PART VI—PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
Senate Revision Amendment
Chapters 169, 171 and 173 were renumbered "167", "169" and "171", respectively, without change in their section numbers, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2014—
2010—
2000—
1998—
1996—
1995—
1992—
1990—
1982—
1980—
1966—
1960—
2 So in original. Probably should be capitalized.
CHAPTER 151 —DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
§2201. Creation of remedy
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under
(b) For limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents see section 505 or 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Amendment of Section
For termination of amendment by section 501(c) of
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §400 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §274d, as added June 14, 1934, ch. 512,
This section is based on the first paragraph of
While this section does not exclude declaratory judgments with respect to State taxes, such suits will not ordinarily be entertained in the courts of the United States where State law makes provision for payment under protest and recovery back or otherwise affords adequate remedy in the State courts. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, La. 1943, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 319 U.S. 293, 87 L.Ed. 1407. See also Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, Conn. 1944, 65 S.Ct. 152, 323 U.S. 101, 89 L.Ed. 101. See also
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
Section corrects a typographical error in
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Section 516A(f)(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Sections 505 and 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, referred to in subsec. (b), are classified to sections 355 and 360b, respectively, of Title 21, Food and Drugs.
Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to
Amendments
2020—Subsec. (a).
2010—Subsec. (b).
1993—Subsec. (a).
1988—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1984—
1978—
1976—
1958—
1954—Act Aug. 28, 1954, extended provisions to Alaska.
1949—Act May 24, 1949, corrected spelling of "or" in second sentence.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2020 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1993 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective and Termination Dates of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1976 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1958 Amendment
Amendment by
Effect of Termination of USMCA Country Status
For provisions relating to effect of termination of USMCA country status on sections 401 to 432 of
Amount in Controversy
Jurisdictional amount in diversity of citizenship cases, see
§2202. Further relief
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §400 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §274d, as added June 14, 1934, ch. 512,
This section is based on the second paragraph of
Provision in said section 400 that the court shall require adverse parties whose rights are adjudicated to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith, were omitted as unnecessary and covered by the revised section.
Provisions relating to submission of interrogatories to a jury were omitted as covered by rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes were made in phraseology.
CHAPTER 153 —HABEAS CORPUS
Senate Revision Amendment
Chapter catchline was changed by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1978—
1966—
§2241. Power to grant writ
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§451, 452, 453 (R.S. §§751, 752, 753; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §291,
Section consolidates
Words "for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty" in
Subsection (b) was added to give statutory sanction to orderly and appropriate procedure. A circuit judge who unnecessarily entertains applications which should be addressed to the district court, thereby disqualifies himself to hear such matters on appeal and to that extent limits his usefulness as a judge of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Justices should not be burdened with applications for writs cognizable in the district courts.
1949 Act
This section inserts commas in certain parts of the text of subsection (b) of
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, referred to in subsec. (e)(2), is section 1005(e) of title X of div. A of
Constitutionality
For information regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of this section, as added and amended by section 1005(e)(1) of
Amendments
2008—Subsec. (e).
2006—Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (e).
2005—Subsec. (e).
1966—Subsec. (d).
1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, inserted commas after "Supreme Court" and "any justice thereof".
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2006 Amendment
Treaty Obligations Not Establishing Grounds for Certain Claims
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
"(2) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
"(3) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and
"(4) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516)."
§2242. Application
Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.
It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known.
It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.
If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §454 (R.S. §754).
Words "or by someone acting in his behalf" were added. This follows the actual practice of the courts, as set forth in United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, C.C. 1908, 164 F. 152; Collins v. Traeger, C.C.A. 1928, 27 F.2d 842, and cases cited.
The third paragraph is new. It was added to conform to existing practice as approved by judicial decisions. See Dorsey v. Gill (App.D.C.) 148 F.2d 857, 865, 866. See also Holiday v. Johnston, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 313 U.S. 342, 85 L.Ed. 1392.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.
The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.
The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.
When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.
Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.
The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.
The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.
The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, and 461 (R.S. §§755–761).
Section consolidates
The requirement for return within 3 days "unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 days is allowed" in the second paragraph, was substituted for the provision of such section 455 which allowed 3 days for return if within 20 miles, 10 days if more than 20 but not more than 100 miles, and 20 days if more than 100 miles distant.
Words "unless for good cause additional time is allowed" in the fourth paragraph, were substituted for words "unless the party petitioning requests a longer time" in
The fifth paragraph providing for production of the body of the detained person at the hearing is in conformity with Walker v. Johnston, 1941, 61 S.Ct. 574, 312 U.S. 275, 85 L.Ed. 830.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2244. Finality of determination
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section 2255.
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.
(c) In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court therein, unless the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and the court shall further find that the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in such record by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
This section makes no material change in existing practice. Notwithstanding the opportunity open to litigants to abuse the writ, the courts have consistently refused to entertain successive "nuisance" applications for habeas corpus. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Hatton Sumners of the Committee on the Judiciary and referred to that Committee.
The practice of suing out successive, repetitious, and unfounded writs of habeas corpus imposes an unnecessary burden on the courts. See Dorsey v. Gill, 1945, 148 F.2d 857, 862, in which Miller, J., notes that "petitions for the writ are used not only as they should be to protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for harassing court, custodial, and enforcement officers with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The most extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1, 1939, and April 1944 presented in the District Court 50 petitions for writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions; a third, 24; a fourth, 22; a fifth, 20. One hundred nineteen persons have presented 597 petitions—an average of 5."
Senate Revision Amendments
Section amended to modify original language which denied Federal judges power to entertain application for writ where legality of detention had been determined on prior application and later application presented no new grounds, and to omit reference to rehearing in section catch line and original provision authorizing hearing judge to grant rehearing. 80th Congress, Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 45.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1996—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (d).
1966—
§2245. Certificate of trial judge admissible in evidence
On the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment, setting forth the facts occurring at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence. Copies of the certificate shall be filed with the court in which the application is pending and in the court in which the trial took place.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
This section makes no substantive change in existing law. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing law and promotes uniform procedure.
§2246. Evidence; depositions; affidavits
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
This section is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing practice without substantial change.
§2247. Documentary evidence
On application for a writ of habeas corpus documentary evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence and a transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application by or in behalf of the same petitioner, shall be admissible in evidence.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It is declaratory of existing law and practice.
§2248. Return or answer; conclusiveness
The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. At common law the return was conclusive and could not be controverted but it is now almost universally held that the return is not conclusive of the facts alleged therein. 39 C.J.S. pp. 664–666, §§98, 99.
§2249. Certified copies of indictment, plea and judgment; duty of respondent
On application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of any person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, the respondent shall promptly file with the court certified copies of the indictment, plea of petitioner and the judgment, or such of them as may be material to the questions raised, if the petitioner fails to attach them to his petition, and same shall be attached to the return to the writ, or to the answer to the order to show cause.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It conforms to the prevailing practice in habeas corpus proceedings.
§2250. Indigent petitioner entitled to documents without cost
If on any application for a writ of habeas corpus an order has been made permitting the petitioner to prosecute the application in forma pauperis, the clerk of any court of the United States shall furnish to the petitioner without cost certified copies of such documents or parts of the record on file in his office as may be required by order of the judge before whom the application is pending.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It conforms to the prevailing practice.
§2251. Stay of State court proceedings
(a)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(b)
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §465 (R.S. §766; Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 226,
Provisions relating to proceedings pending in 1934 were deleted as obsolete.
A provision requiring an appeal to be taken within 3 months was omitted as covered by
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2006—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2006 Amendment
"(1)
"(2)
§2252. Notice
Prior to the hearing of a habeas corpus proceeding in behalf of a person in custody of State officers or by virtue of State laws notice shall be served on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of such State as the justice or judge at the time of issuing the writ shall direct.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §462 (R.S. §762).
Provision for making due proof of such service was omitted as unnecessary. The sheriff's or marshal's return is sufficient.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2253. Appeal
(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§463(a) and 466 (Mar. 10, 1908, ch. 76, 36 [35] Stat. 40; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §§6, 13,
This section consolidates paragraph (a) of section 463, and
The last two sentences of
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects a typographical error in the second paragraph of
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1996—
"In a habeas corpus proceeding before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had.
"There shall be no right of appeal from such an order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his detention pending removal proceedings.
"An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause."
1951—Act Oct. 31, 1951, substituted "to remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his" for "of removal issued pursuant to
1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted "3042" for "3041" in second par.
§2254. State custody; remedies in Federal courts
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
(f) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination.
(g) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
(h) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by
(i) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (See Ex parte Hawk, 1944, 64 S. Ct. 448, 321, U.S. 114, 88L. Ed. 572.)
Senate Revision Amendments
Senate amendment to this section, Senate Report No. 1559, amendment No. 47, has three declared purposes, set forth as follows:
"The first is to eliminate from the prohibition of the section applications in behalf of prisoners in custody under authority of a State officer but whose custody has not been directed by the judgment of a State court. If the section were applied to applications by persons detained solely under authority of a State officer it would unduly hamper Federal courts in the protection of Federal officers prosecuted for acts committed in the course of official duty.
"The second purpose is to eliminate, as a ground of Federal jurisdiction to review by habeas corpus judgments of State courts, the proposition that the State court has denied a prisoner a 'fair adjudication of the legality of his detention under the Constitution and laws of the United States.' The Judicial Conference believes that this would be an undesirable ground for Federal jurisdiction in addition to exhaustion of State remedies or lack of adequate remedy in the State courts because it would permit proceedings in the Federal court on this ground before the petitioner had exhausted his State remedies. This ground would, of course, always be open to a petitioner to assert in the Federal court after he had exhausted his State remedies or if he had no adequate State remedy.
"The third purpose is to substitute detailed and specific language for the phrase 'no adequate remedy available.' That phrase is not sufficiently specific and precise, and its meaning should, therefore, be spelled out in more detail in the section as is done by the amendment."
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to
Amendments
1996—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsecs. (f), (g).
Subsecs. (h), (i).
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Approval and Effective Date of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Section 2255 Proceedings for United States District Courts
For approval and effective date of rules governing petitions under section 2254 and motions under
Postponement of Effective Date of Proposed Rules Governing Proceedings Under Sections 2254 and 2255 of this Title
Rules and forms governing proceedings under
RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
(Effective Feb. 1, 1977, as amended to Dec. 1, 2024)
APPENDIX OF FORMS
Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody.
Effective Date of Rules; Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
Rules governing Section 2254 cases, and the amendments thereto by
Rule 1. Scope
(a)
(1) a person in custody under a state-court judgment who seeks a determination that the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; and
(2) a person in custody under a state-court or federal-court judgment who seeks a determination that future custody under a state-court judgment would violate the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
(b)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 1 provides that the habeas corpus rules are applicable to petitions by persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Whether the rules ought to apply to other situations (e.g., person in active military service, Glazier v. Hackel, 440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971); or a reservist called to active duty but not reported, Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968)) is left to the discretion of the court.
The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. 28 U.S.C. §2241(c) provides that the "writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless * * * (h)e is in custody in violation of the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. §2254 deals specifically with state custody, providing that habeas corpus shall apply only "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court * * *."
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, the court said: "It is clear . . . that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." 411 U.S. at 484.
Initially the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus was appropriate only in those situations in which petitioner's claim would, if upheld, result in an immediate release from a present custody. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). This was changed in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), in which the court held that habeas corpus was a proper way to attack a consecutive sentence to be served in the future, expressing the view that consecutive sentences resulted in present custody under both judgments, not merely the one imposing the first sentence. This view was expanded in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), to recognize the propriety of habeas corpus in a case in which petitioner was in custody when the petition had been originally filed but had since been unconditionally released from custody.
See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 486 et seq.
Since Carafas, custody has been construed more liberally by the courts so as to make a §2255 motion or habeas corpus petition proper in more situations. "In custody" now includes a person who is: on parole, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); at large on his own recognizance but subject to several conditions pending execution of his sentence, Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973); or released on bail after conviction pending final disposition of his case, Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 95 S.Ct. 886 (1975). See also United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967) (on probation); Walker v. North Carolina, 262 F.Supp. 102 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967) (recipient of a conditionally suspended sentence); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1968); Marden v. Purdy, 409 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1969) (free on bail); United States ex rel. Smith v. Dibella, 314 F.Supp. 446 (D.Conn. 1970) (release on own recognizance); Choung v. California, 320 F.Supp. 625 (E.D.Cal. 1970) (federal stay of state court sentence); United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971) (subject to parole detainer warrant); Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970) (released on appeal bond); Glover v. North Carolina, 301 F.Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C. 1969) (sentence served, but as convicted felon disqualified from engaging in several activities).
The courts are not unanimous in dealing with the above situations, and the boundaries of custody remain somewhat unclear. In Morgan v. Thomas, 321 F.Supp. 565 (S.D.Miss. 1970), the court noted:
It is axiomatic that actual physical custody or restraint is not required to confer habeas jurisdiction. Rather, the term is synonymous with restraint of liberty. The real question is how much restraint of one's liberty is necessary before the right to apply for the writ comes into play. * * *
It is clear however, that something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus.
321 F.Supp. at 573
Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968), reviewed prior "custody" doctrine and reaffirmed a generalized flexible approach to the issue. In speaking about 28 U.S.C. §2241, the first section in the habeas corpus statutes, the court said:
While the language of the Act indicates that a writ of habeas corpus is appropriate only when a petitioner is "in custody," * * * the Act "does not attempt to mark the boundaries of 'custody' nor in any way other than by use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ can be used." * * * And, recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that "[i]t [habeas corpus] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty." * * * "[B]esides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus."
398 F.2d at 710–711
There is, as of now, no final list of the situations which are appropriate for habeas corpus relief. It is not the intent of these rules or notes to define or limit "custody."
It is, however, the view of the Advisory Committee that claims of improper conditions of custody or confinement (not related to the propriety of the custody itself), can better be handled by other means such as 42 U.S.C. §1983 and other related statutes. In Wilwording v. Swanson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the court treated a habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Civil Rights Act. Compare Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
The distinction between duration of confinement and conditions of confinement may be difficult to draw. Compare Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), with Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (1975).
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 1 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. In response to at least one commentator on the published rules, the Committee modified Rule 1(b) to reflect the point that if the court was considering a habeas petition not covered by §2254, the court could apply some or all of the rules.
Rule 2. The Petition
(a)
(b)
(c)
(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner;
(2) state the facts supporting each ground;
(3) state the relief requested;
(4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and
(5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. §2242.
(d)
(e)
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 2 describes the requirements of the actual petition, including matters relating to its form, contents, scope, and sufficiency. The rule provides more specific guidance for a petitioner and the court than 28 U.S.C. §2242, after which it is patterned.
Subdivision (a) provides that an applicant challenging a state judgment, pursuant to which he is presently in custody, must make his application in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It also requires that the state officer having custody of the applicant be named as respondent. This is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §2242, which says in part, "[Application for a writ of habeas corpus] shall allege * * * the name of the person who has custody over [the applicant] * * *." The proper person to be served in the usual case is either the warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated (Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F.2d 19 (D.C.Cir. 1945)) or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.
Subdivision (b) prescribes the procedure to be used for a petition challenging a judgment under which the petitioner will be subject to custody in the future. In this event the relief sought will usually not be released from present custody, but rather for a declaration that the judgment being attacked is invalid. Subdivision (b) thus provides for a prayer for "appropriate relief." It is also provided that the attorney general of the state of the judgment as well as the state officer having actual custody of the petitioner shall be named as respondents. This is appropriate because no one will have custody of the petitioner in the state of the judgment being attacked, and the habeas corpus action will usually be defended by the attorney general. The attorney general is in the best position to inform the court as to who the proper party respondent is. If it is not the attorney general, he can move for a substitution of party.
Since the concept of "custody" requisite to the consideration of a petition for habeas corpus has been enlarged significantly in recent years, it may be worthwhile to spell out the various situations which might arise and who should be named as respondent(s) for each situation.
(1) The applicant is in jail, prison, or other actual physical restraint due to the state action he is attacking. The named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner (for example, the warden of the prison).
(2) The applicant is on probation or parole due to the state judgment he is attacking. The named respondents shall be the particular probation or parole officer responsible for supervising the applicant, and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency, or the state correctional agency, as appropriate.
(3) The applicant is in custody in any other manner differing from (1) and (2) above due to the effects of the state action he seeks relief from. The named respondent should be the attorney general of the state wherein such action was taken.
(4) The applicant is in jail, prison, or other actual physical restraint but is attacking a state action which will cause him to be kept in custody in the future rather than the government action under which he is presently confined. The named respondents shall be the state or federal officer who has official custody of him at the time the petition is filed and the attorney general of the state whose action subjects the petitioner to future custody.
(5) The applicant is in custody, although not physically restrained, and is attacking a state action which will result in his future custody rather than the government action out of which his present custody arises. The named respondent(s) shall be the attorney general of the state whose action subjects the petitioner to future custody, as well as the government officer who has present official custody of the petitioner if there is such an officer and his identity is ascertainable.
In any of the above situations the judge may require or allow the petitioner to join an additional or different party as a respondent if to do so would serve the ends of justice.
As seen in rule 1 and paragraphs (4) and (5) above, these rules contemplate that a petitioner currently in federal custody will be permitted to apply for habeas relief from a state restraint which is to go into effect in the future. There has been disagreement in the courts as to whether they have jurisdiction of the habeas application under these circumstances (compare Piper v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 1259 (D.Conn. 1969), with United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971)). This rule seeks to make clear that they do have such jurisdiction.
Subdivision (c) provides that unless a district court requires otherwise by local rule, the petition must be in the form annexed to these rules. Having a standard prescribed form has several advantages. In the past, petitions have frequently contained mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any facts. Since it is the relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that is important, these petitions were obviously deficient. In addition, lengthy and often illegible petitions, arranged in no logical order, were submitted to judges who have had to spend hours deciphering them. For example, in Passic v. Michigan, 98 F.Supp. 1015, 1016 (E.D.Mich. 1951), the court dismissed a petition for habeas corpus, describing it as "two thousand pages of irrational, prolix and redundant pleadings * * *."
Administrative convenience, of benefit to both the court and the petitioner, results from the use of a prescribed form. Judge Hubert L. Will briefly described the experience with the use of a standard form in the Northern District of Illinois:
Our own experience, though somewhat limited, has been quite satisfactory. * * *
In addition, [petitions] almost always contain the necessary basic information * * *. Very rarely do we get the kind of hybrid federal-state habeas corpus petition with civil rights allegations thrown in which were not uncommon in the past. * * * [W]hen a real constitutional issue is raised it is quickly apparent * * *.
33 F.R.D. 363, 384
Approximately 65 to 70% of all districts have adopted forms or local rules which require answers to essentially the same questions as contained in the standard form annexed to these rules. All courts using forms have indicated the petitions are time-saving and more legible. The form is particularly helpful in getting information about whether there has been an exhaustion of state remedies or, at least, where that information can be obtained.
The requirement of a standard form benefits the petitioner as well. His assertions are more readily apparent, and a meritorious claim is more likely to be properly raised and supported. The inclusion in the form of the ten most frequently raised grounds in habeas corpus petitions is intended to encourage the applicant to raise all his asserted grounds in one petition. It may better enable him to recognize if an issue he seeks to raise is cognizable under habeas corpus and hopefully inform him of those issues as to which he must first exhaust his state remedies.
Some commentators have suggested that the use of forms is of little help because the questions usually are too general, amounting to little more than a restatement of the statute. They contend the blanks permit a prisoner to fill in the same ambiguous answers he would have offered without the aid of a form. See Comment, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1177–1178 (1970). Certainly, as long as the statute requires factual pleading, the adequacy of a petition will continue to be affected largely by the petitioner's intelligence and the legal advice available to him. On balance, however, the use of forms has contributed enough to warrant mandating their use.
Giving the petitioner a list of often-raised grounds may, it is said, encourage perjury. See Comment, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1178 (1970). Most inmates are aware of, or have access to, some common constitutional grounds for relief. Thus, the risk of perjury is not likely to be substantially increased and the benefit of the list for some inmates seems sufficient to outweigh any slight risk that perjury will increase. There is a penalty for perjury, and this would seem the most appropriate way to try to discourage it.
Legal assistance is increasingly available to inmates either through paraprofessional programs involving law students or special programs staffed by members of the bar. See Jacob and Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 Kan.L.Rev. 493 (1970). In these situations, the prescribed form can be filled out more competently, and it does serve to ensure a degree of uniformity in the manner in which habeas corpus claims are presented.
Subdivision (c) directs the clerk of the district court to make available to applicants upon request, without charge, blank petitions in the prescribed form.
Subdivision (c) also requires that all available grounds for relief be presented in the petition, including those grounds of which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the petitioner should be aware. This is reinforced by rule 9(b), which allows dismissal of a second petition which fails to allege new grounds or, if new grounds are alleged, the judge finds an inexcusable failure to assert the ground in the prior petition.
Both subdivision (c) and the annexed form require a legibly handwritten or typewritten petition. As required by 28 U.S.C. §2242, the petition must be signed and sworn to by the petitioner (or someone acting in his behalf).
Subdivision (d) provides that a single petition may assert a claim only against the judgment or judgments of a single state court (i.e., a court of the same county or judicial district or circuit). This permits, but does not require, an attack in a single petition on judgments based upon separate indictments or on separate counts even though sentences were imposed on separate days by the same court. A claim against a judgment of a court of a different political subdivision must be raised by means of a separate petition.
Subdivision (e) allows the clerk to return an insufficient petition to the petitioner, and it must be returned if the clerk is so directed by a judge of the court. Any failure to comply with the requirements of rule 2 or 3 is grounds for insufficiency. In situations where there may be arguable noncompliance with another rule, such as rule 9, the judge, not the clerk, must make the decision. If the petition is returned it must be accompanied by a statement of the reason for its return. No petitioner should be left to speculate as to why or in what manner his petition failed to conform to these rules.
Subdivision (e) also provides that the clerk shall retain one copy of the insufficient petition. If the prisoner files another petition, the clerk will be in a better position to determine the sufficiency of the new petition. If the new petition is insufficient, comparison with the prior petition may indicate whether the prisoner has failed to understand the clerk's prior explanation for its insufficiency, so that the clerk can make another, hopefully successful, attempt at transmitting this information to the petitioner. If the petitioner insists that the original petition was in compliance with the rules, a copy of the original petition is available for the consideration of the judge. It is probably better practice to make a photocopy of a petition which can be corrected by the petitioner, thus saving the petitioner the task of completing an additional copy.
1982 Amendment
Subdivision (c). The amendment takes into account 28 U.S.C. §1746, enacted after adoption of the §2254 rules. Section 1746 provides that in lieu of an affidavit an unsworn statement may be given under penalty of perjury in substantially the following form if executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)." The statute is "intended to encompass prisoner litigation," and the statutory alternative is especially appropriate in such cases because a notary might not be readily available. Carter v. Clark, 616 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1980). The §2254 forms have been revised accordingly.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 2 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.
Revised Rule 2(c)(5) has been amended by removing the requirement that the petition be signed personally by the petitioner. As reflected in 28 U.S.C. §2242, an application for habeas corpus relief may be filed by the person who is seeking relief, or by someone acting on behalf of that person. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (discussion of requisites for "next friend" standing in petition for habeas corpus). Thus, under the, [sic] amended rule the petition may be signed by petitioner personally or by someone acting on behalf of the petitioner, assuming that the person is authorized to do so, for example, an attorney for the petitioner. The Committee envisions that the courts will apply third-party, or "next-friend," standing analysis in deciding whether the signer was actually authorized to sign the petition on behalf of the petitioner.
The language in new Rule 2(d) has been changed to reflect that a petitioner must substantially follow the standard form, which is appended to the rules, or a form provided by the court. The current rule, Rule 2(c), seems to indicate a preference for the standard "national" form. Under the amended rule, there is no stated preference. The Committee understood that current practice in some courts is that if the petitioner first files a petition using the national form, the courts may then ask the petitioner to supplement it with the local form.
Current Rule 2(e), which provided for returning an insufficient petition, has been deleted. The Committee believed that the approach in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) was more appropriate for dealing with petitions that do not conform to the form requirements of the rule. That Rule provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed Rule 2(c)(2) to read "state the facts" rather then [sic] "briefly summarize the facts." As one commentator noted, the current language may actually mislead the petitioner and is also redundant. The Committee modified Rule 2(c)(5) to emphasize that any person, other than the petitioner, who signs the petition must be authorized to do so; the revised rule now specifically cites §2242. The Note was changed to reflect that point.
Rule 2(c)(4) was modified to account for those cases where the petitioner prints the petition on a computer word-processing program.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—Subd. (c).
Subd. (e).
Rule 3. Filing the Petition; Inmate Filing
(a)
(1) the applicable filing fee, or
(2) a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. §1915, and a certificate from the warden or other appropriate officer of the place of confinement showing the amount of money or securities that the petitioner has in any account in the institution.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 3 sets out the procedures to be followed by the petitioner and the court in filing the petition. Some of its provisions are currently dealt with by local rule or practice, while others are innovations. Subdivision (a) specifies the petitioner's responsibilities. It requires that the petition, which must be accompanied by two conformed copies thereof, be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court. The petition must be accompanied by the filing fee prescribed by law (presently $5; see 28 U.S.C. §1914(a)), unless leave to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis is applied for and granted. In the event the petitioner desires to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis, he must file the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. §1915, together with a certificate showing the amount of funds in his institutional account.
Requiring that the petition be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court provides an efficient and uniform system of filing habeas corpus petitions.
Subdivision (b) requires the clerk to file the petition. If the filing fee accompanies the petition, it may be filed immediately, and, if not, it is contemplated that prompt attention will be given to the request to proceed in forma pauperis. The court may delegate the issuance of the order to the clerk in those cases in which it is clear from the petition that there is full compliance with the requirements to proceed in forma pauperis.
Requiring the copies of the petition to be filed with the clerk will have an impact not only upon administrative matters, but upon more basic problems as well. In districts with more than one judge, a petitioner under present circumstances may send a petition to more than one judge. If no central filing system exists for each district, two judges may independently take different action on the same petition. Even if the action taken is consistent, there may be needless duplication of effort.
The requirement of an additional two copies of the form of the petition is a current practice in many courts. An efficient filing system requires one copy for use by the court (central file), one for the respondent (under 3(b), the respondent receives a copy of the petition whether an answer is required or not), and one for petitioner's counsel, if appointed. Since rule 2 provides that blank copies of the petition in the prescribed form are to be furnished to the applicant free of charge, there should be no undue burden created by this requirement.
Attached to copies of the petition supplied in accordance with rule 2 is an affidavit form for the use of petitioners desiring to proceed in forma pauperis. The form requires information concerning the petitioner's financial resources.
In forma pauperis cases, the petition must also be accompanied by a certificate indicating the amount of funds in the petitioner's institution account. Usually the certificate will be from the warden. If the petitioner is on probation or parole, the court might want to require a certificate from the supervising officer. Petitions by persons on probation or parole are not numerous enough, however, to justify making special provision for this situation in the text of the rule.
The certificate will verify the amount of funds credited to the petitioner in an institution account. The district court may by local rule require that any amount credited to the petitioner, in excess of a stated maximum, must be used for the payment of the filing fee. Since prosecuting an action in forma pauperis is a privilege (see Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965)), it is not to be granted when the petitioner has sufficient resources.
Subdivision (b) details the clerk's duties with regard to filing the petition. If the petition does not appear on its face to comply with the requirements of rules 2 and 3, it may be returned in accordance with rule 2(e). If it appears to comply, it must be filed and entered on the docket in the clerk's office. However, under this subdivision the respondent is not required to answer or otherwise move with respect to the petition unless so ordered by the court.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 3 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended except as described below.
The last sentence of current Rule 3(b), dealing with an answer being filed by the respondent, has been moved to revised Rule 5(a).
Revised Rule 3(b) is new and is intended to parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e), which provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Revised Rule 3(c), which sets out a specific reference to 28 U.S.C. §2244(d), is new and has been added to put petitioners on notice that a one-year statute of limitations applies to petitions filed under these Rules. Although the rule does not address the issue, every circuit that has addressed the issue has taken the position that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17–18 (2d Cir. 2000); Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618–19 (3d Cir. 1998); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) ("We . . . have no occasion to address the question that Justice Stevens raises concerning the availability of equitable tolling.").
Rule 3(d) is new and provides guidance on determining whether a petition from an inmate is considered to have been filed in a timely fashion. The new provision parallels Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C).
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee Note was changed to reflect that the clerk must file a petition, even in those instances where the necessary filing fee or in forma pauperis form is not attached. The Note also includes new language concerning the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Rule 4. Preliminary Review; Serving the Petition and Order
The clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court's assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order. In every case, the clerk must serve a copy of the petition and any order on the respondent and on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state involved.
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 4 outlines the options available to the court after the petition is properly filed. The petition must be promptly presented to and examined by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached thereto that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must enter an order summarily dismissing the petition and cause the petitioner to be notified. If summary dismissal is not ordered, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer or to otherwise plead to the petition within a time period to be fixed in the order.
28 U.S.C. §2243 requires that the writ shall be awarded, or an order to show cause issued, "unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." Such consideration may properly encompass any exhibits attached to the petition, including, but not limited to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state court opinions. The judge may order any of these items for his consideration if they are not yet included with the petition. See 28 U.S.C. §753(f) which authorizes payment for transcripts in habeas corpus cases.
It has been suggested that an answer should be required in every habeas proceeding, taking into account the usual petitioner's lack of legal expertise and the important functions served by the return. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1178 (1970). However, under §2243 it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970). In addition, "notice" pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a "real possibility of constitutional error." See Aubut v. State of Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970).
In the event an answer is ordered under rule 4, the court is accorded greater flexibility than under §2243 in determining within what time period an answer must be made. Under §2243, the respondent must make a return within three days after being so ordered, with additional time of up to forty days allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(a)(2), for good cause. In view of the widespread state of work overload in prosecutors' offices (see, e.g., Allen, 424 F.2d at 141), additional time is granted in some jurisdictions as a matter of course. Rule 4, which contains no fixed time requirement, gives the court the discretion to take into account various factors such as the respondent's workload and the availability of transcripts before determining a time within which an answer must be made.
Rule 4 authorizes the judge to "take such other action as the judge deems appropriate." This is designed to afford the judge flexibility in a case where either dismissal or an order to answer may be inappropriate. For example, the judge may want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent, which may show that petitioner's claims have already been decided on the merits in a federal court; that petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies; that the petitioner is not in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2254; or that a decision in the matter is pending in state court. In these situations, a dismissal may be called for on procedural grounds, which may avoid burdening the respondent with the necessity of filing an answer on the substantive merits of the petition. In other situations, the judge may want to consider a motion from respondent to make the petition more certain. Or the judge may want to dismiss some allegations in the petition, requiring the respondent to answer only those claims which appear to have some arguable merit.
Rule 4 requires that a copy of the petition and any order be served by certified mail on the respondent and the attorney general of the state involved. See 28 U.S.C. §2252. Presently, the respondent often does not receive a copy of the petition unless the court directs an answer under 28 U.S.C. §2243. Although the attorney general is served, he is not required to answer if it is more appropriate for some other agency to do so. Although the rule does not specifically so provide, it is assumed that copies of the court orders to respondent will be mailed to petitioner by the court.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 4 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.
The amended rule reflects that the response to a habeas petition may be a motion.
The requirement that in every case the clerk must serve a copy of the petition on the respondent by certified mail has been deleted. In addition, the current requirement that the petition be sent to the Attorney General of the state has been modified to reflect practice in some jurisdictions that the appropriate state official may be someone other than the Attorney General, for example, the officer in charge of a local confinement facility. This comports with a similar provision in 28 U.S.C. §2252, which addresses notice of habeas corpus proceedings to the state's attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Rule was modified slightly to reflect the view of some commentators that it is common practice in some districts for the government to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The Committee agreed with that recommendation and changed the word "pleading" in the rule to "response." It also made several minor changes to the Committee Note.
Rule 5. The Answer and the Reply
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(1) any brief that the petitioner submitted in an appellate court contesting the conviction or sentence, or contesting an adverse judgment or order in a post-conviction proceeding;
(2) any brief that the prosecution submitted in an appellate court relating to the conviction or sentence; and
(3) the opinions and dispositive orders of the appellate court relating to the conviction or the sentence.
(e)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Apr. 25, 2019, eff. Dec. 1, 2019.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 5 details the contents of the "answer". (This is a change in terminology from "return," which is still used below when referring to prior practice.) The answer plays an obviously important rule in a habeas proceeding:
The return serves several important functions: it permits the court and the parties to uncover quickly the disputed issues; it may reveal to the petitioner's attorney grounds for release that the petitioner did not know; and it may demonstrate that the petitioner's claim is wholly without merit.
Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1083, 1178 (1970).
The answer must respond to the allegations of the petition. While some districts require this by local rule (see, e.g., E.D.N.C.R. 17(B)), under 28 U.S.C. §2243 little specificity is demanded. As a result, courts occasionally receive answers which contain only a statement certifying the true cause of detention, or a series of delaying motions such as motions to dismiss. The requirement of the proposed rule that the "answer shall respond to the allegations of the petition" is intended to ensure that a responsive pleading will be filed and thus the functions of the answer fully served.
The answer must also state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. This is a prerequisite to eligibility for the writ under 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) and applies to every ground the petitioner raises. Most form petitions now in use contain questions requiring information relevant to whether the petitioner has exhausted his remedies. However, the exhaustion requirement is often not understood by the unrepresented petitioner. The attorney general has both the legal expertise and access to the record and thus is in a much better position to inform the court on the matter of exhaustion of state remedies. An alleged failure to exhaust state remedies as to any ground in the petition may be raised by a motion by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.
The rule requires the answer to indicate what transcripts are available, when they can be furnished, and also what proceedings have been recorded and not transcribed. This will serve to inform the court and petitioner as to what factual allegations can be checked against the actual transcripts. The transcripts include pretrial transcripts relating, for example, to pretrial motions to suppress; transcripts of the trial or guilty plea proceeding; and transcripts of any post-conviction proceedings which may have taken place. The respondent is required to furnish those portions of the transcripts which he believes relevant. The court may order the furnishing of additional portions of the transcripts upon the request of petitioner or upon the court's own motion.
Where transcripts are unavailable, the rule provides that a narrative summary of the evidence may be submitted.
Rule 5 (and the general procedure set up by this entire set of rules) does not contemplate a traverse to the answer, except under special circumstances. See advisory committee note to rule 9. Therefore, the old common law assumption of verity of the allegations of a return until impeached, as codified in 28 U.S.C. §2248, is no longer applicable. The meaning of the section, with its exception to the assumption "to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they (the allegations) are not true," has given attorneys and courts a great deal of difficulty. It seems that when the petition and return pose an issue of fact, no traverse is required; Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
We read §2248 of the Judicial Code as not requiring a traverse when a factual issue has been clearly framed by the petition and the return or answer. This section provides that the allegations of a return or answer to an order to show cause shall be accepted as true if not traversed, except to the extent the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true. This contemplates that where the petition and return or answer do present an issue of fact material to the legality of detention, evidence is required to resolve that issue despite the absence of a traverse. This reference to evidence assumes a hearing on issues raised by the allegations of the petition and the return or answer to the order to show cause.
186 F.2d at 342, n. 5
In actual practice, the traverse tends to be a mere pro forma refutation of the return, serving little if any expository function. In the interests of a more streamlined and manageable habeas corpus procedure, it is not required except in those instances where it will serve a truly useful purpose. Also, under rule 11 the court is given the discretion to incorporate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when appropriate, so civil rule 15(a) may be used to allow the petitioner to amend his petition when the court feels this is called for by the contents of the answer.
Rule 5 does not indicate who the answer is to be served upon, but it necessarily implies that it will be mailed to the petitioner (or to his attorney if he has one). The number of copies of the answer required is left to the court's discretion. Although the rule requires only a copy of petitioner's brief on appeal, respondent is free also to file a copy of respondent's brief. In practice, courts have found it helpful to have a copy of respondent's brief.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 5 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.
Revised Rule 5(a), which provides that the respondent is not required to file an answer to the petition, unless a judge so orders, is taken from current Rule 3(b). The revised rule does not address the practice in some districts, where the respondent files a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. But revised Rule 4 permits that practice and reflects the view that if the court does not dismiss the petition, it may require (or permit) the respondent to file a motion.
Rule 5(b) has been amended to require that the answer address not only failure to exhaust state remedies, but also procedural bars, non-retroactivity, and any statute of limitations. Although the latter three matters are not addressed in the current rule, the Committee intends no substantive change with the additional new language. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(3). Instead, the Committee believes that the explicit mention of those issues in the rule conforms to current case law and statutory provisions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1).
Revised Rule 5(d) includes new material. First, Rule 5(d)(2), requires a respondent—assuming an answer is filed—to provide the court with a copy of any brief submitted by the prosecution to the appellate court. And Rule 5(d)(3) now provides that the respondent also file copies of any opinions and dispositive orders of the appellate court concerning the conviction or sentence. These provisions are intended to ensure that the court is provided with additional information that may assist it in resolving the issues raised, or not raised, in the petition.
Finally, revised Rule 5(e) adopts the practice in some jurisdictions of giving the petitioner an opportunity to file a reply to the respondent's answer. Rather than using terms such as "traverse," see 28 U.S.C. §2248, to identify the petitioner's response to the answer, the rule uses the more general term "reply." The Rule prescribes that the court set the time for such responses and in lieu of setting specific time limits in each case, the court may decide to include such time limits in its local rules.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 5(a) was modified to read that the government is not required to "respond" to the petition unless the court so orders; the term "respond" was used because it leaves open the possibility that the government's first response (as it is in some districts) is in the form of a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. The Note has been changed to reflect the fact that although the rule itself does not reflect that particular motion, it is used in some districts and refers the reader to Rule 4.
The Committee also deleted the reference to "affirmative defenses," because the Committee believed that the term was a misnomer in the context of habeas petitions. The Note was also changed to reflect that there has been a potential substantive change from the current rule, to the extent that the published rule now requires that the answer address procedural bars and any statute of limitations. The Note states that the Committee believes the new language reflects current law.
The Note was modified to address the use of the term "traverse." One commentator noted that that is the term that is commonly used but that it does not appear in the rule itself.
Committee Notes on Rules—2019 Amendment
The petitioner has a right to file a reply. Subsection (e), added in 2004, removed the discretion of the court to determine whether or not to allow the petitioner to file a reply in a case under §2254. The current amendment was prompted by decisions holding that courts nevertheless retained the authority to bar a reply.
As amended, the first sentence of subsection (e) makes it even clearer that the petitioner has a right to file a reply to the respondent's answer or pleading. It retains the word "may," which is used throughout the federal rules to mean "is permitted to" or "has a right to." No change in meaning is intended by the substitution of "file" for "submit."
As amended, the second sentence of the rule retains the court's discretion to decide when the reply must be filed (but not whether it may be filed). To avoid uncertainty, the amended rule requires the court to set a time for filing if that time is not already set by local rule. Adding a reference to the time for the filing of any reply to the order requiring the government to file an answer or other pleading provides notice of that deadline to both parties.
Rule 6. Discovery
(a)
(b)
(c)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
This rule prescribes the procedures governing discovery in habeas corpus cases. Subdivision (a) provides that any party may utilize the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rules 26–37) if, and to the extent that, the judge allows. It also provides for the appointment of counsel for a petitioner who qualifies for this when counsel is necessary for effective utilization of discovery procedures permitted by the judge.
Subdivision (a) is consistent with Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969). In that case the court noted,
[I]t is clear that there was no intention to extend to habeas corpus, as a matter of right, the broad discovery provisions * * * of the new [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].
394 U.S. at 295
However, citing the lack of methods for securing information in habeas proceedings, the court pointed to an alternative.
Clearly, in these circumstances * * * the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage. * * * Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651.
394 U.S. at 299
The court concluded that the issue of discovery in habeas corpus cases could best be dealt with as part of an effort to provide general rules of practice for habeas corpus cases:
In fact, it is our view that the rulemaking machinery should be invoked to formulate rules of practice with respect to federal habeas corpus and §2255 proceedings, on a comprehensive basis and not merely one confined to discovery. The problems presented by these proceedings are materially different from those dealt with in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and reliance upon usage and the opaque language of Civil Rule 81(a)(2) is transparently inadequate. In our view the results of a meticulous formulation and adoption of special rules for federal habeas corpus and §2255 proceedings would promise much benefit.
394 U.S. at 301 n. 7
Discovery may, in appropriate cases, aid in developing facts necessary to decide whether to order an evidentiary hearing or to grant the writ following an evidentiary hearing:
We are aware that confinement sometimes induces fantasy which has its basis in the paranoia of prison rather than in fact. But where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found in the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the "usages and principles."
Granting discovery is left to the discretion of the court, discretion to be exercised where there is a showing of good cause why discovery should be allowed. Several commentators have suggested that at least some discovery should be permitted without leave of court. It is argued that the courts will be burdened with weighing the propriety of requests to which the discovered party has no objection. Additionally, the availability of protective orders under Fed.R.Civ.R., Rules 30(b) and 31(d) will provide the necessary safeguards. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1186–87 (1970); Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1296, 1310 (1967).
Nonetheless, it is felt the requirement of prior court approval of all discovery is necessary to prevent abuse, so this requirement is specifically mandated in the rule.
While requests for discovery in habeas proceedings normally follow the granting of an evidentiary hearing, there may be instances in which discovery would be appropriate beforehand. Such an approach was advocated in Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1969), where the opinion stated the trial court could permit interrogatories, provide for deposing witnesses, "and take such other prehearing steps as may be appropriate." While this was an action under §2255, the reasoning would apply equally well to petitions by state prisoners. Such pre-hearing discovery may show an evidentiary hearing to be unnecessary, as when there are "no disputed issues of law or fact." 83 Harv. L.Rev. 1038, 1181 (1970). The court in Harris alluded to such a possibility when it said "the court may * * * authorize such proceedings with respect to development, before or in conjunction with the hearing of the facts * * *." [emphasis added] 394 U.S. at 300. Such pre-hearing discovery, like all discovery under rule 6, requires leave of court. In addition, the provisions in rule 7 for the use of an expanded record may eliminate much of the need for this type of discovery. While probably not as frequently sought or granted as discovery in conjunction with a hearing, it may nonetheless serve a valuable function.
In order to make pre-hearing discovery meaningful, subdivision (a) provides that the judge should appoint counsel for a petitioner who is without counsel and qualifies for appointment when this is necessary for the proper utilization of discovery procedures. Rule 8 provides for the appointment of counsel at the evidentiary hearing stage (see rule 8(b) and advisory committee note), but this would not assist the petitioner who seeks to utilize discovery to stave off dismissal of his petition (see rule 9 and advisory committee note) or to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Thus, if the judge grants a petitioner's request for discovery prior to making a decision as to the necessity for an evidentiary hearing, he should determine whether counsel is necessary for the effective utilization of such discovery and, if so, appoint counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner qualifies for such appointment.
This rule contains very little specificity as to what types and methods of discovery should be made available to the parties in a habeas proceeding, or how, once made available, these discovery procedures should be administered. The purpose of this rule is to get some experience in how discovery would work in actual practice by letting district court judges fashion their own rules in the context of individual cases. When the results of such experience are available it would be desirable to consider whether further, more specific codification should take place.
Subdivision (b) provides for judicial consideration of all matters subject to discovery. A statement of the interrogatories, or requests for admission sought to be answered, and a list of any documents sought to be produced, must accompany a request for discovery. This is to advise the judge of the necessity for discovery and enable him to make certain that the inquiry is relevant and appropriately narrow.
Subdivision (c) refers to the situation where the respondent is granted leave to take the deposition of the petitioner or any other person. In such a case the judge may direct the respondent to pay the expenses and fees of counsel for the petitioner to attend the taking of the deposition, as a condition granting the respondent such leave. While the judge is not required to impose this condition subdivision (c) will give the court the means to do so. Such a provision affords some protection to the indigent petitioner who may be prejudiced by his inability to have counsel, often court-appointed, present at the taking of a deposition. It is recognized that under 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g), court-appointed counsel in a §2254 proceeding is entitled to receive up to $250 and reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. (Compare Fed.R. Crim.P. 15(c).) Typically, however, this does not adequately reimburse counsel if he must attend the taking of depositions or be involved in other pre-hearing proceedings. Subdivision (c) is intended to provide additional funds, if necessary, to be paid by the state government (respondent) to petitioner's counsel.
Although the rule does not specifically so provide, it is assumed that a petitioner who qualifies for the appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g) and is granted leave to take a deposition will be allowed witness costs. This will include recording and transcription of the witness's statement. Such costs are payable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1825. See Opinion of Comptroller General, February 28, 1974.
Subdivision (c) specifically recognizes the right of the respondent to take the deposition of the petitioner. Although the petitioner could not be called to testify against his will in a criminal trial, it is felt the nature of the habeas proceeding, along with the safeguards accorded by the Fifth Amendment and the presence of counsel, justify this provision. See 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1183–84 (1970).
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 6 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Although current Rule 6(b) contains no requirement that the parties provide reasons for the requested discovery, the revised rule does so and also includes a requirement that the request be accompanied by any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents. The Committee believes that the revised rule makes explicit what has been implicit in current practice.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 6(b) was modified to require that discovery requests be supported by reasons, to assist the court in deciding what, if any, discovery should take place. The Committee believed that the change made explicit what has been implicit in current practice.
Rule 7. Expanding the Record
(a)
(b)
(c)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
This rule provides that the judge may direct that the record be expanded. The purpose is to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing. An expanded record may also be helpful when an evidentiary hearing is ordered.
The record may be expanded to include additional material relevant to the merits of the petition. While most petitions are dismissed either summarily or after a response has been made, of those that remain, by far the majority require an evidentiary hearing. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, for example, of 8,423 §2254 cases terminated, 8,231 required court action. Of these, 7,812 were dismissed before a prehearing conference and 469 merited further court action (e.g., expansion of the record, prehearing conference, or an evidentiary hearing). Of the remaining 469 cases, 403 required an evidentiary hearing, often time-consuming, costly, and, at least occasionally, unnecessary. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report, 245a–245c (table C4) (1970). In some instances these hearings were necessitated by slight omissions in the state record which might have been cured by the use of an expanded record.
Authorizing expansion of the record will, hopefully, eliminate some unnecessary hearings. The value of this approach was articulated in Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529–530 (4th Cir. 1970):
Unless it is clear from the pleadings and the files and records that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the statute makes a hearing mandatory. We think there is a permissible intermediate step that may avoid the necessity for an expensive and time consuming evidentiary hearing in every Section 2255 case. It may instead be perfectly appropriate, depending upon the nature of the allegations, for the district court to proceed by requiring that the record be expanded to include letters, documentary evidence, and, in an appropriate case, even affidavits. United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56 (2nd Cir. 1968); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782 (2nd Cir. 1967); Accardi v. United States, 379 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1967). When the issue is one of credibility, resolution on the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive, but that is not to say they may not be helpful.
In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969), the court said:
At any time in the proceedings * * * either on [the court's] own motion or upon cause shown by the petitioner, it may issue such writs and take or authorize such proceedings * * * before or in conjunction with the hearing of the facts * * * [emphasis added]
Subdivision (b) specifies the materials which may be added to the record. These include, without limitation, letters predating the filing of the petition in the district court, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath directed to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Under this subdivision affidavits may be submitted and considered part of the record. Subdivision (b) is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §§2246 and 2247 and the decision in Raines with regard to types of material that may be considered upon application for a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1968), and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
Under subdivision (c) all materials proposed to be included in the record must be submitted to the party against whom they are to be offered.
Under subdivision (d) the judge can require authentication if he believes it desirable to do so.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 7 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as noted below.
Revised Rule 7(a) is not intended to restrict the court's authority to expand the record through means other than requiring the parties themselves to provide the information. Further, the rule has been changed to remove the reference to the "merits" of the petition in the recognition that a court may wish to expand the record in order to assist it in deciding an issue other than the merits of the petition.
The language in current Rule 7(d), which deals with authentication of materials in the expanded record, has been moved to revised Rule 7(a).
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 7(a) by removing the reference to the "merits" of the petition. One commentator had commented that the court might wish to expand the record for purposes other than the merits of the case. The Committee agreed to the change and also changed the rule to reflect that someone other than a party may authenticate the materials.
Rule 8. Evidentiary Hearing
(a)
(b)
(c)
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
This rule outlines the procedure to be followed by the court immediately prior to and after the determination of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.
The provisions are applicable if the petition has not been dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding [including a summary dismissal under rule 4; a dismissal pursuant to a motion by the respondent; a dismissal after the answer and petition are considered; or a dismissal after consideration of the pleadings and an expanded record].
If dismissal has not been ordered, the court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. This determination is to be made upon a review of the answer, the transcript and record of state court proceedings, and if there is one, the expanded record. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 319 (1963):
Ordinarily [the complete state-court] record—including the transcript of testimony (or if unavailable some adequate substitute, such as a narrative record), the pleadings, court opinions, and other pertinent documents—is indispensable to determining whether the habeas applicant received a full and fair state-court evidentiary hearing resulting in reliable findings.
Subdivision (a) contemplates that all of these materials, if available, will be taken into account. This is especially important in view of the standard set down in Townsend for determining when a hearing in the federal habeas proceeding is mandatory.
The appropriate standard * * * is this: Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.
372 U.S. at 312
The circumstances under which a federal hearing is mandatory are now specified in 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). The 1966 amendment clearly places the burden on the petitioner, when there has already been a state hearing, to show that it was not a fair or adequate hearing for one or more of the specifically enumerated reasons, in order to force a federal evidentiary hearing. Since the function of an evidentiary hearing is to try issues of fact (372 U.S. at 309), such a hearing is unnecessary when only issues of law are raised. See, e.g., Yeaman v. United States, 326 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1963).
In situations in which an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory, the judge may nonetheless decide that an evidentiary hearing is desirable:
The purpose of the test is to indicate the situations in which the holding of an evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district judge.
372 U.S. at 318
If the judge decides that an evidentiary hearing is neither required nor desirable, he shall make such a disposition of the petition "as justice shall require." Most habeas petitions are dismissed before the prehearing conference stage (see Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 245a–245c (table C4) (1970)) and of those not dismissed, the majority raise factual issues that necessitate an evidentiary hearing. If no hearing is required, most petitions are dismissed, but in unusual cases the court may grant the relief sought without a hearing. This includes immediate release from custody or nullification of a judgment under which the sentence is to be served in the future.
Subdivision (b) provides that a magistrate, when so empowered by rule of the district court, may recommend to the district judge that an evidentiary hearing be held or that the petition be dismissed, provided he gives the district judge a sufficiently detailed description of the facts so that the judge may decide whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing. This provision is not inconsistent with the holding in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), that the Federal Magistrates Act did not change the requirement of the habeas corpus statute that federal judges personally conduct habeas evidentiary hearings, and that consequently a local district court rule was invalid insofar as it authorized a magistrate to hold such hearings. 28 U.S.C. §636(b) provides that a district court may by rule authorize any magistrate to perform certain additional duties, including preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.
As noted in Wingo, review "by Magistrates of applications for post-trial relief is thus limited to review for the purpose of proposing, not holding, evidentiary hearings."
Utilization of the magistrate as specified in subdivision (b) will aid in the expeditious and fair handling of habeas petitions.
A qualified, experienced magistrate will, it is hoped, acquire an expertise in examining these [postconviction review] applications and summarizing their important contents for the district judge, thereby facilitating his decisions. Law clerks are presently charged with this responsibility by many judges, but judges have noted that the normal 1-year clerkship does not afford law clerks the time or experience necessary to attain real efficiency in handling such applications.
S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1967)
Under subdivision (c) there are two provisions that differ from the procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2243. These are the appointment of counsel and standard for determining how soon the hearing will be held.
If an evidentiary hearing is required the judge must appoint counsel for a petitioner who qualified for appointment under the Criminal Justice Act. Currently, the appointment of counsel is not recognized as a right at any stage of a habeas proceeding. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964). Some district courts have, however, by local rule, required that counsel must be provided for indigent petitioners in cases requiring a hearing. See, e.g., D.N.M.R. 21(f), E.D. N.Y.R. 26(d). Appointment of counsel at this stage is mandatory under subdivision (c). This requirement will not limit the authority of the court to provide counsel at an earlier stage if it is thought desirable to do so as is done in some courts under current practice. At the evidentiary hearing stage, however, an indigent petitioner's access to counsel should not depend on local practice and, for this reason, the furnishing of counsel is made mandatory.
Counsel can perform a valuable function benefiting both the court and the petitioner. The issues raised can be more clearly identified if both sides have the benefit of trained legal personnel. The presence of counsel at the prehearing conference may help to expedite the evidentiary hearing or make it unnecessary, and counsel will be able to make better use of available prehearing discovery procedures. Compare ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §4.4, p. 66 (Approved Draft 1968). At a hearing, the petitioner's claims are more likely to be effectively and properly presented by counsel.
Under 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g), payment is allowed counsel up to $250, plus reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. The standards of indigency under this section are less strict than those regarding eligibility to prosecute a petition in forma pauperis, and thus many who cannot qualify to proceed under 28 U.S.C. §1915 will be entitled to the benefits of counsel under 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g). Under rule 6(c), the court may order the respondent to reimburse counsel from state funds for fees and expenses incurred as the result of the utilization of discovery procedures by the respondent.
Subdivision (c) provides that the hearing shall be conducted as promptly as possible, taking into account "the need of counsel for both parties for adequate time for investigation and preparation." This differs from the language of 28 U.S.C. §2243, which requires that the day for the hearing be set "not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed." This time limit fails to take into account the function that may be served by a prehearing conference and the time required to prepare adequately for an evidentiary hearing. Although "additional time" is often allowed under §2243, subdivision (c) provides more flexibility to take account of the complexity of the case, the availability of important materials, the workload of the attorney general, and the time required by appointed counsel to prepare.
While the rule does not make specific provision for a prehearing conference, the omission is not intended to cast doubt upon the value of such a conference:
The conference may limit the questions to be resolved, identify areas of agreement and dispute, and explore evidentiary problems that may be expected to arise. * * * [S]uch conferences may also disclose that a hearing is unnecessary * * *.
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §4.6, commentary pp. 74–75. (Approved Draft, 1968.)
See also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1188 (1970).
The rule does not contain a specific provision on the subpoenaing of witnesses. It is left to local practice to determine the method for doing this. The implementation of 28 U.S.C. §1825 on the payment of witness fees is dealt with in an opinion of the Comptroller General, February 28, 1974.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 8 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Rule 8(a) is not intended to supersede the restrictions on evidentiary hearings contained in 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2).
The requirement in current Rule 8(b)(2) that a copy of the magistrate judge's findings must be promptly mailed to all parties has been changed in revised Rule 8(b) to require that copies of those findings be served on all parties. As used in this rule, "service" means service consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which allows mailing the copies.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed the Committee Note to reflect the view that the amendments to Rule 8 were not intended to supercede the restrictions on evidentiary hearings contained in §2254(e)(2).
Committee Notes on Rules—2009 Amendment
The time set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days. See the Committee Note to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45(a).
Amendments by Public Law
1976—Subd. (b).
Subd. (c).
Effective Date of 1976 Amendment
Rule 9. Second or Successive Petitions
Before presenting a second or successive petition, the petitioner must obtain an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition as required by 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3) and (4).
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
This rule is intended to minimize abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by limiting the right to assert stale claims and to file multiple petitions. Subdivision (a) deals with the delayed petition. Subdivision (b) deals with the second or successive petition.
Subdivision (a) provides that a petition attacking the judgment of a state court may be dismissed on the grounds of delay if the petitioner knew or should have known of the existence of the grounds he is presently asserting in the petition and the delay has resulted in the state being prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. If the delay is more than five years after the judgment of conviction, prejudice is presumed, although this presumption is rebuttable by the petitioner. Otherwise, the state has the burden of showing such prejudice.
The assertion of stale claims is a problem which is not likely to decrease in frequency. Following the decisions in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), and Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964), the concept of custody expanded greatly, lengthening the time period during which a habeas corpus petition may be filed. The petitioner who is not unconditionally discharged may be on parole or probation for many years. He may at some date, perhaps ten or fifteen years after conviction, decide to challenge the state court judgment. The grounds most often troublesome to the courts are ineffective counsel, denial of right of appeal, plea of guilty unlawfully induced, use of a coerced confession, and illegally constituted jury. The latter four grounds are often interlocked with the allegation of ineffective counsel. When they are asserted after the passage of many years, both the attorney for the defendant and the state have difficulty in ascertaining what the facts are. It often develops that the defense attorney has little or no recollection as to what took place and that many of the participants in the trial are dead or their whereabouts unknown. The court reporter's notes may have been lost or destroyed, thus eliminating any exact record of what transpired. If the case was decided on a guilty plea, even if the record is intact, it may not satisfactorily reveal the extent of the defense attorney's efforts in behalf of the petitioner. As a consequence, there is obvious difficulty in investigating petitioner's allegations.
The interest of both the petitioner and the government can best be served if claims are raised while the evidence is still fresh. The American Bar Association has recognized the interest of the state in protecting itself against stale claims by limiting the right to raise such claims after completion of service of a sentence imposed pursuant to a challenged judgment. See ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §2.4 (c), p. 45 (Approved Draft, 1968). Subdivision (a) is not limited to those who have completed their sentence. Its reach is broader, extending to all instances where delay by the petitioner has prejudiced the state, subject to the qualifications and conditions contained in the subdivision.
In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the court made reference to the issue of the stale claim:
What is at stake in this phase of the case is not the integrity of the state convictions obtained on guilty pleas, but whether, years later, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their pleas, which were perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting their guilt and putting the State to its proof. [Emphasis added.]
397 U.S. at 773
The court refused to allow this, intimating its dislike of collateral attacks on sentences long since imposed which disrupt the state's interest in finality of convictions which were constitutionally valid when obtained.
Subdivision (a) is not a statute of limitations. Rather, the limitation is based on the equitable doctrine of laches. "Laches is such delay in enforcing one's rights as works disadvantage to another." 30A C.J.S. Equity §112, p. 19. Also, the language of the subdivision, "a petition may be dismissed" [emphasis added], is permissive rather than mandatory. This clearly allows the court which is considering the petition to use discretion in assessing the equities of the particular situation.
The use of a flexible rule analogous to laches to bar the assertion of stale claims is suggested in ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §2.4, commentary at 48 (Approved Draft, 1968). Additionally, in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court noted:
Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (dissenting opinion). Among them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks.
372 U.S. at 438
Finally, the doctrine of laches has been applied with reference to another postconviction remedy, the writ of coram nobis. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1606(25), p. 779.
The standard used for determining if the petitioner shall be barred from asserting his claim is consistent with that used in laches provisions generally. The petitioner is held to a standard of reasonable diligence. Any inference or presumption arising by reason of the failure to attack collaterally a conviction may be disregarded where (1) there has been a change of law or fact (new evidence) or (2) where the court, in the interest of justice, feels that the collateral attack should be entertained and the prisoner makes a proper showing as to why he has not asserted a particular ground for relief.
Subdivision (a) establishes the presumption that the passage of more than five years from the time of the judgment of conviction to the time of filing a habeas petition is prejudicial to the state. "Presumption" has the meaning given it by Fed.R.Evid. 301. The prisoner has "the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption" that the state has not been prejudiced by the passage of a substantial period of time. This does not impose too heavy a burden on the petitioner. He usually knows what persons are important to the issue of whether the state has been prejudiced. Rule 6 can be used by the court to allow petitioner liberal discovery to learn whether witnesses have died or whether other circumstances prejudicial to the state have occurred. Even if the petitioner should fail to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the state, he is not automatically barred from asserting his claim. As discussed previously, he may proceed if he neither knew nor, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the grounds for relief.
The presumption of prejudice does not come into play if the time lag is not more than five years.
The time limitation should have a positive effect in encouraging petitioners who have knowledge of it to assert all their claims as soon after conviction as possible. The implementation of this rule can be substantially furthered by the development of greater legal resources for prisoners. See ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §3.1, pp. 49–50 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Subdivision (a) does not constitute an abridgement or modification of a substantive right under 28 U.S.C. §2072. There are safeguards for the hardship case. The rule provides a flexible standard for determining when a petition will be barred.
Subdivision (b) deals with the problem of successive habeas petitions. It provides that the judge may dismiss a second or successive petition (1) if it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief or (2) if new or different grounds for relief are alleged and the judge finds the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition is inexcusable.
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the court, in dealing with the problem of successive applications, stated:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or §2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. [Emphasis added.]
373 U.S. at 15
The requirement is that the prior determination of the same ground has been on the merits. This requirement is in 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) and has been reiterated in many cases since Sanders. See Gains v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1968); Hutchinson v. Craven, 415 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970).
With reference to a successive application asserting a new ground or one not previously decided on the merits, the court in Sanders noted:
In either case, full consideration of the merits of the new application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the writ * * * and this the Government has the burden of pleading. * * *
Thus, for example, if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, * * * he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground.
373 U.S. at 17–18
Subdivision (b) has incorporated this principle and requires that the judge find petitioner's failure to have asserted the new grounds in the prior petition to be inexcusable.
Sanders, 18 U.S.C. §2244, and subdivision (b) make it clear that the court has discretion to entertain a successive application.
The burden is on the government to plead abuse of the writ. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 (1963); Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C.Cir. 1970); cf. Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969). Once the government has done this, the petitioner has the burden of proving that he has not abused the writ. In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948), the court said:
[I]f the Government chooses * * * to claim that the prisoner has abused the writ of habeas corpus, it rests with the Government to make that claim with clarity and particularity in its return to the order to show cause. That is not an intolerable burden. The Government is usually well acquainted with the facts that are necessary to make such a claim. Once a particular abuse has been alleged, the prisoner has the burden of answering that allegation and of proving that he has not abused the writ.
Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out:
Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
373 U.S. at 18
There are instances in which petitioner's failure to assert a ground in a prior petition is excusable. A retroactive change in the law and newly discovered evidence are examples. In rare instances, the court may feel a need to entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 1, 16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discouraged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough to require a means of dealing with them. For example, a successive application, already decided on the merits, may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge in multijudge courts. A known ground may be deliberately withheld in the hope of getting two or more hearings or in the hope that delay will result in witnesses and records being lost. There are instances in which a petitioner will have three or four petitions pending at the same time in the same court. There are many hundreds of cases where the application is at least the second one by the petitioner. This subdivision is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions from this large volume, so that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and fuller consideration.
The form petition, supplied in accordance with rule 2(c), encourages the petitioner to raise all of his available grounds in one petition. It sets out the most common grounds asserted so that these may be brought to his attention.
Some commentators contend that the problem of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus is greatly overstated:
Most prisoners, of course, are interested in being released as soon as possible; only rarely will one inexcusably neglect to raise all available issues in his first federal application. The purpose of the "abuse" bar is apparently to deter repetitious applications from those few bored or vindictive prisoners * * *.
83 Harv.L.Rev. at 1153–1154
See also ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §6.2, commentary at 92 (Approved Draft, 1968), which states: "The occasional, highly litigious prisoner stands out as the rarest exception." While no recent systematic study of repetitious applications exists, there is no reason to believe that the problem has decreased in significance in relation to the total number of §2254 petitions filed. That number has increased from 584 in 1949 to 12,088 in 1971. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report, table 16 (1971). It is appropriate that action be taken by rule to allow the courts to deal with this problem, whatever its specific magnitude. The bar set up by subdivision (b) is not one of rigid application, but rather is within the discretion of the courts on a case-by-case basis.
If it appears to the court after examining the petition and answer (where appropriate) that there is a high probability that the petition will be barred under either subdivision of rule 9, the court ought to afford petitioner an opportunity to explain his apparent abuse. One way of doing this is by the use of the form annexed hereto. The use of a form will ensure a full airing of the issue so that the court is in a better position to decide whether the petition should be barred. This conforms with Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969), where the court stated:
[T]he petitioner is obligated to present facts demonstrating that his earlier failure to raise his claims is excusable and does not amount to an abuse of the writ. However, it is inherent in this obligation placed upon the petitioner that he must be given an opportunity to make his explanation, if he has one. If he is not afforded such an opportunity, the requirement that he satisfy the court that he has not abused the writ is meaningless. Nor do we think that a procedure which allows the imposition of a forfeiture for abuse of the writ, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the issue, comports with the minimum requirements of fairness.
420 F.2d at 399
Use of the recommended form will contribute to an orderly handling of habeas petitions and will contribute to the ability of the court to distinguish the excusable from the inexcusable delay or failure to assert a ground for relief in a prior petition.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 9 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as noted below.
First, current Rule 9(a) has been deleted as unnecessary in light of the applicable one-year statute of limitations for §2254 petitions, added as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).
Second, current Rule 9(b), now Rule 9, has been changed to also reflect provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3) and (4), which now require a petitioner to obtain approval from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a second or successive petition.
Finally, the title of Rule 9 has been changed to reflect the fact that the only topic now addressed in the rules is that of second or successive petitions.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 9.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—Subd. (a).
Subd. (b).
Rule 10. Powers of a Magistrate Judge
A magistrate judge may perform the duties of a district judge under these rules, as authorized under 28 U.S.C. §636.
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
Under this rule the duties imposed upon the judge of the district court by rules 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 may be performed by a magistrate if and to the extent he is empowered to do so by a rule of the district court. However, when such duties involve the making of an order under rule 4 disposing of the petition, that order must be made by the court. The magistrate in such instances must submit to the court his report as to the facts and his recommendation with respect to the order.
The Federal Magistrates Act allows magistrates, when empowered by local rule, to perform certain functions in proceedings for post-trial relief. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(3). The performance of such functions, when authorized, is intended to "afford some degree of relief to district judges and their law clerks, who are presently burdened with burgeoning numbers of habeas corpus petitions and applications under 28 U.S.C. §2255." Committee on the Judiciary, The Federal Magistrates Act, S.Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 26 (1967).
Under 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any district court,
by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate * * * may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The proposed rule recognizes the limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. §636(b) upon the powers of magistrates to act in federal postconviction proceedings. These limitations are: (1) that the magistrate may act only pursuant to a rule passed by the majority of the judges in the district court in which the magistrate serves, and (2) that the duties performed by the magistrate pursuant to such rule be consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
It has been suggested that magistrates be empowered by law to hold hearings and make final decisions in habeas proceedings. See Proposed Reformation of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 Iowa L.Rev. 1147, 1158 (1969). However, the Federal Magistrates Act does not authorize such use of magistrates. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). See advisory committee note to rule 8. While the use of magistrates can help alleviate the strain imposed on the district courts by the large number of unmeritorious habeas petitions, neither 28 U.S.C. §636(b) nor this rule contemplate the abdication by the court of its decision-making responsibility. See also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L.Rev. 1038, 1188 (1970)
Where a full-time magistrate is not available, the duties contemplated by this rule may be assigned to a part-time magistrate.
1979 Amendment
This amendment conforms the rule to subsequently enacted legislation clarifying and further defining the duties which may be assigned to a magistrate, 18 U.S.C. §636, as amended in 1976 by
The reference to particular rules is stricken, as under §636(b)(1)(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to perform duties under other rules as well (e.g., order that further transcripts be furnished under rule 5; appoint counsel under rule 8). The reference to "established standards and criteria" is stricken, as §636(4) requires each district court to "establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties." The exception with respect to a rule 4 order dismissing a petition is stricken, as that limitation appears in §636(b)(1)(B) and is thereby applicable to certain other actions under these rules as well (e.g., determination of a need for an evidentiary hearing under rule 8; dismissal of a delayed or successive petition under rule 9).
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 10 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee restyled the proposed rule.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—
Rule 11. Certificate of Appealability; Time to Appeal
(a)
(b)
(As added Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)
Committee Notes on Rules—2009
Subdivision (a). As provided in 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), an applicant may not appeal to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under §2254 unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability (COA), identifying the specific issues for which the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of constitutional right. New Rule 11(a) makes the requirements concerning COAs more prominent by adding and consolidating them in the appropriate rule of the Rules Governing §2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 11(a) also requires the district judge to grant or deny the certificate at the time a final order is issued. See 3d Cir. R. 22.2, 111.3. This will ensure prompt decision making when the issues are fresh, rather than postponing consideration of the certificate until after a notice of appeal is filed. These changes will expedite proceedings, avoid unnecessary remands, and help inform the applicant's decision whether to file a notice of appeal.
Subdivision (b). The new subdivision is designed to direct parties to the appropriate rule governing the timing of the notice of appeal and make it clear that the district court's grant of a COA does not eliminate the need to file a notice of appeal.
Changes Made to Proposed Amendment Released for Public Comment. In response to public comments, a sentence was added stating that prior to the entry of the final order the district court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether or not a certificate should issue. This allows a court in complex cases (such as death penalty cases with numerous claims) to solicit briefing that might narrow the issues for appeal. For purposes of clarification, two sentences were added at the end of subdivision (a) stating that (1) although the district court's denial of a certificate is not appealable, a certificate may be sought in the court of appeals, and (2) a motion for reconsideration of a denial of a certificate does not extend the time to appeal.
Finally, a new subdivision (b) was added to mirror the information provided in subdivision (b) of Rule 11 of the Rules Governing §2255 Proceedings, directing petitioners to Rule 4 of the appellate rules and indicating that notice of appeal must be filed even if a COA is issued.
Minor changes were also made to conform to style conventions.
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Rule 12. Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)
Advisory Committee Note
Habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as civil in nature. See e.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906). However, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2), the applicability of the civil rules to habeas corpus actions has been limited, although the various courts which have considered this problem have had difficulty in setting out the boundaries of this limitation. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) at 289, footnote 1. Rule 11 is intended to conform with the Supreme Court's approach in the Harris case. There the court was dealing with the petitioner's contention that Civil Rule 33 granting the right to discovery via written interrogatories is wholly applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. The court held:
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings and that 28 U.S.C. §2246 does not authorize interrogatories except in limited circumstances not applicable to this case; but we conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for habeas corpus which establishes a prima facie case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures, including interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to elicit facts necessary to help the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require" 28 U.S.C. §2243.
394 U.S. at 290
The court then went on to consider the contention that the "conformity" provision of Rule 81(a)(2) should be rigidly applied so that the civil rules would be applicable only to the extent that habeas corpus practice had conformed to the practice in civil actions at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on September 16, 1938. The court said:
Although there is little direct evidence, relevant to the present problem, of the purpose of the "conformity" provision of Rule 81(a)(2), the concern of the draftsmen, as a general matter, seems to have been to provide for the continuing applicability of the "civil" rules in their new form to those areas of practice in habeas corpus and other enumerated proceedings in which the "specified" proceedings had theretofore utilized the modes of civil practice. Otherwise, those proceedings were to be considered outside of the scope of the rules without prejudice, of course, to the use of particular rules by analogy or otherwise, where appropriate.
394 U.S. at 294
The court then reiterated its commitment to judicial discretion in formulating rules and procedures for habeas corpus proceedings by stating:
[T]he habeas corpus jurisdiction and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.
Where their duties require it, this is the inescapable obligation of the courts. Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651.
394 U.S. at 299
Rule 6 of these proposed rules deals specifically with the issue of discovery in habeas actions in a manner consistent with Harris. Rule 11 extends this approach to allow the court considering the petition to use any of the rules of civil procedure (unless inconsistent with these rules of habeas corpus) when in its discretion the court decides they are appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. The court does not have to rigidly apply rules which would be inconsistent or inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus. Rule 11 merely recognizes and affirms their discretionary power to use their judgment in promoting the ends of justice.
Rule 11 permits application of the civil rules only when it would be appropriate to do so. Illustrative of an inappropriate application is that rejected by the Supreme Court in Pitchess v. Davis, 95 S.Ct. 1748 (1975), holding that Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) should not be applied in a habeas case when it would have the effect of altering the statutory exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. §2254.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 11.
Committee Notes on Rules—2009 Amendment
The amendment renumbers current Rule 11 to accommodate the new rule on certificates of appealability.
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.
APPENDIX OF FORMS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS DECLARATION
__________________________________________________
[Insert appropriate court]
____________________________
DECLARATION IN
(Petitioner)
SUPPORT
OF REQUEST
v.
TO PROCEED
____________________________
IN FORMA
(Respondent(s))
PAUPERIS
I, ____________________________, declare that I am the petitioner in the above entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief.
1. Are you presently employed? Yes ☐ No ☐
a. If the answer is "yes," state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name and address of your employer.
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
b. If the answer is "no," state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages per month which you received.
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?
a. Business, profession or form of self-employment? Yes ☐ No ☐
b. Rent payments, interest or dividends? Yes ☐ No ☐
c. Pensions, annuities or life insurance payments? Yes ☐ No ☐
d. Gifts or inheritances? Yes ☐ No ☐
e. Any other sources? Yes ☐ No ☐
If the answer to any of the above is "yes," describe each source of money and state the amount received from each during the past twelve months.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
3. Do you own cash, or do you have money in a checking or savings account?
Yes ☐ No ☐ (Include any funds in prison accounts.)
If the answer is "yes," state the total value of the items owned.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?
Yes ☐ No ☐
If the answer is "yes," describe the property and state its approximate value.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support, state your relationship to those persons, and indicate how much you contribute toward their support.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on __________.
(date)
____________________________
Signature of Petitioner
Certificate
I hereby certify that the petitioner herein has the sum of $________ on account to his credit at the ________ institution where he is confined. I further certify that petitioner likewise has the following securities to his credit according to the records of said ________ institution:
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
____________________________
Authorized Officer of
Institution
(As amended Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
MODEL FORM FOR USE IN 28 U.S.C. §2254 CASES INVOLVING A RULE 9 ISSUE
Form No. 9
[Abrogated Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.]
Changes Made After Publication and Comments—Forms Accompanying Rules Governing §2254 and §2255 Proceedings. Responding to a number of comments from the public, the Committee deleted from both sets of official forms the list of possible grounds of relief. The Committee made additional minor style corrections to the forms.
§2255. Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
(b) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
(c) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
(d) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(g) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by
(h) A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus. It has the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Its principal provisions are incorporated in H.R. 4233, Seventy-ninth Congress.
1949 Act
This amendment conforms language of
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to
Amendments
2008—
1996—
1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted "court established by Act of Congress" for "court of the United States" in first par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Approval and Effective Date of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Section 2255 Proceedings For United States District Courts
For approval and effective date of rules governing petitions under section 2254 and motions under
Postponement of Effective Date of Proposed Rules and Forms Governing Proceedings Under Sections 2254 and 2255 of this Title
Rules and forms governing proceedings under
RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
(Effective Feb. 1, 1977, as amended to Dec. 1, 2024)
APPENDIX OF FORMS
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody.
Effective Date of Rules; Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
Rules, and the amendments thereto by
Rule 1. Scope
These rules govern a motion filed in a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. §2255 by:
(a) a person in custody under a judgment of that court who seeks a determination that:
(1) the judgment violates the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment;
(3) the sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law; or
(4) the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral review; and
(b) a person in custody under a judgment of a state court or another federal court, and subject to future custody under a judgment of the district court, who seeks a determination that:
(1) future custody under a judgment of the district court would violate the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(2) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment;
(3) the district court's sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law; or
(4) the district court's judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral review.
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
The basic scope of this postconviction remedy is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §2255. Under these rules the person seeking relief from federal custody files a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, rather than a petition for habeas corpus. This is consistent with the terminology used in section 2255 and indicates the difference between this remedy and federal habeas for a state prisoner. Also, habeas corpus is available to the person in federal custody if his "remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
Whereas sections 2241–2254 (dealing with federal habeas corpus for those in state custody) speak of the district court judge "issuing the writ" as the operative remedy, section 2255 provides that, if the judge finds the movant's assertions to be meritorious, he "shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." This is possible because a motion under §2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case and not a separate civil action, as appears from the legislative history of section 2 of S. 20, 80th Congress, the provisions of which were incorporated by the same Congress in title 28 U.S.C. as §2255. In reporting S. 20 favorably the Senate Judiciary Committee said (Sen. Rep. 1526, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 2):
The two main advantages of such motion remedy over the present habeas corpus are as follows:
First, habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not a further step in the criminal case in which petitioner is sentenced (Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883)). It is not a determination of guilt or innocence of the charge upon which petitioner was sentenced. Where a prisoner sustains his right to discharge in habeas corpus, it is usually because some right—such as lack of counsel—has been denied which reflects no determination of his guilt or innocence but affects solely the fairness of his earlier criminal trial. Even under the broad power in the statute "to dispose of the party as law and justice require" (28 U.S.C.A., sec. 461), the court or judge is by no means in the same advantageous position in habeas corpus to do justice as would be so if the matter were determined in the criminal proceeding (see Medley, petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 174 (1890)). For instance, the judge (by habeas corpus) cannot grant a new trial in the criminal case. Since the motion remedy is in the criminal proceeding, this section 2 affords the opportunity and expressly gives the broad powers to set aside the judgment and to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."
The fact that a motion under §2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate civil action has significance at several points in these rules. See, e.g., advisory committee note to rule 3 (re no filing fee), advisory committee note to rule 4 (re availability of files, etc., relating to the judgment), advisory committee note to rule 6 (re availability of discovery under criminal procedure rules), advisory committee note to rule 11 (re no extension of time for appeal), and advisory committee not to rule 12 (re applicability of federal criminal rules). However, the fact that Congress has characterized the motion as a further step in the criminal proceedings does not mean that proceedings upon such a motion are of necessity governed by the legal principles which are applicable at a criminal trial regarding such matters as counsel, presence, confrontation, self-incrimination, and burden of proof.
The challenge of decisions such as the revocation of probation or parole are not appropriately dealt with under 28 U.S.C. §2255, which is a continuation of the original criminal action. Other remedies, such as habeas corpus, are available in such situations.
Although rule 1 indicates that these rules apply to a motion for a determination that the judgment was imposed "in violation of the . . . laws of the United States," the language of 28 U.S.C. §2255, it is not the intent of these rules to define or limit what is encompassed within that phrase. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), holding that it is not true "that every asserted error of law can be raised on a §2255 motion," and that the appropriate inquiry is "whether the claimed error of law was a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether [i]t . . . present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' "
For a discussion of the "custody" requirement and the intended limited scope of this remedy, see advisory committee note to §2254 rule 1.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 1 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 1.
Rule 2. The Motion
(a)
(b)
(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the moving party;
(2) state the facts supporting each ground;
(3) state the relief requested;
(4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and
(5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the movant or by a person authorized to sign it for the movant.
(c)
(d)
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
Under these rules the application for relief is in the form of a motion rather than a petition (see rule 1 and advisory committee note). Therefore, there is no requirement that the movant name a respondent. This is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §2255. The United States Attorney for the district in which the judgment under attack was entered is the proper party to oppose the motion since the federal government is the movant's adversary of record.
If the movant is attacking a federal judgment which will subject him to future custody, he must be in present custody (see rule 1 and advisory committee note) as the result of a state or federal governmental action. He need not alter the nature of the motion by trying to include the government officer who presently has official custody of him as a psuedo-respondent, or third-party plaintiff, or other fabrication. The court hearing his motion attacking the future custody can exercise jurisdiction over those having him in present custody without the use of artificial pleading devices.
There is presently a split among the courts as to whether a person currently in state custody may use a §2255 motion to obtain relief from a federal judgment under which he will be subjected to custody in the future. Negative, see Newton v. United States, 329 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1971); affirmative, see Desmond v. The United States Board of Parole, 397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968); and Paalino v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 875 (C.D.Cal. 1970). It is intended that these rules settle the matter in favor of the prisoner's being able to file a §2255 motion for relief under those circumstances. The proper district in which to file such a motion is the one in which is situated the court which rendered the sentence under attack.
Under rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or may reduce the sentence. This remedy should be used, rather than a motion under these §2255 rules, whenever applicable, but there is some overlap between the two proceedings which has caused the courts difficulty.
The movant should not be barred from an appropriate remedy because he has misstyled his motion. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 (1954). The court should construe it as whichever one is proper under the circumstances and decide it on its merits. For a §2255 motion construed as a rule 35 motion, see Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); and United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). For writ of error coram nobis treated as a rule 35 motion, see Hawkins v. United States, 324 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Texas, Tyler Division 1971). For a rule 35 motion treated as a §2255 motion, see Moss v. United States, 263 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1959); Jones v. United States, 400 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 991 (1969); and United States v. Brown, 413 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970).
One area of difference between §2255 and rule 35 motions is that for the latter there is no requirement that the movant be "in custody." Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418, 422 (1959); Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957). Compare with rule 1 and advisory committee note for §2255 motions. The importance of this distinction has decreased since Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), but it might still make a difference in particular situations.
A rule 35 motion is used to attack the sentence imposed, not the basis for the sentence. The court in Gilinsky v. United States, 335 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1964), stated, "a Rule 35 motion presupposes a valid conviction. * * * [C]ollateral attack on errors allegedly committed at trial is not permissible under Rule 35." By illustration the court noted at page 917: "a Rule 35 proceeding contemplates the correction of a sentence of a court having jurisdiction. * * * [J]urisdictional defects * * * involve a collateral attack, they must ordinarily be presented under 28 U.S.C. §2255." In United States v. Semet, 295 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D. Okla. 1968), the prisoner moved under rule 35 and §2255 to invalidate the sentence he was serving on the grounds of his failure to understand the charge to which he pleaded guilty. The court said:
As regards Defendant's Motion under Rule 35, said Motion must be denied as its presupposes a valid conviction of the offense with which he was charged and may be used only to attack the sentence. It may not be used to examine errors occurring prior to the imposition of sentence.
295 F.Supp. at 1085
See also: Moss v. United States, 263 F.2d at 616; Duggins v. United States, 240 F. 2d at 484; Migdal v. United States, 298 F.2d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1961); Jones v. United States, 400 F.2d at 894; United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d at 847; and United States v. Brown, 413 F.2d at 879.
A major difficulty in deciding whether rule 35 or §2255 is the proper remedy is the uncertainty as to what is meant by an "illegal sentence." The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). The prisoner brought a §2255 motion to vacate sentence on the ground that he had not been given a Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(a) opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf at the time of sentencing. The majority held this was not an error subject to collateral attack under §2255. The five-member majority considered the motion as one brought pursuant to rule 35, but denied relief, stating:
[T]he narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. The sentence in this case was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect.
368 U.S. at 430
The four dissenters felt the majority definition of "illegal" was too narrow.
[Rule 35] provides for the correction of an "illegal sentence" without regard to the reasons why that sentence is illegal and contains not a single word to support the Court's conclusion that only a sentence illegal by reason of the punishment it imposes is "illegal" within the meaning of the Rule. I would have thought that a sentence imposed in an illegal manner—whether the amount or form of the punishment meted out constitutes an additional violation of law or not—would be recognized as an "illegal sentence" under any normal reading of the English language.
368 U.S. at 431–432
The 1966 amendment of rule 35 added language permitting correction of a sentence imposed in an "illegal manner." However, there is a 120-day time limit on a motion to do this, and the added language does not clarify the intent of the rule or its relation to §2255.
The courts have been flexible in considering motions under circumstances in which relief might appear to be precluded by Hill v. United States. In Peterson v. United States, 432 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1970), the court was confronted with a motion for reduction of sentence by a prisoner claiming to have received a harsher sentence than his codefendants because he stood trial rather than plead guilty. He alleged that this violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court ruled that, even though it was past the 120-day time period for a motion to reduce sentence, the claim was still cognizable under rule 35 as a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
The courts have made even greater use of §2255 in these types of situations. In United States v. Lewis, 392 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1968), the prisoner moved under §2255 and rule 35 for relief from a sentence he claimed was the result of the judge's misunderstanding of the relevant sentencing law. The court held that he could not get relief under rule 35 because it was past the 120 days for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and under Hill v. United States it was not an illegal sentence. However, §2255 was applicable because of its "otherwise subject to collateral attack" language. The flaw was not a mere trial error relating to the finding of guilt, but a rare and unusual error which amounted to "exceptional circumstances" embraced in §2255's words "collateral attack." See 368 U.S. at 444 for discussion of other cases allowing use of §2255 to attack the sentence itself in similar circumstances, especially where the judge has sentenced out of a misapprehension of the law.
In United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 591, 592 (1st Cir. 1970), the court allowed a prisoner who was past the time limit for a proper rule 35 motion to use §2255 to attack the sentence which he received upon a plea of guilty on the ground that it was induced by an unfulfilled promise of the prosecutor to recommend leniency. The court specifically noted that under §2255 this was a proper collateral attack on the sentence and there was no need to attack the conviction as well.
The court in United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1970), allowed a prisoner to challenge his sentence under §2255 without attacking the conviction. It held rule 35 inapplicable because the sentence was not illegal on its face, but the manner in which the sentence was imposed raised a question of the denial of due process in the sentencing itself which was cognizable under §2255.
The flexible approach taken by the courts in the above cases seems to be the reasonable way to handle these situations in which rule 35 and §2255 appear to overlap. For a further discussion of this problem, see C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal §§581–587 (1969, Supp. 1975).
See the advisory committee note to rule 2 of the §2254 rules for further discussion of the purposes and intent of rule 2 of these §2255 rules.
1982 Amendment
Subdivision (b). The amendment takes into account 28 U.S.C. §1746, enacted after adoption of the §2255 rules. Section 1746 provides that in lieu of an affidavit an unsworn statement may be given under penalty of perjury in substantially the following form if executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)." The statute is "intended to encompass prisoner litigation," and the statutory alternative is especially appropriate in such cases because a notary might not be readily available. Carter v. Clark, 616 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1980). The §2255 forms have been revised accordingly.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 2 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.
Revised Rule 2(b)(5) has been amended by removing the requirement that the motion be signed personally by the moving party. Thus, under the amended rule the motion may be signed by [the] movant personally or by someone acting on behalf of the movant, assuming that the person is authorized to do so, for example, an attorney for the movant. The Committee envisions that the courts would apply third-party, or "next-friend," standing analysis in deciding whether the signer was actually authorized to sign the motion on behalf of the movant. See generally Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (discussion of requisites for "next friend" standing in habeas petitions). See also 28 U.S.C. §2242 (application for state habeas corpus relief may be filed by the person who is seeking relief, or by someone acting on behalf of that person).
The language in new Rule 2(c) has been changed to reflect that a moving party must substantially follow the standard form, which is appended to the rules, or a form provided by the court. The current rule, Rule 2(c), seems to indicate a preference for the standard "national" form. Under the amended rule, there is no stated preference. The Committee understood that the current practice in some courts is that if the moving party first files a motion using the national form, that courts may ask the moving party to supplement it with the local form.
Current Rule 2(d), which provided for returning an insufficient motion[,] has been deleted. The Committee believed that the approach in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) was more appropriate for dealing with motions that do not conform to the form requirements of the rule. That Rule provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed Rule 2(b)(2) to read "state the facts" rather then [sic] "briefly summarize the facts." One commentator had written that the current language may actually mislead the petitioner and is also redundant.
Rule 2(b)(4) was also modified to reflect that some motions may be printed using a word processing program.
Finally, Rule 2(b)(5) was changed to emphasize that any person, other than the petitioner, who signs the petition must be authorized to do so.
Amendments
1976—Subd. (b).
Subd. (d).
Rule 3. Filing the Motion; Inmate Filing
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
There is no filing fee required of a movant under these rules. This is a change from the practice of charging $15 and is done to recognize specifically the nature of a §2255 motion as being a continuation of the criminal case whose judgment is under attack.
The long-standing practice of requiring a $15 filing fee has followed from 28 U.S.C. §1914(a) whereby "parties instituting any civil action * * * pay a filing fee of $15, except that on an application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be $5." This has been held to apply to a proceeding under §2255 despite the rationale that such a proceeding is a motion and thus a continuation of the criminal action. (See note to rule 1.)
A motion under Section 2255 is a civil action and the clerk has no choice but to charge a $15.00 filing fee unless by leave of court it is filed in forma pauperis.
McCune v. United States, 406 F.2d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 1969).
Although the motion has been considered to be a new civil action in the nature of habeas corpus for filing purposes, the reduced fee for habeas has been held not applicable. The Tenth Circuit considered the specific issue in Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961), holding that the reduced fee was exclusive to habeas petitions.
Counsel for Martin insists that, if a docket fee must be paid, the amount is $5 rather than $15 and bases his contention on the exception contained in 28 U.S.C. §1914 that in habeas corpus the fee is $5. This reads into §1914 language which is not there. While an application under §2255 may afford the same relief as that previously obtainable by habeas corpus, it is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A change in §1914 must come from Congress.
273 F.2d at 778
Although for most situations §2255 is intended to provide to the federal prisoner a remedy equivalent to habeas corpus as used by state prisoners, there is a major distinction between the two. Calling a §2255 request for relief a motion rather than a petition militates toward charging no new filing fee, not an increased one. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to suppose that Congress did not mean what it said in making a §2255 action a motion. Therefore, as in other motions filed in a criminal action, there is no requirement of a filing fee. It is appropriate that the present situation of docketing a §2255 motion as a new action and charging a $15 filing fee be remedied by the rule when the whole question of §2255 motions is thoroughly thought through and organized.
Even though there is no need to have a forma pauperis affidavit to proceed with the action since there is no requirement of a fee for filing the motion the affidavit remains attached to the form to be supplied potential movants. Most such movants are indigent, and this is a convenient way of getting this into the official record so that the judge may appoint counsel, order the government to pay witness fees, allow docketing of an appeal, and grant any other rights to which an indigent is entitled in the course of a §2255 motion, when appropriate to the particular situation, without the need for an indigency petition and adjudication at such later point in the proceeding. This should result in a streamlining of the process to allow quicker disposition of these motions.
For further discussion of this rule, see the advisory committee note to rule 3 of the §2254 rules.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 3 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.
Revised Rule 3(b) is new and is intended to parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e), which provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Revised Rule 3(c), which sets out a specific reference to 28 U.S.C. §2255, paragraph 6, is new and has been added to put moving parties on notice that a one-year statute of limitations applies to motions filed under these Rules. Although the rule does not address the issue, every circuit that has addressed the issue has taken the position that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004–07 (6th Cir. 2001); Moore v. United States, 173 F.3d 1131, 1133–35 (8th Cir. 1999); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1270–72 (11th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) ("We . . . have no occasion to address the question that Justice Stevens raises concerning the availability of equitable tolling.").
Rule 3(d) is new and provides guidance on determining whether a motion from an inmate is considered to have been filed in a timely fashion. The new provision parallels Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C).
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified the Committee Note to reflect that the clerk must file a motion, even in those instances where the necessary filing fee or in forma pauperis form is not attached. The Note also includes new language concerning the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Rule 4. Preliminary Review
(a)
(b)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 4 outlines the procedure for assigning the motion to a specific judge of the district court and the options available to the judge and the government after the motion is properly filed.
The long-standing majority practice in assigning motions made pursuant to §2255 has been for the trial judge to determine the merits of the motion. In cases where the §2255 motion is directed against the sentence, the merits have traditionally been decided by the judge who imposed sentence. The reasoning for this was first noted in Currell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348–349 (4th Cir. 1949):
Complaint is made that the judge who tried the case passed upon the motion. Not only was there no impropriety in this, but it is highly desirable in such cases that the motions be passed on by the judge who is familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial, and is consequently not likely to be misled by false allegations as to what occurred.
This case, and its reasoning, has been almost unanimously endorsed by other courts dealing with the issue.
Commentators have been critical of having the motion decided by the trial judge. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1206–1208 (1970).
[T]he trial judge may have become so involved with the decision that it will be difficult for him to review it objectively. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that "court" refers to a specific judge, and the procedural advantages of section 2255 are available whether or not the trial judge presides at the hearing.
The theory that Congress intended the trial judge to preside at a section 2255 hearing apparently originated in Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam), where the panel of judges included Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit, chairman of the Judicial Conference committee which drafted section 2255. But the legislative history does not indicate that Congress wanted the trial judge to preside. Indeed the advantages of section 2255 can all be achieved if the case is heard in the sentencing district, regardless of which judge hears it. According to the Senate committee report the purpose of the bill was to make the proceeding a part of the criminal action so the court could resentence the applicant, or grant him a new trial. (A judge presiding over a habeas corpus action does not have these powers.) In addition, Congress did not want the cases heard in the district of confinement because that tended to concentrate the burden on a few districts, and made it difficult for witnesses and records to be produced.
83 Harv.L.Rev. at 1207–1208
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a judge other than the trial judge should rule on the 2255 motion. See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).
There is a procedure by which the movant can have a judge other than the trial judge decide his motion in courts adhering to the majority rule. He can file an affidavit alleging bias in order to disqualify the trial judge. And there are circumstances in which the trial judge will, on his own, disqualify himself. See, e.g., Webster v. United States, 330 F.Supp. 1080 (1972). However, there has been some questioning of the effectiveness of this procedure. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1200–1207 (1970).
Subdivision (a) adopts the majority rule and provides that the trial judge, or sentencing judge if different and appropriate for the particular motion, will decide the motion made pursuant to these rules, recognizing that, under some circumstances, he may want to disqualify himself. A movant is not without remedy if he feels this is unfair to him. He can file an affidavit of bias. And there is the right to appellate review if the trial judge refuses to grant his motion. Because the trial judge is thoroughly familiar with the case, there is obvious administrative advantage in giving him the first opportunity to decide whether there are grounds for granting the motion.
Since the motion is part of the criminal action in which was entered the judgment to which it is directed, the files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to that judgment are automatically available to the judge in his consideration of the motion. He no longer need order them incorporated for that purpose.
Rule 4 has its basis in §2255 (rather than 28 U.S.C. §2243 in the corresponding habeas corpus rule) which does not have a specific time limitation as to when the answer must be made. Also, under §2255, the United States Attorney for the district is the party served with the notice and a copy of the motion and required to answer (when appropriate). Subdivision (b) continues this practice since there is no respondent involved in the motion (unlike habeas) and the United States Attorney, as prosecutor in the case in question, is the most appropriate one to defend the judgment and oppose the motion.
The judge has discretion to require an answer or other appropriate response from the United States Attorney. See advisory committee note to rule 4 of the §2254 rules.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 4 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
The amended rule reflects that the response to a Section 2255 motion may be a motion to dismiss or some other response.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 4 to reflect the view of some commentators that it is common practice in some districts for the government to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss the §2255 motion. The Committee agreed with that recommendation and changed the word "pleading" in the rule to "response." It also made several minor changes to the Committee Note.
Rule 5. The Answer and the Reply
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Apr. 25, 2019, eff. Dec. 1, 2019.)
Advisory Committee Note
Unlike the habeas corpus statutes (see 28 U.S.C. §§2243, 2248) §2255 does not specifically call for a return or answer by the United States Attorney or set any time limits as to when one must be submitted. The general practice, however, if the motion is not summarily dismissed, is for the government to file an answer to the motion as well as counter-affidavits, when appropriate. Rule 4 provides for an answer to the motion by the United States Attorney, and rule 5 indicates what its contents should be.
There is no requirement that the movant exhaust his remedies prior to seeking relief under §2255. However, the courts have held that such a motion is inappropriate if the movant is simultaneously appealing the decision.
We are of the view that there is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court's entertaining a Section 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal but that the orderly administration of criminal law precludes considering such a motion absent extraordinary circumstances.
Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C.Cir. 1968)
Also see Masters v. Eide, 353 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1965). The answer may thus cut short consideration of the motion if it discloses the taking of an appeal which was omitted from the form motion filed by the movant.
There is nothing in §2255 which corresponds to the §2248 requirement of a traverse to the answer. Numerous cases have held that the government's answer and affidavits are not conclusive against the movant, and if they raise disputed issues of fact a hearing must be held. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494, 495 (1962); United States v. Salerno, 290 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1961); Romero v. United States, 327 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1964); Scott v. United States, 349 F.2d 641, 642, 643 (6th Cir. 1965); Schiebelhut v. United States, 357 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1966); and Del Piano v. United States, 362 F.2d 931, 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1966). None of these cases make any mention of a traverse by the movant to the government's answer. As under rule 5 of the §2254 rules, there is no intention here that such a traverse be required, except under special circumstances. See advisory committee note to rule 9.
Subdivision (b) provides for the government to supplement its answers with appropriate copies of transcripts or briefs if for some reason the judge does not already have them under his control. This is because the government will in all probability have easier access to such papers than the movant, and it will conserve the court's time to have the government produce them rather than the movant, who would in most instances have to apply in forma pauperis for the government to supply them for him anyway.
For further discussion, see the advisory committee note to rule 5 of the §2254 rules.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 5 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Revised Rule 5(a), which provides that the respondent is not required to file an answer to the motion, unless a judge so orders, is taken from current Rule 3(b). The revised rule does not address the practice in some districts, where the respondent files a pre-answer motion to dismiss the motion. But revised Rule 4(b) contemplates that practice and has been changed to reflect the view that if the court does not dismiss the motion, it may require (or permit) the respondent to file a motion.
Finally, revised Rule 5(d) adopts the practice in some jurisdictions giving the movant an opportunity to file a reply to the respondent's answer. Rather than using terms such as "traverse," see 28 U.S.C. §2248, to identify the movant's response to the answer, the rule uses the more general term "reply." The Rule prescribes that the court set the time for such responses, and in lieu of setting specific time limits in each case, the court may decide to include such time limits in its local rules.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 5(a) was modified to read that the government is not required to "respond" to the motion unless the court so orders; the term "respond" was used because it leaves open the possibility that the government's first response (as it is in some districts) is in the form of a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. The Note has been changed to reflect the fact that although the rule itself does not reflect that particular motion, it is used in some districts and refers the reader to Rule 4.
Finally, the Committee changed the Note to address the use of the term "traverse," a point raised by one of the commentators on the proposed rule.
Committee Notes on Rules—2019 Amendment
The moving party has a right to file a reply. Subsection (d), added in 2004, removed the discretion of the court to determine whether or not to allow the moving party to file a reply in a case under §2255. The current amendment was prompted by decisions holding that courts nevertheless retained the authority to bar a reply.
As amended, the first sentence of subsection (d) makes it even clearer that the moving party has a right to file a reply to the respondent's answer or pleading. It retains the word "may," which is used throughout the federal rules to mean "is permitted to" or "has a right to." No change in meaning is intended by the substitution of "file" for "submit."
As amended, the second sentence of the rule retains the court's discretion to decide when the reply must be filed (but not whether it may be filed). To avoid uncertainty, the amended rule requires the court to set a time for filing if that time is not already set by local rule. Adding a reference to the time for the filing of any reply to the order requiring the government to file an answer or other pleading provides notice of that deadline to both parties.
Rule 6. Discovery
(a)
(b)
(c)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
This rule differs from the corresponding discovery rule under the §2254 rules in that it includes the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the civil. This is because of the nature of a §2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal proceeding (see advisory committee note to rule 1) as well as a remedy analogous to habeas corpus by state prisoners.
See the advisory committee note to rule 6 of the §2254 rules. The discussion there is fully applicable to discovery under these rules for §2255 motions.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 6 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.
Although current Rule 6(b) contains no requirement that the parties provide reasons for the requested discovery, the revised rule does so and also includes a requirement that the request be accompanied by any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents. The Committee believes that the revised rule makes explicit what has been implicit in current practice.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 6(b), to require that discovery requests be supported by reasons, to assist the court in deciding what, if any, discovery should take place. The Committee amended the Note to reflect the view that it believed that the change made explicit what has been implicit in current practice.
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subd. (a), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subd. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Rule 7. Expanding the Record
(a)
(b)
(c)
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
It is less likely that the court will feel the need to expand the record in a §2255 proceeding than in a habeas corpus proceeding, because the trial (or sentencing) judge is the one hearing the motion (see rule 4) and should already have a complete file on the case in his possession. However, rule 7 provides a convenient method for supplementing his file if the case warrants it.
See the advisory committee note to rule 7 of the §2254 rules for a full discussion of reasons and procedures for expanding the record.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 7 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Revised Rule 7(a) is not intended to restrict the court's authority to expand the record through means other than requiring the parties themselves to provide the information.
The language in current Rule 7(d), which deals with authentication of materials in the expanded record, has been moved to revised Rule 7(a).
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 7(a) was changed by removing the reference to the "merits" of the motion. One commentator had stated that the court may wish to expand the record for purposes other than the merits of the case. The Committee agreed and also changed the rule to reflect that someone other than a party may authenticate the materials.
Rule 8. Evidentiary Hearing
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
The standards for §2255 hearings are essentially the same as for evidentiary hearings under a habeas petition, except that the previous federal fact-finding proceeding is in issue rather than the state's. Also §2255 does not set specific time limits for holding the hearing, as does §2243 for a habeas action. With these minor differences in mind, see the advisory committee note to rule 8 of §2254 rules, which is applicable to rule 8 of these §2255 rules.
1993 Amendment
The amendment to Rule 8 is one of a series of parallel amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32, 32.1, and 46 which extend the scope of Rule 26.2 (Production of Witness Statements) to proceedings other than the trial itself. The amendments are grounded on the compelling need for accurate and credible information in making decisions concerning the defendant's liberty. See the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26.2(g). A few courts have recognized the authority of a judicial officer to order production of prior statements by a witness at a Section 2255 hearing, see, e.g., United States v. White, 342 F.2d 379, 382, n.4 (4th Cir. 1959). The amendment to Rule 8 grants explicit authority to do so. The amendment is not intended to require production of a witness's statement before the witness actually presents oral testimony.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 8 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.
The requirement in current Rule 8(b)(2) that a copy of the magistrate judge's findings must be promptly mailed to all parties has been changed in revised Rule 8(b) to require that copies of those findings be served on all parties. As used in this rule, "service" means service consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which allows mailing the copies.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 8, as published for public comment.
Committee Notes on Rules—2009 Amendment
The time set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days. See the Committee Note to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45(a).
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subd. (d), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—Subd. (b).
Subd. (c).
Effective Date of 1976 Amendment
Amendments made by
Rule 9. Second or Successive Motions
Before presenting a second or successive motion, the moving party must obtain an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the motion, as required by 28 U.S.C. §2255, para. 8.
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
Unlike the statutory provisions on habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §§2241–2254), §2255 specifically provides that "a motion for such relief may be made at any time." [Emphasis added.] Subdivision (a) provides that delayed motions may be barred from consideration if the government has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by the delay and the movant's failure to seek relief earlier is not excusable within the terms of the rule. Case law, dealing with this issue, is in conflict.
Some courts have held that the literal language of §2255 precludes any possible time bar to a motion brought under it. In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), the concurring opinion noted:
The statute [28 U.S.C. §2255] further provides; "A motion * * * may be made at any time." This * * * simply means that, as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable.
358 U.S. at 420
McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C.Cir. 1953) reversed the district court's dismissal of a §2255 motion for being too late, the court stating:
McKinney's present application for relief comes late in the day: he has served some fifteen years in prison. But tardiness is irrelevant where a constitutional issue is raised and where the prisoner is still confined.
208 F.2d at 846, 847
In accord, see: Juelich v. United States, 300 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1962); Conners v. United States, 431 F.2d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970); Sturrup v. United States, 218 F.Supp. 279, 281 (E.D.N.Car. 1963); and Banks v. United States, 319 F.Supp. 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
It has also been held that delay in filing a §2255 motion does not bar the movant because of lack of reasonable diligence in pressing the claim.
The statute [28 U.S.C. §2255], when it states that the motion may be made at any time, excludes the addition of a showing of diligence in delayed filings. A number of courts have considered contentions similar to those made here and have concluded that there are no time limitations. This result excludes the requirement of diligence which is in reality a time limitation.
Haier v. United States, 334 F.2d 441, 442 (10th Cir. 1964)
Other courts have recognized that delay may have a negative effect on the movant. In Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970), the court stated:
[B]oth petitioners' silence for extended periods, one for 28 months and the other for nine years, serves to render their allegations less believable. "Although a delay in filing a section 2255 motion is not a controlling element * * * it may merit some consideration * * *."
423 F.2d at 531
In Aiken v. United States, 191 F.Supp. 43, 50 (M.D.N.Car. 1961), aff'd 296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961), the court said: "While motions under 28 U.S.C. §2255 may be made at any time, the lapse of time affects the good faith and credibility of the moving party." For similar conclusions, see: Parker v. United States, 358 F.2d 50, 54 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967); Le Clair v. United States, 241 F.Supp. 819, 824 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962); Howell v. United States, 442 F.2d 265, 274 (7th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673, 676 (D.C.Cir. 1960).
There have been holdings by some courts that a delay in filing a §2255 motion operates to increase the burden of proof which the movant must meet to obtain relief. The reasons for this, as expressed in United States v. Bostic, 206 F.Supp. 855 (D.C.Cir. 1962), are equitable in nature.
Obviously, the burden of proof on a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255 is on the moving party. . . . The burden is particularly heavy if the issue is one of fact and a long time has elapsed since the trial of the case. While neither the statute of limitations nor laches can bar the assertion of a constitutional right, nevertheless, the passage of time may make it impracticable to retry a case if the motion is granted and a new trial is ordered. No doubt, at times such a motion is a product of an afterthought. Long delay may raise a question of good faith.
206 F.Supp. at 856–857
See also United States v. Wiggins, 184 F.Supp. at 676.
A requirement that the movant display reasonable diligence in filing a §2255 motion has been adopted by some courts dealing with delayed motions. The court in United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948), did this, again for equitable reasons.
[W]e agree with the District Court that the petitioner has too long slept upon his rights. * * * [A]pparently there is no limitation of time within which * * * a motion to vacate may be filed, except that an applicant must show reasonable diligence in presenting his claim. * * *
The reasons which support the rule requiring diligence seem obvious. * * * Law enforcement officials change, witnesses die, memories grow dim. The prosecuting tribunal is put to a disadvantage if an unexpected retrial should be necessary after long passage of time.
166 F.2d at 105
In accord see Desmond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1964), on remand, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965).
One of the major arguments advanced by the courts which would penalize a movant who waits an unduly long time before filing a §2255 motion is that such delay is highly prejudicial to the prosecution. In Desmond v. United States, writing of a §2255 motion alleging denial of effective appeal because of deception by movant's own counsel, the court said:
[A]pplications for relief such as this must be made promptly. It will not do for a prisoner to wait until government witnesses have become unavailable as by death, serious illness or absence from the country, or until the memory of available government witnesses has faded. It will not even do for a prisoner to wait any longer than is reasonably necessary to prepare appropriate moving papers, however inartistic, after discovery of the deception practiced upon him by his attorney.
333 F.2d at 381
In a similar vein are United States v. Moore and United States v. Bostic, supra, and United States v. Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. at 676.
Subdivision (a) provides a flexible, equitable time limitation based on laches to prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial. It includes a reasonable diligence requirement for ascertaining possible grounds for relief. If the delay is found to be excusable, or nonprejudicial to the government, the time bar is inoperative.
Subdivision (b) is consistent with the language of §2255 and relevant case law.
The annexed form is intended to serve the same purpose as the comparable one included in the §2254 rules.
For further discussion applicable to this rule, see the advisory committee note to rule 9 of the §2254 rules.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 9 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.
First, current Rule 9(a) has been deleted as unnecessary in light of the applicable one-year statute of limitations for §2255 motions, added as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §2255, para. 6.
Second, the remainder of revised Rule 9 reflects provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §2255, parh. [sic] 8, which now require a moving party to obtain approval from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a second or successive motion.
Finally, the title of the rule has been changed to reflect the fact that the revised version addresses only the topic of second or successive motions.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 9, as published.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—Subd. (a).
Subd. (b).
Rule 10. Powers of a Magistrate Judge
A magistrate judge may perform the duties of a district judge under these rules, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. §636.
(As amended
Advisory Committee Note
See the advisory committee note to rule 10 of the §2254 rules for a discussion fully applicable here as well.
1979 Amendment
This amendment conforms the rule to 18 U.S.C. §636. See Advisory Committee Note to rule 10 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 10 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee restyled the proposed rule.
Amendments by Public Law
1976—
Rule 11. Certificate of Appealability; Time to Appeal
(a)
(b)
(As amended Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 11 is intended to make clear that, although a §2255 action is a continuation of the criminal case, the bringing of a §2255 action does not extend the time.
1979 Amendment
Prior to the promulgation of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the courts consistently held that the time for appeal in a section 2255 case is as provided in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), that is, 60 days when the government is a party, rather than as provided in appellate rule 4(b), which says that the time is 10 days in criminal cases. This result has often been explained on the ground that rule 4(a) has to do with civil cases and that "proceedings under section 2255 are civil in nature." E.g., Rothman v. United States, 508 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1975). Because the new section 2255 rules are based upon the premise "that a motion under §2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate civil action," see Advisory Committee Note to rule 1, the question has arisen whether the new rules have the effect of shortening the time for appeal to that provided in appellate rule 4(b). A sentence has been added to rule 11 in order to make it clear that this is not the case.
Even though section 2255 proceedings are a further step in the criminal case, the added sentence correctly states current law. In United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), the Supreme Court noted that such appeals "are governed by the civil rules applicable to appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus actions." In support, the Court cited Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950), a case rejecting the argument that because §2255 proceedings are criminal in nature the time for appeal is only 10 days. The Mercado court concluded that the situation was governed by that part of 28 U.S.C. §2255 which reads: "An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus." Thus, because appellate rule 4(a) is applicable in habeas cases, it likewise governs in §2255 cases even though they are criminal in nature.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 11, as published.
Committee Notes on Rules—2009 Amendment
Subdivision (a). As provided in 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), an applicant may not appeal to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under §2255 unless a judge issues a COA, identifying the specific issues for which the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of constitutional right. New Rule 11(a) makes the requirements concerning certificates of appealability more prominent by adding and consolidating them in the appropriate rule of the Rules Governing §2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Rule 11(a) also requires the district judge to grant or deny the certificate at the time a final order is issued. See 3d Cir. R. 22.2, 111.3. This will ensure prompt decision making when the issues are fresh, rather than postponing consideration of the certificate until after a notice of appeal is filed. These changes will expedite proceedings, avoid unnecessary remands, and help to inform the applicant's decision whether to file a notice of appeal.
Subdivision (b). The amendment is designed to make it clear that the district court's grant of a COA does not eliminate the need to file a notice of appeal.
Changes Made to Proposed Amendment Released for Public Comment. In response to public comments, a sentence was added stating that prior to the entry of the final order the district court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether or not a certificate should issue. This allows a court in complex cases (such as death penalty cases with numerous claims) to solicit briefing that might narrow the issues for appeal. For purposes of clarification, two sentences were added at the end of subdivision (a) stating that (1) although the district court's denial of a certificate is not appealable, a certificate may be sought in the court of appeals, and (2) a motion for reconsideration of a denial of a certificate does not extend the time to appeal. Finally, a sentence indicating that notice of appeal must be filed even if a COA is issued was added to subdivision (b).
Minor changes were also made to conform to style conventions.
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Rule 12. Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.
(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note
This rule differs from rule 11 of the §2254 rules in that it includes the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the civil. This is because of the nature of a §2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal proceeding (see advisory committee note to rule 1) as well as a remedy analogous to habeas corpus by state prisoners.
Since §2255 has been considered analogous to habeas as respects the restrictions in Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2) (see Sullivan v. United States, 198 F.Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)), rule 12 is needed. For discussion, see the advisory committee note to rule 11 of the §2254 rules.
Committee Notes on Rules—2004 Amendment
The language of Rule 12 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 12.
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
APPENDIX OF FORMS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS DECLARATION
__________________________________________________
[Insert appropriate court]
United States
DECLARATION IN
SUPPORT
v.
OF REQUEST
____________________________
TO PROCEED
(Movant)
IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
I, ____________________________, declare that I am the movant in the above entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief.
1. Are you presently employed? Yes ☐ No ☐
a. If the answer is "yes," state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name and address of your employer.
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
b. If the answer is "no," state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages per month which you received.
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?
a. Business, profession or form of self-employment? Yes ☐ No ☐
b. Rent payments, interest or dividends?
Yes ☐ No ☐
c. Pensions, annuities or life insurance payments? Yes ☐ No ☐
d. Gifts or inheritances? Yes ☐ No ☐
e. Any other sources? Yes ☐ No ☐
If the answer to any of the above is "yes," describe each source of money and state the amount received from each during the past twelve months.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
3. Do you own any cash, or do you have money in a checking or savings account?
Yes ☐ No ☐ (Include any funds in prison accounts)
If the answer is "yes," state the total value of the items owned.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
4. Do you own real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?
Yes ☐ No ☐
If the answer is "yes," describe the property and state its approximate value.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support, state your relationship to those persons, and indicate how much you contribute toward their support.
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on __________.
(date)
____________________________
Signature of Movant
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that the movant herein has the sum of $________ on account to his credit at the ________ institution where he is confined.
I further certify that movant likewise has the following securities to his credit according to the records of said ________ institution:
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
____________________________
Authorized Officer of
Institution
(As amended Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)
MODEL FORM FOR USE IN 28 U.S.C. §2255 CASES INVOLVING A RULE 9 ISSUE
Form No. 9
[Omitted as obsolete]
Changes Made After Publication and Comments—Forms Accompanying Rules Governing §2254 and §2255 Proceedings. Responding to a number of comments from the public, the Committee deleted from both sets of official forms the list of possible grounds of relief. The Committee made additional minor style corrections to the forms.
[§2256. Omitted]
Codification
Section, added
§2256. Habeas corpus from bankruptcy courts
A bankruptcy court may issue a writ of habeas corpus—
(1) when appropriate to bring a person before the court—
(A) for examination;
(B) to testify; or
(C) to perform a duty imposed on such person under this title; or
(2) ordering the release of a debtor in a case under title 11 in custody under the judgment of a Federal or State court if—
(A) such debtor was arrested or imprisoned on process in any civil action;
(B) such process was issued for the collection of a debt—
(i) dischargeable under title 11; or
(ii) that is or will be provided for in a plan under
(C) before the issuance of such writ, notice and a hearing have been afforded the adverse party of such debtor in custody to contest the issuance of such writ.
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2256, added
CHAPTER 154 —SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES
Editorial Notes
Amendments
§2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appointment
(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under section 2254 brought by prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.
(b)
(1) the Attorney General of the United States certifies that a State has established a mechanism for providing counsel in postconviction proceedings as provided in section 2265; and
(2) counsel was appointed pursuant to that mechanism, petitioner validly waived counsel, petitioner retained counsel, or petitioner was found not to be indigent.
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of record—
(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the offer;
(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal consequences; or
(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is not indigent.
(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued representation.
(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254. This limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel, on the court's own motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of State or Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2006 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date
§2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; successive petitions
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate State court of record of an order under section 2261(c), a warrant or order setting an execution date for a State prisoner shall be stayed upon application to any court that would have jurisdiction over any proceedings filed under section 2254. The application shall recite that the State has invoked the post-conviction review procedures of this chapter and that the scheduled execution is subject to stay.
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire if—
(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application under section 2254 within the time required in section 2263;
(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been advised of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 2254; or
(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the district court or at any subsequent stage of review.
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive application under section 2244(b).
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable to cases pending on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 107(c) of
§2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time requirements; tolling rules
(a) Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
(b) The time requirements established by subsection (a) shall be tolled—
(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review;
(2) from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition; and
(3) during an additional period not to exceed 30 days, if—
(A) a motion for an extension of time is filed in the Federal district court that would have jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus application under section 2254; and
(B) a showing of good cause is made for the failure to file the habeas corpus application within the time period established by this section.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable to cases pending on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 107(c) of
§2264. Scope of Federal review; district court adjudications
(a) Whenever a State prisoner under capital sentence files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter applies, the district court shall only consider a claim or claims that have been raised and decided on the merits in the State courts, unless the failure to raise the claim properly is—
(1) the result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or
(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction review.
(b) Following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 2254, the court shall rule on the claims properly before it.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable to cases pending on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 107(c) of
§2265. Certification and judicial review
(a)
(1)
(A) whether the State has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State postconviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death;
(B) the date on which the mechanism described in subparagraph (A) was established; and
(C) whether the State provides standards of competency for the appointment of counsel in proceedings described in subparagraph (A).
(2)
(3)
(b)
(c)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2265, added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of
§2266. Limitation periods for determining applications and motions
(a) The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital matters.
(b)(1)(A) A district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 450 days after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the date on which the case is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier.
(B) A district court shall afford the parties at least 120 days in which to complete all actions, including the preparation of all pleadings and briefs, and if necessary, a hearing, prior to the submission of the case for decision.
(C)(i) A district court may delay for not more than one additional 30-day period beyond the period specified in subparagraph (A), the rendering of a determination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the court issues a written order making a finding, and stating the reasons for the finding, that the ends of justice that would be served by allowing the delay outweigh the best interests of the public and the applicant in a speedy disposition of the application.
(ii) The factors, among others, that a court shall consider in determining whether a delay in the disposition of an application is warranted are as follows:
(I) Whether the failure to allow the delay would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
(II) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate briefing within the time limitations established by subparagraph (A).
(III) Whether the failure to allow a delay in a case that, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as described in subclause (II), but would otherwise deny the applicant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the applicant or the government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the applicant or the government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
(iii) No delay in disposition shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court's calendar.
(iv) The court shall transmit a copy of any order issued under clause (i) to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for inclusion in the report under paragraph (5).
(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—
(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;
(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and
(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.
(3)(A) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.
(B) No amendment to an application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter shall be permitted after the filing of the answer to the application, except on the grounds specified in section 2244(b).
(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.
(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall act on the petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition.
(5)(A) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the district courts with the time limitations under this section.
(B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall include copies of the orders submitted by the district courts under paragraph (1)(B)(iv).
(c)(1)(A) A court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of any appeal of an order granting or denying, in whole or in part, an application brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 120 days after the date on which the reply brief is filed, or if no reply brief is filed, not later than 120 days after the date on which the answering brief is filed.
(B)(i) A court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a petition for rehearing or other request for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days after the date on which the petition for rehearing is filed unless a responsive pleading is required, in which case the court shall decide whether to grant the petition not later than 30 days after the date on which the responsive pleading is filed.
(ii) If a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of the appeal not later than 120 days after the date on which the order granting rehearing or rehearing en banc is entered.
(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—
(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;
(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and
(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus or related appeal following a remand by the court of appeals en banc or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.
(3) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.
(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.
(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by applying for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court.
(5) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the courts of appeals with the time limitations under this section.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (b)(1)(A).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2006 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date
Section applicable to cases pending on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 107(c) of
CHAPTER 155 —INJUNCTIONS; THREE-JUDGE COURTS
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1976—
1 So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.
[§§2281, 2282. Repealed. Pub. L. 94–381, §§1, 2, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119 ]
Section 2281, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Section 2282, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal not applicable to any action commenced on or before Aug. 12, 1976, see section 7 of
§2283. Stay of State court proceedings
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §379 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §265,
An exception as to acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy was omitted and the general exception substituted to cover all exceptions.
The phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" was added to conform to
The exceptions specifically include the words "to protect or "effectuate its judgments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 62 S.Ct. 139, 314 U.S. 118, 86 L.Ed. 100. A vigorous dissenting opinion (62 S.Ct. 148) notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, the power of the courts, of the United States to protect their judgments was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change and Congress intended no change).
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2284. Three-judge court; when required; composition; procedure
(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.
(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges under subsection (a) of this section, the composition and procedure of the court shall be as follows:
(1) Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge. The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the request was presented, shall serve as members of the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.
(2) If the action is against a State, or officer or agency thereof, at least five days' notice of hearing of the action shall be given by registered or certified mail to the Governor and attorney general of the State.
(3) A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all orders permitted by the rules of civil procedure except as provided in this subsection. He may grant a temporary restraining order on a specific finding, based on evidence submitted, that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not granted, which order, unless previously revoked by the district judge, shall remain in force only until the hearing and determination by the district court of three judges of an application for a preliminary injunction. A single judge shall not appoint a master, or order a reference, or hear and determine any application for a preliminary or permanent injunction or motion to vacate such an injunction, or enter judgment on the merits. Any action of a single judge may be reviewed by the full court at any time before final judgment.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§47, 47a, 380, 380a, and 792 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§210, 266,
Provisions of
Provisions of
The provision for notice to the United States attorney for the district where the action is pending was added because of the necessity of the United States attorney's preparation for hearing as soon as possible, to expedite such a case.
Provisions of
This revised section represents an effort to provide a uniform method of convoking three-judge district courts, and for procedure therein. It follows recommendations of a committee appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, composed of Circuit Judges Evan A. Evans, Kimbrough Stone, Orie L. Phillips, and Albert B. Maris.
The committee pointed out that
This section governs only the composition and procedure of three-judge district courts. The requirement that applications for injunctions be heard and determined by such courts will appear in other sections of this and other titles of the United States Code as Congress may enact from time to time. For example, see
United States District Judge W. Calvin Chestnut, has referred to the provisions relating to enforcement or setting aside or orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission as unfortunately lengthy and prolix. He has urged revision to insure uniform procedure in the several classes of so-called three-judge cases.
The provision that such notice shall be given by the clerk by registered mail, and shall be complete on the mailing thereof follows, substantially, rules 4(d)(4) and 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The rules of civil procedure, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Amendments
1984—Subsec. (b)(2).
1976—
1960—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1976 Amendment
CHAPTER 157 —SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD ORDERS; ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1995—
1975—
§2321. Judicial review of Board's orders and decisions; procedure generally; process
(a) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Congress, a proceeding to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Surface Transportation Board shall be brought in the court of appeals as provided by and in the manner prescribed in
(b) The procedure in the district courts in actions to enforce, in whole or in part, any order of the Surface Transportation Board other than for payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, shall be as provided in this chapter.
(c) The orders, writs, and process of the district courts may, in the cases specified in subsection (b) and in enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under subtitle IV of title 49, run, be served and be returnable anywhere in the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §44 (Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32,
Word "actions" was substituted for "cases," in view of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The exception as to procedure in the infliction of criminal punishment was omitted as unnecessary, as Title 18, U.S.C., Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern procedure in criminal matters.
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects, in
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1995—
1978—Subsec. (c).
1975—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted "20, 23, and 43" for "20, 43, and 49" in second par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1995 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
§2322. United States as party
All actions specified in
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §48 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §211,
Word "actions" was substituted for "cases and proceedings", in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A provision authorizing intervention by the United States was omitted. The United States, under the provisions of this section, is a necessary and indispensable original party, and hence intervention is unnecessary. (See Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 1922, 42 S.Ct. 349, 258 U.S. 377, 66 L.Ed. 671.)
§2323. Duties of Attorney General; intervenors
The Attorney General shall represent the Government in the actions specified in
The Surface Transportation Board and any party or parties in interest to the proceeding before the Board, in which an order or requirement is made, may appear as parties of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by their counsel, in any action involving the validity of such order or requirement or any part thereof, and the interest of such party.
Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals interested in the controversy or question before the Board, or in any action commenced under the aforesaid sections may intervene in said action at any time after commencement thereof.
The Attorney General shall not dispose of or discontinue said action or proceeding over the objection of such party or intervenor, who may prosecute, defend, or continue said action or proceeding unaffected by the action or nonaction of the Attorney General therein.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §45a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§212, 213,
The provision in the second sentence of
The last paragraph of
Word "action" was substituted for "suit" in conformity with Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects, in
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1995—
1978—
1975—
1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted "20, 23, and 43" for "20, 43, and 49" in first par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1995 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
Amendment by
[§§2324, 2325. Repealed. Pub. L. 93–584, §7, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1918 ]
Section 2324, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Section 2325, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this repeal becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of
CHAPTER 158 —ORDERS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES; REVIEW
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1982—
1966—
§2341. Definitions
As used in this chapter—
(1) "clerk" means the clerk of the court in which the petition for the review of an order, reviewable under this chapter, is filed;
(2) "petitioner" means the party or parties by whom a petition to review an order, reviewable under this chapter, is filed; and
(3) "agency" means—
(A) the Commission, when the order sought to be reviewed was entered by the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, or the Atomic Energy Commission, as the case may be;
(B) the Secretary, when the order was entered by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Transportation;
(C) the Administration, when the order was entered by the Maritime Administration;
(D) the Secretary, when the order is under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act; and
(E) the Board, when the order was entered by the Surface Transportation Board.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §1, |
||
| Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §2(a), |
Subsection (a) of former
In paragraph (3), reference to the United States Maritime Commission is omitted because that Commission was abolished by 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 21, §306, eff. May 24, 1950,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act, referred to in par. (3)(D), is classified to
Amendments
1995—Par. (3)(A).
Par. (3)(E).
1992—Par. (3)(B).
1988—Par. (3)(D).
1975—Par. (3)(A).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1995 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
Amendment by
Transfer of Functions
Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by
§2342. Jurisdiction of court of appeals
The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of—
(1) all final orders of the Federal Communication Commission made reviewable by
(2) all final orders of the Secretary of Agriculture made under chapters 9 and 20A of title 7, except orders issued under
(3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of—
(A) the Secretary of Transportation issued pursuant to
(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued pursuant to section 305,1 41304, 41308, or 41309 or
(4) all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by
(5) all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Surface Transportation Board made reviewable by
(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act; and
(7) all final agency actions described in
Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided by
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §2, |
||
| Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §2(b), |
The words "have exclusive jurisdiction" are substituted for "shall have exclusive jurisdiction".
In paragraph (1), the word "by" is substituted for "in accordance with".
In paragraph (3), the word "now" is omitted as unnecessary. The word "under" is substituted for "pursuant to the provisions of". Reference to "Federal Maritime Commission" is substituted for "Federal Maritime Board" on authority of 1961 Reorg. Plan No. 7, eff. Aug. 12, 1961,
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act, referred to in par. (6), is classified to
Amendments
2006—Par. (3)(A).
Par. (3)(B).
"(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued pursuant to—
"(i) section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (
"(ii) section 14 or 17 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (
"(iii) section 2(d) or 3(d) of the Act of November 6, 1966 (
2005—Par. (3)(A).
1996—Par. (3)(A).
1995—Par. (3)(A).
Par. (3)(B).
"(i) section 23, 25, or 43 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (
"(iii) section 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933 (
Par. (5).
1994—Par. (7).
1992—Par. (7).
1988—Par. (6).
1986—Par. (3).
1984—Par. (5).
1982—
1980—Par. (5).
1978—Par. (6).
1975—Par. (5).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Effective Date of 1995 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1975 Amendment
Amendment by
Transfer of Functions
Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by
1 See References in Text note below.
§2343. Venue
The venue of a proceeding under this chapter is in the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §3, |
The section is reorganized for clarity and conciseness. The word "is" is substituted for "shall be". The word "petitioner" is substituted for "party or any of the parties filing the petition for review" in view of the definition of "petitioner" in
§2344. Review of orders; time; notice; contents of petition; service
On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. The action shall be against the United States. The petition shall contain a concise statement of—
(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought;
(2) the facts on which venue is based;
(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and
(4) the relief prayed.
The petitioner shall attach to the petition, as exhibits, copies of the order, report, or decision of the agency. The clerk shall serve a true copy of the petition on the agency and on the Attorney General by registered mail, with request for a return receipt.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §4, |
The section is reorganized, with minor changes in phraseology. The words "as prescribed by
§2345. Prehearing conference
The court of appeals may hold a prehearing conference or direct a judge of the court to hold a prehearing conference.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §5, |
§2346. Certification of record on review
Unless the proceeding has been terminated on a motion to dismiss the petition, the agency shall file in the office of the clerk the record on review as provided by
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §6, |
||
| Aug. 28, 1958, |
The words "of the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending" are omitted as unnecessary in view of the definition of "clerk" in
§2347. Petitions to review; proceedings
(a) Unless determined on a motion to dismiss, petitions to review orders reviewable under this chapter are heard in the court of appeals on the record of the pleadings, evidence adduced, and proceedings before the agency, when the agency has held a hearing whether or not required to do so by law.
(b) When the agency has not held a hearing before taking the action of which review is sought by the petition, the court of appeals shall determine whether a hearing is required by law. After that determination, the court shall—
(1) remand the proceedings to the agency to hold a hearing, when a hearing is required by law;
(2) pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is not required by law and it appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is presented; or
(3) transfer the proceedings to a district court for the district in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office for a hearing and determination as if the proceedings were originally initiated in the district court, when a hearing is not required by law and a genuine issue of material fact is presented. The procedure in these cases in the district court is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(c) If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that—
(1) the additional evidence is material; and
(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence before the agency;
the court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may modify or set aside its order, and shall file in the court the additional evidence, the modified findings or new findings, and the modified order or the order setting aside the original order.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §7, |
||
| Aug. 28, 1958, |
The headnotes of the subsections are omitted as unnecessary and to conform to the style of title 28.
In subsection (a), the words "the petition" following "on a motion to dismiss" are omitted as unnecessary. The word "are" is substituted for "shall be". The words "in fact" following "when the agency has" are omitted as unnecessary.
In subsection (b)(3), the words "United States" preceding "district court" are omitted as unnecessary because the term "district court" as used in title 28 means a United States district court. See
In subsection (c), the words "applies" and "shows" are substituted for "shall apply" and "shall show", respectively.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
§2348. Representation in proceeding; intervention
The Attorney General is responsible for and has control of the interests of the Government in all court proceedings under this chapter. The agency, and any party in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose interests will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any proceeding to review the order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the order. The Attorney General may not dispose of or discontinue the proceeding to review over the objection of any party or intervenor, but any intervenor may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by the action or inaction of the Attorney General.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §8, |
In the first sentence, the words "is responsible for and has control" are substituted for "shall be responsible for and have charge and control".
In the last sentence, the word "may" is substituted for "shall". The word "aforesaid" following "any party or intervenor" is omitted as unnecessary. The words "any intervenor" and "inaction" are substituted for "said intervenor or intervenors" and "nonaction", respectively.
§2349. Jurisdiction of the proceeding
(a) The court of appeals has jurisdiction of the proceeding on the filing and service of a petition to review. The court of appeals in which the record on review is filed, on the filing, has jurisdiction to vacate stay orders or interlocutory injunctions previously granted by any court, and has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter, on the petition, evidence, and proceedings set forth in the record on review, a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.
(b) The filing of the petition to review does not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the agency, but the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing and determination of the petition. When the petitioner makes application for an interlocutory injunction restraining or suspending the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order reviewable under this chapter, at least 5 days' notice of the hearing thereon shall be given to the agency and to the Attorney General. In a case in which irreparable damage would otherwise result to the petitioner, the court of appeals may, on hearing, after reasonable notice to the agency and to the Attorney General, order a temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, of the operation of the order of the agency for not more than 60 days from the date of the order pending the hearing on the application for the interlocutory injunction, in which case the order of the court of appeals shall contain a specific finding, based on evidence submitted to the court of appeals, and identified by reference thereto, that irreparable damage would result to the petitioner and specifying the nature of the damage. The court of appeals, at the time of hearing the application for an interlocutory injunction, on a like finding, may continue the temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, until decision on the application.
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §9, |
||
| Sept. 13, 1961, |
The headnotes of the subsections are omitted as unnecessary and to conform to the style of title 28.
In subsection (a), the words "has jurisdiction" and "has exclusive jurisdiction" are substituted for "shall have jurisdiction" and "shall have exclusive jurisdiction", respectively. The words "previously granted" are substituted for "theretofore granted" as the preferred expression.
In subsection (b), the words "does not" are substituted for "shall not". The words "of the United States" following "Attorney General" are omitted as unnecessary. The words "In a case in which" are substituted for "In cases where". The word "result" is substituted for "ensue". In the fourth sentence, the words "provided for above" following the last word "application" are omitted as unnecessary. In the last sentence, the word "applies" is substituted for "shall apply".
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1984—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by
§2350. Review in Supreme Court on certiorari or certification
(a) An order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction under
(b) The provisions of
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §10, |
The words "of the United States" following "Supreme Court" are omitted as unnecessary because the term "Supreme Court" as used in title 28 means the Supreme Court of the United States.
The words "
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1988—Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
§2351. Enforcement of orders by district courts
The several district courts have jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to enjoin and restrain any person from violating any order issued under
(Added
| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §12, |
The words "United States" preceding "district court" are omitted as unnecessary because the term "district court" as used in title 28 means a United States district court. See
[§2352. Repealed. Pub. L. 89–773, §4, Nov. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323 ]
Section,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Savings Provision
[§2353. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §138, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42 ]
Section, added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of
CHAPTER 159 —INTERPLEADER
§2361. Process and procedure
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §41(26) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, par. 26, as added Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, §1,
Jurisdiction and venue provisions of
Subsection (e) of
Words, "Notwithstanding any provision of part I of this title to the contrary" were omitted as unnecessary, since the revised title contains no "contrary provisions."
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section makes clear that
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted "In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 under this title" for "In any interpleader action,", and inserted "or prosecuting" between "instituting" and "any proceeding".
CHAPTER 161 —UNITED STATES AS PARTY GENERALLY
Historical and Revision Notes
1949 Act
This section amends the analysis of
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1980—
1976—
1972—
1966—
1961—
1954—Act July 30, 1954, ch. 648, §2(b),
1949—Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §118,
§2401. Time for commencing action against United States
(a) Except as provided by
(b) A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§41(20), 942 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, part 20,
Section consolidates provision in
Words "or within one year after the date of enactment of this Act whichever is later", in
Provisions of
Words in subsec. (a) of this revised section, "person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues" were substituted for "claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim." (See reviser's note under
Words in
A provision in
Subsection (b) of the revised section simplifies and restates said
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
Subsection (b) amended in the Senate to insert the 1 year limitation on the bringing of tort actions and to include the limitation upon the time in which tort claims not exceeding $1000 must be presented to the appropriate Federal agencies for administrative disposition. 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 48.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2011—Subsec. (a).
1978—Subsec. (a).
1966—Subsec. (b).
1959—Subsec. (b).
1949—Subsec. (b). Act Apr. 25, 1949, the time limitation on bringing tort actions from 1 year to 2 years.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
§2402. Jury trial in actions against United States
Subject to
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§41(20), 931(a) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, par. 20,
Section consolidates non-jury provisions of
Word "actions" was substituted for "suits", in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Provisions of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §41(20) relating to jurisdiction of district courts and time for bringing actions against the United States are the basis of
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1996—
1954—Act July 30, 1954, permitted a jury trial at the request of either party in actions under
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Amendment by
§2403. Intervention by United States or a State; constitutional question
(a) In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.
(b) In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §401 (Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, §1,
Word "action" was added before "suit or proceeding", in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since this section applies to all Federal courts, the word "suit" was not required to be deleted by such rule.
"Court of the United States" is defined in
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1976—
Subsecs. (a), (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1976 Amendment
Amendment by
§2404. Death of defendant in damage action
A civil action for damages commenced by or on behalf of the United States or in which it is interested shall not abate on the death of a defendant but shall survive and be enforceable against his estate as well as against surviving defendants.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §780a (June 16, 1933, ch. 103,
Substitution of parties, see rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes in phraseology were made.
§2405. Garnishment
In any action or suit commenced by the United States against a corporation for the recovery of money upon a bill, note, or other security, the debtors of the corporation may be summoned as garnishees. Any person so summoned shall appear in open court and depose in writing to the amount of his indebtedness to the corporation at the time of the service of the summons and at the time of making the deposition, and judgment may be entered in favor of the United States for the sum admitted by the garnishee to be due the corporation as if it had been due the United States. A judgment shall not be entered against any garnishee until after judgment has been rendered against the corporation, nor until the sum in which the garnishee is indebted is actually due.
When any garnishee deposes in open court that he is not and was not at the time of the service of the summons indebted to the corporation, an issue may be tendered by the United States upon such deposition. If, upon the trial of that issue, a verdict is rendered against the garnishee, judgment shall be entered in favor of the United States, pursuant to such verdict, with costs.
Any garnishee who fails to appear at the term to which he is summoned shall be subject to attachment for contempt.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§748, 749, and 750 (R.S. §§935, 936, 937).
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2406. Credits in actions by United States; prior disallowance
In an action by the United States against an individual, evidence supporting the defendant's claim for a credit shall not be admitted unless he first proves that such claim has been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the Government Accountability Office, or that he has, at the time of the trial, obtained possession of vouchers not previously procurable and has been prevented from presenting such claim to the Government Accountability Office by absence from the United States or unavoidable accident.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §774 (R.S., §§236, 951; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §§304, 305,
Word "action" was substituted for "suits", in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes in phraseology were made.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2004—
§2407. Delinquents for public money; judgment at return term; continuance
In an action by the United States against any person accountable for public money who fails to pay into the Treasury the sum reported due the United States, upon the adjustment of his account the court shall grant judgment upon motion unless a continuance is granted as specified in this section.
A continuance may be granted if the defendant, in open court and in the presence of the United States attorney, states under oath that he is equitably entitled to credits which have been disallowed by the Government Accountability Office prior to the commencement of the action, specifying each particular claim so rejected, and stating that he cannot safely come to trial.
A continuance may also be granted if such an action is commenced on a bond or other sealed instrument and the court requires the original instrument to be produced.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §781 (R.S. §957; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §304,
Word "action" was substituted for "suit", in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Words "court requires the original instrument to be produced" were substituted for "defendant pleads non est factum, verifying such plea or motion by his oath, and the court thereupon requires the production of the original bond, contract, or other paper certified in the affidavit". The plea of non est factum is obsolete under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the words deleted are superfluous, since a court would not require the production of an original instrument unless the proper procedure were taken to require such production.
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2004—
§2408. Security not required of United States
Security for damages or costs shall not be required of the United States, any department or agency thereof or any party acting under the direction of any such department or agency on the issuance of process or the institution or prosecution of any proceeding.
Costs taxable, under other Acts of Congress, against the United States or any such department, agency or party shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the department or agency which directed the proceedings to be instituted.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §870 (R.S. §1001; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§117, 289,
Words "process or the institution or prosecution of any proceeding" were substituted for "appeal, or other process in law, admiralty, or equity."
Word "agency" was substituted for "any corporation all the stock of which is beneficially owned by the United States, either directly or indirectly", in view of the creation of many independent governmental agencies since the enactment of the original law on which this section is based.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2409. Partition actions involving United States
Any civil action by any tenant in common or joint tenant owning an undivided interest in lands, where the United States is one of such tenants in common or joint tenants, against the United States alone or against the United States and any other of such owners, shall proceed, and be determined, in the same manner as would a similar action between private persons.
Whenever in such action the court orders a sale of the property or any part thereof the Attorney General may bid for the same in behalf of the United States. If the United States is the purchaser, the amount of the purchase money shall be paid from the Treasury upon a warrant drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the requisition of the Attorney General.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §766 (May 17, 1898, ch. 339, §§1, 2,
Provisions relating to service or commencement of the action and duty of United States attorneys to appear, defend, and file answer were omitted as surplusage and covered by Rules 2, 3, and 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Words "shall proceed, and be determined, in the same manner as would a similar action between private persons" were substituted for "shall proceed as other cases for partition by courts of equity, and in making such partition the court shall be governed by the same principles of equity that control courts of equity, in partition proceedings between private persons," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2409a. Real property quiet title actions
(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which may be or could have been brought under
(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judgment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or control.
(c) No preliminary injunction shall issue in any action brought under this section.
(d) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.
(e) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority conferred by
(f) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried by the court without a jury.
(g) Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.
(h) No civil action may be maintained under this section by a State with respect to defense facilities (including land) of the United States so long as the lands at issue are being used or required by the United States for national defense purposes as determined by the head of the Federal agency with jurisdiction over the lands involved, if it is determined that the State action was brought more than twelve years after the State knew or should have known of the claims of the United States. Upon cessation of such use or requirement, the State may dispute title to such lands pursuant to the provisions of this section. The decision of the head of the Federal agency is not subject to judicial review.
(i) Any civil action brought by a State under this section with respect to lands, other than tide or submerged lands, on which the United States or its lessee or right-of-way or easement grantee has made substantial improvements or substantial investments or on which the United States has conducted substantial activities pursuant to a management plan such as range improvement, timber harvest, tree planting, mineral activities, farming, wildlife habitat improvement, or other similar activities, shall be barred unless the action is commenced within twelve years after the date the State received notice of the Federal claims to the lands.
(j) If a final determination in an action brought by a State under this section involving submerged or tide lands on which the United States or its lessee or right-of-way or easement grantee has made substantial improvements or substantial investments is adverse to the United States and it is determined that the State's action was brought more than twelve years after the State received notice of the Federal claim to the lands, the State shall take title to the lands subject to any existing lease, easement, or right-of-way. Any compensation due with respect to such lease, easement, or right-of-way shall be determined under existing law.
(k) Notice for the purposes of the accrual of an action brought by a State under this section shall be—
(1) by public communications with respect to the claimed lands which are sufficiently specific as to be reasonably calculated to put the claimant on notice of the Federal claim to the lands, or
(2) by the use, occupancy, or improvement of the claimed lands which, in the circumstances, is open and notorious.
(l) For purposes of this section, the term "tide or submerged lands" means "lands beneath navigable waters" as defined in section 2 of the Submerged Lands Act (
(m) Not less than one hundred and eighty days before bringing any action under this section, a State shall notify the head of the Federal agency with jurisdiction over the lands in question of the State's intention to file suit, the basis therefor, and a description of the lands included in the suit.
(n) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952, referred to in subsec. (a), is section 208(a) to (d) of act July 10, 1952, ch. 651,
Amendments
1986—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (c) to (n).
Short Title
This section is popularly known as the "Quiet Title Act".
§2410. Actions affecting property on which United States has lien
(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and
(1) to quiet title to,
(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,
(3) to partition,
(4) to condemn, or
(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to,
real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.
(b) The complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature of the interest or lien of the United States. In actions or suits involving liens arising under the internal revenue laws, the complaint or pleading shall include the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created the lien and, if a notice of the tax lien was filed, the identity of the internal revenue office which filed the notice, and the date and place such notice of lien was filed. In actions in the State courts service upon the United States shall be made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of the process and complaint, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. In such actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty days after such service or such further time as the court may allow.
(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from the mortgage or other lien held by the United States as may be provided with respect to such matters by the local law of the place where the court is situated. However, an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien, naming the United States as a party under this section, must seek judicial sale. A sale to satisfy a lien inferior to one of the United States shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents that the property may be sold free of its lien and the proceeds divided as the parties may be entitled. Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem, except that with respect to a lien arising under the internal revenue laws the period shall be 120 days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is longer, and in any case in which, under the provisions of section 505 of the Housing Act of 1950, as amended (
(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property under this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the amount to be paid for such property shall be the sum of—
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale (which, in the case of a purchaser who is the holder of the lien being foreclosed, shall include the amount of the obligation secured by such lien to the extent satisfied by reason of such sale),
(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under paragraph (1)) at 6 percent per annum from the date of such sale, and
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in connection with such property, over (B) the income from such property plus (to the extent such property is used by the purchaser) a reasonable rental value of such property.
(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal property, duly recorded in the jurisdiction in which the property is located, and a junior lien, other than a tax lien, in favor of the United States attaches to such property, such person may make a written request to the officer charged with the administration of the laws in respect of which the lien of the United States arises, to have the same extinguished. If after appropriate investigation, it appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of the property would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the lien of the United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satisfied or by lapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, such officer may issue a certificate releasing the property from such lien.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§901, 902, 904, 905 (Mar. 4, 1931, ch. 515, §§1, 2, 4, 5,
Provisions including the districts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in
Provisions in
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This amendment conforms the language of
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (d), is classified to
Amendments
1996—Subsec. (e).
1991—Subsec. (c).
1990—Subsec. (c).
1986—Subsec. (d).
1966—Subsec. (a).
"(1) to quiet title to,
"(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,
"(3) to partition,
"(4) to condemn, or
"(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to,"
for "subject matter, to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon".
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsecs. (d), (e).
1960—Subsec. (b).
1958—Subsec. (a).
1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, conformed section with that of prior law with respect to service of process and complaint upon the United States in suits brought in State courts.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1990 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1958 Amendment
Amendment by
§2411. Interest
In any judgment of any court rendered (whether against the United States, a collector or deputy collector of internal revenue, a former collector or deputy collector, or the personal representative in case of death) for any overpayment in respect of any internal-revenue tax, interest shall be allowed at the overpayment rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the payment or collection thereof to a date preceding the date of the refund check by not more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner is authorized to tender by check payment of any such judgment, with interest as herein provided, at any time after such judgment becomes final, whether or not a claim for such payment has been duly filed, and such tender shall stop the running of interest, whether or not such refund check is accepted by the judgment creditor.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§765, 931(a), 932, Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 359, §10,
Section consolidates section 765 with provisions of sections 931(a) and 932, all of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to interest on judgments, the latter two sections being applicable to judgments in tort claims cases. For other provisions of said sections 931(a) and 932, see Distribution Table. Said section 932 made the provisions of said section 765 applicable to such judgments, therefore the provisions of said section 931(a) that "the United States shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment" was omitted as covered by the language of said section 765 providing that interest shall be computed from the date of the judgment.
Provisions of
Words of
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section amends
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in text, is classified to
Amendments
1986—
1982—
1975—Subsec. (a).
1949—Act May 24, 1949, restored provisions relating to payment of interest on tax refunds.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2412. Costs and fees
(a)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in
(2) A judgment for costs, when awarded in favor of the United States in an action brought by the United States, may include an amount equal to the filing fee prescribed under
(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
(c)(1) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for costs pursuant to subsection (a) shall be paid as provided in
(2) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for fees and expenses of attorneys pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid as provided in
(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
(C) The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.
(D) If, in a civil action brought by the United States or a proceeding for judicial review of an adversary adjudication described in
(2) For the purposes of this subsection—
(A) "fees and other expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States; and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.);
(B) "party" means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (
(C) "United States" includes any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity;
(D) "position of the United States" means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings;
(E) "civil action brought by or against the United States" includes an appeal by a party, other than the United States, from a decision of a contracting officer rendered pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract with the Government or pursuant to
(F) "court" includes the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims;
(G) "final judgment" means a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement;
(H) "prevailing party", in the case of eminent domain proceedings, means a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by settlement), exclusive of interest, the amount of which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the Government; and
(I) "demand" means the express demand of the United States which led to the adversary adjudication, but shall not include a recitation of the maximum statutory penalty (i) in the complaint, or (ii) elsewhere when accompanied by an express demand for a lesser amount.
(3) In awarding fees and other expenses under this subsection to a prevailing party in any action for judicial review of an adversary adjudication, as defined in subsection (b)(1)(C) of
(4) Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection to a party shall be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or otherwise.
(5)(A) Not later than March 31 of the first fiscal year beginning after the date of enactment of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, and every fiscal year thereafter, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall submit to Congress and make publicly available online a report on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to this subsection.
(B) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall describe the number, nature, and amount of the awards, the claims involved in the controversy, and any other relevant information that may aid Congress in evaluating the scope and impact of such awards.
(C)(i) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall account for all payments of fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection that are made pursuant to a settlement agreement, regardless of whether the settlement agreement is sealed or otherwise subject to a nondisclosure provision.
(ii) The disclosure of fees and other expenses required under clause (i) shall not affect any other information that is subject to a nondisclosure provision in a settlement agreement.
(D) The Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall include and clearly identify in each annual report under subparagraph (A), for each case in which an award of fees and other expenses is included in the report—
(i) any amounts paid under
(ii) the amount of the award of fees and other expenses; and
(iii) the statute under which the plaintiff filed suit.
(6) As soon as practicable, and in any event not later than the date on which the first report under paragraph (5)(A) is required to be submitted, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall create and maintain online a searchable database containing, with respect to each award of fees and other expenses under this subsection made on or after the date of enactment of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, the following information:
(A) The case name and number, hyperlinked to the case, if available.
(B) The name of the agency involved in the case.
(C) The name of each party to whom the award was made as such party is identified in the order or other court document making the award.
(D) A description of the claims in the case.
(E) The amount of the award.
(F) The basis for the finding that the position of the agency concerned was not substantially justified.
(7) The online searchable database described in paragraph (6) may not reveal any information the disclosure of which is prohibited by law or a court order.
(8) The head of each agency (including the Attorney General of the United States) shall provide to the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States in a timely manner all information requested by the Chairman to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (5), (6), and (7).
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any costs, fees, and other expenses in connection with any proceeding to which section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies (determined without regard to subsections (b) and (f) of such section). Nothing in the preceding sentence shall prevent the awarding under subsection (a) of this section of costs enumerated in
(f) If the United States appeals an award of costs or fees and other expenses made against the United States under this section and the award is affirmed in whole or in part, interest shall be paid on the amount of the award as affirmed. Such interest shall be computed at the rate determined under
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§258, 931(a) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §152,
Section consolidates the last sentence of
Subsection (a) is new. It follows the well-known common-law rule that a sovereign is not liable for costs unless specific provision for such liability is made by law. This is a corollary to the rule that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.
Many enactments of Congress relating to fees and costs contain specific exceptions as to the liability of the United States. (See, for example,
Subsection (b) incorporates
Subsection (c) incorporates the costs provisions of
Words "and for summoning the same," after "witnesses," were omitted from subsection (b) as covered by "those actually incurred for witnesses."
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of enactment of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, referred to in subsec. (d)(5)(A) and (6), is the date of enactment of
Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (d)(3).
Subsec. (d)(5) to (8).
Subsec. (e).
2011—Subsec. (d)(2)(E).
Subsec. (d)(3).
1998—Subsec. (d)(2)(F).
1996—Subsec. (d)(1)(D).
Subsec. (d)(2)(A)(ii).
Subsec. (d)(2)(B).
Subsec. (d)(2)(I).
1995—Subsec. (d)(5).
1992—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (d)(2)(F).
Subsec. (d)(5).
1986—Subsecs. (d)(2)(B), (e).
1985—Subsecs. (a), (b).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (d)(1)(A).
Subsec. (d)(1)(B).
Subsec. (d)(2)(B).
Subsec. (d)(2)(D) to (H).
Subsec. (d)(4).
"(A) Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection may be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency, by appropriation or otherwise, for such purpose. If not paid by any agency, the fees and other expenses shall be paid in the same manner as the payment of final judgments is made in accordance with
"(B) There is authorized to be appropriated to each agency for each of the fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984, such sums as may be necessary to pay fees and other expenses awarded pursuant to this subsection in such fiscal years."
Subsec. (f).
1982—Subsec. (e).
1980—
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1998 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by section 902(b)(1) of
Amendment by sections 301(a) and 502(b) of
Effective Date of 1985 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment
Amendment by section 204(a) of
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Revival of Previously Repealed Provisions
For revival of subsec. (d) of this section effective on or after Aug. 5, 1985, as if it had not been repealed by section 204(c) of
Savings Provision
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), nothing in
"(b) Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act (
Authority of Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to Award Fees Under Equal Access to Justice Act for Non-attorney Practitioners.
Nonliability of Judicial Officers for Costs
Fee Agreements
§2413. Executions in favor of United States
A writ of execution on a judgment obtained for the use of the United States in any court thereof shall be issued from and made returnable to the court which rendered the judgment, but may be executed in any other State, in any Territory, or in the District of Columbia.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §839 (R.S. §986).
Words "or in the District of Columbia" were added on the authority of 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 384, declaring that, under this section, a writ of execution in favor of the United States, obtained from a Federal court in any State, could be executed in the District of Columbia. (See, also,
Changes in phraseology were made.
§2414. Payment of judgments and compromise settlements
Except as provided by
Whenever the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be taken from a judgment or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the same, he shall so certify and the judgment shall be deemed final.
Except as otherwise provided by law, compromise settlements of claims referred to the Attorney General for defense of imminent litigation or suits against the United States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, made by the Attorney General or any person authorized by him, shall be settled and paid in a manner similar to judgments in like causes and appropriations or funds available for the payment of such judgments are hereby made available for the payment of such compromise settlements.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on
Similar provisions of
The second paragraph was added to make clear that the payment of judgments not appealed may be expedited by certificate to that effect.
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2011—
1996—
1980—
1978—
1961—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
§2415. Time for commencing actions brought by the United States
(a) Subject to the provisions of
(b) Subject to the provisions of
(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.
(d) Subject to the provisions of
(e) In the event that any action to which this section applies is timely brought and is thereafter dismissed without prejudice, the action may be recommenced within one year after such dismissal, regardless of whether the action would otherwise then be barred by this section. In any action so recommenced the defendant shall not be barred from interposing any claim which would not have been barred in the original action.
(f) The provisions of this section shall not prevent the assertion, in an action against the United States or an officer or agency thereof, of any claim of the United States or an officer or agency thereof against an opposing party, a co-party, or a third party that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. A claim of the United States or an officer or agency thereof that does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim may, if time-barred, be asserted only by way of offset and may be allowed in an amount not to exceed the amount of the opposing party's recovery.
(g) Any right of action subject to the provisions of this section which accrued prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to have accrued on the date of enactment of this Act.
(h) Nothing in this Act shall apply to actions brought under the Internal Revenue Code or incidental to the collection of taxes imposed by the United States.
(i) The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance with
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of enactment of this Act, referred to in subsecs. (a), (b), and (g), means the date of enactment of
The Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is
This Act, referred to in subsec. (h), probably means
Amendments
1984—Subsecs. (a), (b).
1983—Subsec. (i).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (i).
1980—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1977—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1972—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Short Title of 1982 Amendment
Publication of List of Indian Claims; Additional Claims; Time To Commence Action; Rejection of Claims; Claims Resolved By Legislation
"
"(b) Such list shall group the claims on a reservation-by-reservation, tribe-by-tribe, or State-by-State basis, as appropriate, and shall state the nature and geographic location of each claim and only such other additional information as may be needed to identify specifically such claims.
"(c) Within thirty days after the publication of this list, the Secretary shall provide a copy of the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982 [see Short Title of 1982 Amendment note above] and a copy of the Federal Register containing this list, or such parts as may be pertinent, to each Indian tribe, band or group whose rights or the rights of whose members could be affected by the provisions of
"
"(b) Any such claim submitted to the Secretary shall be accompanied by a statement identifying the nature of the claim, the date when the right of action allegedly accrued, the names of the potential plaintiffs and defendants, if known, and such other information needed to identify and evaluate such claim.
"(c) Not more than thirty days after the expiration of the one hundred and eighty day period provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a list containing the additional claims submitted during such period: Provided, That the Secretary shall have the discretion to exclude from such list any matter which has not been sufficiently identified as a claim.
"
"(b) If the Secretary decides to reject for litigation any of the claims or groups or categories of claims contained on either of the lists required by section 3 or 4(c) of this Act, he shall send a report to the appropriate tribe, band, or group of Indians, whose rights or the rights of whose members could be affected by such rejection, advising them of his decision. The report shall identify the nature and geographic location of each rejected claim and the name of the potential plaintiffs and defendants if they are known or can be reasonably ascertained and shall, briefly, state the reasons why such claim or claims were rejected for litigation. Where the Secretary knows or can reasonably ascertain the identity of any of the potential individual Indian plaintiffs and their present addresses, he shall provide them with written notice of such rejection. Upon the request of any Indian claimant, the Secretary shall, without undue delay, provide to such claimant any nonprivileged research materials or evidence gathered by the United States in the documentation of such claim.
"(c) The Secretary, as soon as possible after providing the report required by subsection (b) of this section, shall publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying the claims covered in such report. With respect to any claim covered by such report, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within one year after the date of publication in the Federal Register.
"
"(b) Any right of action on claims covered by such legislation or report shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within 3 years after the date of submission of such legislation or legislative report to Congress."
Legislative Proposals Respecting Appropriateness of Resolution by Litigation of Unresolved Indian Claims
§2416. Time for commencing actions brought by the United States—Exclusions
For the purpose of computing the limitations periods established in section 2415, there shall be excluded all periods during which—
(a) the defendant or the res is outside the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; or
(b) the defendant is exempt from legal process because of infancy, mental incompetence, diplomatic immunity, or for any other reason; or
(c) facts material to the right of action are not known and reasonably could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the responsibility to act in the circumstances; or
(d) the United States is in a state of war declared pursuant to article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Added
CHAPTER 163 —FINES, PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2000—
§2461. Mode of recovery
(a) Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress, whenever a forfeiture of property is prescribed as a penalty for violation of an Act of Congress and the seizure takes place on the high seas or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, such forfeiture may be enforced by libel in admiralty but in cases of seizures on land the forfeiture may be enforced by a proceeding by libel which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.
(c) If a person is charged in a criminal case with a violation of an Act of Congress for which the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is authorized, the Government may include notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the defendant is convicted of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property as part of the sentence in the criminal case pursuant to to 1 the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Subsection (a) was drafted to clarify a serious ambiguity in existing law and is based upon rulings of the Supreme Court. Numerous sections in the United States Code prescribe civil fines, penalties, and pecuniary forfeitures for violation of certain sections without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof. See, for example,
A civil fine, penalty, or pecuniary forfeiture is recoverable in a civil action. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess et al., 1943, 63 S.Ct. 379, 317 U.S. 537, 87 L.Ed. 433, rehearing denied 63 S.Ct. 756, 318 U.S. 799, 87 L.Ed. 1163; Hepner v. United States, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 474, 213 U.S. 103, 53 L.Ed. 720, and cases cited therein.
Forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal cases are enforceable by procedure set out in Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
If the statute contemplates a criminal fine, it can only be recovered in a criminal proceeding under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, after a conviction. The collection of civil fines and penalties, however, may not be had under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 54(b)(5), but enforcement of a criminal fine imposed in a criminal case may be had by execution on the judgment rendered in such case, as in civil actions. (See
Subsection (b) was drafted to cover the subject of forfeiture of property generally. Sections in the United States Code specifically providing a mode of enforcement of forfeiture of property for their violation and other procedural matters will, of course, govern and subsection (b) will not affect them. It will only cover cases where no mode of recovery is prescribed.
Words "Unless otherwise provided by enactment of Congress" were inserted at the beginning of subsection (b) to exclude from its application instances where a libel in admiralty is not required. For example, under
Rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes such rules applicable to the appeals in cases of seizures on land. (See also 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States, 1912, 33 S.Ct. 50, 226 U.S. 172, 57 L.Ed. 174, and Eureka Productions v. Mulligan, C.C.A. 1940, 108 F.2d 760.) The proceeding, which resembles a suit in admiralty in that it is begun by a libel, is, strictly speaking, an "action at law" (The Sarah, 1823, 8 Wheat. 391, 21 U.S. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644; Morris's Cotton, 1869, 8 Wall. 507, 75 U.S. 507, 19 L.Ed. 481; Confiscation cases, 1873, 20 Wall. 92, 87 U.S. 92, 22 L.Ed. 320; Eureka Productions v. Mulligan, supra), even though the statute may direct that the proceedings conform to admiralty as near as may be. In re Graham, 1870, 10 Wall. 541, 19 L.Ed. 981, and 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States, supra.
Subsection (b) is in conformity with Rule 21 of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules, which recognizes that a libel may be filed upon seizure for any breach of any enactment of Congress, whether on land or on the high seas or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Such rule also permits an information to be filed, but is rarely, if ever, used at present. Consequently, "information" has been omitted from the text and only "libel" is incorporated.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subsec. (c), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
The Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (c), is title II of
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (c).
2000—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2000 Amendment
Amendment by
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
"short title
"findings and purpose
"(1) the power of Federal agencies to impose civil monetary penalties for violations of Federal law and regulations plays an important role in deterring violations and furthering the policy goals embodied in such laws and regulations;
"(2) the impact of many civil monetary penalties has been and is diminished due to the effect of inflation;
"(3) by reducing the impact of civil monetary penalties, inflation has weakened the deterrent effect of such penalties; and
"(4) the Federal Government does not maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts of Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.
"(b)
"(1) allow for regular adjustment for inflation of civil monetary penalties;
"(2) maintain the deterrent effect of civil monetary penalties and promote compliance with the law; and
"(3) improve the collection by the Federal Government of civil monetary penalties.
"definitions
"(1) 'agency' means an Executive agency as defined under
"(2) 'civil monetary penalty' means any penalty, fine, or other sanction that—
"(A)(i) is for a specific monetary amount as provided by Federal law; or
"(ii) has a maximum amount provided for by Federal law; and
"(B) is assessed or enforced by an agency pursuant to Federal law; and
"(C) is assessed or enforced pursuant to an administrative proceeding or a civil action in the Federal courts; and
"(3) 'Consumer Price Index' means the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.
"civil monetary penalty inflation adjustment reports
"(1) in accordance with subsection (b), adjust each civil monetary penalty provided by law within the jurisdiction of the Federal agency, except for any penalty (including any addition to tax and additional amount) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [
"(2) publish each such adjustment in the Federal Register.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) the head of an agency shall adjust civil monetary penalties through an interim final rulemaking; and
"(B) the adjustment shall take effect not later than August 1, 2016.
"(2)
"(c)
"(1) the head of the agency, after publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking and providing an opportunity for comment, determines in a final rule that—
"(A) increasing the civil monetary penalty by the otherwise required amount will have a negative economic impact; or
"(B) the social costs of increasing the civil monetary penalty by the otherwise required amount outweigh the benefits; and
"(2) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concurs with the determination of the head of the agency under paragraph (1).
"(d)
"cost-of-living adjustments of civil monetary penalties
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) the Consumer Price Index for the month of October preceding the date of the adjustment, exceeds
"(B) the Consumer Price Index for the month of October 1 year before the month of October referred to in subparagraph (A).
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(C)
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
[
[For authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to consolidate reports required under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990,
§2462. Time for commencing proceedings
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §791 (R.S. §1047).
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2463. Property taken under revenue law not repleviable
All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §747 (R.S. §934).
Changes were made in phraseology.
§2464. Security; special bond
(a) Except in cases of seizures for forfeiture under any law of the United States, whenever a warrant of arrest or other process in rem is issued in any admiralty case, the United States marshal shall stay the execution of such process, or discharge the property arrested if the process has been levied, on receiving from the respondent or claimant of the property a bond or stipulation in double the amount claimed by the libellant, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court where the case is pending, or, in his absence, by the collector of the port, conditioned to answer the decree of the court in such case. Such bond or stipulation shall be returned to the court, and judgment or decree thereon, against both the principal and sureties, may be secured at the time of rendering the decree in the original case. The owner of any vessel may deliver to the marshal a bond or stipulation, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court, conditioned to answer the decree of such court in all or any cases that are brought thereafter in such court against the vessel. Thereupon the execution of all such process against such vessel shall be stayed so long as the amount secured by such bond or stipulation is at least double the aggregate amount claimed by libellants in such suits which are begun and pending against such vessel. Similar judgments or decrees and remedies may be had on such bond or stipulation as if a special bond or stipulation had been filed in each of such suits.
(b) The court may make necessary orders to carry this section into effect, particularly in giving proper notice of any such suit. Such bond or stipulation shall be indorsed by the clerk with a minute of the suits wherein process is so stayed. Further security may be required by the court at any time.
(c) If a special bond or stipulation in the particular case is given under this section, the liability as to said case on the general bond or stipulation shall cease. The parties may stipulate the amount of the bond or stipulation for the release of a vessel or other property to be not more than the amount claimed in the libel, with interest, plus an allowance for libellant's costs. In the event of the inability or refusal of the parties to so stipulate, the court shall fix the amount, but if not so fixed then a bond shall be required in the amount prescribed in this section.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §754 (R.S. §941; Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 441,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Executive Documents
Transfer of Functions
All offices of collector of customs, comptroller of customs, surveyor of customs, and appraiser of merchandise of Bureau of Customs of Department of the Treasury to which appointments were required to be made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate were ordered abolished, with such offices to be terminated not later than Dec. 31, 1966, by Reorg. Plan No. 1, of 1965, eff. May 25, 1965, 30 F.R. 7035,
§2465. Return of property to claimant; liability for wrongful seizure; attorney fees, costs, and interest
(a) Upon the entry of a judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized or arrested under any provision of Federal law—
(1) such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; and
(2) if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure or arrest, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered and, in such case, neither the person who made the seizure or arrest nor the prosecutor shall be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution, nor shall the claimant be entitled to costs, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for—
(A) reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant;
(B) post-judgment interest, as set forth in
(C) in cases involving currency, other negotiable instruments, or the proceeds of an interlocutory sale—
(i) interest actually paid to the United States from the date of seizure or arrest of the property that resulted from the investment of the property in an interest-bearing account or instrument; and
(ii) an imputed amount of interest that such currency, instruments, or proceeds would have earned at the rate applicable to the 30-day Treasury Bill, for any period during which no interest was paid (not including any period when the property reasonably was in use as evidence in an official proceeding or in conducting scientific tests for the purpose of collecting evidence), commencing 15 days after the property was seized by a Federal law enforcement agency, or was turned over to a Federal law enforcement agency by a State or local law enforcement agency.
(2)(A) The United States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection.
(B) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply if the claimant is convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.
(C) If there are multiple claims to the same property, the United States shall not be liable for costs and attorneys fees associated with any such claim if the United States—
(i) promptly recognizes such claim;
(ii) promptly returns the interest of the claimant in the property to the claimant, if the property can be divided without difficulty and there are no competing claims to that portion of the property;
(iii) does not cause the claimant to incur additional, reasonable costs or fees; and
(iv) prevails in obtaining forfeiture with respect to one or more of the other claims.
(D) If the court enters judgment in part for the claimant and in part for the Government, the court shall reduce the award of costs and attorney fees accordingly.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§818, 827 (R.S. §§970, 979).
Section consolidates
The words "in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property" were inserted in conformity with the uniform course of judicial decisions. See Hammel v. Little, App.D.C. 1936, 87 F.2d 907, and cases there cited.
The qualifying language of
(See also
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2000—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2000 Amendment
Amendment by
§2466. Fugitive disentitlement
(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such person—
(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid criminal prosecution—
(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction; or
(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal case is pending against the person; and
(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction.
(b) Subsection (a) may be applied to a claim filed by a corporation if any majority shareholder, or individual filing the claim on behalf of the corporation is a person to whom subsection (a) applies.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2006—
2001—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2006 Amendment
Effective Date
§2467. Enforcement of foreign judgment
(a)
(1) the term "foreign nation" means a country that has become a party to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (referred to in this section as the "United Nations Convention") or a foreign jurisdiction with which the United States has a treaty or other formal international agreement in effect providing for mutual forfeiture assistance; and
(2) the term "forfeiture or confiscation judgment" means a final order of a foreign nation compelling a person or entity—
(A) to pay a sum of money representing the proceeds of an offense described in Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention, any violation of foreign law that would constitute a violation or an offense for which property could be forfeited under Federal law if the offense were committed in the United States, or any foreign offense described in
(B) to forfeit property involved in or traceable to the commission of such offense.
(b)
(1)
(A) a summary of the facts of the case and a description of the proceedings that resulted in the forfeiture or confiscation judgment;
(B) certified 1 copy of the forfeiture or confiscation judgment;
(C) an affidavit or sworn declaration establishing that the foreign nation took steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to all persons with an interest in the property in sufficient time to enable such persons to defend against the charges and that the judgment rendered is in force and is not subject to appeal; and
(D) such additional information and evidence as may be required by the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney General.
(2)
(c)
(1)
(2)
(A) the United States shall be the applicant and the defendant or another person or entity affected by the forfeiture or confiscation judgment shall be the respondent;
(B) venue shall lie in the district court for the District of Columbia or in any other district in which the defendant or the property that may be the basis for satisfaction of a judgment under this section may be found; and
(C) the district court shall have personal jurisdiction over a defendant residing outside of the United States if the defendant is served with process in accordance with rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d)
(1)
(A) the judgment was rendered under a system that provides tribunals or procedures incompatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(B) the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
(C) the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(D) the foreign nation did not take steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to a person with an interest in the property of the proceedings 2 in sufficient time to enable him or her to defend; or
(E) the judgment was obtained by fraud.
(2)
(3)
(A)
(i)
(ii)
(I)
(II)
(aa) references in such section 983(j) to civil forfeiture or the filing of a complaint shall be deemed to refer to the applicable foreign criminal or forfeiture proceedings; and
(bb) the reference in paragraph (1)(B)(i) of such section 983(j) to the United States shall be deemed to refer to the foreign nation.
(B)
(i) may rely on information set forth in an affidavit describing the nature of the proceeding or investigation underway in the foreign country, and setting forth a reasonable basis to believe that the property to be restrained will be named in a judgment of forfeiture at the conclusion of such proceeding; or
(ii) may register and enforce a restraining order that has been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the foreign country and certified by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2).
(C)
(e)
(f)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsecs. (c)(2)(C) and (d)(2), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Amendments
2010—Subsec. (d)(3)(A).
2001—Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (b)(1)(C).
Subsec. (d)(1)(D).
Subsec. (d)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after Apr. 25, 2000, see section 21 of
1 So in original. Probably should be preceded by "a".
2 So in original. The words "of the proceedings" probably should not appear.
CHAPTER 165 —UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS PROCEDURE
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2000—
1992—
1982—
1978—
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, §§46, 54(c), 55(d), 59(b),
1 So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.
§2501. Time for filing suit
Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.
Every claim under
A petition on the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases.
A suit for the fees of an officer of the United States shall not be filed until his account for such fees has been finally acted upon, unless the Government Accountability Office fails to act within six months after receiving the account.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§250(2), 250a, and 262 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§145, 156,
Section consolidates limitation provisions of
Words "a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues" were substituted for "married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued; entitled to the claim,". The revised language will cover all legal disabilities actually barring suit. For example, the particular reference to married women is archaic, and is eliminated by use of the general language substituted.
Words "nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively" were omitted, in view of the elimination of the reference to specific disabilities. Also, persons under legal disability could not sue, and their suits should not be barred until they become able to sue. Similar sections of the U.S. Code do not contain any such provision. (For example, see
The section was extended to include claims referred by the head of an executive department in conformity with
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2004—
1992—
1982—
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, struck out ", or the claim is referred by the Senate or House of Representatives, or by the head of an executive department" in first par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2502. Aliens' privilege to sue
(a) Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court's jurisdiction.
(b) See section 7422(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for exception with respect to suits involving internal revenue taxes.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §261 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §155,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 7422(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to
Amendments
1992—Subsec. (a).
1986—Subsec. (b).
1982—Subsec. (a).
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
§2503. Proceedings generally
(a) Parties to any suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims may appear before a judge of that court in person or by attorney, produce evidence, and examine witnesses.
(b) The proceedings of the Court of Federal Claims shall be in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than the rules of evidence) as the Court of Federal Claims may prescribe and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(c) The judges of the Court of Federal Claims shall fix times for trials, administer oaths or affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and enter dispositive judgments. Hearings shall, if convenient, be held in the counties where the witnesses reside.
(d) For the purpose of construing
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§269, 276, and 278 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§168, 170,
Section consolidates provisions relating to proceedings before commissioners and reporter-commissioners contained in
Provisions of
Words "including reporter-commissioners" after "commissioners" were inserted to clarify meaning and conform to Rule 54(a) of the Court of Claims authorizing oaths before reporter-commissioners.
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
The Senate amended this section by inserting "and when directed by the court his recommendations for conclusions of law" following "commissioner" in the second paragraph. This amendment authorizes the Court to direct its commissioners to report recommendations for conclusions of law as well as findings of fact in cases assigned to them. 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 50.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subsec. (b), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Amendments
1992—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b), (c).
Subsec. (d).
1982—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, designated former first par. subsec. (a), and former second par. subsec. (b), and incorporated in one place provisions relating to function of Commissioners.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2504. Plaintiff's testimony
The United States Court of Federal Claims may, at the instance of the Attorney General, order any plaintiff to appear, upon reasonable notice, before any judge of the court and be examined on oath as to all matters pertaining to his claim. Such examination shall be reduced to writing by the judge, and shall be returned to and filed in the court, and may, at the discretion of the attorneys for the United States, be read and used as evidence on the trial. If any plaintiff, after such order is made and due and reasonable notice thereof is given to him, fails to appear, or refuses to testify or answer fully as to all material matters within his knowledge, the court may order that the case shall not be tried until he fully complies with such order.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §274 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §166,
Words "Attorney General" were substituted for "attorney or solicitor appearing in behalf of the United States," in view of
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2505. Trial before judges
Any judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims may sit at any place within the United States to take evidence and enter judgment.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§275 and 275a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §167,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted "Trial before judges" for "Place of taking evidence" in section catchline and repealed second par. relating to taking of testimony.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2506. Interest of witness
A witness in a suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims shall not be exempt or disqualified because he is a party to or interested in such suit.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §274 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §186,
A provision that a witness should not be disqualified by color was omitted as obsolete and unnecessary, since no such disqualification could be invoked in absence of statutory authority.
A provision that the United States could examine any plaintiff or party interested is covered by the word "exempt" in the revised section, and by
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2507. Calls and discovery
(a) The United States Court of Federal Claims may call upon any department or agency of the United States or upon any party for any information or papers, not privileged, for purposes of discovery or for use as evidence. The head of any department or agency may refuse to comply with a call issued pursuant to this subsection when, in his opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public interest.
(b) Without limitation on account of anything contained in subsection (a) of this section, the court may, in accordance with its rules, provide additional means for the discovery of any relevant facts, books, papers, documents or tangible things, not privileged.
(c) The Court of Federal Claims may use all recorded and printed reports made by the committees of the Senate or House of Representatives.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §272 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §164,
Words "or agency" were added. (See reviser's note under
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted "Calls and discovery" for "Calls on departments for information" in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), and added subsecs. (b) and (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2508. Counterclaim or set-off; registration of judgment
Upon the trial of any suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in which any setoff, counterclaim, claim for damages, or other demand is set up on the part of the United States against any plaintiff making claim against the United States in said court, the court shall hear and determine such claim or demand both for and against the United States and plaintiff.
If upon the whole case it finds that the plaintiff is indebted to the United States it shall render judgment to that effect, and such judgment shall be final and reviewable.
The transcript of such judgment, filed in the clerk's office of any district court, shall be entered upon the records and shall be enforceable as other judgments.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §252 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §146,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, struck out "United States" from name of Court of Claims in first par.
1953—Act July 28, 1953, substituted "United States Court of Claims" for "Court of Claims" in first par., and substituted "shall be enforceable as other judgments" for "be a judgment of such district court and enforceable as such" in third par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2509. Congressional reference cases
(a) Whenever a bill, except a bill for a pension, is referred by either House of Congress to the chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to
(b) Proceedings in a congressional reference case shall be under rules and regulations prescribed for the purpose by the chief judge who is hereby authorized and directed to require the application of the pertinent rules of practice of the Court of Federal Claims insofar as feasible. Each hearing officer and each review panel shall have authority to do and perform any acts which may be necessary or proper for the efficient performance of their duties, including the power of subpena and the power to administer oaths and affirmations. None of the rules, rulings, findings, or conclusions authorized by this section shall be subject to judicial review.
(c) The hearing officer to whom a congressional reference case is assigned by the chief judge shall proceed in accordance with the applicable rules to determine the facts, including facts relating to delay or laches, facts bearing upon the question whether the bar of any statute of limitation should be removed, or facts claimed to excuse the claimant for not having resorted to any established legal remedy. He shall append to his findings of fact conclusions sufficient to inform Congress whether the demand is a legal or equitable claim or a gratuity, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimant.
(d) The findings and conclusions of the hearing officer shall be submitted by him, together with the record in the case, to the review panel for review by it pursuant to such rules as may be provided for the purpose, which shall include provision for submitting the report of the hearing officer to the parties for consideration, exception, and argument before the panel. The panel, by majority vote, shall adopt or modify the findings or the conclusions of the hearing officer.
(e) The panel shall submit its report to the chief judge for transmission to the appropriate House of Congress.
(f) Any act or failure to act or other conduct by a party, a witness, or an attorney which would call for the imposition of sanctions under the rules of practice of the Court of Federal Claims shall be noted by the panel or the hearing officer at the time of occurrence thereof and upon failure of the delinquent or offending party, witness, or attorney to make prompt compliance with the order of the panel or the hearing officer a full statement of the circumstances shall be incorporated in the report of the panel.
(g) The Court of Federal Claims is hereby authorized and directed, under such regulations as it may prescribe, to provide the facilities and services of the office of the clerk of the court for the filing, processing, hearing, and dispatch of congressional reference cases and to include within its annual appropriations the costs thereof and other costs of administration, including (but without limitation to the items herein listed) the salaries and traveling expenses of the judges serving as hearing officers and panel members, mailing and service of process, necessary physical facilities, equipment, and supplies, and personnel (including secretaries and law clerks).
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §257 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §151,
Jurisdiction provisions of
A provision as to the court's power to render judgment on a referred claim and its duty to report thereon to Congress, was omitted from this section as covered by
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—Subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (b), (f), (g).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (g).
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2510. Referral of cases by Comptroller General
(a) The Comptroller General may transmit to the United States Court of Federal Claims for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of which the Court of Federal Claims might take jurisdiction on the voluntary action of the claimant, together with all vouchers, papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto.
(b) The Court of Federal Claims shall proceed with the claims or matters so referred as in other cases pending in such Court and shall render judgment thereon.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§254 and 255 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§148, 149,
Section consolidates procedural provisions of
Jurisdiction provisions of such section 254 appear in
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1978—
1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted "Referral of cases by Comptroller General" for "Departmental reference cases" in section catchline.
1953—Act July 28, 1953, struck out provisions relating to procedure in connection with departmental reference cases provided for by former
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
§2511. Accounts of officers, agents or contractors
Notice of suit under
The judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims in such suit shall be conclusive upon the parties, and payment of the amount found due shall discharge the obligation.
The transcript of such judgment, filed in the clerk's office of any district court, shall be entered upon the records, and shall be enforceable as other judgments.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §287 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §180,
Words "The Attorney General shall represent the United States at the hearing of said cause" were omitted as covered by
Jurisdiction provisions of
A provision for continuances was omitted as unnecessary, in view of the inherent power of the court to grant continuances in any suit.
A provision in
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
1953—Act July 28, 1953, inserted "to the Comptroller General," in first par., struck out third par. which provided for accrual to the United States of a right of action upon the judgment, with a limitation period extending to three years after judgment, and inserted provisions for filing and recording the transcript of such judgment in the clerk's office of any district court and for enforcement thereof.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2512. Disbursing officers; relief
Whenever the United States Court of Federal Claims finds that any loss by a disbursing officer of the United States was without his fault or negligence, it shall render a judgment setting forth the amount thereof, and the Government Accountability Office shall allow the officer such amount as a credit in the settlement of his accounts.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §253 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §147,
Words "paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other" were omitted as covered by words "disbursing officer of the United States". (See reviser's note under
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2004—
1992—
1982—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2513. Unjust conviction and imprisonment
(a) Any person suing under
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.
(b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon wherein such facts are alleged to appear, and other evidence thereof shall not be received.
(c) No pardon or certified copy of a pardon shall be considered by the United States Court of Federal Claims unless it contains recitals that the pardon was granted after applicant had exhausted all recourse to the courts and that the time for any court to exercise its jurisdiction had expired.
(d) The Court may permit the plaintiff to prosecute such action in forma pauperis.
(e) The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed $100,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any other plaintiff.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (e).
1992—Subsec. (c).
1982—Subsec. (c).
1954—Subsec. (c). Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted "considered by" for "filed with".
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2514. Forfeiture of fraudulent claims
A claim against the United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance thereof.
In such cases the United States Court of Federal Claims shall specifically find such fraud or attempt and render judgment of forfeiture.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§279 and 280 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§172, 173,
A provision of
A provision of
A provision of
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2515. New trial; stay of judgment
(a) The United States Court of Federal Claims may grant a plaintiff a new trial on any ground established by rules of common law or equity applicable as between private parties.
(b) Such court, at any time while any suit is pending before it, or after proceedings for review have been instituted, or within two years after the final disposition of the suit, may grant the United States a new trial and stay the payment of any judgment upon satisfactory evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§281 and 282 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§174, 175,
Words "but until an order is made staying the payment of a judgment, the same shall be payable and paid as on March 3, 1911, was provided by law," in
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—Subsec. (a).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2516. Interest on claims and judgments
(a) Interest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.
(b) Interest on a judgment against the United States affirmed by the Supreme Court after review on petition of the United States is paid at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §284 and
Subdivision (b) of
Subsection (b) of this section is based on the last sentence of
Changes were made in phraseology.
| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
|---|---|---|
| 28:2516(b) | 28:2516(b)(1st sentence words before "from the date"). |
Section 2(g)(5) of the bill restates 28:2516(b) because the provisions in 28:2516(b) on the periods for computing interest were superseded by the source provisions restated in section 1304 of the revised title 31.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2000—Subsec. (b).
1992—Subsec. (a).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1954—Subsec. (b). Act Sept. 3, 1954, inserted "for any period" after "allowed" in last sentence.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Repeals
§2517. Payment of judgments
(a) Except as provided by
(b) Payment of any such judgment and of interest thereon shall be a full discharge to the United States of all claims and demands arising out of the matters involved in the case or controversy, unless the judgment is designated a partial judgment, in which event only the matters described therein shall be discharged.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §285, and
Section consolidates
Words "chief judge" were substituted for "the chief justice, or, in his absence, by the presiding judge of said court" in
Words "or, on review, by the Supreme Court, where the same are affirmed in favor of the claimant" in
Provisions of
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2011—Subsec. (a).
1996—Subsec. (a).
1992—Subsec. (a).
1982—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1978—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by
[§2518. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §139(l), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43 ]
Section, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of
§2519. Conclusiveness of judgment
A final judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims against any plaintiff shall forever bar any further claim, suit, or demand against the United States arising out of the matters involved in the case or controversy.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §286 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §179,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
1982—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
[§2520. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–518, title II, §207, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2414 ]
Section, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§2521. Subpoenas and incidental powers
(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of parties or witnesses and subpoenas requiring the production of books, papers, documents or tangible things by any party or witness having custody or control thereof, may be issued for purposes of discovery or for use of the things produced as evidence in accordance with the rules and orders of the court. Such subpoenas shall be issued and served and compliance therewith shall be compelled as provided in the rules and orders of the court.
(b) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority as—
(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or
(3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
(c) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have such assistance in the carrying out of its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command as is available to a court of the United States. The United States marshal for any district in which the Court of Federal Claims is sitting shall, when requested by the chief judge of the Court of Federal Claims, attend any session of the Court of Federal Claims in such district.
(Added Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, §59(a),
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
§2522. Notice of appeal
Review of a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims shall be obtained by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims within the time and in the manner prescribed for appeals to United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1992—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of
[CHAPTER 167 —REPEALED]
[§§2601 to 2604. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §140, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 44 ]
Section 2601, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Section 2602, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Section 2603, added
Section 2604, added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of
CHAPTER 169 —COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROCEDURE
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1984—
1980—
1979—
1970—
1949—Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §121,
§2631. Persons entitled to commence a civil action
(a) A civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed the protest pursuant to section 514 of such Act, or by a surety on the transaction which is the subject of the protest.
(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed such petition.
(c) A civil action contesting a determination listed in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose.
(d)(1) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of workers for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a worker, group of workers, certified or recognized union, or authorized representative of such worker or group that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination.
(2) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a firm for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a firm or its representative that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination, or by any other interested domestic party that is aggrieved by such final determination.
(3) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 271 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a community for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a community that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination, or by any other interested domestic party that is aggrieved by such final determination.
(e) A civil action to review a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any person who was a party-at-interest with respect to such determination.
(f) A civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any interested party whose application for disclosure of such confidential information was denied under section 777(c)(1) of such Act.
(g)(1) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs broker's license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930, or to deny a customs broker's permit under section 641(c)(1) of such Act, or to revoke such license or permit under section 641(b)(5) or (c)(2) of such Act, may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license or permit was denied or revoked.
(2) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customs broker's license or permit or impose a monetary penalty in lieu thereof under section 641(d)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person against whom the decision was issued.
(3) A civil action to review any decision or order of the Customs Service to deny, suspend, or revoke accreditation of a private laboratory under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose accreditation was denied, suspended, or revoked.
(h) A civil action described in
(i) Any civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction, other than an action specified in subsections (a)–(h) of this section, may be commenced in the court by any person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
(j)(1) Any person who would be adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a civil action pending in the Court of International Trade may, by leave of court, intervene in such action, except that—
(A) no person may intervene in a civil action under section 515 or 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930;
(B) in a civil action under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, only an interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose may intervene, and such person may intervene as a matter of right; and
(C) in a civil action under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, only a person who was a party to the investigation may intervene, and such person may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) In those civil actions in which intervention is by leave of court, the Court of International Trade shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(k) In this section—
(1) "interested party" has the meaning given such term in section 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930; and
(2) "party-at-interest" means—
(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or a United States importer, of merchandise which is the subject of a final determination under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979;
(B) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a like product;
(C) United States members of a labor organization or other association of workers whose members are employed in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product;
(D) a trade or business association a majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United States,1 and
(E) an association composed of members who represent parties-at-interest described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D).
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (a), (h), (j)(1)(A), is classified to
Section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (b), (j)(1)(A), is classified to
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (c), (j)(1)(B), is classified to
The Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d)(1) to (3), is
Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsecs. (e), (k)(2)(A), is classified to
Section 777 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (f), (j)(1)(C), is classified to
Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to
Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g)(3), is classified to
Section 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (k)(1), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2631, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Amendments
1993—Subsec. (g)(3).
1984—Subsec. (g).
"(1) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny or revoke a customhouse broker's license under section 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license was denied or revoked.
"(2) A civil action to review any order of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customhouse broker's license under section 641(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license was revoked or suspended."
Subsec. (k)(2)(E).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by section 212(b)(3) of
Amendment by section 612(b)(3) of
Effective Date
Chapter effective Nov. 1, 1980, unless otherwise provided, and applicable with respect to civil actions pending on or commenced on or after such date, see section 701(a) of
Subsecs. (d) and (g) to (j) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
Application of 1993 Amendment
For purposes of applying amendment by
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
1 So in original. The comma probably should be a semicolon.
§2632. Commencement of a civil action
(a) Except for civil actions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a civil action in the Court of International Trade shall be commenced by filing concurrently with the clerk of the court a summons and complaint, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.
(b) A civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 515 or section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court a summons, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.
(c) A civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court a summons or a summons and a complaint, as prescribed in such section, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.
(d) The Court of International Trade may prescribe by rule that any summons, pleading, or other paper mailed by registered or certified mail properly addressed to the clerk of the court with the proper postage affixed and return receipt requested shall be deemed filed as of the date of mailing.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Sections 515 and 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), are classified to sections 1515 and 1516, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2632, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Subsec. (a) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
§2633. Procedure and fees
(a) A filing fee shall be payable to the clerk of the Court of International Trade upon the commencement of a civil action in such court. The amount of the fee shall be prescribed by the rules of the court, but shall be not less than $5 nor more than the filing fee for commencing a civil action in a district court of the United States. The court may fix all other fees to be charged by the clerk of the court.
(b) The Court of International Trade shall prescribe rules governing the summons, pleadings, and other papers, for their amendment, service, and filing, for consolidations, severances, suspensions of cases, and for other procedural matters.
(c) All summons, pleadings, and other papers filed in the Court of International Trade shall be served on all parties in accordance with rules prescribed by the court. When the United States, its agencies, or its officers are adverse parties, service of the summons shall be made upon the Attorney General and the head of the Government agency whose action is being contested. When injunctive relief is sought, the summons, pleadings, and other papers shall also be served upon the named officials sought to be enjoined.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2633, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§2634. Notice
Reasonable notice of the time and place of trial or hearing before the Court of International Trade shall be given to all parties to any civil action, as prescribed by the rules of the court.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2634, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§2635. Filing of official documents
(a) In any action commenced in the Court of International Trade contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the denial of a petition under section 516 of such Act, the Customs Service, as prescribed by the rules of the court, shall file with the clerk of the court, as part of the official record, any document, paper, information or data relating to the entry of merchandise and the administrative determination that is the subject of the protest or petition.
(b)(1) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, within forty days or within such other period of time as the court may specify, after the date of service of a complaint on the administering authority established to administer title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the United States International Trade Commission, the administering authority or the Commission shall transmit to the clerk of the court the record of such action, as prescribed by the rules of the court. The record shall, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, consist of—
(A) a copy of all information presented to or obtained by the administering authority or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceedings, including all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings required to be maintained by section 777(a)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930; and
(B)(i) a copy of the determination and the facts and conclusions of law upon which such determination was based, (ii) all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and (iii) all notices published in the Federal Register.
(2) The administering authority or the Commission shall identify and transmit under seal to the clerk of the court any document, comment, or information that is accorded confidential or privileged status by the Government agency whose action is being contested and that is required to be transmitted to the clerk under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any such document, comment, or information shall be accompanied by a nonconfidential description of the nature of the material being transmitted. The confidential or privileged status of such material shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine the confidential or privileged material in camera and may make such material available under such terms and conditions as the court may order.
(c) Within fifteen days, or within such other period of time as the Court of International Trade may specify, after service of a summons and complaint in a civil action involving an application for an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the administering authority or the Commission shall transmit under seal to the clerk of the Court of International Trade, as prescribed by its rules, the confidential information involved, together with pertinent parts of the record. Such information shall be accompanied by a nonconfidential description of the nature of the information being transmitted. The confidential status of such information shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine the confidential information in camera and may make such information available under a protective order consistent with section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(d)(1) In any other civil action in the Court of International Trade in which judicial review is to proceed upon the basis of the record made before an agency, the agency shall, within forty days or within such other period of time as the court may specify, after the date of service of the summons and complaint upon the agency, transmit to the clerk of the court, as prescribed by its rules—
(A) a copy of the contested determination and the findings or report upon which such determination was based;
(B) a copy of any reported hearings or conferences conducted by the agency; and
(C) any documents, comments, or other papers filed by the public, interested parties, or governments with respect to the agency's action.
(2) The agency shall identify and transmit under seal to the clerk of the court any document, comment, or other information that was obtained on a confidential basis and that is required to be transmitted to the clerk under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any such document, comment, or information shall include a nonconfidential description of the nature of the material being transmitted. The confidential or privileged status of such material shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine such material in camera and may make such material available under such terms and conditions as the court may order.
(3) The parties may stipulate that fewer documents, comments, or other information than those specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (a), (b)(1), and (c), is act June 17, 1930, ch. 497,
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2635, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Amendments
1993—Subsec. (a).
"(1) Upon service of the summons on the Secretary of the Treasury in any civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the denial of a petition under section 516 of such Act, the appropriate customs officer shall forthwith transmit to the clerk of the Court of International Trade, as prescribed by its rules, and as a part of the official record—
"(A) the consumption or other entry and the entry summary;
"(B) the commercial invoice;
"(C) the special customs invoice;
"(D) a copy of the protest or petition;
"(E) a copy of the denial, in whole or in part, of the protest or petition;
"(F) the importer's exhibits;
"(G) the official and other representative samples;
"(H) any official laboratory reports; and
"(I) a copy of any bond relating to the entry.
"(2) If any of the items listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection do not exist in a particular civil action, an affirmative statement to that effect shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court."
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701 (b)(1)(B) of
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§2636. Time for commencement of action
(a) A civil action contesting the denial, in whole or in part, of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade—
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the date of mailing of notice of denial of a protest under section 515(a) of such Act; or
(2) within one hundred and eighty days after the date of denial of a protest by operation of law under the provisions of section 515(b) of such Act.
(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within thirty days after the date of mailing of a notice pursuant to section 516(c) of such Act.
(c) A civil action contesting a reviewable determination listed in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within the time specified in such section.
(d) A civil action contesting a final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 or a final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within sixty days after the date of notice of such determination.
(e) A civil action contesting a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within thirty days after the date of the publication of such determination in the Federal Register.
(f) A civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order making confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within ten days after the date of the denial of the request for such confidential information.
(g) A civil action contesting the denial or revocation by the Secretary of the Treasury of a customs broker's license or permit under subsection (b) or (c) of section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or the revocation or suspension of such license or permit or the imposition of a monetary penalty in lieu thereof by such Secretary under section 641(d) of such Act, is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within sixty days after the date of the entry of the decision or order of such Secretary.
(h) A civil action contesting the denial, suspension, or revocation by the Customs Service of a private laboratory's accreditation under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within 60 days after the date of the decision or order of the Customs Service.
(i) A civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction under
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to
Sections 223 and 251 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d), are classified to sections 2273 and 2341, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.
Section 271 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d), means section 271 of
Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to
Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (f), is classified to
Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to
Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2636, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Amendments
1993—Subsecs. (h), (i).
1984—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsecs. (e) to (g).
Subsec. (h).
Subsec. (i).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by section 212(b)(4) of
Amendment by section 623(b)(1) of
Effective Date
Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
Application of 1993 Amendment
For purposes of applying amendment by
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§2637. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
(a) A civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only if all liquidated duties, charges, or exactions have been paid at the time the action is commenced, except that a surety's obligation to pay such liquidated duties, charges, or exactions is limited to the sum of any bond related to each entry included in the denied protest.
(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only by a person who has first exhausted the procedures set forth in such section.
(c) A civil action described in
(d) In any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2637, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Subsec. (c) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
§2638. New grounds in support of a civil action
In any civil action under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in which the denial, in whole or in part, of a protest is a precondition to the commencement of a civil action in the Court of International Trade, the court, by rule, may consider any new ground in support of the civil action if such new ground—
(1) applies to the same merchandise that was the subject of the protest; and
(2) is related to the same administrative decision listed in section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that was contested in the protest.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to
Section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in par. (2), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2638, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§2639. Burden of proof; evidence of value
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, in any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 515, 516, or 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the administering authority, or the International Trade Commission is presumed to be correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such decision.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under
(b) In any civil action described in
(c) Where the value of merchandise or any of its components is in issue in any civil action in the Court of International Trade—
(1) reports or depositions of consuls, customs officers, and other officers of the United States, and depositions and affidavits of other persons whose attendance cannot reasonably be had, may be admitted into evidence when served upon the opposing party as prescribed by the rules of the court; and
(2) price lists and catalogs may be admitted in evidence when duly authenticated, relevant, and material.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Sections 515, 516, and 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), are classified to sections 1515, 1516, and 1516a, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2639, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Subsec. (a)(2) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after the 90th day after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(c)(1)(A) of
Subsec. (b) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
§2640. Scope and standard of review
(a) The Court of International Trade shall make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court in the following categories of civil actions:
(1) Civil actions contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(2) Civil actions commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(3) Civil actions commenced to review a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
(4) Civil actions commenced under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(5) Civil actions commenced to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury under section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, with the exception of decisions under section 641(d)(2)(B), which shall be governed by subdivision (d) of this section.
(6) Civil actions commenced under
(b) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court shall review the matter as specified in subsection (b) of such section.
(c) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 or any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act, the court shall review the matter as specified in section 284 of such Act.
(d) In any civil action commenced to review any order or decision of the Customs Service under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court shall review the action on the basis of the record before the Customs Service at the time of issuing such decision or order.
(e) In any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of International Trade shall review the matter as provided in
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), is classified to
Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(2), is classified to
Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsec. (a)(3), is classified to
Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is classified to
Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(5), is classified to
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to
Sections 223, 251, 271, and 284 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (c), are classified to sections 2273, 2341, 2371, and 2395, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.
Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (d), is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2640, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Amendments
1993—Subsecs. (d), (e).
1984—Subsec. (a)(5).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date
Subsecs. (a)(5), (c), and (d) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
Subsec. (a)(6) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after the 90th day after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(c)(1)(A) of
Application of 1993 Amendment
For purposes of applying amendment by
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§2641. Witnesses; inspection of documents
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, in any civil action in the Court of International Trade, each party and its counsel shall have an opportunity to introduce evidence, to hear and cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, and to inspect all samples and papers admitted or offered as evidence, as prescribed by the rules of the court. Except as provided in
(b) The Court of International Trade may order that trade secrets and commercial or financial information which is privileged and confidential, or any information provided to the United States by any foreign government or foreign person, may be disclosed to a party, its counsel, or any other person under such terms and conditions as the court may order.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2641, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§2642. Analysis of imported merchandise
The Court of International Trade may order an analysis of imported merchandise and reports thereon by laboratories or agencies of the United States or laboratories accredited by the Customs Service under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2642, act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §123,
Amendments
1993—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Application of 1993 Amendment
For purposes of applying amendment by
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§2643. Relief
(a) The Court of International Trade may enter a money judgment—
(1) for or against the United States in any civil action commenced under
(2) for or against the United States or any other party in any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party action under
(b) If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court may order a retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary to enable it to reach the correct decision.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this subsection, the Court of International Trade may, in addition to the orders specified in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition.
(2) The Court of International Trade may not grant an injunction or issue a writ of mandamus in any civil action commenced to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, or any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act.
(3) In any civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Court of International Trade may issue an order of disclosure only with respect to the information specified in such section.
(4) In any civil action described in
(5) In any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, the Court of International Trade may not order declaratory relief.
(d) If a surety commences a civil action in the Court of International Trade, such surety shall recover only the amount of the liquidated duties, charges, or exactions paid on the entries included in such action. The excess amount of any recovery shall be paid to the importer of record.
(e) In any proceeding involving assessment or collection of a monetary penalty under section 641(b)(6) or 641(d)(2)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court may not render judgment in an amount greater than that sought in the initial pleading of the United States, and may render judgment in such lesser amount as shall seem proper and just to the court.
(Added
Amendment of Section
For termination of amendment by section 501(c) of
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Sections 223, 251, and 271 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (c)(2), are classified to sections 2273, 2341, and 2371, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.
Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c)(3), is classified to
Section 516A(f)(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c)(5), is classified to
Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to
Amendments
2020—Subsec. (c)(5).
1993—Subsec. (c)(5).
1988—Subsec. (c).
1984—Subsec. (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2020 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1993 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective and Termination Dates of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date
Subsecs. (a) and (c)(2), (4) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
Effect of Termination of USMCA Country Status
For provisions relating to effect of termination of USMCA country status on sections 401 to 432 of
§2644. Interest
If, in a civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the plaintiff obtains monetary relief by a judgment or under a stipulation agreement, interest shall be allowed at an annual rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the filing of the summons in such action to the date of the refund.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to
Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in text, is classified to
Amendments
1986—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of
§2645. Decisions
(a) A final decision of the Court of International Trade in a contested civil action or a decision granting or refusing a preliminary injunction shall be supported by—
(1) a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law; or
(2) an opinion stating the reasons and facts upon which the decision is based.
(b) After the Court of International Trade has rendered a judgment, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon its own motion, amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the decision and judgment accordingly. A motion of a party or the court shall be made not later than thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment.
(c) A decision of the Court of International Trade is final and conclusive, unless a retrial or rehearing is granted pursuant to
(Added
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1982—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment
Amendment by
§2646. Retrial or rehearing
After the Court of International Trade has rendered a judgment or order, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon its own motion, grant a retrial or rehearing, as the case may be. A motion of a party or the court shall be made not later than thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order.
(Added
[§2647. Repealed. Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, §402(29)(G), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359 ]
Section, added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal not applicable to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of
CHAPTER 171 —TORT CLAIMS PROCEDURE
Senate Revision Amendment
As printed in this report, this chapter should have read "173" and not "171". It was properly numbered "173" in the bill. However, the chapter was renumbered "171", without change in its section numbers, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1966—
1959—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Federal Cause of Action Relating to Water at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) sufficient to conclude that a causal relationship exists; or
"(B) sufficient to conclude that a causal relationship is at least as likely as not.
"(d)
"(e)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) under—
"(i) any program under the laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
"(ii) the Medicare program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (
"(iii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act (
"(B) in connection with health care or a disability relating to exposure to the water at Camp Lejeune.
"(f)
"(g)
"(h)
"(i)
"(j)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) the date that is two years after the date of enactment of this Act; or
"(B) the date that is 180 days after the date on which the claim is denied under
"(3)
§2671. Definitions
As used in this chapter and
"Employee of the government" includes (1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under
"Acting within the scope of his office or employment", in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States or a member of the National Guard as defined in
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §941 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §402,
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects a typographical error in
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2000—
1988—
1981—
1966—
1949—Act May 24, 1949, corrected spelling of "office".
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2000 Amendment
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1981 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
Short Title
This chapter is popularly known as the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Federal Tort Claims Act was previously the official short title of title IV of act Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753,
Severability
Law Enforcement Officer Acting Within Scope of Office or Employment
"(a)
"(1) the term 'crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in
"(2) the term 'law enforcement officer' means any employee described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
"(b)
"(1) protect an individual in the presence of the officer from a crime of violence;
"(2) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
"(3) prevent the escape of any individual who the officer reasonably believes to have committed in the presence of the officer a crime of violence."
Congressional Findings and Purposes
"(a)
"(1) For more than 40 years the Federal Tort Claims Act [see Short Title note above] has been the legal mechanism for compensating persons injured by negligent or wrongful acts of Federal employees committed within the scope of their employment.
"(2) The United States, through the Federal Tort Claims Act, is responsible to injured persons for the common law torts of its employees in the same manner in which the common law historically has recognized the responsibility of an employer for torts committed by its employees within the scope of their employment.
"(3) Because Federal employees for many years have been protected from personal common law tort liability by a broad based immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act has served as the sole means for compensating persons injured by the tortious conduct of Federal employees.
"(4) Recent judicial decisions, and particularly the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Westfall v. Erwin, have seriously eroded the common law tort immunity previously available to Federal employees.
"(5) This erosion of immunity of Federal employees from common law tort liability has created an immediate crisis involving the prospect of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the entire Federal workforce.
"(6) The prospect of such liability will seriously undermine the morale and well being of Federal employees, impede the ability of agencies to carry out their missions, and diminish the vitality of the Federal Tort Claims Act as the proper remedy for Federal employee torts.
"(7) In its opinion in Westfall v. Erwin, the Supreme Court indicated that the Congress is in the best position to determine the extent to which Federal employees should be personally liable for common law torts, and that legislative consideration of this matter would be useful.
"(b)
§2672. Administrative adjustment of claims
The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred: Provided, That any award, compromise, or settlement in excess of $25,000 shall be effected only with the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Notwithstanding the proviso contained in the preceding sentence, any award, compromise, or settlement may be effected without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee, to the extent that the Attorney General delegates to the head of the agency the authority to make such award, compromise, or settlement. Such delegations may not exceed the authority delegated by the Attorney General to the United States attorneys to settle claims for money damages against the United States. Each Federal agency may use arbitration, or other alternative means of dispute resolution under the provisions of subchapter IV of
Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil actions on tort claims against the United States, any such award, compromise, settlement, or determination shall be final and conclusive on all officers of the Government, except when procured by means of fraud.
Any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount of $2,500 or less made pursuant to this section shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency concerned out of appropriations available to that agency. Payment of any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount in excess of $2,500 made pursuant to this section or made by the Attorney General in any amount pursuant to
The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §921 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §403,
The phrase "accruing on and after January 1, 1945" was omitted because executed as of the date of the enactment of this revised title.
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects a typographical error in
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1990—
1966—
1959—
1950—Act Sept. 23, 1950, struck out requirement for specific authorization for payment of tort claims in appropriation acts.
1949—Act Apr. 25, 1949, inserted "accruing on or after January 1, 1945" after "United States" in first par.
Act May 24, 1949, substituted "2677" for "2678" in third par.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Laws Unaffected
Act Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, title IV, §424(b),
§2673. Reports to Congress
The head of each federal agency shall report annually to Congress all claims paid by it under
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §922 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §404,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Repeal
§2674. Liability of United States
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof.
With respect to any claim under this chapter, the United States shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to which the United States is entitled.
With respect to any claim to which this section applies, the Tennessee Valley Authority shall be entitled to assert any defense which otherwise would have been available to the employee based upon judicial or legislative immunity, which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority whose act or omission gave rise to the claim as well as any other defenses to which the Tennessee Valley Authority is entitled under this chapter.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §931(a) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §410(a),
Section constitutes the liability provisions in the second sentence of
Other provisions of
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
For Senate amendment to this section, see 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, amendment No. 60.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1988—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
Amendment by
§2675. Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.
(b) Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.
(c) Disposition of any claim by the Attorney General or other head of a federal agency shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
1948 Act
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §931(b) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §410(b),
Section constitutes all of section 931(b), except the first sentence, of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The remainder of such section 931(b) is incorporated in
Changes were made in phraseology.
1949 Act
This section corrects a typographical error in
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Amendments
1966—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, substituted "section" for "subsection".
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
§2676. Judgment as bar
The judgment in an action under
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §931(b) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §410(b),
Section constitutes the first sentence of
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
This section was eliminated by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
§2677. Compromise
The Attorney General or his designee may arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §934 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §413,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
This section was renumbered "2676" by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
§2678. Attorney fees; penalty
No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant to
Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if recovery be had, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §944 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §422,
Words "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor" and "shall, upon conviction thereof", in the second sentence, were omitted in conformity with revised title 18, U.S.C., Crimes and Criminal Procedure (H.R. 1600, 80th Cong.). See sections 1 and 2 of said revised title 18.
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
This section was renumbered "2677" by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1966—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
§2679. Exclusiveness of remedy
(a) The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under
(b)(1) The remedy against the United States provided by
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government—
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
(c) The Attorney General shall defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government or his estate for any such damage or injury. The employee against whom such civil action or proceeding is brought shall deliver within such time after date of service or knowledge of service as determined by the Attorney General, all process served upon him or an attested true copy thereof to his immediate superior or to whomever was designated by the head of his department to receive such papers and such person shall promptly furnish copies of the pleadings and process therein to the United States attorney for the district embracing the place wherein the proceeding is brought, to the Attorney General, and to the head of his employing Federal agency.
(d)(1) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
(2) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.
(3) In the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify scope of office or employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment. Upon such certification by the court, such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the United States in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(d)(4) 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the petition is filed in a civil action or proceeding pending in a State court, the action or proceeding may be removed without bond by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which it is pending. If, in considering the petition, the district court determines that the employee was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding shall be remanded to the State court.
(4) Upon certification, any action or proceeding subject to paragraph (1), (2), or (3) shall proceed in the same manner as any action against the United States filed pursuant to
(5) Whenever an action or proceeding in which the United States is substituted as the party defendant under this subsection is dismissed for failure first to present a claim pursuant to
(A) the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was commenced, and
(B) the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after dismissal of the civil action.
(e) The Attorney General may compromise or settle any claim asserted in such civil action or proceeding in the manner provided in section 2677, and with the same effect.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §945 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §423,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
The catchline and text of this section were changed and the section was renumbered "2678" by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (d)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Amendments
1988—Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (d).
1966—Subsec. (b).
1961—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1988 Amendment
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1961 Amendment
1 So in original. Probably should be a reference to Rule 4(i).
§2680. Exceptions
The provisions of this chapter and
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, except that the provisions of this chapter and
(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;
(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;
(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture); and
(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law..1
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States.
[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, §13 (5),
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(l) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §943 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §421,
Changes were made in phraseology.
Senate Revision Amendment
Sections 2680 and 2681 were renumbered "2679" and "2680", respectively, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of the enactment of this proviso, referred to in subsec. (h), means Mar. 16, 1974, the date on which
Panama Canal Company, referred to in subsec. (m), deemed to refer to Panama Canal Commission, see
Amendments
2006—Subsec. (d).
2000—Subsec. (c).
1974—Subsec. (h).
1959—Subsec. (n).
1950—Subsec. (g). Act Sept. 26, 1950, §13(5), repealed subsec. (g).
Subsec. (m). Act Sept. 26, 1950, §2, substituted "Panama Canal Company" for "Panama Railroad Company".
1949—Subsec. (m). Act July 16, 1949, added subsec. (m).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2000 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1959 Amendment
Amendment by
Effective Date of 1950 Amendment
Amendment by act Sept. 26, 1950, to take effect upon effective date of transfer to the Panama Canal Company, pursuant to the provisions of section 256 of the former Canal Zone Code, as added by section 10 of that act, of the Panama Canal together with the facilities and appurtenances related thereto, see section 14 of act Sept. 26, 1950.
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
Coast Guard transferred to Department of Transportation and all functions, powers, and duties, relating to Coast Guard, of Secretary of the Treasury and of all other offices and officers of Department of the Treasury transferred to Secretary of Transportation by
Northern Mariana Islands—Applicability of Subsec. (k)
Termination of National Emergency
Declaration of national emergency in effect on Sept. 14, 1976, was terminated two years from that date by
Applicability of Subsec. (j)
Joint Res. July 3, 1952, ch. 570, §1(a)(32),
Joint Res. July 3, 1952, ch. 570, §6,
Executive Documents
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of certain functions relating to claims and litigation, insofar as they pertain to the Air Force, from Secretary of the Army to Secretary of the Air Force, see Secretary of Defense Transfer Order No. 34 [§1a(2)(4)], eff. July 1, 1949.
2 See References in Text note below.
CHAPTER 173 —ATTACHMENT IN POSTAL SUITS
§2710. Right of attachment
(a) Where debts are due from a defaulting or delinquent postmaster, contractor, or other officer, agent or employee of the Post Office Department, a warrant of attachment may issue against all property and legal and equitable rights belonging to him, and his sureties, or either of them, where he—
(1) is a nonresident of the district where he was appointed, or has departed from that district for the purpose of permanently residing outside thereof, or of avoiding the service of civil process; and
(2) has conveyed away, or is about to convey away any of his property, or has removed or is about to remove the same from the district wherein it is situated, with intent to defraud the United States.
(b) When the property has been removed, the marshal of the district into which it has been removed, upon receipt of certified copies of the warrant, may seize the property and convey it to a convenient place within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the warrant. Alias warrants may be issued upon due application. The warrant first issued remains valid until the return day thereof.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §924, which was originally classified to section 737 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §924 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
References to Post Office Department, Postal Service, Postal Field Service, Field Postal Service, or Departmental Service or Departmental Headquarters of Post Office Department to be considered references to United States Postal Service pursuant to
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2711. Application for warrant
A United States attorney or assistant United States attorney or a person authorized by the Attorney General—
(1) upon his own affidavit or that of another credible person, stating the existence of either of the grounds of attachments enumerated in
(2) upon production of legal evidence of the debt
may apply for a warrant of attachment to a judge, or, in his absence, to the clerk of any court of the United States having original jurisdiction of the cause of action.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §925, which was originally classified to section 738 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §925 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2712. Issue of warrant
Upon an order of a judge of a court, or, in his absence and upon the clerk's own initiative, the clerk shall issue a warrant for the attachment of the property belonging to the person specified in the affidavit. The marshal shall execute the warrant forthwith and take the property attached, if personal, in his custody, subject to the interlocutory or final orders of the court.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §926, which was originally classified to section 739 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §926 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2713. Trial of ownership of property
Not later than twenty days before the return day of a warrant issued under
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §927, which was originally classified to section 740 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §927 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2714. Investment of proceeds of attached property
When the property attached is sold on an interlocutory order or is producing revenue, the money arising from the sale or revenue shall be invested, under the order of the court, in securities of the United States. The accretions therefrom are subject to the order of the court.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §928, which was originally classified to section 741 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §928 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2715. Publication
The marshal shall cause publication of an executed warrant of attachment—
(1) for two months in case of an absconding debtor, and
(2) for four months in case of a nonresident debtor
in a newspaper published in the district where the property is situated pursuant to the details of the order under which the warrant is issued.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §929, which was originally classified to section 742 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §929 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2716. Personal notice
After the first publication of the notice of attachment, a person indebted to, or having possession of property of a defendant and having knowledge of the notice, shall answer for the amount of his debt or the value of the property. Any disposal or attempted disposal of the property, to the injury of the United States, is unlawful. When the person indebted to, or having possession of the property of a defendant, is known to the United States attorney or marshal, the officer shall cause a personal notice of the attachment to be served upon him, but the lack of the notice does not invalidate the attachment.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §930, which was originally classified to section 743 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §930 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2717. Discharge
The court, or a judge thereof, upon—
(1) application of the party when property has been attached and
(2) execution to the United States of a penal bond, approved by a judge, in double the value of the property attached and conditioned upon the return of the property or the payment of any judgment rendered by the court
may discharge the warrant of attachment as to the property of the applicant.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §931, which was originally classified to section 744 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §931 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
§2718. Interest on balances due department
In suits for balances due the Post Office Department may recover interest at the rate of 6 per centum per year from the time of default.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was derived from R.S. §964, which was originally classified to section 788 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §964 was reclassified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
References to Post Office Department, Postal Service, Postal Field Service, Field Postal Service, or Departmental Service or Departmental Headquarters of Post Office Department to be considered references to United States Postal Service pursuant to
Effective Date
Section effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of
[CHAPTER 175 —REPEALED]
[§§2901 to 2906. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–310, div. B, title XXXIV, §3405(c)(1), Oct. 17, 2000, 114 Stat. 1221 ]
Section 2901, added
Section 2902, added
Section 2903, added
Section 2904, added
Section 2905, added
Section 2906, added
CHAPTER 176 —FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE
2 So in original. Does not conform to subchapter heading.
SUBCHAPTER A—DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
"United States magistrate judges" substituted for "United States magistrates" in item 3008 pursuant to section 321 of
§3001. Applicability of chapter
(a)
(1) to recover a judgment on a debt; or
(2) to obtain, before judgment on a claim for a debt, a remedy in connection with such claim.
(b)
(c)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act [probably should be "title", meaning title XXXVI of
"(b)(1) The amendments made by title I of this Act [probably should be "subtitle A of this title", meaning subtitle A (§§3611, 3302 [3612]) of title XXXVI of
"(A) a claim for a debt; or
"(B) a judgment for a debt.
"(2) All notices, writs, orders, and judgments in effect in such actions shall continue in effect until superseded or modified in an action under
"(3) For purposes of this subsection—
"(A) the term 'court' means a Federal, State, or local court, and
"(B) the term 'debt' has the meaning given such term in section and [sic] 3002(3) of such chapter."
1 So in original. Probably should be "this".
§3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Counsel for the United States" means—
(A) a United States attorney, an assistant United States attorney designated to act on behalf of the United States attorney, or an attorney with the United States Department of Justice or with a Federal agency who has litigation authority; and
(B) any private attorney authorized by contract made in accordance with
(2) "Court" means any court created by the Congress of the United States, excluding the United States Tax Court.
(3) "Debt" means—
(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, by the United States; or
(B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a contract originally entered into by only persons other than the United States;
and includes any amount owing to the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual Indian, but excludes any amount to which the United States is entitled under section 3011(a).
(4) "Debtor" means a person who is liable for a debt or against whom there is a claim for a debt.
(5) "Disposable earnings" means that part of earnings remaining after all deductions required by law have been withheld.
(6) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(7) "Garnishee" means a person (other than the debtor) who has, or is reasonably thought to have, possession, custody, or control of any property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, including any obligation due the debtor or to become due the debtor, and against whom a garnishment under section 3104 or 3205 is issued by a court.
(8) "Judgment" means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.
(9) "Nonexempt disposable earnings" means 25 percent of disposable earnings, subject to section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
(10) "Person" includes a natural person (including an individual Indian), a corporation, a partnership, an unincorporated association, a trust, or an estate, or any other public or private entity, including a State or local government or an Indian tribe.
(11) "Prejudgment remedy" means the remedy of attachment, receivership, garnishment, or sequestration authorized by this chapter to be granted before judgment on the merits of a claim for a debt.
(12) "Property" includes any present or future interest, whether legal or equitable, in real, personal (including choses in action), or mixed property, tangible or intangible, vested or contingent, wherever located and however held (including community property and property held in trust (including spendthrift and pension trusts)), but excludes—
(A) property held in trust by the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual Indian; and
(B) Indian lands subject to restrictions against alienation imposed by the United States.
(13) "Security agreement" means an agreement that creates or provides for a lien.
(14) "State" means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, or any territory or possession of the United States.
(15) "United States" means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States.
(16) "United States marshal" means a United States marshal, a deputy marshal, or an official of the United States Marshals Service designated under section 564.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, referred to in par. (9), is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3003. Rules of construction
(a)
(1) the terms "includes" and "including" are not limiting;
(2) the term "or" is not exclusive; and
(3) the singular includes the plural.
(b)
(1) to collect taxes or to collect any other amount collectible in the same manner as a tax;
(2) to collect any fine, penalty, assessment, restitution, or forfeiture arising in a criminal case;
(3) to appoint or seek the appointment of a receiver; or
(4) to enforce a security agreement.
(c)
(1) title 11;
(2) admiralty law;
(3)
(4) section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (
(5) a statute of limitation applicable to a criminal proceeding;
(6) the common law or statutory rights to set-off or recoupment;
(7) any Federal law authorizing, or any inherent authority of a court to provide, injunctive relief;
(8) the authority of a court—
(A) to impose a sanction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(B) to appoint a receiver to effectuate its order; or
(C) to exercise the power of contempt under any Federal law;
(9) any law authorizing the United States to obtain partition, or to recover possession, of property in which the United States holds title; or
(10) any provision of any other chapter of this title, except to the extent such provision is inconsistent with this chapter.
(d)
(e)
(f)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsecs. (c)(8)(A) and (f), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3004. Service of process; enforcement; notice
(a)
(b)
(A) any writ, order, judgment, or other process, including a summons and complaint, filed under this chapter may be served in any State; and
(B) such writ, order, or judgment may be enforced by the court issuing the writ, order, or process, regardless of where the person is served with the writ, order, or process.
(2) If the debtor so requests, within 20 days after receiving the notice described in section 3101(d) or 3202(b), the action or proceeding in which the writ, order, or judgment was issued shall be transferred to the district court for the district in which the debtor resides.
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3005. Application of chapter to judgments
This chapter shall not apply with respect to a judgment on a debt if such judgment is entered more than 10 years before the effective date of this chapter.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
For effective date of this chapter, referred to in text, see section 3631 of
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3006. Affidavit requirements
Any affidavit required of the United States by this chapter may be made on information and belief, if reliable and reasonably necessary, establishing with particularity, to the court's satisfaction, facts supporting the claim of the United States.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3007. Perishable personal property
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3008. Proceedings before United States magistrate judges
A district court of the United States may assign its duties in proceedings under this chapter to a United States magistrate judge to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
"United States magistrate judges" substituted for "United States magistrates" in catchline and "United States magistrate judge" substituted for "United States magistrate" in text pursuant to section 321 of
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3009. United States marshals' authority to designate keeper
Whenever a United States marshal is authorized to seize property pursuant to this chapter, the United States marshal may designate another person or Federal agency to hold for safekeeping such property seized.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3010. Co-owned property
(a)
(b)
(1) the term "retirement system for Federal military or civilian personnel" means a pension or annuity system for Federal military or civilian personnel of more than one agency, or for some or all of such personnel of a single agency, established by statute or by regulation pursuant to statutory authority; and
(2) the term "qualified retirement arrangement" means a plan qualified under section 401(a), 403(a), or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a plan that is subject to the requirements of section 205 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Sections 401(a), 403(a), and 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), are classified to sections 401(a), 403(a), and 409, respectively, of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Section 205 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3011. Assessment of surcharge on a debt
(a)
(b)
(1) the United States receives an attorney's fee in connection with the enforcement of the claim; or
(2) the law pursuant to which the action on the claim is based provides any other amount to cover such costs.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3012. Joinder of additional defendant
The United States or the debtor may join as an additional defendant in an action or proceeding under this chapter any person reasonably believed to owe money (including money owed on account of a requirement to provide goods or services pursuant to a loan or loan guarantee extended under Federal law) to the debtor arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to a debt.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3013. Modification or protective order; supervision of enforcement
The court may at any time on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person, and after such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending, or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure under this chapter.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3014. Exempt property
(a)
(1) property that is specified in
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than paragraph (1), or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the application for a remedy under this chapter at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of such application, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the filing of such application, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant, or an interest in a community estate, to the extent that such interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(b)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(c)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3015. Discovery as to debtor's financial condition
(a)
(b)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
SUBCHAPTER B—PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
§3101. Prejudgment remedies
(a)
(2) Such application shall be filed with the court and shall set forth the factual and legal basis for each prejudgment remedy sought.
(3) Such application shall—
(A) state that the debtor against whom the prejudgment remedy is sought shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing; and
(B) set forth with particularity that all statutory requirements under this chapter for the issuance of the prejudgment remedy sought have been satisfied.
(b)
(1) the debtor—
(A) is about to leave the jurisdiction of the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States in its effort to recover a debt;
(B) has or is about to assign, dispose, remove, conceal, ill treat, waste, or destroy property with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States;
(C) has or is about to convert the debtor's property into money, securities, or evidence of debt in a manner prejudicial to the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States; or
(D) has evaded service of process by concealing himself or has temporarily withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States; or
(2) a prejudgment remedy is required to obtain jurisdiction within the United States and the prejudgment remedy sought will result in obtaining such jurisdiction.
(c)
(2) The affidavit shall state—
(A) specifically the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and any interest or costs attributable to such debt;
(B) one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (b); and
(C) the requirements of section 3102(b), 3103(a), 3104(a), or 3105(b), as the case may be.
(3) No bond is required of the United States.
(d)
"notice
"You are hereby notified that this [property] is being taken by the United States Government ('the Government'), which says that [name of debtor] owes it a debt of $ [amount] for [reason for debt] and has filed a lawsuit to collect this debt. The Government says it must take this property at this time because [recite the pertinent ground or grounds from section 3101(b)]. The Government wants to make sure [name of debtor] will pay if the court determines that this money is owed.
"In addition, you are hereby notified that there are exemptions under the law which may protect some of this property from being taken by the Government if [name of debtor] can show that the exemptions apply. Below is a summary of the major exemptions which apply in most situations in the State of [State where property is located]:
"[A statement summarizing in plain and understandable English the election available with respect to such State under section 3014 and the types of property that may be exempted under each of the alternatives specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 3014(a), and a statement that different property may be so exempted with respect to the State in which the debtor resides.]
"If you are [name of debtor] and you disagree with the reason the Government gives for taking your property now, or if you think you do not owe the money to the Government that it says you do, or if you think the property the Government is taking qualifies under one of the above exemptions, you have a right to ask the court to return your property to you.
"If you want a hearing, you must promptly notify the court. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. If you wish, you may use this notice to request the hearing by checking the box below and mailing this notice to the court clerk. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want a hearing. The hearing will take place within 5 days after the clerk receives your request, if you ask for it to take place that quickly, or as soon after that as possible.
"At the hearing you may explain to the judge why you think you do not owe the money to the Government, why you disagree with the reason the Government says it must take your property at this time, or why you believe the property the Government has taken is exempt or belongs to someone else. You may make any or all of these explanations as you see fit.
"If you think you live outside the Federal judicial district in which the court is located, you may request, not later than 20 days after you receive this notice, that this proceeding to take your property be transferred by the court to the Federal judicial district in which you reside. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want the proceeding to be transferred.
"Be sure to keep a copy of this notice for your own records. If you have any questions about your rights or about this procedure, you should contact a lawyer, an office of public legal assistance, or the clerk of the court. The clerk is not permitted to give legal advice, but can refer you to other sources of information."
(2) By requesting, at any time before judgment on the claim for a debt, the court to hold a hearing, the debtor may move to quash the order granting such remedy. The court shall hold a hearing on such motion as soon as practicable, or, if requested by the debtor, within 5 days after receiving the request for a hearing or as soon thereafter as possible. The issues at such hearing shall be limited to—
(A) the probable validity of the claim for the debt for which such remedy was granted and of any defense or claim of exemption asserted by such person;
(B) compliance with any statutory requirement for the issuance of the prejudgment remedy granted;
(C) the existence of any ground set forth in subsection (b); and
(D) the inadequacy of alternative remedies (if any) to protect the interests of the United States.
(e)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3102. Attachment
(a)
(2) The value of property attached shall not exceed the amount by which the sum of the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and the amount of interest and costs reasonably likely to be assessed against the debtor by the court exceeds the aggregate value of the nonexempt interest of the debtor in any—
(A) property securing the debt; and
(B) property garnished or in receivership, or income sequestered, under this subchapter.
(b)
(1) in an action on a contract, express or implied, against the debtor for payment of money, only if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that—
(A) the contract is not fully secured by real or personal property; or
(B) the value of the original security is substantially diminished, without any act of the United States or the person to whom the security was given, below the amount of the debt;
(2) in an action against the debtor for damages in tort;
(3) if the debtor resides outside the jurisdiction of the United States; or
(4) in an action to recover a fine, penalty, or tax.
(c)
(2) Several writs of attachment may be issued at the same time, or in succession, and sent to different judicial districts until sufficient property is attached.
(3) The writ of attachment shall contain—
(A) the date of the issuance of the writ;
(B) the identity of the court, the docket number of the action, and the identity of the cause of action;
(C) the name and last known address of the debtor;
(D) the amount to be secured by the attachment; and
(E) a reasonable description of the property to be attached.
(d)
(2) In performing the levy, the United States marshal may enter any property owned, occupied, or controlled by the debtor, except that the marshal may not enter a residence or other building unless the writ expressly authorizes the marshal to do so or upon specific order of the court.
(3) Levy on real property is made by entering the property and posting the writ and notice of levy in a conspicuous place upon the property.
(4) Levy on personal property is made by taking possession of it. Levy on personal property not easily taken into possession or which cannot be taken into possession without great inconvenience or expense may be made by affixing a copy of the writ and notice of levy on it or in a conspicuous place in the vicinity of it describing in the notice of levy the property by quantity and with sufficient detail to identify the property levied on.
(5) The United States marshal shall file a copy of the notice of levy in the same manner as provided for judgments in section 3201(a)(1). The United States marshal shall serve a copy of the writ and notice of levy on—
(A) the debtor against whom the writ is issued; and
(B) the person who has possession of the property subject to the writ;
in the same manner that a summons is served in a civil action and make the return thereof.
(e)
(2) The return shall describe the property attached with sufficient certainty to identify it and shall state the location where it was attached, the date and time it was attached, and the disposition made of the property. If no property was attached, the return shall so state.
(3) If the property levied on is claimed, replevied under subsection (j)(2), or sold under section 3007 after the return, the United States marshal shall immediately make a further return to the clerk of the court showing the disposition of the property.
(4) If personal property is replevied, the United States marshal shall deliver the replevin bond to the clerk of the court to be filed in the action.
(f)
(2) Such lien shall be ranked ahead of any other security interests perfected after the later of the time of levy and the time a copy of the notice of levy is filed under subsection (d)(5).
(3) Such lien shall arise from the time of levy and shall continue until a judgment in the action is obtained or denied, or the action is otherwise dismissed. The death of the debtor whose property is attached does not terminate the attachment lien. Upon issuance of a judgment in the action and registration under this chapter, the judgment lien so created relates back to the time of levy.
(g)
(2) The court shall order a part of the property to be released, if after a hearing the court finds that the amount of the attachment is excessive or unreasonable or if the attachment is for an amount larger than the sum of the liquidated or ascertainable amount of the debt and the amount of interest and costs likely to be taxed.
(3) The court shall dissolve the attachment if the amount of the debt is unliquidated and unascertainable by calculation.
(4) If any property claimed to be exempt is levied on, the debtor may, at any time after such levy, request that the court vacate such levy. If it appears to the court that the property so levied upon is exempt, the court shall order the levy vacated and the property returned to the debtor.
(h)
(i)
(j)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3103. Receivership
(a)
(b)
(A) to take possession of real and personal property and sue for, collect, and sell obligations upon such conditions and for such purposes as the court shall direct; and
(B) to administer, collect, improve, lease, repair or sell pursuant to section 3007 such real and personal property as the court shall direct.
A receiver appointed to manage residential or commercial property shall have demonstrable expertise in the management of these types of property.
(2) Unless expressly authorized by order of the court, a receiver shall have no power to employ attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(2) If, at the termination of a receivership, there are no funds in the hands of a receiver, the court may fix the compensation of the receiver in accordance with the services rendered and may direct the party who moved for the appointment of the receiver to pay such compensation in addition to the necessary expenditures incurred by the receiver which remain unpaid.
(3) At the termination of a receivership, the receiver shall file a final accounting of the receipts and disbursements and apply for compensation setting forth the amount sought and the services rendered by the receiver.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3104. Garnishment
(a)
(b)
(A) earnings of the debtor shall not be subject to garnishment; and
(B) a reference in such subsections to a judgment debtor shall be deemed to be a reference to a debtor.
(2) The United States shall include in its application for a writ of garnishment—
(A) the amount of the claim asserted by the United States for a debt; and
(B) the date the writ is issued.
(c)
(1) property securing the debt; and
(2) property attached or in receivership, or income sequestered, under this subchapter.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3105. Sequestration
(a)
(2) The amount of income sequestered shall not exceed the amount by which the sum of the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and the amount of interest and costs reasonably likely to be assessed against the debtor by the court exceeds the aggregate value of the nonexempt interest of the debtor in any—
(A) property securing the debt; and
(B) property attached, garnished, or in receivership under this subchapter.
(b)
(1) in an action on a contract, express or implied, against the debtor for payment of money, only if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that—
(A) the contract is not fully secured by real or personal property; or
(B) the value of the original security is substantially diminished, without any act of the United States or the person to whom the security was given, below the amount of the debt;
(2) in an action against the debtor for damages in tort;
(3) if the debtor resides outside the jurisdiction of the United States; or
(4) in an action to recover a fine, penalty, or tax.
(c)
(2) Several writs of sequestration may be issued at the same time, or in succession, and sent to different judicial districts until sufficient income is sequestered.
(3) The writ of sequestration shall contain—
(A) the date of the issuance of the writ;
(B) the identity of the court, the docket number of the action, and the identity of the cause of action;
(C) the name and last known address of the debtor;
(D) the amount to be secured by the sequestration; and
(E) a reasonable description of the income to be sequestered.
(d)
(2) The United States marshal shall file a copy of the notice of sequestration in the same manner as provided for judgments in section 3201(a)(1). The United States marshal shall serve a copy of the writ and notice of sequestration on—
(A) the debtor against whom the writ is issued; and
(B) the person who has possession of the income subject to the writ;
in the same manner that a summons is served in a civil action and make the return thereof.
(e)
(f)
(2) The return shall describe the income sequestered with sufficient certainty to identify it and shall state the location where it was sequestered, and the date and time it was sequestered. If no income was sequestered, the return shall so state.
(3) If sequestered income is claimed after the return, the United States marshal shall immediately make a further return to the clerk of the court showing the disposition of the income.
(g)
(2) The court shall order a part of the income to be released, if after a hearing the court finds that the amount of the sequestration is excessive or unreasonable or if the sequestration is for an amount larger than the sum of the liquidated or ascertainable amount of the debt and the amount of interest and costs likely to be taxed.
(3) The court shall dissolve the sequestration if the amount of the debt is unliquidated and unascertainable by calculation.
(h)
(i)
(1)
(2)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
SUBCHAPTER C—POSTJUDGMENT REMEDIES
§3201. Judgment liens
(a)
(b)
(c)
(2) Such lien may be renewed for one additional period of 20 years upon filing a notice of renewal in the same manner as the judgment is filed and shall relate back to the date the judgment is filed if—
(A) the notice of renewal is filed before the expiration of the 20-year period to prevent the expiration of the lien; and
(B) the court approves the renewal of such lien under this paragraph.
(d)
(e)
(f)
(2) This subsection shall not preclude the United States from using an execution sale pursuant to section 3203(g) to sell real property subject to a judgment lien.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 6323(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3202. Enforcement of judgments
(a)
(b)
"Notice
"You are hereby notified that this [property] is being taken by the United States Government, which has a court judgment in [case docket number and jurisdiction of court] of $[amount] for [reason of debt].
"In addition, you are hereby notified that there are exemptions under the law which may protect some of this property from being taken by the United States Government if [name of judgment debtor] can show that the exemptions apply. Below is a summary of the major exemptions which apply in most situations in the State of [State where property is located]:
"[A statement summarizing in plain and understandable English the election available with respect to such State under section 3014 and the types of property that may be exempted under each of the alternatives specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 3014(a) and a statement that different property may be so exempted with respect to the State in which the debtor resides.]
"If you are [name of judgment debtor], you have a right to ask the court to return your property to you if you think the property the Government is taking qualifies under one of the above exemptions [For a default judgment:] or if you think you do not owe the money to the United States Government that it says you do.
"If you want a hearing, you must notify the court within 20 days after you receive this notice. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. If you wish, you may use this notice to request the hearing by checking the box below and mailing this notice to the court clerk. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want a hearing. The hearing will take place within 5 days after the clerk receives your request, if you ask for it to take place that quickly, or as soon after that as possible.
"At the hearing you may explain to the judge why you believe the property the Government has taken is exempt [For a default judgment:] or why you think you do not owe the money to the Government. [For a writ of execution:] If you do not request a hearing within 20 days of receiving this notice, your [property] may be sold at public auction and the payment used toward the money you owe the Government.
"If you think you live outside the Federal judicial district in which the court is located, you may request, not later than 20 days after your 1 receive this notice, that this proceeding to take your property be transferred by the court to the Federal judicial district in which you reside. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want the proceeding to be transferred.
"Be sure to keep a copy of this notice for your own records. If you have any questions about your rights or about this procedure, you should contact a lawyer, an office of public legal assistance, or the clerk of the court. The clerk is not permitted to give legal advice, but can refer you to other sources of information."
(c)
(d)
(1) to the probable validity of any claim of exemption by the judgment debtor;
(2) to compliance with any statutory requirement for the issuance of the postjudgment remedy granted; and
(3) if the judgment is by default and only to the extent that the Constitution or another law of the United States provides a right to a hearing on the issue, to—
(A) the probable validity of the claim for the debt which is merged in the judgment; and
(B) the existence of good cause for setting aside such judgment.
This subparagraph shall not be construed to afford the judgment debtor the right to more than one such hearing except to the extent that the Constitution or another law of the United States provides a right to more than one such hearing.
(e)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
1 So in original. Probably should be "you".
§3203. Execution
(a)
(b)
(c)
(1)
(2)
(A)
(B)
(ii) A writ of execution issued on a judgment for the delivery to the United States of the possession of personal property, or for the delivery of the possession of real property, shall particularly describe the property, and shall require the marshal to deliver the possession of the property to the United States.
(iii) A writ of execution on a judgment for the recovery of personal property or its value shall direct the marshal, in case a delivery of the specific property cannot be had, to levy and collect such value out of any property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest.
(d)
(1)
(2)
(A) against the executor, administrator, or personal representative of the estate of the deceased; or
(B) if there be none, against the deceased's property coming to the heirs or devisees or at their option against cash in their possession, but only to the extent of the value of the property coming to them.
(3)
(B) The United States marshal shall make a written record of every levy, specify the property on which levy is made, the date on which levy is made, and the marshal's costs, expenses, and fees.
(C) The United States marshal shall make a written return to the court on each writ of execution stating concisely what is done pursuant to the writ and shall deliver a copy to counsel for the United States who requests the writ. The writ shall be returned not more than—
(i) 90 days after the date of issuance if levy is not made; or
(ii) 10 days after the date of sale of property on which levy is made.
(e)
(f)
(1)
(i) satisfaction of the judgment, interest, and costs, and any costs incurred in connection with scheduling the sale; or
(ii) receipt from the judgment debtor of a bond—
(I) payable to the United States, with 2 or more good and sufficient sureties to be approved by the marshal, conditioned on the delivery of the property to the marshal at the time and place named in the bond to be sold under subsection (g); or
(II) for the payment to the marshal of a fair value thereof which shall be stated in the bond.
(B) A judgment debtor who sells or disposes of property replevied under subparagraph (A) shall pay the United States marshal the stipulated value of such property.
(C) If the judgment debtor fails to deliver such property to the United States marshal pursuant to the terms of the delivery described in subparagraph (A)(ii)(I) and fails to pay the United States marshal the stipulated value of such property, the United States marshal shall endorse the bond "forfeited" and return it to the court from which the writ of execution issued. If the judgment is not fully satisfied, the court shall issue a writ of execution against the judgment debtor and the sureties on the bond for the amount due, not exceeding the stipulated value of the property, on which execution no delivery bond shall be taken, which instruction shall be endorsed on the writ.
(2)
(g)
(1)
(A)
(i)
(II) The court may order the sale of any real property after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date of levy under subsection (d) if the court determines that such property is likely to perish, waste, be destroyed, or otherwise substantially depreciate in value during the 90-day period beginning on the date of levy.
(III) The time and place of sale of real property, or any interest therein, under execution shall be advertised by the United States marshal, by publication of notice, once a week for at least 3 weeks prior to the sale, in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the county or parish where the property is located. The first publication shall appear not less than 25 days preceding the day of sale. The notice shall contain a statement of the authority by which the sale is to be made, the time of levy, the time and place of sale, and a brief description of the property to be sold, sufficient to identify the property (such as a street address for urban property and the survey identification and location for rural property), but it shall not be necessary for the notice to contain field notes. Such property shall be open for inspection and appraisal, subject to the judgment debtor's reasonable objections, for a reasonable period before the day of sale.
(IV) The United States marshal shall serve written notice of public sale by personal delivery, or certified or registered mail, to each person whom the marshal has reasonable cause to believe, after a title search is conducted by the United States, has an interest in property under execution, including lienholders, co-owners, and tenants, at least 25 days before the day of sale, to the last known address of each such person.
(ii)
(iii)
(I) divide the property into lots of not less than 50 acres or in such greater or lesser amounts as ordered by the court;
(II) furnish a survey of such prepared by a registered surveyor; and
(III) designate the order in which those lots shall be sold.
When a sufficient number of lots are sold to satisfy the amount of the execution and costs of sale, the marshal shall stop the sale.
(B)
(I) the property consists of shares of stock in corporations;
(II) by reason of the nature of the property, it is impractical to exhibit it; or
(III) the debtor's interest in the property does not include the right to the exclusive possession.
(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), personal property, or any interest therein, shall be sold after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date of levy under subsection (d).
(II) The court may order the sale of any personal property before the expiration of such 30-day period if the court determines that such property is likely to perish, waste, be destroyed, or otherwise substantially depreciate in value during such 30-day period.
(iii) Notice of the time and place of the sale of personal property shall be given by the United States marshal by posting notice thereof for not less than 10 days successively immediately before the day of sale at the courthouse of any county, parish, or city, and at the place where the sale is to be made.
(iv) The United States marshal shall serve written notice of public sale by personal delivery, or registered or certified mail at their last known addresses, on the judgment debtor and other persons who the marshal has reasonable cause to believe, after diligent inquiry, have a substantial interest in the property.
(2)
"The above sale is postponed until the day of , 19 , at o'clock .M., , United States Marshal for the District of , by , Deputy, dated ."
(3)
(A)
(B)
(4)
(A)
(i) If property is sold under this subsection and the successful bidder complies with the terms of the sale, the United States marshal shall execute and deliver all documents necessary to transfer to the successful bidder, without warranty, all the rights, titles, interests, and claims of the judgment debtor in the property.
(ii) If the successful bidder dies before execution and delivery of the documents needed to transfer ownership, the United States marshal shall execute and deliver them to the successful bidder's estate. Such delivery to the estate shall have the same effect as if accomplished during the lifetime of the purchaser.
(B)
(C)
(h)
(1)
(B) The United States marshal shall next deduct from the proceeds of an execution sale of property an amount equal to the reasonable expenses incurred in making the levy of execution and in keeping and maintaining the property.
(C) Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the United States marshal shall deliver the balance of the proceeds to the counsel for the United States as soon as practicable.
(D) If more proceeds are received from the execution sale than is necessary to satisfy the executions held by the United States marshal, the marshal shall pay the surplus to the judgment debtor.
(2)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
1 So in original. The word "property" probably should not appear.
§3204. Installment payment order
(a)
(1) is receiving or will receive substantial nonexempt disposable earnings from self employment that are not subject to garnishment; or
(2) is diverting or concealing substantial earnings from any source, or property received in lieu of earnings;
then upon motion of the United States and notice to the judgment debtor, the court may, if appropriate, order that the judgment debtor make specified installment payments to the United States. Notice of the motion shall be served on the judgment debtor in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. In fixing the amount of the payments, the court shall take into consideration after a hearing, the income, resources, and reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor's dependents, any other payments to be made in satisfaction of judgments against the judgment debtor, and the amount due on the judgment in favor of the United States.
(b)
(c)
(2) An order may not be issued under subsection (a) with respect to any earnings of the debtor except nonexempt disposable earnings.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3205. Garnishment
(a)
(b)
(1)
(A) the judgment debtor's name, social security number (if known), and last known address;
(B) the nature and amount of the debt owed and the facts that not less than 30 days has elapsed since demand on the debtor for payment of the debt was made and the judgment debtor has not paid the amount due; and
(C) that the garnishee is believed to have possession of property (including nonexempt disposable earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest.
(2)
(A) If the property consists of a right to or share in the stock of an association or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for which a certificate of stock or other negotiable instrument is not outstanding, the corporation, or the president or treasurer of the association shall be the garnishee.
(B) If the property consists of an interest in a partnership interest, any partner other than the debtor shall be the garnishee on behalf of the partnership.
(C) If the property or a debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument for the payment of money, a negotiable document of title or a certificate of stock of an association or corporation, the instrument, document, or certificate shall be treated as property capable of delivery and the person holding it shall be the garnishee, except that—
(i) subject to clause (ii), in the case of a security which is transferable in the manner set forth in State law, the entity that carries on its books an account in the name of the debtor in which is reflected such security shall be the garnishee; and
(ii) notwithstanding clause (i), the pledgee shall be the garnishee if such security is pledged.
(c)
(1)
(2)
(A) The nature and amount of the debt, and any cost and interest owed with respect to the debt.
(B) The name and address of the garnishee.
(C) The name and address of counsel for the United States.
(D) The last known address of the judgment debtor.
(E) That the garnishee shall answer the writ within 10 days of service of the writ.
(F) That the garnishee shall withhold and retain any property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest and for which the garnishee is or may become indebted to the judgment debtor pending further order of the court.
(3)
(A) an instruction explaining the requirement that the garnishee submit a written answer to the writ; and
(B) instructions to the judgment debtor for objecting to the answer of the garnishee and for obtaining a hearing on the objections.
(4)
(A) whether the garnishee has custody, control or possession of such property;
(B) a description of such property and the value of such interest;
(C) a description of any previous garnishments to which such property is subject and the extent to which any remaining property is not exempt; and
(D) the amount of the debt the garnishee anticipates owing to the judgment debtor in the future and whether the period for payment will be weekly or another specified period.
The garnishee shall file the original answer with the court issuing the writ and serve a copy on the debtor and counsel for the United States.
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(B) Within 10 days after the garnishment terminates, the United States shall give a cumulative written accounting to the judgment debtor and garnishee of all property it receives under a writ of garnishment. Within 10 days after such accounting is received, the judgment debtor or garnishee may file a written objection to the accounting and a request for hearing. The party objecting shall state grounds for the objection. The court shall hold a hearing on the objection within 10 days after the court receives the request for a hearing, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
(10)
(A) a court order quashing the writ of garnishment;
(B) exhaustion of property in the possesion,1 custody, or control of the garnishee in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest (including nonexempt disposable earnings), unless the garnishee reinstates or reemploys the judgment debtor within 90 days after the judgment debtor's dismissal or resignation; or
(C) satisfaction of the debt with respect to which the writ is issued.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
1 So in original. Probably should be "possession,".
§3206. Discharge
A person who pursuant to an execution or order issued under this chapter by a court pays or delivers to the United States, a United States marshal, or a receiver, money or other personal property in which a judgment debtor has or will have an interest, or so pays a debt such person owes the judgment debtor, is discharged from such debt to the judgment debtor to the extent of the payment or delivery.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
SUBCHAPTER D—FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS INVOLVING DEBTS
1 So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.
§3301. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means—
(A) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities—
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(B) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than the person who holds securities—
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(C) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(D) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include—
(A) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(B) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(C) an interest in real property held in tenancy by the entirety, or as part of a community estate, to extent such interest is not subject to process by the United States holding a claim against only one tenant or co-owner.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Insider" includes—
(A) if the debtor is an individual—
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (ii); or
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation—
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (iv); or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership—
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (iii); or
(v) a person in control of the debtor.1
(D) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(E) a managing agent of the debtor.
(4) 2 "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common law lien, or a statutory lien.
(5) 3 "Relative" means an individual related, by consanguinity or adoption, within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual so related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined.
(6) 4 "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(7) 5 "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained in legal or equitable proceeding.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
2 So in original. Probably should be "(6)".
3 So in original. Probably should be "(7)".
4 So in original. Probably should be "(8)".
5 So in original. Probably should be "(9)".
§3302. Insolvency
(a)
(b)
(c)
(1) all of the partnership's assets; and
(2) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's non-partnership assets over the partner's non-partnership debts.
(d)
(e)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3303. Value for transfer or obligation
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3304. Transfer fraudulent as to a debt to the United States
(a)
(1)(A) the debtor makes the transfer or incurs the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and
(B) the debtor is insolvent at that time or the debtor becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation; or
(2)(A) the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time; and
(B) the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
(b)
(A) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; or
(B) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation if the debtor—
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) In determining actual intent under paragraph (1), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether—
(A) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(B) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(C) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(D) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(E) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(F) the debtor absconded;
(G) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(H) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(I) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(J) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(K) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3305. When transfer is made or obligation is incurred
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(1) A transfer is made—
(A) with respect to an asset that is real property (other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset), when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire, otherwise than under this subchapter, a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as approved in paragraph (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action or proceeding for relief under this subchapter, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action or proceeding.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred—
(A) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(B) if evidenced by a writing executed by the obligor, when such writing is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3306. Remedies of the United States
(a)
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the debt to the United States;
(2) a remedy under this chapter against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee; or
(3) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(b)
(1) under section 3304(b)(1)(A) within 6 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within 2 years after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
(2) under subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1)(B) of section 3304 within 6 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
(3) under section 3304(a)(2) within 2 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3307. Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee
(a)
(b)
(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(2) any subsequent transferee, other than a good faith transferee who took for value or any subsequent transferee of such good-faith transferee.
(c)
(d)
(1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(e)
(1) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(2) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code or its equivalent in effect in the State where the property is located.
(f)
(1) to the extent the insider gives new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer is made unless the new value is secured by a valid lien;
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or
(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured both present value given for that purpose and an antecedent debt of the debtor.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
§3308. Supplementary provision
Except as provided in this subchapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause shall apply to actions and proceedings under this subchapter.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, and applicable with respect to certain actions for debts owed the United States pending in court on that effective date, see section 3631 of
CHAPTER 178 —PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION
§3701. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter—
(1) the term "amateur sports organization" means—
(A) a person or governmental entity that sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more amateur athletes participate, or
(B) a league or association of persons or governmental entities described in subparagraph (A),
(2) the term "governmental entity" means a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an entity or organization, including an entity or organization described in section 4(5) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (
(3) the term "professional sports organization" means—
(A) a person or governmental entity that sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more professional athletes participate, or
(B) a league or association of persons or governmental entities described in subparagraph (A),
(4) the term "person" has the meaning given such term in
(5) the term "State" means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, or any territory or possession of the United States.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Constitutionality
For information regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of this chapter, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
§3702. Unlawful sports gambling
It shall be unlawful for—
(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Constitutionality
For information regarding constitutionality of par. (1) of this section, as added by section 2(a) of
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Jan. 1, 1993, see section 3 of
§3703. Injunctions
A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Jan. 1, 1993, see section 3 of
§3704. Applicability
(a) Section 3702 shall not apply to—
(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990;
(2) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity where both—
(A) such scheme was authorized by a statute as in effect on October 2, 1991; and
(B) a scheme described in section 3702 (other than one based on parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games) actually was conducted in that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning September 1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the law of that State or other governmental entity;
(3) a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme, other than a lottery described in paragraph (1), conducted exclusively in casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent that—
(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was authorized, not later than one year after the effective date of this chapter, to be operated in that municipality; and
(B) any commercial casino gaming scheme was in operation in such municipality throughout the 10-year period ending on such effective date pursuant to a comprehensive system of State regulation authorized by that State's constitution and applicable solely to such municipality; or
(4) parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), section 3702 shall apply on lands described in section 4(4) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The effective date of this chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A), is Jan. 1, 1993, see section 3 of
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Jan. 1, 1993, see section 3 of
CHAPTER 179 —JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS BY PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES
§3901. Civil actions
(a)
(b)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3902. Judicial review of regulations
In any proceeding under
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3903. Effect of failure to issue regulations
In any proceeding under
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3904. Expedited review of certain appeals
(a)
(b)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3905. Attorney's fees and interest
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Sections 706 and 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), are classified to sections 2000e–5 and 2000e–16, respectively, of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3906. Payments
A judgment, award, or compromise settlement against the United States under this chapter (including any interest and costs) shall be paid—
(1) under
(2) out of amounts otherwise appropriated or available to the office involved, if it arises out of an appeal from an administrative proceeding under
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3907. Other judicial review prohibited
Except as expressly authorized by this chapter and
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
§3908. Definitions
For purposes of applying this chapter, the terms "employing office" and "covered employee" have the meanings given those terms in
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of
CHAPTER 180 —ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
§4001. Assumption of contractual obligations related to transfers of rights in motion pictures
(a)
(A) the transferee knows or has reason to know at the time of the transfer that such collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture; or
(B) in the event of a court order confirming an arbitration award against the transferor under the collective bargaining agreement, the transferor does not have the financial ability to satisfy the award within 90 days after the order is issued.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), "knows or has reason to know" means any of the following:
(A) Actual knowledge that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture.
(B)(i) Constructive knowledge that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture, arising from recordation of a document pertaining to copyright in the motion picture under
(ii) Clause (i) applies only if the transfer referred to in subsection (a)(1) occurs—
(I) after the motion picture is completed, or
(II) before the motion picture is completed and—
(aa) within 18 months before the filing of an application for copyright registration for the motion picture under
(bb) if no such application is filed, within 18 months before the first publication of the motion picture in the United States.
(C) Awareness of other facts and circumstances pertaining to a particular transfer from which it is apparent that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture.
(b)
(c)
(1) a transfer of copyright ownership consisting solely of a mortgage, hypothecation, or other security interest; or
(2) a subsequent transfer of the copyright ownership secured by the security interest described in paragraph (1) by or under the authority of the secured party, including a transfer through the exercise of the secured party's rights or remedies as a secured party, or by a subsequent transferee.
The exclusion under this subsection shall not affect any rights or remedies under law or contract.
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
References in Text
The effective date of this chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (h), is Oct. 28, 1998. See Effective Date of 1998 Amendment note set out under
CHAPTER 181 —FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
1 So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.
§4101. Definitions
In this chapter:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(A) a United States citizen;
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that the speech that is the subject of the foreign defamation action was researched, prepared, or disseminated; or
(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, the United States.
(Added
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Findings
"(1) The freedom of speech and the press is enshrined in the first amendment to the Constitution, and is necessary to promote the vigorous dialogue necessary to shape public policy in a representative democracy.
"(2) Some persons are obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers, and in turn chilling the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States interest of the citizenry in receiving information on matters of importance, by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections to authors and publishers that are available in the United States, and suing a United States author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction.
"(3) These foreign defamation lawsuits not only suppress the free speech rights of the defendants to the suit, but inhibit other written speech that might otherwise have been written or published but for the fear of a foreign lawsuit.
"(4) The threat of the libel laws of some foreign countries is so dramatic that the United Nations Human Rights Committee examined the issue and indicated that in some instances the law of libel has served to discourage critical media reporting on matters of serious public interest, adversely affecting the ability of scholars and journalists to publish their work. The advent of the internet and the international distribution of foreign media also create the danger that one country's unduly restrictive libel law will affect freedom of expression worldwide on matters of valid public interest.
"(5) Governments and courts of foreign countries scattered around the world have failed to curtail this practice of permitting libel lawsuits against United States persons within their courts, and foreign libel judgments inconsistent with United States first amendment protections are increasingly common."
§4102. Recognition of foreign defamation judgments
(a)
(1)
(A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located; or
(B) even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication did not provide as much protection for freedom of speech and press as the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State, the party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located.
(2)
(b)
(1)
(2)
(c)
(1)
(2)
(d)
(e)
(1) affect the enforceability of any foreign judgment other than a foreign judgment for defamation; or
(2) limit the applicability of section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (
(Added
§4103. Removal
In addition to removal allowed under section 1441, any action brought in a State domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment for defamation in which—
(1) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;
(2) any plaintiff is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(3) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state,
may be removed by any defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending without regard to the amount in controversy between the parties.
(Added
§4104. Declaratory judgments
(a)
(1)
(2)
(b)
(Added
§4105. Attorneys' fees
In any action brought in a domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment for defamation, including any such action removed from State court to Federal court, the domestic court shall, absent exceptional circumstances, allow the party opposing recognition or enforcement of the judgment a reasonable attorney's fee if such party prevails in the action on a ground specified in section 4102(a), (b), or (c).
(Added
CHAPTER 190 —MISCELLANEOUS
§5001. Civil action for death or personal injury in a place subject to exclusive jurisdiction of United States
(a)
(b)
(Added
| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
|---|---|---|
| 5001 | Feb. 1, 1928, ch. 15, |
In subsection (a), the words "civil action" are substituted for "action" for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code.