regional, state, local, and tribal emergency management entities, including State Adjutants General and other appropriate public safety entities; or
(5) private sector entities serving as part of the nation's Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.
(tt) "Violation" means:
(1) any knowing, willful, or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
(2) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to classify or continue the classification of information contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives; or
(3) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order.
(uu) "Weapons of mass destruction" means any weapon of mass destruction as defined in
(b) The Director of National Intelligence may, with respect to the Intelligence Community and after consultation with the heads of affected departments and agencies, issue such policy directives and guidelines as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order with respect to the classification and declassification of all intelligence and intelligence-related information, and for access to and dissemination of all intelligence and intelligence-related information, both in its final form and in the form when initially gathered. Procedures or other guidance issued by Intelligence Community element heads shall be in accordance with such policy directives or guidelines issued by the Director of National Intelligence. Any such policy directives or guidelines issued by the Director of National Intelligence shall be in accordance with directives issued by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office under section 5.1(a) of this order.
(c) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.
(d) Nothing in this order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law, including the Constitution, Freedom of Information Act exemptions, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This order is not intended to and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. The foregoing is in addition to the specific provisos set forth in sections 1.1(b), 3.1(c) and 5.3(e) of this order.
(e) Nothing in this order shall be construed to obligate action or otherwise affect functions by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(f) This order shall be implemented subject to the availability of appropriations.
(g) Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, and amendments thereto, including Executive Order 13292 of March 25, 2003, are hereby revoked as of the effective date of this order.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13549. Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities
Ex. Ord. No. 13549, Aug. 18, 2010, 75 F.R. 51609, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to ensure the proper safeguarding of information shared with State, local, tribal, and private sector entities, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) Eligibility for access to classified information by SLTPS personnel shall be determined by a sponsoring agency. The level of access granted shall not exceed the Secret level, unless the sponsoring agency determines on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has a demonstrated and foreseeable need for access to Top Secret, Special Access Program, or Sensitive Compartmented Information.
(b) Upon the execution of a non-disclosure agreement prescribed by the Information Security Oversight Office or the Director of National Intelligence, and absent disqualifying conduct as determined by the clearance granting official, a duly elected or appointed Governor of a State or territory, or an official who has succeeded to that office under applicable law, may be granted access to classified information without a background investigation in accordance with the implementing directive for this order. This authorization of access may not be further delegated by the Governor to any other person.
(c) All clearances granted to SLTPS personnel, as well as accreditations granted to SLTPS facilities without a waiver, shall be accepted reciprocally by all agencies and SLTPS entities.
(d) Physical custody of classified information by State, local, and tribal (SLT) entities shall be limited to Secret information unless the location housing the information is under the full-time management, control, and operation of the Department of Homeland Security or another agency. A standard security agreement, established by the Department of Homeland Security in consultation with the SLTPS Advisory Committee, shall be executed between the head of the SLT entity and the U.S. Government for those locations where the SLT entity will maintain physical custody of classified information.
(e) State, local, and tribal facilities where classified information is or will be used or stored shall be inspected, accredited, and monitored for compliance with established standards, in accordance with Executive Order 13526 and the implementing directive for this order, by the Department of Homeland Security or another agency that has entered into an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security to perform such inspection, accreditation, and monitoring.
(f) Private sector facilities where classified information is or will be used or stored shall be inspected, accredited, and monitored for compliance with standards established pursuant to Executive Order 12829, as amended, by the Department of Defense or the cognizant security agency under Executive Order 12829, as amended.
(g) Access to information systems that store, process, or transmit classified information shall be enforced by the rules established by the agency that controls the system and consistent with approved dissemination and handling markings applied by originators, separate from and in addition to criteria for determining eligibility for access to classified information. Access to information within restricted portals shall be based on criteria applied by the agency that controls the portal and consistent with approved dissemination and handling markings applied by originators.
(h) The National Industrial Security Program established in Executive Order 12829, as amended, shall govern the access to and safeguarding of classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of SLT entities.
(i) All access eligibility determinations and facility security accreditations granted prior to the date of this order that do not meet the standards set forth in this order or its implementing directive shall be reconciled with those standards within a reasonable period.
(j) Pursuant to section 4.1(i)(3) of Executive Order 13526, documents created prior to the effective date of Executive Order 13526 shall not be re-disseminated to other entities without the consent of the originating agency. An agency head or senior agency official may waive this requirement for specific information that originated within that agency.
(b) Members of the Committee shall serve without compensation for their work on the Committee, except that any representatives of SLTPS entities may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (
(c) The Information Security Oversight Office shall provide staff support to the Committee.
(d) Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended ([former] 5 App. U.S.C.) [see
(1) overall program management and oversight;
(2) accreditation, periodic inspection, and monitoring of all facilities owned or operated by SLT entities that have access to classified information, except when another agency has entered into an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security to perform some or all of these functions;
(3) processing of security clearance applications by SLTPS personnel, when requested by a sponsoring agency, on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise determined by the Department of Homeland Security and the sponsoring agency;
(4) documenting and tracking the final status of security clearances for all SLTPS personnel in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
(5) developing and maintaining a security profile of SLT facilities that have access to classified information; and
(6) developing training, in consultation with the Committee, for all SLTPS personnel who have been determined eligible for access to classified information, which shall cover the proper safeguarding of classified information and sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
(b) The Secretary of Defense, or the cognizant security agency under Executive Order 12829, as amended, shall provide program management, oversight, inspection, accreditation, and monitoring of all private sector facilities that have access to classified information.
(c) The Director of National Intelligence may inspect and monitor SLTPS programs and facilities that involve access to information regarding intelligence sources, methods, and activities.
(d) Heads of agencies that sponsor SLTPS personnel and facilities for access to and storage of classified information under section 1.3(a) of this order shall:
(1) ensure on a periodic basis that there is a demonstrated, foreseeable need for such access; and
(2) provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with information, as requested by the Secretary, about SLTPS personnel sponsored for security clearances and SLT facilities approved for use of classified information prior to and after the date of this order, except when the disclosure of the association of a specific individual with an intelligence or law enforcement agency must be protected in the interest of national security, as determined by the intelligence or law enforcement agency.
(a) "Access" means the ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of classified information.
(b) "Agency" means any "Executive agency" as defined in
(c) "Classified National Security Information" or "classified information" means information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 13526, or any predecessor or successor order, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure, and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.
(d) "Information" means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.
(e) "Intelligence activities" means all activities that elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to law or Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a successor order.
(f) "Local" entities refers to "(A) a county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; and (B) a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity" as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (
(g) "Private sector" means persons outside government who are critically involved in ensuring that public and private preparedness and response efforts are integrated as part of the Nation's Critical Infrastructure or Key Resources (CIKR), including:
(1) corporate owners and operators determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security to be part of the CIKR;
(2) subject matter experts selected to assist the Federal or State CIKR;
(3) personnel serving in specific leadership positions of CIKR coordination, operations, and oversight;
(4) employees of corporate entities relating to the protection of CIKR; or
(5) other persons not otherwise eligible for the granting of a personnel security clearance pursuant to Executive Order 12829, as amended, who are determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security to require a personnel security clearance.
(h) "Restricted portal" means a protected community of interest or similar area housed within an information system and to which access is controlled by a host agency different from the agency that controls the information system.
(i) "Sponsoring Agency" means an agency that recommends access to or possession of classified information by SLTPS personnel.
(j) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States, as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (
(k) "State, local, and tribal personnel" means any of the following persons:
(1) Governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and other elected or appointed officials of a State, local government, or tribe;
(2) State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel and firefighters;
(3) public health, radiological health, and medical professionals of a State, local government, or tribe; and
(4) regional, State, local, and tribal emergency management agency personnel, including State Adjutants General and other appropriate public safety personnel and those personnel providing support to a Federal CIKR mission.
(l) "Tribe" means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe as defined in the Federally Recognized [Indian] Tribe List Act of 1994 (
(m) "United States" when used in a geographic sense, means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, any possession of the United States and any waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede or change the authorities of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (
(c) Nothing in this order shall limit the authority of an agency head, or the agency head's designee, to authorize in an emergency and when necessary to respond to an imminent threat to life or in defense of the homeland, in accordance with section 4.2(b) of Executive Order 13526, the disclosure of classified information to an individual or individuals who are otherwise not eligible for access in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12968.
(d) Consistent with section 892(a)(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (
(e) Nothing in this order shall supersede measures established under the authority of law or Executive Order to protect the security and integrity of specific activities and associations that are in direct support of intelligence operations.
(f) Pursuant to section 892(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (
(g) Nothing in this order limits the protection afforded any classified information by other provisions of law. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(h) Nothing in this order shall be construed to obligate action or otherwise affect functions by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(i) This order shall be implemented subject to the availability of appropriations and consistent with procedures approved by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as amended.
Barack Obama.
Extension of Term of State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee
Term of State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee extended until Sept. 30, 2025, by Ex. Ord. No. 14109, Sept. 29, 2023, 88 F.R. 68447, set out as a note under
Previous extensions of term of State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee were contained in the following prior Executive Orders:
Ex. Ord. No. 14048, Sept. 30, 2021, 86 F.R. 55465, extended term until Sept. 30, 2023.
Ex. Ord. No. 13889, Sept. 27, 2019, 84 F.R. 52743, extended term until Sept. 30, 2021.
Ex. Ord. No. 13811, Sept. 29, 2017, 82 F.R. 46363, extended term until Sept. 30, 2019.
Ex. Ord. No. 13708, Sept. 30, 2015, 80 F.R. 60271, extended term until Sept. 30, 2017.
Ex. Ord. No. 13652, Sept. 30, 2013, 78 F.R. 61817, extended term until Sept. 30, 2015.
Ex. Ord. No. 13591, Nov. 23, 2011, 76 F.R. 74623, extended term until Sept. 30, 2013.
Ex. Ord. No. 13587. Structural Reforms To Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information
Ex. Ord. No. 13587, Oct. 7, 2011, 76 F.R. 63811, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to ensure the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information (classified information) on computer networks, it is hereby ordered as follows:
This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.
(a) designate a senior official to be charged with overseeing classified information sharing and safeguarding efforts for the agency;
(b) implement an insider threat detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and standards developed by the Insider Threat Task Force established in section 6 of this order;
(c) perform self-assessments of compliance with policies and standards issued pursuant to sections 3.3, 5.2, and 6.3 of this order, as well as other applicable policies and standards, the results of which shall be reported annually to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee established in section 3 of this order;
(d) provide information and access, as warranted and consistent with law and section 7(d) of this order, to enable independent assessments by the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force of compliance with relevant established policies and standards; and
(e) detail or assign staff as appropriate and necessary to the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office and the Insider Threat Task Force on an ongoing basis.
(a) establishing Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals and annually reviewing executive branch successes and shortcomings in achieving those goals;
(b) preparing within 90 days of the date of this order and at least annually thereafter, a report for the President assessing the executive branch's successes and shortcomings in sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks and discussing potential future vulnerabilities;
(c) developing program and budget recommendations to achieve Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals;
(d) coordinating the interagency development and implementation of priorities, policies, and standards for sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks;
(e) recommending overarching policies, when appropriate, for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO;
(f) coordinating efforts by agencies, the Executive Agent, and the Task Force to assess compliance with established policies and standards and recommending corrective actions needed to ensure compliance;
(g) providing overall mission guidance for the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM–ISE) with respect to the functions to be performed by the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office established in section 4 of this order; and
(h) referring policy and compliance issues that cannot be resolved by the Steering Committee to the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive/PPD–1 of February 13, 2009 (Organization of the National Security Council System).
(a) providing staff support for the Steering Committee;
(b) advising the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force on the development of an effective program to monitor compliance with established policies and standards needed to achieve classified information sharing and safeguarding goals; and
(c) consulting with the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the ISOO, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and others, as appropriate, to ensure consistency with policies and standards under Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, Executive Order 12829 of January 6, 1993, as amended, Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, and Executive Order 13556 of November 4, 2010.
(a) developing effective technical safeguarding policies and standards in coordination with the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), as re-designated by Executive Orders 13286 of February 28, 2003, and 13231 of October 16, 2001, that address the safeguarding of classified information within national security systems, as well as the safeguarding of national security systems themselves;
(b) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the Executive Agent's timely development and issuance of technical policies and standards;
(c) reporting at least annually to the Steering Committee on the work of CNSS, including recommendations for any changes needed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of that work; and
(d) conducting independent assessments of agency compliance with established safeguarding policies and standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee.
(a) developing, in coordination with the Executive Agent, a Government-wide policy for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider threats, which shall be submitted to the Steering Committee for appropriate review;
(b) in coordination with appropriate agencies, developing minimum standards and guidance for implementation of the insider threat program's Government-wide policy and, within 1 year of the date of this order, issuing those minimum standards and guidance, which shall be binding on the executive branch;
(c) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are obtained, continuing in coordination with appropriate agencies after 1 year from the date of this order to add to or modify those minimum standards and guidance, as appropriate;
(d) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are not obtained, recommending for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO any additional or modified minimum standards and guidance developed more than 1 year after the date of this order;
(e) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the timely development and issuance of minimum standards;
(f) conducting, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Task Force, independent assessments of the adequacy of agency programs to implement established policies and minimum standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee;
(g) providing assistance to agencies, as requested, including through the dissemination of best practices; and
(h) providing analysis of new and continuing insider threat challenges facing the United States Government.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to change the requirements of Executive Orders 12333 of December 4, 1981, 12829 of January 6, 1993, 12968 of August 2, 1995, 13388 of October 25, 2005, 13467 of June 30, 2008, 13526 of December 29, 2009, 13549 of August 18, 2010, and their successor orders and directives.
(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede or change the authorities of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Secretary of Defense under Executive Order 12829, as amended; the Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order 13549; the Secretary of State under
(d) Nothing in this order shall authorize the Steering Committee, CISSO, CNSS, or the Task Force to examine the facilities or systems of other agencies, without advance consultation with the head of such agency, nor to collect information for any purpose not provided herein.
(e) The entities created and the activities directed by this order shall not seek to deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of information by Government employees or contractors that are lawful under and protected by the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of 1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or policies.
(f) With respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies, may issue such policy directives and guidance as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order.
(g) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(1) the authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or
(2) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(h) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(i) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
[Reference to the National Security Staff deemed to be a reference to the National Security Council staff, see Ex. Ord. No. 13657, set out as a note under
Ex. Ord. No. 14040. Declassification Reviews of Certain Documents Concerning the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Ex. Ord. No. 14040, Sept. 3, 2021, 86 F.R. 50439, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:
(a) not later than September 11, 2021, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) electronic communication dated April 4, 2016, from the subfile investigation described in chapter V of the 2015 Report of the Congressionally-directed 9/11 Review Commission to the Director of the FBI (subfile investigation), which was identified but withheld in full during discovery in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, MDL No. 03–1570 (S.D.N.Y.);
(b) not later than 60 days after the date of this order [Sept. 3, 2021], of:
(i) all other records that previously were withheld as classified, in full or in part, during discovery in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001; and
(ii) the 2021 FBI electronic communication closing the subfile investigation;
(c) not later than 120 days after the date of this order, of all interview reports, analytical documents, documents reporting investigative findings, or other substantive records (including phone records and banking records, if any) from the FBI's initial investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks—known as the Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings (PENTTBOM) investigation—that reference the individual subjects of the subfile investigation and may be found through search terms, keyword identifiers, and other diligent means; and
(d) not later than 180 days after the date of this order, of all records from any separate FBI investigation other than the PENTTBOM investigation or the subfile investigation of any individual subjects of the subfile investigation that are relevant to the 9/11 terrorist attacks or to any of the individual subjects' connection to an agency relationship with a foreign government.
(b) Even when information requires continued protection in the interest of the national security, the Attorney General or the head of any other agency that originated the information, as the case may be, should determine, as an exercise of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure of the information outweighs the damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure.
(c) Upon the completion of the declassification reviews under section 2 of this order, the Attorney General and the heads of any other agencies that originated relevant information shall ensure that, as to all information subject to such reviews but not declassified pursuant to such reviews:
(i) such information meets the requirements for classification, in accordance with Executive Order 13526;
(ii) all non-classified information is disentangled from any classified information and, to the extent practicable, made available to the public under section 5 of this order; and
(iii) all information is nonetheless declassified, in accordance with section 3.1 of Executive Order 13526, or any successor order, when the Attorney General or the head of any other agency that originated the information, as the case may be, determines that the United States Government's interest in classification is outweighed by the public's interest in disclosure.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including the Privacy Act [
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
J.R. Biden, Jr.
Implementation of the Executive Order, "Classified National Security Information"
Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 733, provided:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Today I have signed an executive order [Ex. Ord. No. 13526, set out above] entitled, "Classified National Security Information" (the "order"), which substantially advances my goals for reforming the security classification and declassification processes. I expect that the order will produce measurable progress towards greater openness and transparency in the Government's classification and declassification programs while protecting the Government's legitimate interests, and I will closely monitor the results. I also look forward to reviewing recommendations from the study that the National Security Advisor will undertake in cooperation with the Public Interest Declassification Board to design a more fundamental transformation of the security classification system. To further assist in fulfilling the goal of measurable progress toward greater openness and transparency, I hereby direct the following actions.
1. Initial Implementation Efforts.
Successful implementation of the order requires personal commitment from the heads of departments and agencies, as well as their senior officials. It also requires effective security education and training programs, self-inspection programs, and measures designed to hold personnel accountable.
In accordance with section 5.4 of the order, the head of each department and agency that creates or handles classified information shall provide the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) a copy of the department or agency regulations implementing the requirements of the order. Such regulations shall be issued in final form within 180 days of ISOO's publication of its implementing directive for the order. The Director of ISOO shall consider agency actions to implement the requirements of section 5.4 of the order as a key element in planning oversight of agencies. Each senior agency official designated under section 5.4(d) of the order shall provide ISOO with updates concerning agency plans and other actions to implement the requirements of the order. The Director of ISOO shall publish a periodic status report on agency implementation.
2. Declassification of Records of Permanent Historical Value.
Under the direction of the National Declassification Center (NDC), and utilizing recommendations of an ongoing Business Process Review in support of the NDC, referrals and quality assurance problems within a backlog of more than 400 million pages of accessioned Federal records previously subject to automatic declassification shall be addressed in a manner that will permit public access to all declassified records from this backlog no later than December 31, 2013. In order to promote the efficient and effective utilization of finite resources available for declassification, further referrals of these records are not required except for those containing information that would clearly and demonstrably reveal: (a) the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source; or (b) key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction.
The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence shall provide the Archivist of the United States with sufficient guidance to complete this task. The Archivist shall make public a report on the status of the backlog every 6 months.
3. Delegation of Original Classification Authority.
Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum necessary to implement the order and only those individuals or positions with a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise such authority shall be delegated original classification authority.
Accordingly, heads of departments and agencies with original classification authority shall commence a review to ensure that all delegations of original classification authority are so limited and otherwise in accordance with section 1.3(c) of the order. Each department and agency shall submit a report on the results of this review to the Director of ISOO within 120 days of the date of this memorandum.
4. Promotion of New Technologies to Support Declassification.
Striking the critical balance between openness and secrecy is a difficult but necessary part of our democratic form of government. Striking this balance becomes more difficult as the volume and complexity of the information increases. Improving the capability of departments and agencies to identify still-sensitive information and to make declassified information available to the public are integral parts of the classification system.
Therefore, I am directing that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence each support research to assist the NDC in addressing the cross-agency challenges associated with declassification.
5. Publication. The Archivist of the United States is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
Original Classification Authority
Order of President of the United States, dated Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 735, provided:
Pursuant to the provisions of section 1.3 of the Executive Order issued today [Ex. Ord. No. 13526, set out above], entitled "Classified National Security Information" (Executive Order), I hereby designate the following officials to classify information originally as "Top Secret" or "Secret":
TOP SECRET
Executive Office of the President:
The Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor)
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
The Director of National Drug Control Policy
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
The Chair or Co-Chairs, President's Intelligence Advisory Board
Departments and Agencies:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Energy
The Secretary of Homeland Security
The Director of National Intelligence
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director, Information Security Oversight Office
SECRET
Executive Office of the President:
The United States Trade Representative
Departments and Agencies:
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Transportation
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
Any delegation of this authority shall be in accordance with section 1.3(c) of the Executive Order, except that the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency may not delegate the authority granted in this order. If an agency head without original classification authority under this order, or otherwise delegated in accordance with section 1.3(c) of the Executive Order, has an exceptional need to classify information originated by their agency, the matter shall be referred to the agency head with appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority in accordance with section 1.3(e) of the Executive Order. If the agency with appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority cannot readily be determined, the matter shall be referred to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.
Presidential designations ordered prior to the issuance of the Executive Order are revoked as of the date of this order. However, delegations of authority to classify information originally that were made in accordance with the provisions of section 1.4 of Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995 [formerly set out above], as amended, by officials designated under this order shall continue in effect, provided that the authority of such officials is delegable under this order.
This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
Prior Presidential designations to classify National Security Information were contained in the following:
Ex. Ord. No. 13010, §7(b), July 15, 1996, 61 F.R. 37347, as amended, set out as a note under
Order of President of the United States, dated Oct. 13, 1995, 60 F.R. 53845, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Feb. 27, 1996, 61 F.R. 7977, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Feb. 26, 1997, 62 F.R. 9349, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Dec. 10, 2001, 66 F.R. 64347, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated May 6, 2002, 67 F.R. 31109, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Sept. 26, 2002, 67 F.R. 61465, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Sept. 17, 2003, 68 F.R. 55257, formerly set out as a note under this section.
Order of President of the United States, dated Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 21609, formerly set out as a note under this section.
§3162. Requests by authorized investigative agencies
(a) Generally
(1) Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, other financial information, and consumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any authorized investigative agency may also request records maintained by any commercial entity within the United States pertaining to travel by an employee in the executive branch of Government outside the United States.
(2) Requests may be made under this section where—
(A) the records sought pertain to a person who is or was an employee in the executive branch of Government required by the President in an Executive order or regulation, as a condition of access to classified information, to provide consent, during a background investigation and for such time as access to the information is maintained, and for a period of not more than three years thereafter, permitting access to financial records, other financial information, consumer reports, and travel records; and
(B)(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible information, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power;
(ii) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the person has incurred excessive indebtedness or has acquired a level of affluence which cannot be explained by other information known to the agency; or
(iii) circumstances indicate the person had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified information which is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
(3) Each such request—
(A) shall be accompanied by a written certification signed by the department or agency head or deputy department or agency head concerned, or by a senior official designated for this purpose by the department or agency head concerned (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Secretary or Assistant Director), and shall certify that—
(i) the person concerned is or was an employee within the meaning of paragraph (2)(A);
(ii) the request is being made pursuant to an authorized inquiry or investigation and is authorized under this section; and
(iii) the records or information to be reviewed are records or information which the employee has previously agreed to make available to the authorized investigative agency for review;
(B) shall contain a copy of the agreement referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii);
(C) shall identify specifically or by category the records or information to be reviewed; and
(D) shall inform the recipient of the request of the prohibition described in subsection (b).
(b) Prohibition of certain disclosure
(1) Prohibition
(A) In general
If a certification is issued under subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review under subsection (c) is provided, no governmental or private entity that receives a request under subsection (a), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that an authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a) has sought or obtained access to information under subsection (a).
(B) Certification
The requirements of subparagraph (A) shall apply if the head of an authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a), or a designee, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of disclosure under this subsection may result in—
(i) a danger to the national security of the United States;
(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation;
(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
(2) Exception
(A) In general
A governmental or private entity that receives a request under subsection (a), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to—
(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in order to comply with the request;
(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or
(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a) or a designee.
(B) Application
A person to whom disclosure is made under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as the person to whom the request is issued.
(C) Notice
Any recipient that discloses to a person described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the applicable nondisclosure requirement.
(D) Identification of disclosure recipients
At the request of the head of an authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a), or a designee, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or (iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the head of the authorized investigative agency or such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.
(c) Judicial review
(1) In general
A request under subsection (a) or a nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such request under subsection (b) shall be subject to judicial review under
(2) Notice
A request under subsection (a) shall include notice of the availability of judicial review described in paragraph (1).
(d) Records or information; inspection or copying
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than
(2) Any entity (including any officer, employee, or agent thereof) that discloses records or information for inspection or copying pursuant to this section in good faith reliance upon the certifications made by an agency pursuant to this section shall not be liable for any such disclosure to any person under this subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State.
(e) Reimbursement of costs
Any agency requesting records or information under this section may, subject to the availability of appropriations, reimburse a private entity for any cost reasonably incurred by such entity in responding to such request, including the cost of identifying, reproducing, or transporting records or other data.
(f) Dissemination of records or information received
An agency receiving records or information pursuant to a request under this section may disseminate the records or information obtained pursuant to such request outside the agency only—
(1) to the agency employing the employee who is the subject of the records or information;
(2) to the Department of Justice for law enforcement or counterintelligence purposes; or
(3) with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United States, if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.
(g) Construction of section
Nothing in this section may be construed to affect the authority of an investigative agency to obtain information pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VIII, §802, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Right to Financial Privacy Act, referred to in subsec. (g), probably means the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, which is title XI of
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, referred to in subsec. (g), is title VI of
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2015—Subsec. (b).
Subsecs. (c) to (g).
2006—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(4).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Oct. 14, 1994, see section 802(c) of
§3162a. Security Executive Agent
(a) In general
The Director of National Intelligence, or such other officer of the United States as the President may designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all departments and agencies of the United States.
(b) Duties
The duties of the Security Executive Agent are as follows:
(1) To direct the oversight of investigations, reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any Federal agency.
(2) To review the national security background investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to determine whether such programs are being implemented in accordance with this section.
(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as applicable.
(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to determine eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order No. 12968 (
(6) To review and approve the policies of the Federal agencies that ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position among Federal agencies, and to act as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of eligibility.
(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security Executive Agent by law.
(c) Authorities
The Security Executive Agent shall—
(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and security in processes relating to determinations by such agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;
(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers of, national security investigative requirements, including issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the duties of the Security Executive Agent described in subsection (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
(4) define and set standards for continuous vetting for continued access to classified information and for eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VIII, §803, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Executive Order No. 12968, referred to in subsec. (b)(5), is Ex. Ord. No. 12968, Aug. 2, 1995, 60 F.R. 40245, which is set out as a note under
Prior Provisions
A prior section 803 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was renumbered section 804 and is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Timeliness in the Administration of Polygraphs
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) adjudicating decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information (as defined in the procedures established pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (
"(B) granting reciprocity pursuant to Security Executive Agent Directive 2, or successor directive.
"(2)
"(b)
Policy on Submittal of Applications for Access to Classified Information for Certain Personnel
§3163. Exceptions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to the President and Vice President, Members of the Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Federal judges appointed by the President.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VIII, §804, formerly §803, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 804 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was renumbered section 805 and is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Oct. 14, 1994, see section 802(c) of
§3164. Definitions
For purposes of this subchapter—
(1) the term "authorized investigative agency" means an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information;
(2) the term "classified information" means any information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [
(3) the term "consumer reporting agency" has the meaning given such term in
(4) the term "employee" includes any person who receives a salary or compensation of any kind from the United States Government, is a contractor of the United States Government or an employee thereof, is an unpaid consultant of the United States Government, or otherwise acts for or on behalf of the United States Government, except as otherwise determined by the President;
(5) the terms "financial agency" and "financial institution" have the meanings given to such terms in
(6) the terms "foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power" have the same meanings as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of section 1801, respectively, of this title;
(7) the term "State" means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau, and any other possession of the United States; and
(8) the term "computer" means any electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device and any data or other information stored or contained in such device.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title VIII, §805, formerly §804, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Executive Order No. 12356, referred to in par. (2), which was formerly set out as a note under section 435 (now section 3161) of this title, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12958, §6.1(d), Apr. 17, 1995, 60 F.R. 19843.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in par. (2), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2023—Par. (6).
1999—Par. (8).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Oct. 14, 1994, see section 802(c) of
SUBCHAPTER VII—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
§3171. Stay of sanctions
Notwithstanding any provision of law identified in
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title IX, §901, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3172. Extension of stay
Whenever the President determines and reports to Congress in accordance with
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title IX, §902, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3173. Reports
Reports to Congress pursuant to
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title IX, §903, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2002—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007.
§3174. Laws subject to stay
The President may use the authority of
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title IX, §904, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, referred to in text, is title III of
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, referred to in text, is title VIII of
Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, referred to in text, is title XVII of div. A of
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, referred to in text, is title XVI of div. A of
Section 573 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, referred to in text, probably means section 573 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994,
Section 563 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, referred to in text, probably means section 563 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995,
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3175. Repealed. Pub. L. 108–177, title III, §313(a), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2610
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title IX, §905, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
SUBCHAPTER VIII—EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Part A—Science and Technology
§3191. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees in science and technology
(a) Program authorized
The Director of National Intelligence may carry out a program to provide scholarships and work-study for individuals who are pursuing graduate degrees in fields of study in science and technology that are identified by the Director as appropriate to meet the future needs of the intelligence community for qualified scientists and engineers.
(b) Administration
If the Director of National Intelligence carries out the program under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall administer the program through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Identification of fields of study
If the Director of National Intelligence carries out the program under subsection (a), the Director shall identify fields of study under subsection (a) in consultation with the other heads of the elements of the intelligence community.
(d) Eligibility for participation
An individual eligible to participate in the program is any individual who—
(1) either—
(A) is an employee of the intelligence community; or
(B) meets criteria for eligibility for employment in the intelligence community that are established by the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) is accepted in a graduate degree program in a field of study in science or technology identified under subsection (a); and
(3) is eligible for a security clearance at the level of Secret or above.
(e) Regulations
If the Director of National Intelligence carries out the program under subsection (a), the Director shall prescribe regulations for purposes of the administration of this section.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1001, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 1001 of act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was renumbered section 1101 and is classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d)(1)(B).
Subsec. (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
Pilot Program on Recruitment and Training of Intelligence Analysts
§3192. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the intelligence community in order to promote a more effective and productive intelligence community through cross-disciplinary education and joint training.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1002, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
§3193. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–259, title III, §313(b)(1)(B), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2666
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1003, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Savings Provision
Part B—Foreign Languages Program
§3201. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence community
(a) In general
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence may jointly carry out a program to advance skills in foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out the national security activities of the United States (hereinafter in this part referred to as the "Foreign Languages Program").
(b) Identification of requisite actions
In order to carry out the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly identify actions required to improve the education of personnel in the intelligence community in foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out the national security activities of the United States and to meet the long-term intelligence needs of the United States.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1011, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Pilot Program for Intensive Language Instruction in African Languages
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for which scholarships are not offered under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (
"(2) both in the United States and in a country in which the language is the native language of a significant portion of the population, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
§3202. Education partnerships
(a) In general
In carrying out the Foreign Languages Program, the head of a covered element of the intelligence community may enter into one or more education partnership agreements with educational institutions in the United States in order to encourage and enhance the study in such educational institutions of foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out the national security activities of the United States.
(b) Assistance provided under educational partnership agreements
Under an educational partnership agreement entered into with an educational institution pursuant to this section, the head of a covered element of the intelligence community may provide the following assistance to the educational institution:
(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of the element of the intelligence community to the educational institution for any purpose and duration that the head of the element considers appropriate.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the transfer of surplus property, the transfer to the educational institution of any computer equipment, or other equipment, that is—
(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
(B) surplus to the needs of the element of the intelligence community; and
(C) determined by the head of the element to be appropriate for support of such agreement.
(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the educational institution—
(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out the national security activities of the United States; or
(B) to assist in the development for the educational institution of courses and materials on such languages.
(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the educational institution in research projects of the element of the intelligence community.
(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in developing a program under which students receive academic credit at the educational institution for work on research projects of the element of the intelligence community.
(6) The provision of academic and career advice and assistance to students of the educational institution.
(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the head of the element of the intelligence community considers appropriate.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1012, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3203. Voluntary services
(a) Authority to accept services
Notwithstanding
(b) Requirements and limitations
(1) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of a covered element of the intelligence community shall—
(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the head of the element would supervise a compensated employee of that element providing similar services; and
(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, has appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or is otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to provide such services.
(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of a covered element of the intelligence community may not—
(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or other position performing inherently governmental functions; or
(B) compensate the individual for the provision of such services.
(c) Authority to recruit and train individuals providing services
The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary services under subsection (a).
(d) Status of individuals providing services
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services under subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection (c), an individual shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal Government only for purposes of the following provisions of law:
(A)
(B)
(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services under paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the scope of the services accepted under that paragraph, the individual shall be deemed to be a volunteer of a governmental entity or nonprofit institution for purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (
(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such Act (
(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security clearance.
(e) Reimbursement of incidental expenses
(1) The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may reimburse an individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual in providing voluntary services under subsection (a). The head of a covered element of the intelligence community shall determine which expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this subsection.
(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
(f) Authority to install equipment
(1) The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may install telephone lines and any necessary telecommunication equipment in the private residences of individuals who provide voluntary services under subsection (a).
(2) The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may pay the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed under paragraph (1) for authorized purposes.
(3) Notwithstanding
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1013, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, referred to in subsec. (d)(2)(A), is
Section 4(d) of such Act (
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
1 See References in Text note below.
§3204. Regulations
(a) In general
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly prescribe regulations to carry out the Foreign Languages Program.
(b) Elements of the intelligence community
The head of each covered element of the intelligence community shall prescribe regulations to carry out
(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of voluntary services under
(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the installation of equipment under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1014, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3205. Definitions
In this part:
(1) The term "covered element of the intelligence community" means an agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in subparagraphs (B) through (L) of
(2) The term "educational institution" means—
(A) a local educational agency (as that term is defined in
(B) an institution of higher education (as defined in
(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides instruction of foreign languages in languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the United States.
(3) The term "dedicated personnel" means employees of the intelligence community and private citizens (including former civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been voluntarily separated, and members of the United States Armed Forces who have been honorably discharged, honorably separated, or generally discharged under honorable circumstances and rehired on a voluntary basis specifically to perform the activities authorized under this part).
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1015, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2015—Par. (2)(A).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2015 Amendment
Amendment by
Part C—Additional Education Provisions
§3221. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
(a) In general
The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, may assign employees of such elements in analyst positions requiring foreign language expertise as students at accredited professional, technical, or other institutions of higher education for training at the graduate or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
(b) Authority for reimbursement of costs of tuition and training
(1) The Director of National Intelligence may reimburse an employee assigned under subsection (a) for the total cost of the training described in that subsection, including costs of educational and supplementary reading materials.
(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to employees who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
(c) Relationship to compensation as an analyst
Reimbursement under this section to an employee who is an analyst is in addition to any benefits, allowances, travel expenses, or other compensation the employee is entitled to by reason of serving in such an analyst position.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1021, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3222. Program on recruitment and training
(a) Program
(1) Requirement
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall carry out a program to ensure that selected individuals are provided funds for academic training (including with respect to both undergraduate and postgraduate education), or to reimburse for academic training previously obtained—
(A) in capabilities, missions, or skillsets, especially in the fields of science, technology, math, and engineering, to address workforce requirements in which the intelligence community is deficient or likely to be deficient in the future; or
(B) for such individuals who have backgrounds or experiences that the Director has identified as—
(i) contributing to capabilities, missions, or skillsets in which the intelligence community is deficient or likely to be deficient in future; and
(ii) being underrepresented in the intelligence community or likely to be underrepresented in the future.
(2) Commitment
An individual selected for participation in the program shall commit to employment with an element of the intelligence community for a period that the Director determines is commensurate with the amount of funding provided to the individual under the program and under such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Designation
The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.
(4) Outreach
The Director, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall maintain a publicly available internet website on the program that describes—
(A) the intent of the program;
(B) the conditions and requirements for selection and participation;
(C) application instructions;
(D) the areas covered by the program pursuant to the review conducted under subsection (b)(2); and
(E) any other details the Director determines appropriate.
(b) Elements
In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director shall—
(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic training of participants as the Director considers appropriate to ensure that participants are prepared for employment as intelligence professionals; and
(2) on an annual basis, review the areas that will contribute to the capabilities, missions, and skillsets in which the intelligence community is deficient or is likely to be deficient in the future.
(c) Use of funds
Funds made available for the program under subsection (a) shall be used—
(1) to provide a monthly stipend for each month that a participant is pursuing a course of study;
(2) to pay the partial or full tuition of a participant for the completion of such course of study;
(3) to reimburse a participant for tuition paid by the participant before becoming an employee of an element of the intelligence community, including with respect to providing payments for student loans used for such tuition;
(4) to pay for books and materials that the participant requires or required to complete such course of study;
(5) to pay the expenses of the participant for travel requested by an element of the intelligence community in relation to such program; or
(6) for such other purposes the Director considers reasonably appropriate to carry out such program.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1022, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—
§3223. Educational scholarship program
The head of a department or agency containing an element of the intelligence community may establish an undergraduate or graduate training program with respect to civilian employees and prospective civilian employees of such element similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the program that the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1023, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3224. Intelligence officer training program
(a) Programs
(1) The Director of National Intelligence may carry out grant programs in accordance with subsections (b) and (c) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community workforce with capabilities critical to the national security interests of the United States.
(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director shall identify the skills necessary to meet current or emergent needs of the intelligence community and the educational disciplines that will provide individuals with such skills.
(b) Institutional grant program
(1) The Director may provide grants to institutions of higher education to support the establishment or continued development of programs of study in educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2).
(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with respect to the educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2), be used for the following purposes:
(A) Curriculum or program development.
(B) Faculty development.
(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
(D) Faculty research.
(c) Grant program for certain minority-serving colleges and universities
(1) The Director may provide grants to historically black colleges and universities, Predominantly Black Institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, and Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions to provide programs of study in educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2) or described in paragraph (2).
(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may be used to provide programs of study in the following educational disciplines:
(A) Intermediate and advanced foreign languages deemed in the immediate interest of the intelligence community, including Farsi, Pashto, Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian dialects.
(B) Study abroad programs and cultural immersion programs.
(d) Application
An institution of higher education seeking a grant under this section shall submit an application describing the proposed use of the grant at such time and in such manner as the Director may require.
(e) Reports
An institution of higher education that receives a grant under this section shall submit to the Director regular reports regarding the use of such grant, including—
(1) a description of the benefits to students who participate in the course of study funded by such grant;
(2) a description of the results and accomplishments related to such course of study; and
(3) any other information that the Director may require.
(f) Regulations
The Director shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(g) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "Director" means the Director of National Intelligence.
(2)
(3) The term "institution of higher education" has the meaning given the term in
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(A) takes place outside the geographical boundaries of the United States;
(B) focuses on areas of the world that are critical to the national security interests of the United States and are generally underrepresented in study abroad programs at institutions of higher education, including Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East; and
(C) is a credit or noncredit program.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1024, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (g)(7)(A).
2015—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (g)(5) to (7).
2014—Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (g)(4), (5).
2011—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsecs. (c) to (f).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (g)(2) to (4).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Findings Regarding Improvement of Equality of Employment Opportunities in the Intelligence Community
"(1) It is the recommendation of the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, that the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique cultural and linguistic capabilities of first generation Americans.
"(2) The Intelligence Community could greatly benefit from an increased number of employees who are proficient in foreign languages and knowledgeable of world cultures, especially in foreign languages that are critical to the national security interests of the United States. Particular emphasis should be given to the recruitment of United States citizens whose linguistic capabilities are acutely required for the improvement of the overall intelligence collection and analysis effort of the United States Government.
"(3) The Intelligence Community has a significantly lower percentage of women and minorities than the total workforce of the Federal government and the total civilian labor force.
"(4) Women and minorities continue to be under-represented in senior grade levels, and in core mission areas, of the intelligence community."
§3224a. Authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence for certain workforce activities
(a) Authorization
The Director may, with or without reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for covered workforce activities for the purpose of supporting a covered workforce activity of an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Notification
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director exercises the authority in subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate written notification of such exercise.
(c) Covered workforce activity defined
In this section, the term "covered workforce activity" means an activity relating to—
(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence community workforce; or
(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, with respect to such workforce.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1025, as added
Part D—National Intelligence University
§3227. Transfer date
In this part, the term "transfer date" means the date on which the National Intelligence University is transferred from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence under
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1031, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The transfer date, referred to in text, is June 20, 2021.
§3227a. Degree-granting authority
(a) In general
Beginning on the transfer date, under regulations prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, the President of the National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
(b) Limitation
A degree may not be conferred under this section unless—
(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended approval of the degree in accordance with the Federal Policy Governing Granting of Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies; and
(2) the University is accredited by the appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization to award the degree, as determined by the Secretary of Education.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1032, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (c).
§3227b. Reporting
(a) In general
Not less frequently than once each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for employing professors, instructors, and lecturers at the National Intelligence University.
(b) Elements
Each plan submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) The total number of proposed personnel to be employed at the National Intelligence University.
(2) The total annual compensation to be provided the personnel described in paragraph (1).
(3) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate.
(c) Form of submittal
Each plan submitted by the Director to the congressional intelligence committees under subsection (a) shall be submitted as part of another annual submission from the Director to the congressional intelligence committees.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1033, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Plan Regarding Personnel at National Intelligence University
"(1)
"(2)
§3227c. Continued applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Board of Visitors
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) 1 shall continue to apply to the Board of Visitors of the National Intelligence University on and after the transfer date.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title X, §1034, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Advisory Committee Act, referred to in text, is
1 See References in Text note below.
SUBCHAPTER IX—ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
§3231. Applicability to United States intelligence activities of Federal laws implementing international treaties and agreements
(a) In general
No Federal law enacted on or after December 27, 2000, that implements a treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activity of the United States Government or its employees, or any other person to the extent such other person is carrying out such activity on behalf of, and at the direction of, the United States, unless such Federal law specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
(b) Authorized intelligence activities
An intelligence activity shall be treated as authorized for purposes of subsection (a) if the intelligence activity is authorized by an appropriate official of the United States Government, acting within the scope of the official duties of that official and in compliance with Federal law and any applicable Presidential directive.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1101, formerly title X, §1001, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3232. Counterintelligence initiatives
(a) Inspection process
In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish and implement an inspection process for all agencies and departments of the United States that handle classified information relating to the national security of the United States intended to assure that those agencies and departments maintain effective operational security practices and programs directed against counterintelligence activities.
(b) Annual review of dissemination lists
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and implement a process for all elements of the intelligence community to review, on an annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists for access to classified information. Such process shall ensure that only individuals who have a particularized "need to know" (as determined by the Director) are continued on such distribution lists.
(c) Completion of financial disclosure statements required for access to certain classified information
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and implement a process by which each head of an element of the intelligence community directs that all employees of that element, in order to be granted access to classified information referred to in subsection (a) of section 1.3 of Executive Order No. 12968 (August 2, 1995; 60 Fed. Reg. 40245; [former] 50 U.S.C. 435 note [now
(d) Arrangements to handle sensitive information
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish, for all elements of the intelligence community, programs and procedures by which sensitive classified information relating to human intelligence is safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by employees of those elements.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1102, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3232a. Measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(2) Covered entity
The term "covered entity" means any foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops, maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases, licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.
(3) Foreign commercial spyware
The term "foreign commercial spyware" means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed, marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.
(4) Foreign company
The term "foreign company" means a company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.
(5) Spyware
The term "spyware" means a tool or set of tools that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or transiting through an electronic device connected to the Internet and not owned or operated by the unauthorized user, including end-to-end systems that—
(A) allow an unauthorized user to remotely infect electronic devices with malicious software, including without any action required by the user of the device;
(B) can record telecommunications or other audio captured on a device not owned by the unauthorized user;
(C) undertake geolocation, collect cell site location information, or otherwise track the location of a device or person using the internal sensors of an electronic device not owned by the unauthorized user;
(D) allow an unauthorized user access to and the ability to retrieve information on the electronic device, including text messages, files, e-mails, transcripts of chats, contacts, photos, and browsing history; or
(E) any additional criteria described in publicly available documents published by the Director of National Intelligence, such as whether the end-to-end system is used outside the context of a codified lawful intercept system.
(b) Annual assessments of counterintelligence threats
(1) Requirement
Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with an accompanying classified annex containing an assessment of the counterintelligence threats and other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the proliferation of foreign commercial spyware. The assessment shall incorporate all credible data, including open-source information.
(2) Elements
Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following, if known:
(A) A list of the most significant covered entities.
(B) A description of the foreign commercial spyware marketed by the covered entities identified under subparagraph (A) and an assessment by the intelligence community of the foreign commercial spyware.
(C) An assessment of the counterintelligence risk to the intelligence community or personnel of the intelligence community posed by foreign commercial spyware.
(D) For each covered entity identified in subparagraph (A), details of any subsidiaries, resellers, or other agents acting on behalf of the covered entity.
(E) Details of where each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is domiciled.
(F) A description of how each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is financed, where the covered entity acquired its capital, and the organizations and individuals having substantial investments or other equities in the covered entity.
(G) An assessment by the intelligence community of any relationship between each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) and any foreign government, including any export controls and processes to which the covered entity is subject.
(H) A list of the foreign customers of each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D), including the understanding by the intelligence community of the organizations and end-users within any foreign government.
(I) With respect to each foreign customer identified under subparagraph (H), an assessment by the intelligence community regarding how the foreign customer is using the spyware, including whether the foreign customer has targeted personnel of the intelligence community.
(J) With respect to the first report required under paragraph (1), a mitigation plan to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.
(K) With respect to each report following the first report required under paragraph (1), details of steps taken by the intelligence community since the previous report to implement measures to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.
(3) Classified annex
In submitting the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall also include an accompanying but separate classified annex, providing a watchlist of companies selling, leasing, or otherwise providing foreign commercial spyware that the Director determines are engaged in activities that pose a counterintelligence risk to personnel of the intelligence community.
(4) Form
Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
(5) Dissemination
The Director of National Intelligence shall separately distribute each report under paragraph (1) and each annex under paragraph (3) to the President, the heads of all elements of the intelligence community, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Cyber Director, and the heads of any other departments or agencies the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(c) Authority to prohibit purchase or use by intelligence community
(1) Foreign commercial spyware
(A) In general
The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from procuring, leasing, or otherwise acquiring on the commercial market, or extending or renewing a contract to procure, lease, or otherwise acquire, foreign commercial spyware.
(B) Considerations
In determining whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—
(i) the assessment of the intelligence community of the counterintelligence threats or other risks to the United States posed by foreign commercial spyware;
(ii) the assessment of the intelligence community of whether the foreign commercial spyware has been used to target United States Government personnel.1
(iii) whether the original owner or developer retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(iv) whether the original owner or developer has verifiably destroyed all copies of the data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(v) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(vi) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and
(vii) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.
(2) Company that has acquired foreign commercial spyware
(A) Authority
The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from entering into any contract or other agreement for any purpose with a company that has acquired, in whole or in part, any foreign commercial spyware.
(B) Considerations
In considering whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—
(i) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the spyware;
(ii) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware has verifiably destroyed all data, and any copies thereof, collected by or associated with the spyware;
(iii) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(iv) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and
(v) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.
(3) Notifications of prohibition
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence exercises the authority to issue a prohibition under subsection (c), the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such exercise of authority. Such notice shall include—
(A) a description of the circumstances under which the prohibition was issued;
(B) an identification of the company or product covered by the prohibition;
(C) any information that contributed to the decision of the Director of National Intelligence to exercise the authority, including any information relating to counterintelligence or other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the company or product, as assessed by the intelligence community; and
(D) an identification of each element of the intelligence community to which the prohibition has been applied.
(4) Waiver authority
(A) In general
The head of an element of the intelligence community may request from the Director of National Intelligence the waiver of a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2).
(B) Director of National Intelligence determination
The Director of National Intelligence, upon receiving the waiver request in subparagraph (A), may issue a waiver for a period not to exceed one year in response to the request from the head of an element of the intelligence community if such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.
(C) Notice
Not later than 30 days after approving a waiver request pursuant to subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a written notification. The notification shall include—
(i) an identification of the head of the element of the intelligence community that requested the waiver;
(ii) the details of the waiver request, including the national security interests of the United States;
(iii) the rationale and basis for the determination that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States;
(iv) the considerations that informed the ultimate determination of the Director of National Intelligence to issue the waiver; and
(v) and any other considerations contributing to the determination, made by the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) Waiver termination
The Director of National Intelligence may revoke a previously granted waiver at any time. Upon revocation of a waiver, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a written notification to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after making a revocation determination.
(5) Termination of prohibition
The Director of National Intelligence may terminate a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2) at any time. Upon termination of a prohibition, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a notification of the termination to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after terminating a prohibition, detailing the basis for the termination, including any United States national security interests that may be affected by such termination.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1102A, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (c)(4)(C)(iv).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
Rule of Construction—No Enhanced Authorities
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6318(e) of
Statement of Policy
[For definition of "foreign commercial spyware" as used in section 6318(b) of
Protection of Covered Devices
"(1)
"(A) issue standards, guidance, best practices, and policies for elements of the intelligence community to protect covered devices from being compromised by foreign commercial spyware;
"(B) survey elements of the intelligence community regarding the processes used by the elements to routinely monitor covered devices for indicators of compromise associated with foreign commercial spyware; and
"(C) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the sufficiency of the measures in place to routinely monitor covered devices for indicators of compromise associated with foreign commercial spyware.
"(2)
"(3)
"(A) the component of the element and the location of the personnel whose covered device was targeted or compromised;
"(B) the number of covered devices compromised or targeted;
"(C) an assessment by the intelligence community of the damage to national security of the United States resulting from any loss of data or sensitive information;
"(D) an assessment by the intelligence community of any foreign government, or foreign organization or entity, and, to the extent possible, the foreign individuals, who directed and benefitted from any information acquired from the targeting or compromise; and
"(E) as appropriate, an assessment by the intelligence community of the capacity and will of such governments or individuals to continue targeting personnel of the United States Government."
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6318(d)(1)–(3) of
[For definitions of "covered device" and "foreign commercial spyware" as used in section 6318(d)(1)–(3) of
Definitions
"(1)
"(2)
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6318(a) of
Executive Documents
Ex. Ord. No. 14093. Prohibition on Use by the United States Government of Commercial Spyware That Poses Risks to National Security
Ex. Ord. No. 14093, Mar. 27, 2023, 88 F.R. 18957, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
To advance these interests, the United States supports the development of an international technology ecosystem that protects the integrity of international standards development; enables and promotes the free flow of data and ideas with trust; protects our security, privacy, and human rights; and enhances our economic competitiveness. The growing exploitation of Americans' sensitive data and improper use of surveillance technology, including commercial spyware, threatens the development of this ecosystem. Foreign governments and persons have deployed commercial spyware against United States Government institutions, personnel, information, and information systems, presenting significant counterintelligence and security risks to the United States Government. Foreign governments and persons have also used commercial spyware for improper purposes, such as to target and intimidate perceived opponents; curb dissent; limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association; enable other human rights abuses or suppression of civil liberties; and track or target United States persons without proper legal authorization, safeguards, or oversight.
The United States has a fundamental national security and foreign policy interest in countering and preventing the proliferation of commercial spyware that has been or risks being misused for such purposes, in light of the core interests of the United States in protecting United States Government personnel and United States citizens around the world; upholding and advancing democracy; promoting respect for human rights; and defending activists, dissidents, and journalists against threats to their freedom and dignity. To advance these interests and promote responsible use of commercial spyware, the United States must establish robust protections and procedures to ensure that any United States Government use of commercial spyware helps protect its information systems and intelligence and law enforcement activities against significant counterintelligence or security risks; aligns with its core interests in promoting democracy and democratic values around the world; and ensures that the United States Government does not contribute, directly or indirectly, to the proliferation of commercial spyware that has been misused by foreign governments or facilitate such misuse.
Therefore, I hereby establish as the policy of the United States Government that it shall not make operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person. In furtherance of the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, this order accordingly directs steps to implement that policy and protect the safety and security of United States Government institutions, personnel, information, and information systems; discourage the improper use of commercial spyware; and encourage the development and implementation of responsible norms regarding the use of commercial spyware that are consistent with respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic norms and values. The actions directed in this order are consistent with the policy objectives set forth in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA FY 2023) (
(i) Commercial spyware may pose counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government when:
(A) a foreign government or foreign person has used or acquired the commercial spyware to gain or attempt to gain access to United States Government computers or the computers of United States Government personnel without authorization from the United States Government; or
(B) the commercial spyware was or is furnished by an entity that:
(1) maintains, transfers, or uses data obtained from the commercial spyware without authorization from the licensed end-user or the United States Government;
(2) has disclosed or intends to disclose non-public United States Government information or non-public information about the activities of the United States Government without authorization from the United States Government; or
(3) is under the direct or effective control of a foreign government or foreign person engaged in intelligence activities, including surveillance or espionage, directed against the United States.
(ii) Commercial spyware may pose risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person when:
(A) the commercial spyware, or other commercial spyware furnished by the same vendor, has been used by a foreign government or foreign person for any of the following purposes:
(1) to collect information on activists, academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, or members of non-governmental organizations or marginalized communities in order to intimidate such persons; curb dissent or political opposition; otherwise limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association; or enable other forms of human rights abuses or suppression of civil liberties; or
(2) to monitor a United States person, without such person's consent, in order to facilitate the tracking or targeting of the person without proper legal authorization, safeguards, and oversight; or
(B) the commercial spyware was furnished by an entity that provides commercial spyware to governments for which there are credible reports in the annual country reports on human rights practices of the Department of State that they engage in systematic acts of political repression, including arbitrary arrest or detention, torture, extrajudicial or politically motivated killing, or other gross violations of human rights, consistent with any findings by the Department of State pursuant to section 5502 of the NDAA FY 2022 or other similar findings.
(iii) In determining whether the operational use of commercial spyware poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or poses significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, such that operational use should be prohibited, agencies shall consider, among other relevant considerations, whether the entity furnishing the commercial spyware knew or reasonably should have known that the spyware posed risks described in subsections (a)(i) or (ii) of this section, and whether the entity has taken appropriate measures to remove such risks, such as canceling relevant licensing agreements or contracts that present such risks; taking other verifiable action to prevent continuing uses that present such risks; or cooperating in United States Government efforts to counter improper use of the spyware.
(b) An agency shall not request or directly enable a third party to make operational use of commercial spyware where the agency has determined that such use poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or that the commercial spyware poses significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, as described in subsection (a) of this section. For purposes of this order, the term "operational use" includes such indirect use.
(c) To facilitate effective interagency coordination of information relevant to the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section and to promote consistency of application of this order across the United States Government, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) shall, within 90 days of the date of this order [Mar. 27, 2023], and on a semiannual basis thereafter, issue a classified intelligence assessment that integrates relevant information—including intelligence, open source, financial, sanctions-related, and export controls-related information—on foreign commercial spyware or foreign government or foreign person use of commercial spyware relevant to the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The intelligence assessment shall incorporate, but not be limited to, the report and assessment required by section 1102A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 [
(d) Any agency that makes a determination of whether operational use of a commercial spyware product is prohibited under subsection (a) of this section shall provide the results of that determination and key elements of the underlying analysis to the DNI. After consulting with the submitting agency to protect operational sensitivities, the DNI shall incorporate this information into the intelligence assessment described in subsection (c) of this section and, as needed, shall make this information available to other agencies consistent with section 3(b) of this order.
(e) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), or a designee, shall, within 30 days of the issuance of the intelligence assessment described in subsection (c) of this section, and additionally as the APNSA or designee deems necessary, convene agencies to discuss the intelligence assessment, as well as any other information about commercial spyware relevant to the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section, in order to ensure effective interagency awareness and sharing of such information.
(f) For any commercial spyware intended by an agency for operational use, a relevant official, as provided in section 5(k) of this order, shall certify the determination that the commercial spyware does not pose significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person based on the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The obligation to certify such a determination shall not be delegated, except as provided in section 5(k) of this order.
(g) If an agency decides to make operational use of commercial spyware, the head of the agency shall notify the APNSA of such decision, describing the due diligence completed before the decision was made, providing relevant information on the agency's consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section, and providing the reasons for the agency's determination. The agency may not make operational use of the commercial spyware until at least 7 days after providing this information or until the APNSA has notified the agency that no further process is required.
(h) Within 90 days of the issuance of the intelligence assessment described in subsection (c) of this section, each agency shall review all existing operational uses of commercial spyware and discontinue, as soon as the head of the agency determines is reasonably possible without compromising ongoing operations, operational use of any commercial spyware that the agency determines poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, each agency that may make operational use of commercial spyware shall develop appropriate internal controls and oversight procedures for conducting determinations under subsection (a) of this section, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.
(j) At any time after procuring commercial spyware for operational use, if the agency obtains relevant information with respect to the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section, the agency shall determine whether the commercial spyware poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, and, if so, shall terminate such operational use as soon as the head of the agency determines is reasonably possible without compromising ongoing operations, and shall notify the DNI and the APNSA.
(k) The Federal Acquisition Security Council shall consider the intelligence assessment described in subsection (c) of this section in evaluating whether commercial spyware poses a supply chain risk, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, including 41 CFR Part 201–1 and
(l) The prohibitions contained in this section shall not apply to the use of commercial spyware for purposes of testing, research, analysis, cybersecurity, or the development of countermeasures for counterintelligence or security risks, or for purposes of a criminal investigation arising out of the criminal sale or use of the spyware.
(m) A relevant official, as provided in section 5(k) of this order, may issue a waiver, for a period not to exceed 1 year, of an operational use prohibition determined pursuant to subsection (a) of this section if the relevant official determines that such waiver is necessary due to extraordinary circumstances and that no feasible alternative is available to address such circumstances. This authority shall not be delegated, except as provided in section 5(k) of this order. A relevant official may, at any time, revoke any waiver previously granted. Within 72 hours of making a determination to issue or revoke a waiver pursuant to this subsection, the relevant official who has issued or revoked the waiver shall notify the President, through the APNSA, of this determination, including the justification for the determination. The relevant official shall provide this information concurrently to the DNI.
(a) review the intelligence assessment issued by the DNI pursuant to section 2(c) of this order;
(b) request from the DNI any additional information regarding the commercial spyware that is relevant to the factors set forth in section 2(a) of this order;
(c) consider the factors set forth in section 2(a) of this order in light of the information provided by the DNI; and
(d) consider whether any entity furnishing the commercial spyware being considered for procurement has implemented reasonable due diligence procedures and standards—such as the industry-wide norms reflected in relevant Department of State guidance on business and human rights and on transactions linked to foreign government end-users for products or services with surveillance capabilities—and controls that would enable the entity to identify and prevent uses of the commercial spyware that pose significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person.
(i) a description of such existing operational use;
(ii) a determination of whether the commercial spyware poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, along with key elements of the underlying analysis, pursuant to section 2(a) of this order; and
(iii) in the event the agency determines that the commercial spyware poses significant risks pursuant to section 2(a) of this order, what steps have been taken to terminate its operational use.
(b) Within 45 days of an agency's procurement of any commercial spyware for any use described in section 2(l) of this order except for use in a criminal investigation arising out of the criminal sale or use of the spyware, the head of the agency shall notify the APNSA of such procurement and shall include in the notification a description of the purpose and authorized uses of the commercial spyware.
(c) Within 6 months of the date of this order, the head of each agency that has made operational use of commercial spyware or has procured commercial spyware for operational use shall submit to the APNSA a report on the actions that the agency has taken to implement this order, including the internal controls and oversight procedures the agency has developed pursuant to section 2(i) of this order.
(d) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and on an annual basis thereafter, the head of each agency that has procured commercial spyware for operational use shall provide the APNSA a report that identifies:
(i) any existing operational use of commercial spyware and the reasons why it does not pose significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, pursuant to section 2(a) of this order;
(ii) any operational use of commercial spyware that was terminated during the preceding year because it was determined to pose significant risks pursuant to section 2(a) of this order, the circumstances under which this determination was made, and the steps taken to terminate such use; and
(iii) any purchases made of commercial spyware, and whether they were made for operational use, during the preceding year.
(a) The term "agency" means any authority of the United States that is an "agency" under
(b) The term "commercial spyware" means any end-to-end software suite that is furnished for commercial purposes, either directly or indirectly through a third party or subsidiary, that provides the user of the software suite the capability to gain remote access to a computer, without the consent of the user, administrator, or owner of the computer, in order to:
(i) access, collect, exploit, extract, intercept, retrieve, or transmit content, including information stored on or transmitted through a computer connected to the Internet;
(ii) record the computer's audio calls or video calls or use the computer to record audio or video; or
(iii) track the location of the computer.
(c) The term "computer" shall have the same meaning as it has in
(d) The term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization.
(e) The term "foreign entity" means an entity that is not a United States entity.
(f) The term "foreign government" means any national, state, provincial, or other governing authority, any political party, or any official of any governing authority or political party, in each case of a country other than the United States.
(g) The term "foreign person" means a person that is not a United States person.
(h) The term "furnish," when used in connection with commercial spyware, means to develop, maintain, own, operate, manufacture, market, sell, resell, broker, lease, license, repackage, rebrand, or otherwise make available commercial spyware.
(i) The term "operational use" means use to gain remote access to a computer, without the consent of the user, administrator, or owner of the computer, in order to:
(i) access, collect, exploit, extract, intercept, retrieve, or transmit the computer's content, including information stored on or transmitted through a computer connected to the Internet;
(ii) record the computer's audio calls or video calls or use the computer to otherwise record audio or video; or
(iii) track the location of the computer.
The term "operational use" does not include those uses described in section 2(l) of this order.
(j) The term "person" means an individual or entity.
(k) The term "relevant official," for purposes of sections 2(f) and 2(m) of this order, refers to any of the following: the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the DNI, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Director of the National Security Agency. The Attorney General's obligation under section 2(f) of this order and authority under section 2(m) of this order may be delegated only to the Deputy Attorney General.
(l) The term "remote access," when used in connection with commercial spyware, means access to a computer, the computer's content, or the computer's components by using an external network (e.g., the Internet) when the computer is not in the physical possession of the actor seeking access to that computer.
(m) The term "United States entity" means any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches).
(n) The term "United States person" shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981 (United States Intelligence Activities) [
(o) The term "United States Government personnel" means all United States Government employees as defined by
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the use of any remedies available to the head of an agency or any other official of the United States Government.
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including section 6318 of the NDAA FY 2023, as well as applicable procurement laws, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
J.R. Biden, Jr.
1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
§3233. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or seal
(a) Prohibited acts
No person may, except with the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence, or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words "Office of the Director of National Intelligence", the initials "ODNI", the seal of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Injunction
Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1103, as added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
§3234. Prohibited personnel practices in the intelligence community
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Agency
The term "agency" means an executive department or independent establishment, as defined under
(2) Covered intelligence community element
The term "covered intelligence community element"—
(A) means—
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and
(ii) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under
(B) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) Personnel action
The term "personnel action" means, with respect to an employee in a position in a covered intelligence community element (other than a position excepted from the competitive service due to its confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating character) or a contractor employee—
(A) an appointment;
(B) a promotion;
(C) a disciplinary or corrective action;
(D) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
(E) a demotion, suspension, or termination;
(F) a reinstatement or restoration;
(G) a performance evaluation;
(H) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards;
(I) a decision concerning education or training if such education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, or performance evaluation; or
(J) any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.
(4) Contractor employee
The term "contractor employee" means an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor, of a covered intelligence community element.
(b) Agency employees
Any employee of a covered intelligence community element or an agency who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee of a covered intelligence community element as a reprisal for—
(1) any lawful disclosure of information by the employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, a supervisor in the employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the employing agency with responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including the head of the employing agency (or an employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose), the appropriate inspector general of the employing agency, a congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a congressional intelligence committee, which the employee reasonably believes evidences—
(A) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation; or
(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety;
(2) any lawful disclosure that complies with—
(A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); 1
(B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of
(C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of
(3) if the actions do not result in the employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with—
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation;
(B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (A); or
(C) cooperation with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General.
(c) Contractor employees
(1) Any employee of an agency or of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor, of a covered intelligence community element who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any contractor employee as a reprisal for—
(A) any lawful disclosure of information by the contractor employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, a supervisor in the contractor employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the employing or contracting agency or employing contractor with responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including the head of the employing or contracting agency (or an employee designated by the head of that agency for that purpose) or employing contractor, the appropriate inspector general of the employing or contracting agency, a congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a congressional intelligence committee, which the contractor employee reasonably believes evidences—
(i) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation (including with respect to evidence of another employee or contractor employee accessing or sharing classified information without authorization); or
(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.2
(B) any lawful disclosure that complies with—
(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); 1
(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of
(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of
(C) if the actions do not result in the contractor employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with—
(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation;
(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in clause (i); or
(iii) cooperation with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General.
(2) A personnel action under paragraph (1) is prohibited even if the action is undertaken at the request of an agency official, unless the request takes the form of a nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the agency official making the request.
(d) Rule of construction
Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be construed to authorize—
(1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
(2) the taking of any personnel action against an employee who lawfully discloses information to Congress.
(e) Disclosures
A disclosure shall not be excluded from this section because—
(1) the disclosure was made to an individual, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (b)(1)(B) or the contractor employee reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii);
(2) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed;
(3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
(4) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty;
(5) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure; or
(6) the disclosure was made during the normal course of duties of an employee or contractor employee.
(f) Enforcement
The President shall provide for the enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with the policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of
(g) Existing rights preserved
Nothing in this section shall be construed to—
(1) preempt or preclude any employee, contractor employee, or applicant for employment, at the Federal Bureau of Investigation from exercising rights provided under any other law, rule, or regulation, including
(2) repeal
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1104, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978, referred to in subsecs. (b)(2)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(i), is section 8H of
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(1)(B).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (c)(1)(A).
Subsec. (c)(1)(B).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsecs. (f), (g).
2018—Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (a)(4).
Subsec. (b).
Subsecs. (c) to (e).
Subsec. (e)(1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Policies and Procedures; Nonapplicability to Certain Terminations
"(a)
"(1) means—
"(A) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and
"(B) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under
"(2) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) the affected employee is concurrently terminated under—
"(A)
"(B) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 (
"(C) the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (
"(D)
"(2) not later than 30 days after such termination, the head of the agency that employed the affected employee notifies the congressional intelligence committees of the termination."
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 604 of
1 See References in Text note below.
2 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
§3235. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered official
The term "covered official" means—
(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and
(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
(2) Investigation
The term "investigation" means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information
The term "unauthorized disclosure of classified information" means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any recipient.
(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified information
The term "unauthorized public disclosure of classified information" means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.
(b) Intelligence community reporting
(1) In general
Not less frequently than once every 6 months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.
(2) Elements
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, the following:
(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
(C) Of the number of such completed investigations identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.
(c) Department of Justice reporting
(1) In general
Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the status of each referral made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was made.
(2) Contents
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a minimum, the following:
(A) The date the referral was received.
(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was substantiated by the Department of Justice.
(C) A statement indicating the highest level of classification of the information that was revealed in the unauthorized disclosure.
(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal investigation related to the referral is active.
(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges have been filed related to the referral.
(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
(d) Form of reports
Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1105, as added
§3235a. Notice and damage assessment with respect to significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence
(a) Notification and damage assessment requirements
(1) Requirements
If the Director of National Intelligence becomes aware of an actual or potential significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence—
(A) as soon as practicable, but not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director becomes so aware, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such actual or potential disclosure or compromise; and
(B) in the case of an actual disclosure or compromise, not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director becomes so aware, the Director or the head of any element of the intelligence community from which the significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise originated shall initiate a damage assessment consistent with the procedures set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 732 (relating to the conduct of damage assessments), or successor directive, with respect to such disclosure or compromise.
(2) Contents of notification
A notification submitted to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1)(A) with respect to an actual or potential significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence shall include—
(A) a summary of the facts and circumstances of such disclosure or compromise;
(B) a summary of the contents of the national intelligence revealed or potentially revealed, as the case may be, by such disclosure or compromise;
(C) an initial appraisal of the level of actual or potential damage, as the case may be, to the national security of the United States as a result of such disclosure or compromise; and
(D) in the case of an actual disclosure or compromise, which elements of the intelligence community will be involved in the damage assessment conducted with respect to such disclosure or compromise pursuant to paragraph (1)(B).
(b) Damage assessment reporting requirements
(1) Recurring reporting requirement
Not later than 30 days after the date of the initiation of a damage assessment pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), and every 90 days thereafter until the completion of the damage assessment or upon the request of the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of any documents or materials disclosed as a result of the significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of the classified national intelligence that is the subject of the damage assessment; and
(B) provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on such documents and materials and a status of the damage assessment.
(2) Final damage assessment
As soon as practicable after completing a damage assessment pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit the final damage assessment to the congressional intelligence committees.
(c) Notification of referral to Department of Justice
If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding a significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral on the date such referral is made.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1105A, as added
§3236. Inspector General external review panel
(a) Request for review
An individual with a claim described in subsection (b) may submit to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a request for a review of such claim by an external review panel convened under subsection (c).
(b) Claims and individuals described
A claim described in this subsection is any—
(1) claim by an individual—
(A) that the individual has been subjected to a personnel action that is prohibited under
(B) who has exhausted the applicable review process for the claim pursuant to enforcement of such section; or
(2) claim by an individual—
(A) that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) of
(B) who received a decision on an appeal regarding that claim under paragraph (4) of such section.
(c) External review panel convened
(1) Discretion to convene
Upon receipt of a request under subsection (a) regarding a claim, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, at the discretion of the Inspector General, convene an external review panel under this subsection to review the claim.
(2) Membership
(A) Composition
An external review panel convened under this subsection shall be composed of three members as follows:
(i) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(ii) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), two members selected by the Inspector General as the Inspector General considers appropriate on a case-by-case basis from among inspectors general of the following:
(I) The Department of Defense.
(II) The Department of Energy.
(III) The Department of Homeland Security.
(IV) The Department of Justice.
(V) The Department of State.
(VI) The Department of the Treasury.
(VII) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(VIII) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(IX) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(X) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(XI) The National Security Agency.
(B) Limitation
An inspector general of an agency may not be selected to sit on the panel under subparagraph (A)(ii) to review any matter relating to a decision made by such agency.
(C) Chairperson
(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), the chairperson of any panel convened under this subsection shall be the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(ii) Conflicts of interest
If the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community finds cause to recuse himself or herself from a panel convened under this subsection, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall—
(I) select a chairperson from inspectors general of the elements listed under subparagraph (A)(ii) whom the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community considers appropriate; and
(II) notify the congressional intelligence committees of such selection.
(3) Period of review
Each external review panel convened under this subsection to review a claim shall complete review of the claim no later than 270 days after the date on which the Inspector General convenes the external review panel.
(d) Remedies
(1) Panel recommendations
If an external review panel convened under subsection (c) determines, pursuant to a review of a claim submitted by an individual under subsection (a), that the individual was the subject of a personnel action prohibited under
(A) in the case of an employee or former employee—
(i) to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the reprisal not occurred; or
(ii) reconsider the employee's or former employee's eligibility for access to classified information consistent with national security; or
(B) in any other case, such other action as the external review panel considers appropriate.
(2) Agency action
(A) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date on which the head of an agency receives a recommendation from an external review panel under paragraph (1), the head shall—
(i) give full consideration to such recommendation; and
(ii) inform the panel and the Director of National Intelligence of what action the head has taken with respect to the recommendation.
(B) Failure to inform
The Director shall notify the President of any failures to comply with subparagraph (A)(ii).
(e) Annual reports
(1) In general
Not less frequently than once each year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Director of National Intelligence a report on the activities under this section during the previous year.
(2) Contents
Subject to such limitations as the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community considers necessary to protect the privacy of an individual who has made a claim described in subsection (b), each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, for the period covered by the report, the following:
(A) The determinations and recommendations made by the external review panels convened under this section.
(B) The responses of the heads of agencies that received recommendations from the external review panels.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1106, as added
§3237. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
(a) Requirement
On an annual basis, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
(b) Contents
Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.
(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.
(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of China.
(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese Communist Party.
(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department that are operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
(8) An identification of influence activities and operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United States science and technology sectors, specifically employees of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and students in the science and technology sector in the United States.
(9) A listing of all known Chinese talent recruitment programs operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
(10) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
(c) Coordination
In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.
(d) Form
Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1107, as added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b)(9), (10).
2020—
Subsecs. (a), (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(8), (9).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Report
§3237a. Repealed. Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXVIII, §6811(a), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3600
Section, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1107A, as added
§3238. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Russian Federation
(a) Requirement
On an annual basis, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Russian Federation.
(b) Contents
Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description and listing of the Russian organizations and persons involved in influence operations and campaigns operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated with or receive funding from organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1), particularly such entities operating in the United States.
(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and influence populations within the United States.
(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States or candidates for election in the United States.
(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1).
(c) Coordination
In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.
(d) Form
Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1108, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Initial Report
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 5501(c) of
§3239. Requirement to buy certain satellite component from American sources
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered element of the intelligence community
The term "covered element of the intelligence community" means an element of the intelligence community that is not an element of the Department of Defense.
(2) National security satellite
The term "national security satellite" means a satellite weighing over 400 pounds whose principle purpose is to support the national security or intelligence needs of the United States Government.
(3) United States
The term "United States" means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.
(b) Requirement
Beginning January 1, 2021, except as provided in subsection (c), a covered element of the intelligence community may not award a contract for a national security satellite if the satellite uses a star tracker that is not produced in the United States, including with respect to both the software and the hardware of the star tracker.
(c) Exception
The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may waive the requirement under subsection (b) if, on a case-by-case basis, the head certifies in writing to the congressional intelligence committees that—
(1) there is no available star tracker produced in the United States that meets the mission and design requirements of the national security satellite for which the star tracker will be used;
(2) the cost of a star tracker produced in the United States is unreasonable, based on a market survey; or
(3) such waiver is necessary for the national security interests of the United States based on an urgent and compelling need.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1109, as added
§3240. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be specifically targeting the Chinese-American community for intelligence purposes;
(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling;
(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's Republic of China;
(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China; and
(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all Chinese Americans.
(b) Report
On an annual basis, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees containing—
(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China; and
(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.
(c) Form
The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1110, formerly
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2020—
Subsec. (b).
§3241. Biennial reports on foreign biological threats
(a) Reports
On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 years after March 15, 2022, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the intelligence community with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country.
(b) Matters included
Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the following:
(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to such threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities.
(2) A detailed description of all duties and responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly authorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any identified gaps in such duties or responsibilities.
(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant elements of the intelligence community with respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and responsibilities specified in paragraph (2).
(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats, and an assessment of any identified gaps therein.
(5) A description of the coordination and interactions among the relevant elements of the intelligence community and non-intelligence community partners.
(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts relating to such threats, including any foreign academics engaged in such efforts, and a description of how the intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-intelligence community partners to counter such foreign malign influence.
(c) Form
Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered country
The term "covered country" means—
(A) China;
(B) Iran;
(C) North Korea;
(D) Russia; and
(E) any other foreign country—
(i) from which the Director of National Intelligence determines a biological threat emanates; or
(ii) that the Director determines has a known history of, or has been assessed as having conditions present for, infectious disease outbreaks or epidemics.
(2) Foreign biological threat
The term "foreign biological threat" means biological warfare, bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases, or accidental exposures to biological materials, without regard to whether the threat originates from a state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, or an undetermined source.
(3) Foreign malign influence
The term "foreign malign influence" has the meaning given such term in section 3059(e) 1 of this title.
(4) Non-intelligence community partner
The term "non-intelligence community partner" means a Federal department or agency that is not an element of the intelligence community.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1111, as added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
First Report
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 821(b) of div. X of
1 See References in Text note below.
§3242. Annual reports on certain cyber vulnerabilities procured by intelligence community and foreign commercial providers of cyber vulnerabilities
(a) Annual reports
On an annual basis through 2026, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing information on foreign commercial providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence community through foreign commercial providers.
(b) Elements
Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured through a foreign commercial provider, including—
(A) a description of the vulnerability;
(B) the date of the procurement;
(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
(D) the cost of the procurement;
(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if the commercial provider was not the original supplier of the vulnerability, a description of the original supplier;
(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and
(G) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to use the vulnerability, including whether such use will be operational or for research and development, and the approximate timeline for such use.
(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that—
(A) pose a significant threat to the national security of the United States; or
(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any foreign government that—
(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to target United States persons, the United States Government, journalists, or dissidents; or
(ii) has an established pattern or practice of violating human rights or suppressing dissent.
(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence community has conducted business with the foreign commercial providers identified under paragraph (2) during the 5-year period preceding the date of the report.
(c) Form
Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Commercial provider
The term "commercial provider" means any person that sells, or acts as a broker, for a cyber vulnerability.
(2) Cyber vulnerability
The term "cyber vulnerability" means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code that is intended to compromise a device, network, or system, including such a tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code procured by the intelligence community for purposes of research and development.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1112, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
First Report
§3243. Periodic reports on technology strategy of intelligence community
(a) Reports
On a basis that is not less frequent than once every 4 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of such other agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the technology strategy of the intelligence community, which shall be designed to support the maintenance of the leadership of the United States in critical and emerging technologies essential to the national security of the United States.
(b) Elements
Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of technologies critical to the national security of the United States, particularly those technologies with respect to which foreign countries that are adversarial to the United States have or are poised to match or surpass the technology leadership of the United States.
(2) A review of current technology policies of the intelligence community, including long-term goals.
(3) An identification of sectors and supply chains the Director determines to be of the greatest strategic importance to national security.
(4) An identification of opportunities to protect the leadership of the United States, and the allies and partners of the United States, in critical technologies, including through targeted export controls, investment screening, and counterintelligence activities.
(5) An identification of research and development areas the Director determines critical to the national security of the United States, including areas in which the private sector does not focus.
(6) Recommendations for growing talent in key critical and emerging technologies and enhancing the ability of the intelligence community to recruit and retain individuals with critical skills relating to such technologies.
(7) An identification of opportunities to improve the leadership of the United States in critical technologies, including opportunities to develop international partnerships to reinforce domestic policy actions, develop new markets, engage in collaborative research, and maintain an international environment that reflects the values of the United States and protects the interests of the United States.
(8) A technology annex to establish an approach for the identification, prioritization, development, and fielding of emerging technologies critical to the mission of the intelligence community.
(9) Such other information as the Director determines may be necessary to inform Congress on matters relating to the technology strategy of the intelligence community and related implications for the national security of the United States.
(c) Form of annex
Each annex submitted under subsection (b)(8) may be submitted in classified form.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1113, as added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
First Report
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 823(b) of div. X of
§3244. Annual report on reporting requirements
(a) Annual report required
Not later than March 1 of each fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report detailing all congressionally mandated reporting requirements applicable to Office 1 of the Director of National Intelligence for the upcoming fiscal year.
(b) Contents
Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include, for the fiscal year covered by the report and for each congressionally mandated reporting requirement detailed in the report:
(1) A description of the reporting requirement.
(2) A citation to the provision of law (or other source of congressional directive) imposing the reporting requirement.
(3) Whether the reporting requirement is recurring, conditional, or subject to a termination provision.
(4) Whether the Director recommends repealing or modifying the requirement.
(c) Form
Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1114, as added