CHAPTER 48A —TAIWAN ENHANCED RESILIENCE
SUBCHAPTER I—IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
SUBCHAPTER II—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
SUBCHAPTER III—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
SUBCHAPTER IV—SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN
SUBCHAPTER V—RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
SUBCHAPTER I—IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
§3351. Modernizing Taiwan's security capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression by the People's Republic of China
(a) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Taiwan security programs
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan's defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (
(c) Purpose
In addition to the purposes otherwise authorized for Foreign Military Financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act (
(1) to accelerate the modernization of capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's Liberation Army forces—
(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities;
(B) to blockade Taiwan; or
(C) to secure a lodgment on any islands administered by Taiwan and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and
(2) to prevent the People's Republic of China from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan's civilian and defense leadership.
(d) Regional contingency stockpile
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (h), not more than $100,000,000 may be used during each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to maintain a stockpile (if established pursuant to
(e) Availability of funds
(1) Annual spending plan
Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees describing how amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (h), if made available, would be used to achieve the purpose described in subsection (c).
(2) Certification
(A) In general
Amounts authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) are authorized to be made available after the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not later than 1 year after December 22, 2023, and not less than annually to the appropriate committees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan's defense spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting accounts in Taiwan's defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency).
(B) Waiver
The Secretary of State may waive the certification requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that for any given year—
(i) Taiwan is unable to increase its defense spending relative to its defense spending in its prior fiscal year due to severe hardship; and
(ii) making available the amounts authorized under subparagraph (A) is in the national interests of the United States.
(3) Remaining funds
Amounts authorized to be appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) that are not obligated and expended during such fiscal year shall be added to the amount that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.
(f) Annual report on advancing the defense of Taiwan
(1) Initial report
Concurrently with the first certification required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes steps taken to enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relationship and Taiwan's modernization of its defense capabilities.
(2) Matters to be included
Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People's Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;
(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counterintervention capabilities, including—
(i) long-range precision fires;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense systems;
(iii) anti-ship cruise missiles;
(iv) land-attack cruise missiles;
(v) coastal defense;
(vi) anti-armor;
(vii) undersea warfare, including manned and unmanned systems;
(viii) survivable swarming maritime assets;
(ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems;
(x) mining and countermining capabilities;
(xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;
(xii) command and control systems;
(xiii) defensive cybersecurity capabilities; and
(xiv) any other defense capabilities that the United States determines, including jointly with Taiwan, are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, consistent with the joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan created pursuant to
(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;
(D) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including—
(i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces;
(ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and
(iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;
(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan's reserve forces and All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces;
(F) an evaluation of—
(i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;
(ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and
(iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to address such shortages;
(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;
(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, satellite communications, and energy;
(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security and survivability of official civilian and military networks;
(J) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to improve the image and prestige of its defense forces among the population of Taiwan;
(K) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;
(L) a description of cooperative efforts between the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (K);
(M) a description of any challenge in Taiwan to—
(i) implement the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); or
(ii) United States support or engagement with regard to such matters;
(N) a description of actions taken to establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan pursuant to
(O) a description of actions taken to establish a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan, and the multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan, pursuant to
(P) the list compiled pursuant to
(3) Subsequent reports
Concurrently with subsequent certifications required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit updates to the initial report required under paragraph (1) that provides a description of changes and developments that occurred in the prior year.
(4) Form
The reports required under paragraphs (1) and (3) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(5) Sharing of summary
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly share any unclassified portions of the reports, pursuant to paragraph (4), with Taiwan, as appropriate.
(g) Foreign military financing loan and loan guarantee authority
(1) Direct loans
(A) In general
Notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (
(B) Maximum obligations
Gross obligations for the principal amounts of loans authorized under subparagraph (A) may not exceed $2,000,000,000.
(C) Source of funds
(i) Defined term
In this subparagraph, the term "cost"—
(I) has the meaning given such term in
(II) shall include the cost of modifying a loan authorized under subparagraph (A); and
(III) may include the costs of selling, reducing, or cancelling any amounts owed to the United States or to any agency of the United States.
(ii) In general
Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (g) may be made available to pay for the cost of loans authorized under subparagraph (A).
(D) Fees authorized
(i) In general
The Government of the United States may charge processing and origination fees for a loan made pursuant to subparagraph (A), not to exceed the cost to the Government of making such loan, which shall be collected from borrowers through a financing account (as defined in
(ii) Limitation on fee payments
Amounts made available under any appropriations Act for any fiscal year may not be used to pay any fees associated with a loan authorized under subparagraph (A).
(E) Repayment
Loans made pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be repaid not later than 12 years after the loan is received by the borrower, including a grace period of not more than 1 year on repayment of principal.
(F) Interest
(i) In general
Notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (
(ii) Treatment of loan amounts used to pay interest
Amounts made available under this paragraph for interest costs shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any statutory limitation on assistance to a country.
(2) Loan guarantees
(A) In general
Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (g) may be made available for the costs of loan guarantees for Taiwan under section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (
(B) Maximum amounts
A loan guarantee authorized under subparagraph (A)—
(i) may not guarantee a loan that exceeds $2,000,000,000; and
(ii) may not exceed 80 percent of the loan principal with respect to any single borrower.
(C) Subordination
Any loan guaranteed pursuant to subparagraph (A) may not be subordinated to—
(i) another debt contracted by the borrower; or
(ii) any other claims against the borrower in the case of default.
(D) Repayment
Repayment in United States dollars of any loan guaranteed under this paragraph shall be required not later than 12 years after the loan agreement is signed.
(E) Fees
Notwithstanding section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (
(F) Treatments of loan guarantees
Amounts made available under this paragraph for the costs of loan guarantees authorized under subparagraph (A) shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any statutory limitation on assistance to a country.
(3) Notification requirement
Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection may not be expended without prior notification of the appropriate committees of Congress.
(h) Authorization of appropriations
(1) Authorization of appropriations
In addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan Foreign Military Finance grant assistance up to $2,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2027.
(2) Training and education
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State should use not less than $2,000,000 per fiscal year for one or more blanket order Foreign Military Financing training programs related to the defense needs of Taiwan.
(3) Direct commercial contracting
The Secretary of State may use amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) for the procurement of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services that are not sold by the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act (
(4) Procurement in Taiwan
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing and made available for Taiwan, not more than 15 percent of the amount made available for each fiscal year may be available for the procurement by Taiwan in Taiwan of defense articles and defense services, including research and development, as agreed by the United States and Taiwan.
(i) Sunset provision
Assistance may not be provided under this section after September 30, 2032.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is
The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsecs. (c) and (h)(3), is
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (e)(2)(A).
Subsec. (f)(2)(N) to (P).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Short Title
Military Cybersecurity Cooperation With Taiwan
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
"(2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
"(3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and
"(4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) A description of the feasibility and advisability of cooperating with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan on the defensive military cybersecurity activities identified pursuant to subsection (b).
"(B) An identification of any challenges and resources that would be needed to addressed to conduct such cooperative activities.
"(C) An overview of efforts undertaken pursuant to this section.
"(D) Any other matters the Secretary determines relevant.
"(d)
"(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."
Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
"(1) the United States' one China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (
"(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;
"(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;
"(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;
"(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, including by—
"(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy;
"(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
"(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
"(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (
"(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
"(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
"(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
"(E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its ability to employ military capabilities in asymmetric ways, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
"(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and
"(6) the United States should increase its support to a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise."
"(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (
"(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;
"(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;
"(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;
"(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, including by—
"(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy;
"(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
"(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
"(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (
"(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
"(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
"(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
"(E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its ability to employ military capabilities in asymmetric ways, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
"(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and
"(6) the United States should increase its support to a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise."
§3352. Establishment
Subject to
(
§3353. International military education and training cooperation with Taiwan
(a) In general
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—
(1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan;
(2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership between the militaries of the United States and Taiwan, and foster understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan;
(3) improve Taiwan's defense capabilities; and
(4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights.
(b) Elements
The training program required by subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.
(c) Authorization of participation of Taiwan in the International Military Education and Training program
The Secretary of State is authorized to provide training and education to relevant entities in Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training program authorized under
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (c), is
1 So in original. Probably should be "seq.)."
§3354. Use of Special Defense Acquisition Fund
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in text, is
§3355. Multi-year plan to fulfill defensive requirements of military forces of Taiwan
(a) Multi-year plan
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall engage for the purposes of establishing a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined training, exercises, and planning activities consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (
(b) Elements
The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive military capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan that are required to—
(A) allow Taiwan to respond effectively to aggression by the People's Liberation Army or other actors from the People's Republic of China; and
(B) advance a strategy of denial, reduce the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and mitigate other risks to the United States and Taiwan.
(2) An assessment of the relative priority assigned by appropriate departments and agencies of Taiwan to include its military to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(4) A description and justification of the relative importance of overcoming each identified capability gap and capacity shortfall for deterring, delaying, or defeating military aggression by the People's Republic of China; 1
(5) An assessment of—
(A) the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by Taiwan; and
(B) the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely by Taiwan.
(6) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (5)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by—
(A) the Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales programs of the Department of State;
(B) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by
(C) Department of State training and education programs authorized by
(D) section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (
(E) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (
(F) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.
(7) A description of United States or Taiwan engagement with other countries that could assist in addressing in a sufficient and timely manner the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(8) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and shared situational awareness between the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined training, exercises, and planning events, including—
(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign;
(B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary;
(C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary;
(D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and
(E) any other combined training, exercises, or planning with Taiwan's military forces that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State consider relevant.
(9) An identification of options for the United States to use, to the maximum extent practicable, existing authorities or programs to expedite military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict, including—
(A) a list of defense articles of the United States that may be transferred to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict;
(B) a list of authorities that may be used to provide expedited military assistance to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict;
(C) an assessment of methods that could be used to deliver such assistance to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict, including—
(i) the feasibility of employing such methods in different scenarios; and
(ii) recommendations for improving the ability of the Armed Forces to deliver such assistance to Taiwan; and
(D) an assessment of any challenges in providing such assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict and recommendations for addressing such challenges.
(c) Recurrence
The joint consultative mechanism required in subsection (a) shall convene on a recurring basis and not less than annually.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (b)(6)(C), is
The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(6)(E), is
1 So in original. The semicolon probably should be a period.
§3356. Fast-tracking sales to Taiwan under foreign military sales program
(a) Preclearance of certain foreign military sales items
(1) In general
Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in conjunction with coordinating entities such as the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and other appropriate entities, shall compile a list of available and emerging military platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales program.
(2) Rules of construction
(A) Selection of items
The list compiled pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be construed as limiting the type, timing, or quantity of items that may be requested by, or sold to, Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program.
(B) Notifications required
Nothing in this chapter may be construed to supersede congressional notification requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (
(b) Prioritized processing of foreign military sales requests from Taiwan
(1) Requirement
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall prioritize and expedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not delay the processing of requests for bundling purposes.
(2) Duration
The requirement under paragraph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.
(c) Interagency policy
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, including incorporating the preclearance provisions of this section.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B), was in the original "this Act", meaning
The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B), is
§3357. Findings and statement of policy
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1) Advancing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific has been a central element of United States foreign policy toward the region.
(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan's future.
(3) To secure United States interests and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan's diplomatic, economic, and territorial space.
(b) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and
(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability.
(
§3357a. Statement of policy on Taiwan
(a) Statement of policy
Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (
(b) Fait accompli defined
In this section, the term "fait accompli" refers to the resort to force by the People's Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (
1 So in original. The period probably should not appear.
§3357b. Establishment of training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for military forces of Taiwan
Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in text, is
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, and not as part of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which comprises this chapter.
SUBCHAPTER II—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
§3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party's "United Front" work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
(b) Elements
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People's Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—
(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan's public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan's ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda.
(
§3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People's Republic of China
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;
(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC's coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable;
(3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC's coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and
(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness.
(b) Establishment of Task Force
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the President shall establish an interagency task force to be known as the "Countering Economic Coercion Task Force" (referred to in this section as the "Task Force").
(c) Duties
(1) In general
The Task Force shall—
(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include—
(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—
(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;
(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and
(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and
(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and
(iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices;
(B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such practices and establishing long-term deterrence of such practices;
(C) effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic practices, on concerns related to such practices; and
(D) develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such PRC coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector.
(2) Consultation
In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector.
(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force.
(C) United States allies and partners.
(d) Membership
The President shall—
(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;
(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and
(3) determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the task force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.
(e) Reports
(1) Initial report
Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce other governments and non-PRC companies (including United States companies) including the Government of the PRC's continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law.
(B) The strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).
(C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive economic practices that captures both—
(i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC coercive economic practices; and
(ii) the inappropriate use of economic tools, including those authorized under the laws and regulations of the PRC.
(D) A comprehensive review of the array of tools the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the government, companies, and other entities of the United States or its allies and partners.
(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral—
(i) preemptive practices to defend or deter against PRC coercive economic practices; and
(ii) actions taken in response to the Government of the PRC's general use of coercive economic practices, including the imposition of costs on the PRC.
(F) An assessment of United States allies and partners key vulnerabilities to PRC coercive economic practices.
(G) A description of gaps in existing resources or capabilities for United States Government departments and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive economic practices directed at United States entities and assist United States allies and partners in their responses to PRC coercive economic practices.
(H) An analysis of the circumstances under which the PRC employs different types of economic coercion and against what kinds of targets.
(I) An assessment of United States and international rules and norms as well as any treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, circumvented, or broken through its economically coercive practices and the United States response in each instance.
(2) Interim reports
(A) First interim report
Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(i) Updates to information required by subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).
(ii) A description of activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).
(iii) An assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year and planned changes to the strategy.
(B) Second interim report
Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by subparagraph (A) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes an update to the elements required under the report required by subparagraph (A).
(3) Final report
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a final report that includes the following elements:
(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic practices and the cost of such coercive practices to United States businesses.
(B) A description of areas of possible vulnerability for United States businesses and businesses of United States partners and allies.
(C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort to counter PRC coercive economic practices, including through further coordination with United States allies and partners.
(D) Illustrative examples.
(4) Form
The reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
(f) Sunset
(1) In general
The Task Force shall terminate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final report required by subsection (e)(3) is submitted to Congress.
(2) Additional actions
The Task force 1 may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning the final report required by subsection (e)(3).
(g) Assistance for countries and entities targeted by the People's Republic of China for economic coercion
The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide appropriate assistance to countries and entities that are subject to coercive economic practices by the People's Republic of China.
(
1 So in original. Probably should be capitalized.
§3363. China censorship monitor and action group
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Qualified research entity
The term "qualified research entity" means an entity that—
(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a Federally funded research and development center;
(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under subsection (c); and
(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with—
(i) the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
(iii) any company incorporated in the People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; or
(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People's Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People's Republic of China.
(3) United States person
The term "United States person" means—
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group
(1) In general
The President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the "China Censorship Monitor and Action Group" (referred to in this subsection as the "Task Force").
(2) Membership
The President shall take the following actions with respect to the membership of, and participation in, the Task Force:
(A) Appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council.
(B) Appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council.
(C) Determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the Task Force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.
(3) Responsibilities
The Task Force shall—
(A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People's Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; and
(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 120 days after December 23, 2022.
(4) Meetings
The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.
(5) Consultations
The Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—
(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task Force;
(B) independent agencies of the United States Government that are not represented on the Task Force;
(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and
(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(6) Reporting requirements
(A) Annual report
The Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes, with respect to the reporting period—
(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and intimidation of United States persons while in the United States or any of its possessions or territories, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in clause (i); and
(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of such activities on the national interests of the United States.
(B) Form of report
Each report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
(C) Congressional briefings
Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).
(c) Report on censorship and intimidation of United States persons by the Government of the People's Republic of China
(1) Report
(A) In general
Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement with a qualified research entity that is independent of the Department of State to write a report on censorship and intimidation in the United States and its possessions and territories of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(B) Matters to be included
The report required under subparagraph (A) shall—
(i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of the Government of the People's Republic of China's efforts to direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech;
(ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the impact on and consequences for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, that criticize—
(I) the Chinese Communist Party;
(II) the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(III) the authoritarian model of government of the People's Republic of China; or
(IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(iii) identify the implications for the United States of the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii);
(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy of the efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to limit freedom of expression in the private sector, including media, social media, film, education, travel, financial services, sports and entertainment, technology, telecommunication, and internet infrastructure interests;
(v) include policy recommendations for the United States Government, including recommendations regarding collaboration with United States allies and partners, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China; and
(vi) include policy recommendations for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in China, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(C) Applicability to United States allies and partners
To the extent practicable, the report required under subparagraph (A) should identify implications and policy recommendations that are relevant to United States allies and partners facing censorship and intimidation directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(2) Submission of report
(A) In general
Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of State shall submit the report written by the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate congressional committees.
(B) Publication
The report referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.
(d) Sunset
This section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after December 23, 2022.
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SUBCHAPTER III—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
§3371. Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.
(2) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO), as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.
(3) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018, and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the eleventh busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 2013.
(4) United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.
(
§3372. Strategy to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—
(1) to advance Taiwan"s 1 meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations (IOs); and
(2) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its "One-China Principle", with respect to Taiwan.
(b) Matters to be included
The strategy required under subsection (a) should include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its "One-China Principle." The methods should include those employed against governments, IOs, and civil society organizations. The assessment should also include pressure on commercial actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context of Taiwan's meaningful participation in IOs.
(2) An assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become public or private partners in the strategy.
(3) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as practicable, to identify IOs that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan's participation.
(4) A plan to expand economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, in accordance with United States interests.
(5) A survey of IOs that have allowed Taiwan's meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan's engagement has occurred within those organizations and how Taiwan's participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity of these organizations, thereby providing positive models for Taiwan's inclusion in other similar forums.
(6) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which the United States Government will prioritize for using its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation over the three-year period following December 23, 2022. The list should be derived from the IOs identified in paragraph (3).
(7) A description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the United States Government plans to develop to implement paragraph (6).
(c) Form of report
The strategy required in subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an unclassified summary.
(d) Support for meaningful participation
The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other relevant United States officials shall actively support Taiwan's meaningful participation in all appropriate international organizations.
(
1 So in original. Probably should be "Taiwan's".
§3373. Meaningful participation of Taiwan in the International Civil Aviation Organization
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should allow Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the organization, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;
(2) Taiwan is a global leader and hub for international aviation, with a range of expertise, information, and resources and the fifth busiest airport in Asia (Taoyuan International Airport), and its meaningful participation in ICAO would significantly enhance the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation; and
(3) coercion by the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China has ensured the systematic exclusion of Taiwan from meaningful participation in ICAO, significantly undermining the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation.
(b) Plan for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Transportation, is authorized—
(1) to initiate a United States plan to secure Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and
(2) to instruct the United States representative to the ICAO to—
(A) use the voice and vote of the United States to ensure Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and
(B) seek to secure a vote at the next ICAO triennial assembly session on the question of Taiwan's participation in that session.
(c) Report concerning Taiwan's meaningful participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization
Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter for the following 6 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives an unclassified report that—
(1) describes the United States plan to ensure Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;
(2) includes an account of the efforts made by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to ensure Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and
(3) identifies the steps the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce will take in the next year to ensure Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms.
(
SUBCHAPTER IV—SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN
§3381. Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Taiwan Relations Act (
(2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (
(3) The creation of a United States fellowship program with Taiwan would support—
(A) a key priority of expanding people-to-people exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy;
(B) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment to Taiwan, "a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner", as expressed in his March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and
(C) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State based on a review required under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF of
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in par. (1), is
The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, referred to in par. (2), is
The Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020, referred to in par. (3)(C), is subtitle B (§§311–315) of
§3382. Purposes
The purposes of this subchapter are—
(1) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan strategic partnership and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials of any agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin and placement as Fellows in a Taiwanese civic institution;
(2) to provide for eligible United States personnel—
(A) to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese language skills; and
(B) to expand their understanding of the political economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) to better position the United States to advance its economic, security, and human rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.
(
§3383. Definitions
In this subchapter:
(1) Agency head
The term "agency head" means, in the case of the executive branch of United States Government or a legislative branch agency described in paragraph (2), the head of the respective agency.
(2) Agency of the United States Government
The term "agency of the United States Government" includes the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service of the legislative branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch.
(3) Appropriate committees of Congress
The term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(4) Detailee
The term "detailee" means—
(A) an employee of an agency of the United States Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a change of position from the agency at which the employee is employed; and
(B) a legislative branch employee from the Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, or the Congressional Research Service.
(5) Implementing partner
The term "implementing partner" means any United States organization described in
(A) performs logistical, administrative, and other functions, as determined by the Department of State and the American Institute of Taiwan in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and
(B) enters into a cooperative agreement with the American Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
(6) Program
The term "Program" means the Taiwan Fellowship Program established pursuant to
(
§3384. Taiwan Fellowship Program
(a) Establishment
The Secretary of State shall establish the Taiwan Fellowship Program (referred to in this section as the "Program") to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 years for eligible United States citizens. The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.
(b) Cooperative agreement
(1) In general
The American Institute in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated pursuant to
(2) Fellowships
The Department of State or the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with, as appropriate, the implementing partner, should award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—
(A) approximately 5 fellowships during the first 2 years of the Program; and
(B) approximately 10 fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.
(c) American Institution 1 in Taiwan agreement; implementing partner
Not later than 30 days after December 23, 2022, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, should—
(1) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of Taiwan; and
(2) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—
(A) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and
(B) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.
(d) Curriculum
(1) First year
During the first year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow should study—
(A) the Mandarin Chinese language;
(B) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and
(C) the issues affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Second year
During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this chapter, should work in—
(A) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of Taiwan; or
(B) an organization outside the public sector in Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow is or had been employed.
(e) Program requirements
(1) Eligibility requirements
A United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section if the citizen—
(A) is an employee of the United States Government;
(B) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his or her current United States Government role within at least the last three years prior to beginning the fellowship;
(C) has at least 2 years of experience in any branch of the United States Government;
(D) has a demonstrated professional or educational background in the relationship between the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(E) has demonstrated his or her commitment to further service in the United States Government.
(2) Responsibilities of fellows
Each recipient of a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—
(A) to maintain satisfactory progress in language training and appropriate behavior in Taiwan, consistent with United States Government policy toward Taiwan, as determined by the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its implementing partner;
(B) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf of the United States Government; and
(C) to continue Federal Government employment for a period of not less than 4 years after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not less than 2 years for a fellowship that is 1 year or shorter.
(3) Responsibilities of implementing partner
(A) Selection of fellows
The implementing partner, with the concurrence of the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall—
(i) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the diversity of the United States;
(ii) select fellows for the Taiwan Fellowship Program based solely on merit, with appropriate supervision from the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and
(iii) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve in a fellowship lasting 1 year or longer.
(B) First year
The implementing partner should provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan for those who are not serving a 2-year fellowship) with—
(i) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and
(ii) courses in the politics, culture, and history of Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.
(C) Waiver of first-year training
The Department of State, in coordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required under paragraph (2) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin language skills, knowledge of the topic described in subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other related reasons approved by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are waived for a fellow serving a 2-year fellowship, the training portion of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.
(D) Office; staffing
The implementing partner, in consultation with the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, may maintain an office and at least 1 full-time staff member in Taiwan—
(i) to liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and institutions of Taiwan; and
(ii) to serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the recipients of fellowships under this subchapter and their dependents.
(E) Other functions
The implementing partner may perform other functions in association with support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program, including logistical and administrative functions, as prescribed by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
(4) Noncompliance
(A) In general
Any fellow who fails to comply with the requirements under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan, or the appropriate United States Government agency for—
(i) the Federal funds expended for the fellow's participation in the fellowship, as set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C); and
(ii) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing rate).
(B) Full reimbursement
Any fellow who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan, or the appropriate United States Government agency, in an amount equal to the sum of—
(i) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow's participation in the fellowship; and
(ii) interest on the amount specified in subparagraph (A), which shall be calculated at the prevailing rate.
(C) Pro rata reimbursement
Any fellow who violates subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan, or the appropriate United States Government agency, in an amount equal to the difference between—
(i) the amount specified in subparagraph (B); and
(ii) the product of—
(I) the amount the fellow received in compensation during the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any allowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by
(II) the percentage of the period specified in paragraph (2)(C) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the Federal Government.
(f) Flexible fellowship duration
Notwithstanding any requirement under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of less than 2 years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under subsection (d) for such purposes.
(g) Sunset
The fellowship program under this subchapter shall terminate 7 years after December 23, 2022.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (d)(2), was in the original "this subtitle", meaning subtitle A (§§5501–5540) of
1 So in original. Probably should be "Institute".
§3385. Reports and audits
(a) Annual report
Not later than 90 days after the selection of the first class of fellows under this subchapter, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the Department of State shall offer to brief the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the following issues:
(1) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this subchapter.
(2) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of the United States.
(3) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agencies of Taiwan, and nongovernmental institutions to which each fellow was assigned during the second year of the fellowship.
(4) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the Taiwan Fellowship Program, including added flexibilities in the administration of the program.
(5) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellowship Program's value upon the relationship between the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian countries.
(b) Annual financial audit
(1) In general
The financial records of any implementing partner shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards by independent certified public accountants or independent licensed public accountants who are certified or licensed by a regulatory authority of a State or another political subdivision of the United States.
(2) Location
Each audit under paragraph (1) shall be conducted at the place or places where the financial records of the implementing partner are normally kept.
(3) Access to documents
The implementing partner shall make available to the accountants conducting an audit under paragraph (1)—
(A) all books, financial records, files, other papers, things, and property belonging to, or in use by, the implementing partner that are necessary to facilitate the audit; and
(B) full facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or securities held by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians.
(4) Report
(A) In general
Not later than 270 days after the end of each fiscal year, the implementing partner shall provide a report of the audit conducted for such fiscal year under paragraph (1) to the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
(B) Contents
Each audit report shall—
(i) set forth the scope of the audit;
(ii) include such statements, along with the auditor's opinion of those statements, as may be necessary to present fairly the implementing partner's assets and liabilities, surplus or deficit, with reasonable detail;
(iii) include a statement of the implementing partner's income and expenses during the year; and
(iv) include a schedule of—
(I) all contracts and cooperative agreements requiring payments greater than $5,000; and
(II) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at a rate greater than $5,000 per year.
(C) Copies
Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient copies for distribution to the public.
(
§3386. Taiwan fellows on detail from Government service
(a) In general
(1) Detail authorized
With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than 2 years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this subchapter, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to Taiwan or an organization described in
(2) Agreement
Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—
(A) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least 4 years (or at least 2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year or shorter) unless the detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and
(B) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan, or the United States Government agency, as appropriate, any additional expenses incurred by the Federal Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.
(3) Exception
The payment agreed to under paragraph (2)(B) may not be required from a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Government unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee before the effective date of entry into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.
(b) Status as Government employee
A detailee—
(1) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;
(2) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to comply with
(3) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in
(A) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or
(B) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any foreign government by such detailee.
(c) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency
(1) In general
The Federal agency from which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—
(A) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
(B) a cost of living allowance to cover any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;
(C) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;
(D) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fellow's minor children with educational services ordinarily provided without charge by public schools in the United States;
(E) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fellow and his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and
(F) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow's immediate family.
(2) Modification of benefits
The American Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of State, may modify the benefits set forth in paragraph (1) if such modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.
(d) No financial liability
The American Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and Taiwan or non-public sector entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.
(e) Reimbursement
Fellows may be detailed under subsection (a)(1) without reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.
(f) Allowances and benefits
Detailees may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in subsection (c).
(
§3387. Funding
(a) Authorization of appropriations
There are authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute in Taiwan—
(1) for fiscal year 2023, $2,900,000, of which—
(A) $500,000 should be used to launch the Taiwan Fellowship Program through a competitive cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner;
(B) $2,300,000 should be used to fund a cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner; and
(C) $100,000 should be used for management expenses of the American Institute in Taiwan related to the management of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and
(2) for fiscal year 2024, and each succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000, of which—
(A) $2,300,000 should be used for a cooperative agreement to the appropriate implementing partner; and
(B) $100,000 should be used for management expenses of the American Institute in Taiwan related to the management of the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
(b) Private sources
The implementing partner selected to implement the Taiwan Fellowship Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out such program, subject to the review and approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.
(
§3388. Supporting United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan
(a) Establishment of the United States-Taiwan cultural exchange foundation
The Secretary of State should consider establishing an independent nonprofit entity that—
(1) is dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and the future leaders of the United States; and
(2) works with State and local school districts and educational institutions to send high school and university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other relevant subjects.
(b) Partner
State and local school districts and educational institutions, including public universities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States to establish programs to promote more educational and cultural exchanges.
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SUBCHAPTER V—RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
§3391. Rule of construction
Nothing in this chapter may be construed—
(1) to restore diplomatic relations with the Republic of China; or
(2) to alter the United States Government's position with respect to the international status of the Republic of China.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this subtitle", meaning subtitle A (§§5501–5540) of
§3392. Rule of construction regarding the use of military force
Nothing in this chapter may be construed as authorizing the use of military force or the introduction of United States forces into hostilities.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this title", and was translated as reading "this subtitle", meaning subtitle A (§§5501–5540) of